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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
Summer List 23, Sheet 2
No. 80-15

Cert to CA10 (en bane)
(Logan; McKay, concurring;
~ and Barrett, dissenting)

AMOCO PRODUCTION CO., ET AL.

v.
JICARILLA APACHE TRIBE, ET AL.

Federal/Civil

'Timely

Please refer to the memo in Merrion, et al. v. Jicarilla
Apache Tribe, et al.,
8/25/80

No. 80-11.

Smith

Opn. in app. to petn.
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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM

-·

Summer List 23, Sheet 2
No. 80-11

Cert to CA10 ~n bane) )
(Logan; McKay, concurring;
Seth and Barrett, dissenting)
~-----

MERRION, ET AL.

v.
JICARILLA APACHE TRIBE, ET AL.

Federal/Civil

No. 80-15

Same

Timely

AMOCO PRODUCTION CO., ET AL.

v.
JICARILLA APACHE TRIBE, ET AL.
1.

companies,

SUMMARY:
~rgue

Petrs,

Same
vari_ous

Same
large

-

and

that the CA10 should not have upheld

small
the_po~

oil
of

/

.a New Mexico Indian tribe to tax production of oil and gas on its

2.
reservation.
/

2.

FACTS AND DECISION BELOW:

Petrs are all non-Indian

-

producers of oil and gas that operate wells on the reservation of
the Jicarilla Apaches under leases with the tribe.

These leases

provide for the payment of royalties to the tribe.

In 1976,

the

tribal council passed an ordinance imposing a "severance tax" on
"any oil and natural gas severed,

saved and removed from Tribal ·

tax was · imposed in
--------

lands."

This

addition

to

authorized tax imposed by the state of New Mexico.

'--

~

,.,_,

which

-

-----------

~proved

was

by

the

~

fe

rally

..-

~

Secretary

of

the

The ordinance,
Interior,

also

contained a provision consenting to the jurisdiction of the United
States District Court for actions concerning the tax.
Two suits were brought challenging this ordinance, naming
the tribe and the Secretary of the Interior as defendants.
were consolidated for trial.

The DC held the ordinance invalid on

(1) that the statute authorizing state taxation

several grounds:
of oil and gas

These

production on reservations,

25 U.S. C.

398 (c),

§

gave an exclusive right to the states, (2) that the tax imposes a
multiple

burden

discriminates

on

interstate

against

interstate

commerce,
commerce,

(3 )

and

that

the

tax

{4)

that

the

sovereignty of the tribe does not include the power to impose this
tax.
On appeal,

the~

10 en bane reversed by a vote of 5-2.

After dealing with certain jurisdictional issues not raised here,
the

court

sovereignty

.

rejected
issue

each
of
.

the DC' s

first, · the

court

arguments.
stated

that

Discussing
Indian

the

tribes

retain all sovereign powers not relinquished by treaty or divested

by statute and not inconsistent with the superior interests of the
(_~

United States as a sovereign, citing Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe, 435
313

u.s.

(1978).

191

(1978) and United States v. Wheeler, 435

u.s.

It concluded that the power to tax even nonmembers

when they engage

in energy production on the reservation is not

inconsistent with any federal interest.

It rejected the argument

that taxes can only be imposed as conditions on the right to enter ·
the reservation, a right that the tribe here had already conveyed
through leases.
As for the commerce clause arguments, the court rejected
the notion that it was discriminatory for the tribe to impose its
tax only on oil and gas leaving the reservation.
be wasteful,
o'f'/any

('-

the court reasoned,

products

destined

to

stay

for the tribe
on

the

It would simply
to

impose a

reservation.

tax

A second

discrimination claim--that the tax imposed a burden on interstate
commerce because 80% of the production left New Mexico--was also
rejected on the basis of the "settled" rule that the severing of
mineral resources is a "local activity properly subject to local
taxation."

The court found the "multiple taxation" argument to be

flawed because even though the tribe and the state both tax this
production, this is not a case where a tax burden is being added
merely because a commodity is in interstate commerce.
Finally the court considered the effect of 25 ·

u.s.c.

§

398c, a 1927 enactment that authorizes the state to impose its tax
on oil and gas production on the reservation.

The same statute

gave the Indians exclusive royalties, but the CA10 was unconvinced

. ..,.._...

I

that Congress intended the taxing power to belong exclusively to

4.
the state.
Judge

McKay's

concurrence,

mainly

a

response

to

Chief

Judge Seth's dissent, discusses the history of New Mexic6 and the
Apaches and defends the concept of limited Indian sovereignty.
Chief Judge Seth uses the history of the Jicarillas to
argue that they never possessed true sovereignty because they were
merely a disorganized nomadic group.
of Guadalupe-Hidalgo,
this

country,

would

have

did

held

in which Mexico ceded the Western lands to

not reserve any
that

He asserts that the treaty

the

concept

sovereignty
of

Indian

for

Indians.

sovereignty

He

really

means nothing more than self-determination and does not extend to
this kind of tax.
in dissent

Judge Barrett

------

sovereignty,

but

nonmembers.

He

argued
also

that

stated

it

accepted the notion of Indian
~~
does ...to" extend to taxation of

~"

that his

review of

the

legislative

history of § 398c convinced him that Congress did intend to give
an exclusive power of taxation to the states, while allowing the
tribes

to

collect

He

royal ties.

would

also

have

accepted

the

commerce clause arguments made by ' petrs.
3. CONTENTIONS:

Petrs argue in their two petitions that

---

this is an exceptionally important case in light of the nation's
energy

needs

and

the

number

involving similar taxes.

of

cases

pending

in

lower

courts

Five states and at least one tribe filed

amicus briefs in the CA10.
Petrs allege a conflict with the Court's recent decision
in

Washington

Reservation,
l
I

v.
No.

Confed e rated
78-630

(June

Tribes
10,

of

1980).

the
In

Colville

Indian

Colville,

the

?

cigarette

taxes

important

federal

regulation.

upheld,

unlike

the

interests or

Section

398c

tax here,

did

not

implicate

intrude on , cornprehens i ve

was

a

carefully

drafted

federal

compromise

giving the royalties to the Indians and the power to tax to the
This tax has upset that balance.

states.

Moreover there is an

entire federal statutory scheme here that implicitly preempts this
tax ordinance.
In

addition,

the

idea of Indian sovereignty should not

apply here because it is premised solely on the right to exclude
people from the reservation, a right that cannot support the tax
at issue.

If Indians do have genuine governmental authority over

nonmembers,

then constitutional

constraints must

actions, and the Court should so hold.

apply to

their

Finally; the Court should

act to correct this rnanifest )P urden on interstate commerce.
the v(G argues

In response,
plainly

correct

and

does

not

that the CA 10 's decision is

merit

review.

Colville

only

reinforced the legal principle that tribe's possess the power to
tax.

No dist-inction can be drawn between this

reservation"
Section

and

398c,

other

while

reservations

authorizing

"executive order

established

state

taxation,

by

treaty.

does

not

taxation by the tribes and we should not infer such an intent.
for

the

Commerce

Clause,

it probably does

not

apply

to

bar
As

tribal

actions any more than the Bill Of Rights, which has been held to
be inapplicable.

See Wheeler,

supra.

Moreover commerce clearly

is not burdened here in any event.
· 4. DISCUSSION:
the CA10's

decision,

Colville, which of course carne down after

does

contain

a

strong

affirmation

of

the

6.
"acknowledged

tribal

power

to

non-~ndians

tax

reservation to engage in economic activity."
possible

to

argue,

as

Chief Judge

Seth

entering

the

Thus it is no longer

did

below,

that

Indian

sovereignty is strictly limited to the governance of members of
the

tribe.

Because

conflict with

any

this

particular

essential

aspect

tax

of

does

federal

not

appear

sovereignty,

to
the

"'

V CA 10 's view has strong support.
But

the

preemption under

case
§

does

raise

more

specific

398 and burdens on commerce.

issues

of

These appear to

be substantial,

and the case itself is clearly impor:tant, but I

would

a denial on

recommend

the ground

that

this

is

the

first

circuit court decision in this area and · more are likely soon.

If

a conflict develops, the argument ~or review by this Court will be
stronger.
There is a response.
8/24/80

Smith

Opn. in apps. to petns.

September 29, 1980
Court ................... .

Voted on ..... ............ , 19 .. .

Argued ................... , 19 .. .

Assigned .................. , 19 . . .

Submitted ................ , 19 . . .

Announced ................ , 19 ...
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Marshall, J ........................ .~'t • .•••.••••••.....
Blackmun, J .......................~ ................ .
Powell, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .....
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Rehnquist, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............... .
Stevens, J .................. ...
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NOT VOTING

lfp/ss

3/23/81

80-11} Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe
80-15} Amoco Production Co. v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe
80-581 Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana
The above cases involve multiple parties,
primarily oil companies and coal companies.

The

Commonwealth Edison case also involves a number of electric
utility companies.
I have checked the briefs in these cases,
'

carefully I believe, and I find no party, subsidiary or
affiliate in which we own any interest.

Moreover, we own no

stock in any of the major oil companies nor any coal
company.

The Ethyl Corporation owns a small acreage of coal

land (in west Virginia} through a subsidiary, that is leased
to some ·producing company.

I consider this too remote and

negligible to disqualify, particularly since neither Ethyl
nor its sub is a party.

L.F.P., Jr.

cc:

My Clerks:

In cases such as the above, I would

particularly like each of you to exercise care when you
review the briefs.

The foregoing cases are Greg's, and I

----

would like for him to double check my own examination.

-----------------------~-----------·~----------------------------------------~~-o~--~---

Apache Tribe

Question Presented
This

case

involves

a

tax

imposed

by

the

Jicarilla Apache Tribe upon the serverance of oil and gas

2.

from trust property on its reservation.

The questions are

(1) whether the Tribe has an inherent sovereign power to
impose

the

tax?

~

whether

Congress

has

divested

the

Tribe of such a power by authorizing the States to impose

'249

their own severance taxes? and (3) whether the Tribe's tax
violates the Commerce Clause?

~

Background
The
reservation

Jicarilla

Apache

in New Mexico.

Tribe

All

of

(Tribe)
this

occupies

reservation

a
is

7~f

"trust land"--that is, land held by the federal government

~-

in trust

~

for

the

Indians;

there

is

no

non-Indian tracts on the reservation.

allotted

For many years, the

Tribe has leased oil and gas reserves under
non-Indian

producers.

approves such leases.
gas

pumped

from

the

The

Secretary

of

Approximately 80%
'

Tribe's

land

land or

its
the

of

land to
Interior

the oil and

?J.ux-

--~~

~k
w/~

~-

..---;':"

enters

interstate

c~e.

In July 1976,

the Tribe instituted a severance

tax on oil and natural gas removed from its land.
t::,

which

the

Secretary

of

the

Interior

/~

This~

approved,

is

4

separate and beyond the severance tax that the producers

$u~
·

pay to New Mexico, and it applies only to oil or gas "sold

~t..L-

cj.,

~

~ ?1,/J(&x

~~</....

4~

~~~.

3.

or transported off the Reservation."
Tribe takes as a royalty in kind is exempt from the tax.
In May 1977, a group of
holding leases from the Tribe
enjoin

enforcement of

the Tribe 1 s

producers are petitioners in
two

different

oil

seeking similar

N~

production

relief.

severance

companies

tax.

These

Sometime later,
filed

a

lawsuit

These companies are petitioners

in N o @ After consolidating the suits for trial,
the District Court for the District of New Mexico
J.)

held that the Tribe 1 s

tax

is invalid.

(Payne,

The Court of

Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, sitting en bane, reversed.
It held that the Tribe has the sovereign power to impose
the tax,

that Congress did not divest the Tribe of that

power by authorizing New Mexico to impose a similar tax,
and

that

Clause

the

Tribe 1 s

either

by

tax does

not violate

discriminating

the Commerce

against

interstate

commerce or by imposing a multiple burden upon it.

Discussion
Petitioners
essentially

the

same

in

Nos.

80-11

three-step

and

argument.

80-15
It

is

make
their

\

initial position that the Tribe has,no sovereign power to

'

\ I

-..'\·

""

'\

""'\ '

4.

impose

this

tax.

Even

if

the

Tribe

has

such

a

power,

petitioners contend that Congress has divested the Tribe
of it.

If the Tribe has this power and it has not been

divested,

petitioners

unconstitutional
violates

the

petitioners'

contend

nonetheless,
Commerce

for

that

the

they

believe

Clause.

that

conclude

I

is

tax

it

that

initial position is foreclosed by Washington

v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation,

u.s.

(1980),

unsupported.

I

find

and that
that

their

second position is

petitioners'

third

argument

presents a unique and difficult question.

I. Sovereign Power
It is beyond dispute that Indians may exercise
sovereignty
occurring
tribe

or

and

on
its

that

trust

"[t]he

lands

members

power

and

is

a

to

tax

significantly
fundamental

transactions
involving
attribute

a
of

sovereignty which the tribes retain unless divested of it
by federal law or necessary implication of their dependent
status."
15.

Colville Indian Reservation, supra, slip op., at

Petitioners attempt

to skirt this holding

in three

ways.

k- /3/A/;- ~ ~ ~1-tUuJL
-f s . 's~~

5.

First, petitioners contend that the power to tax
recognized in Colville
exclude

nonmembers

is based upon a

from

reservation

to

assertion

upon

opinion.

In one, the Court referred to "tribal power to

non-Indians

unconnected

entering

economic activity."
Court

referred

non-Indians

or

the

Petitioners

attach

to

two

entry.

or

to

conditions

tax

nonmembers'

the

tribe's power

phrases

reservation

Slip op., at 16.

to an

"inherent

impose

in

the Colville

to

on

those

to

contend,

is not based upon the Tribe's power

the

and

producers

have

argument

entered

concludes,

to

The tax at issue here, petitioners

producers,

negotiated terms of

in

exclude

permitted

Id., at 19.

gas

engage

power

enter."

oil

this

In the second, the

tribal

conditions

rest

but

the

is

imposed

reservation

the oil and gas
the

tax

is

to exclude
after
under

leases.
beyond

Thus,
the

the
the
the

Tribe's

sovereign power.
This
unpersuasive.

argument

fails

Colville

did

because
not

hold

the

premise

that

a

is

tribe's

sovereign authority to tax is dependent on its authority
to
nor

exclude

non-Indians.

the holding

Neither

the

question

presented

in Colville support petitioners'

reading

6.

of the opinion.

The phrases cited by petitioners are not

supportive when read in context.
Second,
no

sovereign

petitioners suggest that the Tribe has

authority

to

impose

this

oil

and

gas

severance tax because the tax does not concern "internal
and

social

relations."

White

Bracker,

U.S.

to foreclose

this argument.

and

the

(1980) .

transportation

of

Mountain

Apache

Tribe

v.

But again, Col ville seems
The pumping of oi 1 and gas
those

resources

off

the

reservation is an activity that substantially affects the
reservation

and

activity must

its

self-government.

affect

the

economy

and

Indeed,

such

an

governance

of

the

reservation much more than the sale of cigarettes, which
was the issue in Colville.
Third,

petitioners

suggest

that

the

Tribe's

sovereign authority to tax is diminished by the fact that
its

reservation

was

created

by

Executive

Order.

From

this, petitioners conclude that the Tribe's authority to
tax cannot be based upon "ownership" of the resources and
therefore is less than the authority a sovereign otherwise
would

have.

There

First, Colville

are

two

responses

to

this

argument.

involved tribes residing on reservations

created either by Executive Order or by treaty.

There is

7.

no

indication

in

Colville

that

the

manner

of

the

reservation's creation affects the scope of the resident
tribe's
435

sovereignty.

U.S.

313,

326

sovereign power
power

Second,

United States

(1978),

suggests

v.

that

Wheeler,

a

tribe's

is limited only to the extent that that

is inconsistent with the tribe's dependent status;

the fact that the tribe resides on land held for it by the
federal

government

does

not

by

itself

diminish

sovereignty.
In sum,
power

to impose

I

conclude

this

tax.

tribal

~

that the Tribe a sovereign

Of course,

that

is only

the

first step in petitioners' argument.

II.

ftc

Divestiture

Petitioners contend

that

the Tribe's sovereign

power to impose this severance tax has been divested

(1)

by the Act of March 3, 1927, which authorizes states to
impose

a

severance

tax,

and

(2)

by overriding

national

interests.
In

the

Act

lands

in

leasing

of

Order.

The Act

of

1927,

Congress

reservations

provides

that

the

authorized

created
resident

by

the

Executive

tribe

------- ------ - - --------

shall

have the right to "rentals, royalties, or bonuses" derived

----------------------------------

Set 3(<: ~

8.

from the leases,

25

that "[t]axes may be
local authority

U.S.C ~~

levi~llected

u~~-~- ~ tput

the same manner

as

collected."

u.s.c.

25

The Act also provides

such

by the State or

of ... oil and gas wells •.. in

taxes

are

otherwise

The

§398c.

state

levied

also may

and
levy

taxes against the share obtained by the tribe as a bonus,
rental,

or

royality.

-- ~ ~._........__.....____..----._.....-

"[a]

_-

~-...__

imposed by the state.
review of

the

provision

"historical

ut petitioners contend

historical events"

reveal

a

as

events"

the

Act

___ _________
by

recounted
to

which

that

prompting the Act
Brief, at 16.

reveals that such was Congress• intent.
Even

in

-------~~-----------imposing
a tax ......._
in addition to the
.......

prohibits tribes from
tax

No

Id.

petitioners,

petitioners

refer

do

the
not

~~:_nt~ng~~

a ~~~-~-r_i ty ~~_:-~-~s.

Prior to the Act of 1927, there was

a dispute between departments of the Executive Branch over
the question whether the manner in which a reservation was
created--by
whether

order

or

by

treaty--determined

land upon the reservation could

prior Acts.
Acts

executive

be

leased under

In addition, some officials considered prior

to give too much

lease compensation

to

Indians

in

comparison to the states; others considered prior Acts to
give too little.

The Act of 1927 established that lands

~

~?

-~

~-~

9.

upon Executive Order reservations could be leased as well
as

could

lands

provided

under

that

royalities

the

and

treaty

resident

that

reservations.
tribe

the

It

receives

state

may

further

rentals

impose

and

taxes.

Petitioners conclude from this that Congress intended the
states

1

taxing authority to be exclusive.

intended

tribes

to

have

a

concurrent

Had Congress

taxing

authority,

petitioners conclude, Congress would have so provided.
Petitioners 1

argument

it is not well supported.
fail

to

cite

proposition

clear

that

reasonable one,

legislative

history

silence

authority

evinces

an

intent

certainly

is

self-obvious

as

tribal

Congress

denied

a

such

power

u.s.

Hitchcock, 194
947
sum,

that Congress

384

(CA8 1905), app.
petitioners
l

without

have

is

must

It
have

Furthermore,

appears that taxation by Indians tribes was
by 1927

taxing

to deny such authority.
that

See

it

sufficiently

unlikely

comment.

to

Morris

have
v.

(1904); Buster v. Wright, 135 F.

dismissed,
failed

to

203

u.s.

marshall

599

(1906).

much

evidence

\

that Congress implicitly intended the Act to deny taxing
authority to resident tribes.

/~

the~

supporting

to

meant to deny such authority to tribes.

acknowledged

but

petit~s ~

Most pertinently,

Congress 1

not

is a

10.

Petitioners also contend that the Tribe's taxing
power

is divested by an overriding national

interest

in

uniform federal standards for the leasing and development
of oil and gas reserves and in the development of domestic
sources of energy.

Like the argument that the Act of 1927

works a divestiture,
well

supported.

statements
statutes.

of

this argument is reasonable but not

Petitioners
policy

in

Furthermore,

Interior

has

rely

tangentially

petitioners'

at least in part by the facts
the

must

approved

(1)

upon

general

related

federal

argument

is refuted

that the Secretary of

the Tribe's severance tax and

(2) that the Secretary, who presumably is aware of federal
energy

policy,

is

defending

the

Tribe's

tax

in

this

lawsuit.
In

sum,

I

am

inclined

Tribe's sovereign taxing power

to

has

conclude

not

that

been divested

the
by

federal statutes or "overriding national interests."

"#-~~~-

Clause
tribes?
.....

III.

Commerce

restrict

the

commercial

---------

·---

activities

Petitioners contend that the Clause

of

Indian

imposes

the

11.

5&- ~~~
~~
T~~~iiJ
same restrictions upon tribes as

it imposes upon states,

and that the Tribe's tax violates those restrictions.
SG disagrees.

The

He contends that tribes and states are to

be treated quite differently under the Commerce Clause.
The

Commerce

----- -

"regulate Commerce

lL

Clause

with

\\

foreign

empowers
Nations,

Congress
If

' \\
'
several States, an d J/w1th
the In d'1an Tr1bes.

II

\

among

and

to
the

In the SG's

view, the Court should construe the structure and language
to mean that Congress may regulate commerce "with" tribes
as it regulates commerce "with" foreign nations, not as it
regulates

commerce

"among"

states.

Because

commercial

activities of a foreign nation do not violate the Commerce
Clause

even

if

commerce,

the

activities

by

Under

view,

this

those

SG

contends

Indians

that

interstate

burdensome

commercial

do not violate the Clause either.

---

it

burden

activities

is Congress'

duty

to

remedy

Indian

activity that is inimical to interstate commerce, just as
it is Congress'
The SG concludes

duty to negotiate with
that

foreign nations.

the Court therefore should decide

that the Commerce Clause of its own power does not impose
any restrictions upon the Tribe's severance tax.
The
refers

SG

is

correct

that

to the states and tribes

the

Commerce

Clause

in distinct phrases and

~

..
12.

that the Court acknowledged this distinction in Cherokee
Nation v. Georiga,

30 U.S.

(5 Pet.)

question the SG's conclusion.

1, 18

(1831).

But I

It is true that the Clause

refers to Indian tribes in the same manner that it refers
to

foreign

nations,

and

of

tribes retain sovereignty.
nation,
nation.
tribes

Indian

tribes

Because
are

not

nations for

of

course

is

settled

But unlike any other

reside
this

among

the

concurrent

considered

all purposes.

it

the

foreign

states

of

residence,

equivalent

For example,

that

of

this

Indian
foreign

petitioners note

that Congress has abandoned the notion that tribes must be
dealt with by treaty.
553,

(1904).

565-66

activity

is

Lone Wolf v.

an

area

I
in

would
which

Hitchcock,

think
tribes

are

foreign nations, and quite like states.
foreign

nations

legislation
Indians.
regulate
this

by

virtue

controlling
The

the

federal
commercial

pervasive

manner.

trade

of

the

activity
I

of

commercial

quite

unlike

Indians

federal
and

non-

obviously

does

not

foreign

nations

therefore

am

inclined

in

to~

conclude that the standards developed under the Commerce
Clause to restrict the commercial activity of states apply
to commercial activity of Indian tribes.

I 1;0---

They are unlike
elaborate

between

government

that

187 U.S.

~,

~'
~

~

~

13.

Assuming
applicable

to

remaining

that

the

s tates

question

apply

the Clause either

imposing

a

multiple

to me

whether
burden

the
on

that

to

is whether

violates

seems

Commerce

Tribe's

interstate

tribes

as

the Tribe's

on

interstate

important question

standards

tax

~

against or

commerce.
of

~

the ~

well,

severance

by discriminating

burden

the

Clause

the

severance

tax

imposes

a

commerce,

for

petitioners

It

two

is

multiple
contend

that even a nondiscriminatory tribal severance tax imposes
a multiple burden.

The

factual

argument is fairly simple:

-

premise

to

petitioners'

Because both the Tribe and New

Mexico impose a tax upon the severance of the oil and gas,
the act of

--

------:-------:-:-and gas is taxed twice at
1

t

\'

-

-------------------------------------------------value.
The legal implications of this fact

--

full

- extracting oil

hardly

as

petitioners

simple.
are

I

am

correct,

inclined

but

not

for

to

conclude

the

reason

its
are
that
they

advance.
As an initial matter,

I disagree with the SG's

contention that a multiple taxation is permissible in this
case.

In the SG's view, the two taxes upon the same act

of extracting oil and gas are simply incremental costs to
petitioners.

But

the

Court

-

has _held

that

-

"[i]t

is

a

commonplace of constitutional jurisprudence that multiple

~

~

14.

taL

Ja~~

ion may well be offensive to the Commerce Clause."
Line,

(1979).

Ltd.

v.

County of Los Angeles,

441

u.s.

434

I therefore do not think that the SG can toss off

the risk of multiple burden so easily.
Petitioners contend that Japan Line provides a
proper

analogy

for

determining

whether

the

Tribe

impose its severance tax on top of the state's.

may

In that

case, the County of Los Angeles imposed a property tax on
freight containers that already had been taxed by Japan.
The Court held that the tax could be invalid even though
it passed the 4-part test in Complete Auto Transit, Inc v.
Brady,

430

u.s.

274

(1977),

for

state

taxes

upon

interstate commerce.

In addition to satisfying that test,

the Court held,

tax

the

also had

to

avoid

the

risk of

multiple

taxation and had to be consistent with federal

policy.

Applying that holding to this case,

petitioners

contend that the Tribe's tax creates an impermissible risk
of multiple taxation.
The

pertinent

point

in

Japan

Line

for

our

purposes is the Court's reason for deciding that the risk
of multiple taxation had to be avoided.

Where two states

impose a tax upon essentially the same act or transaction,
each state can apportion its own tax to the extent of the

15.

_L/~~
~

~UA-U-.~

~,lo~~

~~~~\
act or transaction that occurs within its b6-uftdar ies. The ~t ~
Court

demands
But

Auto.

such

where

apportionment.

one

taxing

Japan

Line,

country,

enforce

apportionment.

As

Lines,

" [ t] he

bas is

for

enforce

property

full

bodies."

in

the

foreign

apportioned

as

of

this

apportionment
at

authorities
the

Court

the Court explained
Court's

taxation ... has

441 U.S.,

~' Complete~~-

See

by

all

It

447.

been

cannot

approval
its

of

ability

to me

a

in Japan

potential

seems

is

to

taxing

that

this

statement distinguishes Japan Line from this case, for the
Court can demand apportionment by both New Mexico and the
There

Tribe .

......____

is

no

reason

therefore

to

conclude

by

analogy to Japan Line that the Tribe's tax must be invalid
on

the

ground

apportion.

that

New

Mexico

cannot

be

forced

to

It also seems to me, however, that the Court's

cases

require

Tribe;

for

apportionment

without

some

by

both New Mexico

apportionment

by

and

each,

the
the

extraction of oil and gas is taxed twice at full value.
In

sum,

I

am

inclined

to

conclude

that

the

Commerce Clause restricts the commercial activities of the
Tribe

and

that

it

requires

the

Tribe,

as

well

as

Mexico, to apportion its severance tax in some manner.

New

16.

Conclusion
I

am

inclined to recommend reversing the Court

of Appeals on the ground that the Tribe's tax violates the
Commerce Clause.

GM
To:

03/23/81
Mr. Justice Powell

From: Greg Morgan
Re:

80-11:
80-15:
80-581:

Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe
Amoco Prod. Co. v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana

Given that these cases became my responsibility
because I lost the draw for case-selection, the first thing I
did upon picking up the briefs was to check--search!--for a
party or subsidiary that might disqualify you.

I could not

find one, even with the aid of the "Special Appendix" filed in
Nos. 80-11 & 15 which purports to list all of the subsidiaries
of all of the parties.
I will double-check before oral arguments.

80-11 MERRION v. JICARILLA APACHE
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Argued 3/30/81
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GM
To:

04/02/81
Mr. Justice Powell

From: Greg Morgan
Re:

No. 80-11:

Merrion v. Jicarrilla Apache Tribe

You asked for a case involving the apportionment of
taxes imposed on interstate commerce by two or more States.

I

looked at the cases cited by Japan Line Ltd. v. Country of Los
Angeles, 441

u.s.

434 (1979), for the proposition that "[i]t is

a commonplace of constitutional jurisprudence that multiple
taxation may well be offensive to the Commerce Clause."

The

citations include Central Railroad Co. v. Pennsylvania, 370
U.S. 607 (1962), in which Justice Harlan generally discussed
~

the requirement of apportioning state taxes.
At issue in Central Railroad was an ad valorum
property tax upon railroad cars.

The Court stated that the

Commerce Clause barred Pennsylvania, the domiciliary state,
from taxing the railroad cars at full value if some other state
could tax them.

Each state could apportion its tax upon some

reasonable basis--for example, on the basis of the amount of
time that the railroad car spent during the year in each state.
The severance tax in the case now before us strikes me
~~ ff ~e~~

in some ways

apportionment doctrine.

~t

generally susceptible to the

The tax on severance of oil and gas

differs from the property tax on railroad cars because the
severance absolutely occurs only in one State.

But two

/

2.

~ sovereign:.:_ res ~d_: _i r:_ t~te:

New Mexico and the Tribe.

Thus, there is as great a risk of multiple taxation as in
Central Railroad where the railroad cars roll between states.
For that reason, I would think that the apportionment doctrine
generally can be applied.

I am perplexed, however, because I

do not see a ready basis for apportionment.

logical,

I see no basis as

/"

for example, as the basis in Central Railroad:

amount of time the railraod cars spent in each state.

the
Perhaps

the Court can hold simply that the apportionment doctrine
requires the the State and the Tribe either to devise between
themselves some reasonable apportionment or to split the tax in
half.
In any event, I think that you will find Central
Railroad helpful.
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April 6, 1981

30-11 Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe
80-15 Amoco v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe
80-581 Commonwealth Edison v. Montana

Dear Harry:
I

am happy for you to write for us in the above

cases.
I agree that they are important, particularly
Commonwealth Edison. It is especially appropriate for you as the author of Comelete Auto - to write.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Blackmun
lfp/ss

~UJtUUU ~ll'Urlltf

tJrt ~b ,jfatts

'htslfittgtott. ~. ~· 2llp'l$
CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

April 6, 1981

Re: No. 80-11 - Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe
No. 80-15 - Amoco Production Co. v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe
Dear Lewis:

~

You and I stand alone as the swing votes for the judgment in
this case. May I try to write something that sets forth my
views? I feel the Commonwealth Edison case is the more vital
one, and I shall regard that as the primary writing.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell

~u:vttmt

QJourt of fltt ~e~ .§hili.tr
<q. 20,?>1-;l

~cwJringfott, ~.
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

June 1, 1981

Re:

80-11; 80-15 - Amoco Production Co. v.
Jicarilla Apache Tribe, etc.

Dear John:
I took no part in the consideration or
decision of these cases.
Sincerely yours,

Justice Stevens
Copies to the Conference

:§upuut.t <!Jo-url o-f tltr 'J!irtiu~ ~tatrg

'Jilfa$'1thtgto-n. ~. <!f. 20,?J.I..;l
CHA~B E RS

OF'

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

June 1, 1981

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

Re:

80-11; 80-15 - Amoco Production v.
Jicarilla Apache Tribe; Merrion v.
Jicarilla Apache Tribe

My study of what has turned out to be an
especially interesting assignment has persuaded me that
this case should be decided on a quite different
rationale than seemed correct at the time of our
conference. Accordingly, with apologies for taking so
m~ch time with this important case, I submit herewith a
memorandum that will speak for itself and that I
recommend as the basis for a Court opinion.
Respectfully,

)L

Attachment

...

~·

<qtrurt of t!rt ~tb ~taits
'J]llrasfrington, :!fl. <!f. 20~J.l-~

~upumt

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

June 1, 1981
Re:

Nos. 80-11 & 80-15 Amoco Production Co. v.
Jicarilla Apache Tribe; Merrion v. Jicarilla
Apache Tribe

Dear John:
Your opinion of June 1st, while as you note in your
cover letter is somewhat different than the reasoning of the
Conference discussion, seems persuasive to me and I am
prepared to join it.
I wonder if you could cite somewhere
in the opinion Byron's Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411
U.S. 145 (1973), and Thurgood's McClanahan v. Arizona State
Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164 (1973). They are more or less
the "flip side" of this case, but since they are fairly
recent opinions dealing with state authority to tax income
of a tribe or individual Indians residing on a reservation
I think they are consistent with your analysis and are more
tax-related than Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976),
which you cite on p. 17 of your draft.
Sincerely,

Justice Stevens
Copies to the Conference

' ""'

vul.<::l.J..

uu:::~~ce

!Jr. Justice Brennan
!Jr. Ju s ti0e StS"ra:rl

Mr. Justice White

1:T' .
C' .
~'r .

From : Mr. Justice Stevens

JUN

1'81

Circul ated : ______~-------

80-11; 80-15 - Amoco Production Co. v. Jicarilla ~~c~~ aTEdbe;
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe

] :

I

MEMORANDUM OF JUSTICE STEVENS

The Indian tribes that occupied North America before
Europeans settled the continent were unquestionably sovereigns .
They ruled th emselves and they exercised dominion over the lands
that nourished them.

Many of those tribes, and some attributes

of their sovereignty, survive today.

This Court, since its

earliest days, has had the task of identifying those inherent
sovereign

~owers

that survived the creation of a new nation and

the introduction of an entirely new system of laws applicable to
both Indians and non-Indians.

In this case we must decide

whether one such surviving attribute of tribal sovereignty is the
power to lease tribal property to a non-member and, after the
lease is signed, to impose a tax on the exercise of the rights
granted by the lease.

The lessor in this case is the Jicarilla Apache Tribe.

The

21 petitioner-lessees in these two consolidated cases are
extracting oil and gas from tribal lands pursuant to long-term
leases, some of which have been in effect since 1953.

In 1976

No. 80-11; 80-15

- 2 the Tribe enacted an ordinance imposing a severance tax on the
oil and gas produced under these leases, and petitioners brought
suit to enjoin the collection of the tax.

The District Court

granted the injunction, but the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit reversed, upholding the tax.
certiorari

u.s.

617 F.2d 537.

We granted

Before addressing the legal issues, we

shall recount some of the history of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe,
the derivation of the Indian leasing power, and the facts of
these cases.

I

The 2100 members of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe live on a
reservation in northern New Mexico.l

Most of the residents of

the reservation live in the town of Dulce, New Mexico, near the
Colorado border.

The area encompassed by the Reservation became

a part of the United States when the Mexican War ended in the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848.

See 9 Stat. 922.

Between

1848 and 1871, the United States did not enter into any treaty
with the Jicarillas or, as far as we are advised, enact any
special legislation relating to them.

In 1871 Congress outlawed

any future treaties with Indian tribes.2

1

In 1887 President

See Plaintiff's Exhibit E p. 14.

2

"(H]ereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the
territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or
recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power
with whom the United States may contract by treaty:

No. 80-11; 8 0-15
-

3 -

Cleveland issued a simple executive order setting aside a tract
of public lands in the Territory of New Mexico "as a reservation
for the use and occupancy of the Jicarilla Apache Indians."3
Except for a provision protecting bona fide settlers from
deprivation of any previously acquired valid rights, the
executive order contained no special rules applying to the
reservation.4

Provided further, That nothing herein contained shall
be construed to invalidate or impair the obligation of
any treaty heretofore lawfully made and ratified with
any such Indian nation or tribe." 16 Stat. 566,
current version at 25 U.S.C. § 71.
3 Two previous e xecutive orders setting aside land as a
reservation for the Jicarillas had been cancelled.
In 1874
President Grant set aside land in an order that he cancelled in
1876. See I Kappler, C. Kappler, Indian Affairs, Laws, and
Treaties 874 (1904) (hereinafter Kappler).
In 1880 President
Hayes established a reservation in an order that President Arthur
cancelled in 1884. Id., at 875.
4

The ~ntire executive order reads as follows:
"EXECUTIVE MANSION, FEBRUARY 11, 1887.
"It is hereby ordered that all that portion of the
public domain in the Territory of New Mexico which,
when surveyed, will be embraced in the following
townships, viz:
27, 28, 29, and 30 north, ranges 1
east and 1, 2, and 3 west; 31 and 32 north, ranges 2
west and 3 west, and the south half of township 31
north, range 1 west, be, and the same is hereby, set
apart as a reservation for the use and occupation of
the Jicarilla Apache Indians:
Provided, That this
order shall not be so construed as to deprive any bona
fide settler of any valid rights he may have acquired
under the law of the United States providing for the
disposition of the public domain."
GROVER CLEVELAND.
Id., at 875.

The boundaries of the Reservation were redefined or clarified by

No. 80-11; 80-15
- 4 The record does not indicate what leasing activity, if any,
occurred on the Jicarilla Reservation between 1887 and 1953.
During that period, however, the authority of Indian tribes to
enter into mineral leases was clarified.

In 1891 Congress passed

a statute permitting the mineral leasing of Indian lands.
February 28, 1891, 26 Stat. 795, 25

u.s.c.

§397.

Act of

Because the

statute applied only to lands "occupied by Indians who have
bought and paid for the same," the statute was interpreted to be
inapplicable to reservations created by executive order.

See

British-American Oil Producing Co. v. Board of Equalization, 299

u.s.

159, 161-162, 164.

Thus in 1922 the Secretary of the

Interior took the position that Indian reservations created by
executive order were public lands and that Indians residing on
such reservations had no right to share in the royalties derived
from oil and gas leases on such lands.5

In 1927 Congress enacted

executive orders issued by President Theodore Roosevelt on
November 11, 1907 and January 28, 1908, and by President Taft on
February 17, 1912. See App. to Brief for Petitioners in No. 8015, at 22a-24a.
5 This decision held that the land on executive order
reservations was subject to leasing, as "lands of the United
States," under the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of February 25,
1920, 41 Stat. 437, 30 u.s.c. §181 et seq.
49 I.D. 139.
In
1924, Attorney General Stone rendered an opinion stating that the
Mineral Lands Leasing Act did not apply to Executive Order
reservations.
34 Op. Atty. Gen. 181 (1924). Then in 1925
Attorney General Stone instituted litigation in the District
Court of Utah to cancel certain leases that had been authorized
by the Secretary of the Interior pursuant to the Mineral Lands
Leasing Act. See United States v. Harrison, Equity No. 8288 (D.
Utah 1925). See H.R. Rep. No. 1791, 69th Cong., 2nd Sess. 5
(1927). The case was dismissed by stipulation after the 1927 Act
referred to in the text was passed. See United States v.
McMahon, 273 u.s. 782.
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a statute expressly providing that unallotted lands on any Indian
reservation created by executive order may be leased for oil and
gas mining purposes with the approval of the Secretary of the
Interior.6

The statute directed that all rentals, royalties, or

A later decision by this Court suggests that the Secretary's
position was correct.
In Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United
States, 316 U.S. 317, the Court held that an Indian tribe was not
entitled to any compensation from the United States when an
executive order reservation was abolished. The Court said:
"Perhaps the most striking proof of the belief
shared by Congress and the Executive that the Indians
were not entitled to compensation upon the abolition of
an executive order reservation is the very absence of
compensatory payments in such situations.
It was a
common practice, during the period in which
reservations were created by executive order, for the
President simply to terminate the existence of a
reservation by cancelling or revoking the order
establishing it. That is to say, the procedure
followed in the case before us was typical. No
compensation was made, and neither the Government nor
the Indians suggested that it was due.

*

*

*

*

*

"We conclude therefore that there was no express
constitutional or statutory authorization for the
conveyance of a compensable interest to petitioner by
the four executive orders of 1875 and 1876, and that no
implied Congressional delegation of the power to do so
can be spelled out from the evidence of Congressional
and executive understanding. The orders were effective
to withdraw from sale the lands affected and to grant
the use of the lands to the petitioner. But the
interest which the Indians received was subject to
termination at the will of either the executive or
Congress and without obligation to the United States.
The executive orders of 1879 and 1884 were simply an
exercise of this power of termination, and the payment
of compensation was not required."
316 U.S., at 330331. See also Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States,
348 u.s. 272, 279-282.

Footnote(s)

6 appear on following page(s).
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- 6 bonuses from such leases should be paid to the Treasurer of the
United States for the benefit of the tribes.?

The statute

further provided that State taxes could be levied upon the output
of such oil and gas leases8 but made no mention of the

6 Section 1 of the Act of March 3, 1927, 44 Stat. 1347,
current version at 25 U.S.C. §398a, provided:
"Unallotted lands within the limits of any
reservation or withdrawal created by Executive order
for Indian purposes or for the use or occupancy of any
Indians or tribe may be leased for oil and gas mining
purposes in accordance with the provisions contained in
the Act of May 29, 1924 [25 u.s.c. § 398]. "
See also 25 U.S.C. §398. Unallotted land was land which had not
been allotted in severalty to individual Indians pursuant to the
formula prescribed in the General Allotment Act of 1887, 24 Stat.
388.

7

Section 2 of the Act provided:
"The proceeds from rentals, royalties, or bonuses of
oil and gas leases upon lands within Executive order
Indian reservations or withdrawals shall be deposited
in tne Treasury of the United States to the credit of
the tribe of Indians for whose benefit the reservation
or withdrawal was created or who are using and
occupying the land, and shall draw interest at the rate
of 4 per centum per annum and be available for
appropriation by Congress for expenses in connection
with the supervision of the development and operation
of the oil and gas industry and for the use and benefit
of such Indians:
Provided, That said Indians, or their
tribal council, shall be consulted in regard to the
expenditure of such money, but no per capita payment
shall be made except by Act of Congress."
25 U.S.C.
§398b.

8

Section 3 of the Act provided:
"Taxes may be levied and collected by the State or
local authority upon improvements, output of mines or
oil and gas wells, or other rights, property, or assets
of any lessee upon lands within Executive order Indian
reservations in the same manner as such taxes are
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royalties, could impose taxes on the output.9

In 1934, Congress enacted the Indian Reorganization Act, 48
Stat. 984, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461 et seq., which authorized any Indian
tribe residing on a reservation to adopt a constitution and bylaws, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior.
The Act provided that in "addition to all other powers vested in
an Indian tribe or tribal council by existing law," the
constitution should also vest certain specific powers, such as
the power to employ legal counsel, in the Tribe.lO

25 U.S.C.

otherwise levied and collected, and such taxes may be
levied against the share obtained for the Indians as
bonuses, rentals, and royalties, and the Secretary of
the Interior is authorized and directed to cause such
taxes to be paid out of the tribal funds in the
Treasury:
Provided, That such taxes shall not become a
lien or charge of any kind against the land or other
property of such Indians." 25 u.s.c. § 398c.
9 In 1938, Congress passed the Act of May 11, 1938, 52
Stat. 347, 25 U.S.C. §396a-g, which was designed in part to
achieve uniformity for all mineral leases of Indian lands. Like
the 1927 Act, the statute also provided that the tribes were
entitled to the royalties from such leases. The statute made no
mention of state taxes.
See nn. 51, 59, infra.
10

The statute provided, in part:
"Any Indian tribe, or tribes, residing on the same
reservation, shall have the right to organize for its
common welfare, and may adopt an appropriate
constitution and bylaws, which shall become effective
when ratified by a majority vote of the adult members
of the tribe, or of the adult Indians residing on such
reservation, as the case may be, at a special election
authorized and called by the Secretary of the Interior
under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe.
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The Act further authorized the Secretary of the Interior

to issue a charter of incorporation to an Indian tribe, and
provided that the charter may convey to the tribe the power to
purchase, manage and dispose of its property.ll
said nothing about the power to levy taxes.l2

*

*

The 1934 Act
The first

*

"In addition to all powers vested in any Indian
tribe or tribal council by existing law, the
constitution adopted by said tribe shall also v e st in
such tribe or its tribal council the following rights
and powers: To employ legal counsel, the choice of
counsel and fixing of fees to be subject to the
approval of the Secretary of the Interior; to prevent
the sale, disposition, lease, or encumbrance of tribal
lands, interests in lands, or other tribal assets
without the consent of the tribe; and to negotiate with
the Federal, State, and local Governments."
25 U.S.C.
§ 476.
11

Section 477 provides:
"The Secretary of the Interior may, upon petition
by at least one-third of the adult Indians, issue a
charfer of incorporation to such tribe: Provided, That
such charter shall not become operative until ratified
at a special election by a majority vote of the adult
Indians living on the reservation. Such charter may
convey to the incorporated tribe the power to purchase,
take by gift, or bequest, or otherwise, own, hold,
manage, operate, and dispose of property of every
description, real and personal, including the power to
purchase restricted Indian lands and to issue in
exchange therefor interests in corporate property, and
such further powers as may be incidental to the conduct
of corporate business, not inconsistent with law; but
no authority shall be granted to sell, mortgage, or
lease for a period exceeding ten years any of the land
included in the limits of the reservation. Any charter
so issued shall not be revoked or surrendered except by
Act of Congress."
25 u.s.c. § 477.

12 See F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 267 (1942)
(hereinafter Cohen) .
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- 9 Jicarilla Apache Constitution was approved by the Secretary of
the Interior in 1937.13

In 1953, the Tribe entered into an oil and gas lease with
the Phillips Petroleum Company.

App. 22-30.

The lease, which is

on a form prepared by the Bureau of Indian Affairs of the
Department of Interior, is presumably typical of later leases
executed between other companies and the Tribe.l4

The lease

provides that in return for a cash bonus of $71,345.99, to be
paid to the tr e asurer of the Tribe, and rents and royalties, the
Tribe as l e ssor granted to the lessee "the exclusive right and
privilege to drill for, mine, extract, remove, and dispose of all
the oil and natural gas deposits in or under" the described
tracts of land, together with the right to construct and maintain
buildings, plants, tanks, and other necessary structures on the
surface.

App. 22-23.

The lease is for a term of 10 years after

.....-

approval by the Secretary of the Interior "and as much longer
thereafter as oil and/or gas is produced in paying quantities
from said land."

Ibid.

The lessee is obligated to use

13 The 1937 Constitution made no reference to any power to
assess taxes against nonmembers. See 1937 Constitution and ByLaws of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe, Defendants' Exhibit G
(hereinafter 1937 Constitution).
14 The original plaintifs in No. 80-11 operate under this
lease. The original plaintiffs in No. 80-15 also executed a
lease with the Tribe in 1953. See App. 62. Leases of Jicarilla
tribal property in the aggregate cover over 500,000 acres of
land, comprising almost 69% of the acreage within the Jicarilla
Reservation. Brief for Respondent 2.
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- 10 reasonable diligence in the development of the property and to
pay an annual rental of $1.25 per acre and a royalty of 12 1/2%
"of the volume or amount" of all oil and gas "produced and saved"
from the leased land.

App. 24, 26.

Oil and gas used by the

lessee for development and operation of the lease is royaltyfree.

Id., at 24.

The Tribe reserved the right to use free of

charge sufficient gas for any school or other building owned by
the Tribe on the leased premises and to take its royalty in kind.
Id., at 27-28.

The lease contains no reference to the payment of any taxes.
The lessee does, however, agree to comply with all regulations of
the Secretary of Interior

"[N]ow or hereafter in force relative to such leases:
Provided, That no regulation hereafter approved shall
effect a change in rate or royalty or annual rental
herein specified without the written consent of the
parties to this lease." Id., at 27.

The lease was approved by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs on
behalf of the Secretary of the Interior.

Id., at 32.

Both of

the 1953 leases described in the record are still producing.

In 1968 the Tribe adopted a revised constitution giving the
Tribal Council authority, "subject to approval by the Secretary
of the Interior, to impose taxes and fees on non-members of the
tribe doing business on the reservation."
Petitioners in No. 80-15, at 12a-13a.

App. to Brief for

Eight years later, on July
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- 11 9, 1976, the Tribal Council enacted an Oil and Gas Severance Tax
Ordinance, which was later approved by the Secretary of the
Interior.

The Tribal Ordinance provides that the severance tax

"is imposed on any oil and natural gas severed, saved and removed
from Tribal lands . . . • "

App. 38.

The rate of the tax is $.05

per million BTU of gas produced on the reservation and sold or
transported off the reservation and $0.29 per barrel of crude oil
or condensate produced on the reservation and sold or transported
off the reservation.

Royalty gas or oil taken by the Tribe, as

well as gas or oil used by the Tribe, is exempt from the tax.
App. 39.

Thus the entire burden of the tax apparently will fall

on nonmembers of the Tribe.

The tax, if sustained, will produce

over $2,000,000 in revenues annually.l5

Petitioners-lessees commenced two separate actions in the
United States District Court seeking to enjoin the tribal
authorities and the Secretary of the Interior from taking any
action to collect the tax.

The District Court consolidated the

two cases, allowed other lessees to intervene, and held the
taxing ordinance invalid on three separate grounds.

First, after

finding that the Tribe had never attempted to exercise a power of
taxation over nonresidents prior to its incorporation in 1937,

1 5 See District Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, Finding No. 32, App. 130. The Tribe's answers to
interrogatories indicate that in 1976 the royalties on the leases
received by the Tribe amounted to $3,995,469.69. See Plaintiff's
Exhibit E p. 7; Tr. 269.
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that power on the Tribe, the District Court concluded that the
attributes of sovereignty possessed by the Tribe did not extend
to the imposition of a severance tax on nonmembers.

Second, the

court held that the statute enacted by Congress in 1927, which
authorized oil and gas leases on reservations created by
executive order, had granted State and local authorities the
exclusive right to impose severance taxes on oil and gas
production from such reservations.

Finally, after finding that

approximately 80% of the oil and gas production from the
reservation is shipped interstate for sale outside of New Mexico,
that the tax burden amounts to a significant percentage of the
price of gas and oil,l6 and that the tax is only imposed on gas,
oil, or condensate sold or transported off the reservation, the
court concluded that it discriminated against and created an
impermissible burden on interstate commerce.

Over the dissent of two judges, the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit, sitting en bane, reversed.

617 F.2d 537.

The

court held that the taxing power was an inherent attribute of
sovereignty possessed by the Tribe prior to the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934.

The court further held that that

16 Finding No. 36 reads:
"That if the Jicarilla Apache Oil
and Gas Severence Tax were valid the combined tax burden amounts
to more than 29% of the interstate price of old gas and over
12.5% of the price of old oil." App. 130. The Tribe contends
that this finding is not supported by the record, but the Court
of Appeals did not set it aside.
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been divested by Congress, and was not inconsistent with any
superior interest of the United States.

The Court of Appeals

rejected the argument that the 1927 Act had pre-empted the
Tribe's power to levy a severance tax, because a review of the
legislative history indicated that "Congress simply did not think
of the issue when it enacted the statute."

Id., at 547.

The

Court of Appeals' reversal of the District Court's commerce
clause holding was based on the two courts' different readings of
the ordinance:

whereas the District Court had construed the

taxable event as removal of the oil or gas from the boundaries of
the reservation, the Court of Appeals construed severance from
the land as the critical event.

Id., at 546.

Under the Court of

Appeals' view, the ordinance would not discriminate against
interstate commerce because oil or gas sold within the
reservation as well as oil or gas transported off the reservation
would be taxed.

The court concluded that the fact that royalties

paid in kind are exempt did not render the tax discriminatory,
and that the fact that New Mexico had imposed separate taxes on
the same taxable event did not create an impermissible multiple
burden on commerce.

Id., at 545-546.

II

The powers possessed by Indian tribes stem from three
sources: federal statutes, treaties, or the tribe's inherent
sovereignty.

Neither the Tribe nor the federal government seeks

No. 80-ll; 80-15
- 14 to justify the Jicarilla Tribe's severance tax on the basis of
any federal statute,l7 and the Jicarilla Apaches, who reside on
an executive order reservation, executed no treaty with the
United States from which they derive any sovereign powers.
Therefore, if the severance tax is valid, it must be as an
exercise of the Tribe's inherent sovereignty.

Last Term, in

Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation,
447 U.S. 134, we held that a tribal tax on cigarettes sold on the
reservations of the Colville, Makah, and Lummi tribes to
nonmembers of the tribes was a permissible exercise of the
tribes' retained sovereign power to tax.l8

We must determine

whether the severance tax imposed on nonmembers of the tribe in
this case can likewise be characterized as a valid exercise of
the tribe's inherent powers.

To make this determination, we must

first consider the source and scope of tribal sovereignty and
more particularly the source and scope of the sovereign power to

17 Congress may delegate "sovereign" powers to the tribes.
See Mazurie v. United States, 419 U.S. 544. As we have
indicated, however, neither the 1927 statute permitting Indians
to receive royalties from the lease of tribal lands nor the
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 make any mention of the
authority of Indian tribes to tax. See pp.4-8, supra.
18

The Court stated:
"The power to tax transactions occurring on trust lands
and significantly involving a tribe or its members is a
fundamental attribute of sovereignty which the tribes
retain unless divested of it by federal law or
necessary implication of their dependent status."
447
U.S., at 152.
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Tribal sovereignty, unlike the sovereignty of the United
States and the individual states, is not derived from the
Constitution.l9

Rather, Indian tribes are assumed to have

retained powers of self-government that they possessed at the
time of their incorporation into the United States.

In Worcester

v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, the Court held unconstitutional a Georgia
criminal statute purporting to regulate residency of non-Indians
in the Cherokee Nation.

In an opinion by Chief Justice Marshall,

the Court held that the Cherokees, although submitting to the
protection of the United States, nevertheless retain e d some
aspects of sovereignty:
"By various treaties, the Cherokees have placed
themselves under the protection of the United States:
they have agreed to trade with no other people, nor to
invoke the protection of any other sovereignty. But
such engagements do not divest them of the right of
self government, nor destroy their capacity to enter
into treaties or compacts."
Id., at 581-582.20

19 The only reference to Indian tribes in the Constitution
is in Art i c 1 e I , § 8 ( 3 ) , which provides that " [ t ] he Congress s h a 11
have the Power to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian tribes." More
significant than this reference to Indian tribes is the absence
of any mention of the tribes in the Tenth Amendment, which
provides:
"The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people."
20

The Court also stated:
"At no time has the sovereignty of the country been
recognized as existing in the Indians, but they have
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United States retains plenary authority to divest the tribes of
any such attributes.21

Moreover, this Court's decisions since

Worcester have recognized that not all attributes of sovereignty
are consistent with the tribes' status as "domestic dependent
nations."22

In determining what sovereign powers the tribes

been always admitted to possess many of the attributes
of sovereignty. All the rights which belong to self
government have been recognized as vested in them.
Their right of occupancy has never been questioned, but
the fee in the soil has been considered in the
government. This may be called the right to the
ultimate domain, but the Indians have a present right
of possession."
31 U.S., at 580.
21 See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 319; Winton
v. Amos, 255 u.s. 373, 391-392; Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 u.s.
553, 565; 1 American Indian Policy Review Commission, Final
Report, 106-107 (1977) (hereinafter AIPRC Final Report). Thus,
for example, Congress can waive the tribes' sovereign immunity.
See United States v. u.s. Fidelity, 309 u.s. 506, 512.
22 In.The Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1, 17, the
Court held that the tribes were not ''foreign nations" within the
meaning of the Constitution:
"Though the Indians are acknowledged to have an
unquestionable, and, heretofore, unquestioned right to
the lands they occupy, until that right shall be
extinguished by a voluntary cession to our government;
yet it may well be doubted whether those tribes which
reside within the acknowledged boundaries of the United
States can, with strict accuracy, be denominated
foreign nations. They may, more correctly, perhaps, be
denominated domestic dependent nations. They occupy a
territory to which we assert a title independent of
their will, which must take effect in point of
possession when their right of possession ceases.
Meanwhile they are in a state of pupilage. Their
relation to the United States resembles that of a ward
to his guardian."
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Court has repeatedly recognized a fundamental distinction between
the right of tribes to govern their own internal affairs and the
right to exercise powers affecting nonmembers of the tribe.23

The Court has been careful to protect the tribes from
interference with tribal control over its members.
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 65.

See, e.g.,

The Court has

recognized that the power to preosecute members of the tribe for
violations of tribal criminal law does not derive from power
delegated by the United States but is an inherent attribute of
sovereignty.

United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313.

Furthermore, the Indian tribes retain the power to create
substantive law to govern their internal affairs.
v.Burney, 168 U.S. 218
29

See Roff

(membership); Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1,

(inheritance rules); Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382

(domestic relations and family law).
law in tribal courts.
District Court, supra.

They also may enforce that

Williams v. Lee, 358

u.s.

217; Fisher v.

Moreover, the Indian tribes' sovereignty

2 3 In United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-382, the
Court stated that the tribes
"[W]ere, and always have been, regarded as having a
semi-independent position when they preserved their
tribal relations: not as States, not as nations, not as
possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty, but as
a separate people, with the power of regulating their
internal and social relations, and thus far not brought
under the laws of the Union or of the State within
whose limits they resided."

No. 80-11; 80-15
- 18 over their own members is, in many respects, significantly
greater than the States' powers over their own citizens.

The

tribes' virtually absolute control over their own membership
carries with it the power to enforce discriminatory rules that
would be intolerable in a non-Indian community.24

Their criminal

jurisdiction over their own members is unconstrained by
constitutional limitations that are applicable to the States and
the Federal Government.25

Thus the use of the word "sovereign"

to characterize tribal powers of self-government is surely
appropriate.

In sharp contrast to the Tribe's broad powers over their own
always been narrowly
_;

confined.26

The Court has emphasized that "exercise of tribal

24 Although the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 82 Stat.
77, 25 U.~C. §§ 1301-1303, prohibits Indian tribe.s from denying
"to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
its laws," see id., §1302(8), the provisions of the United
States Constitution, including the Fourteenth Amendment, which
limit federal or state authority do not similarly limit tribal
authority. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56
and n. 7. In Santa Clara Pueblo, the Court held that sovereign
immunity protected the tribe from suit under the Indian Civil
Rights Act, that the Act did not create a private cause of action
cognizable in federal court, and that a tribal court was the
appropriate forum for vindication of rights created by the Act.
2 5 In Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, the Court held that the
restrictions of the Fifth Amendment did not apply to prosecutions
in tribal courts. See also United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S.,
at 328-329; Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354, 355.
26 Treaties which specifically granted the right of self
government to the tribes often also specifically excluded
jurisdiction over nonmembers. See, ~' Treaty with the
Cherokees, art. 5, 7 Stat. 478 (1835); Treaty with the Choctaws
and Chickasaws, art 7, 11 Stat 611 (1855); Treaty with the Creeks
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or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the
dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot survive without
express Congressional delegation."

u.s.

Montana v. United States,

In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S.

191, the Court held that tribes have no criminal jurisdiction
over crimes committed by nonmembers within the reservations.27
In Montana v. United States, supra, the court, in holding that
the Crow Tribe could not prohibit hunting and fishing by
nonmembers on reservation land no longer owned by the Tribe,
indicated that the principle underlying Oliphant--limited tribal
power over nonmembers--was applicable in a civil as well as a

and Seminoles, art. 15, 11 Stat. 699 (1856).
27

The Court stated in support of that holding:
"Upon incorporation into the territory of the United
States, the Indian tribes thereby come under the
territorial sovereignty of the United States and their
exercise of separate power is constrained so as not to
conflict with the interests of this overriding
sovereignty.
'[T)heir rights to complete sovereignty,
as independent nations, [are] necessarily diminished.'
Johnson v. M'Intosh, 8 Wheat. 543, 574 (1823).
"We have already described some of the inherent
limitations on tribal powers that stem from their
incorporation into the United States.
In Johnson v.
M'Intosh, supra, we noted that the Indian tribes'
'power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to
whomsoever they pleased,' was inherently lost to the
overriding sovereignty of the United States."
435 U.S.
at 209.

See also New York ex rel Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496, 499 (state
court has jurisdiction to try a non-Indian for a crime committed
against non-Indian on reservation) •
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Thus the Court has recognized that it is

when the tribes attempt to impose controls on nonmembers that the
tribes' exercise of sovereign powers would be inconsistent with
their status.29

28
"The Court recently applied these general
principles in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435
u.s. 191, rejecting a tribal claim of inherent
sovereign authority to exercise criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians. Stressing that Indian tribes cannot
exercise power inconsistent with their diminished
status as sovereigns, the Court quoted Justice
Johnson's words in his concurrence in Fletcher v. Peck,
Cranch 87--the first Indian case to reach this Court-that the Indian tribes have lost 'any right to
governing every person within their limits except
themselves.'
Id., at 147, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Trib~, supra, 435 U.S., at 209.
Though Oliphant only
determined inherent tribal authority in criminal
matters, the principles on which it relied support the
general proposition that the inherent sovereign powers
of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of
nonmembers of the tribe."
Montana v. United States,
U.S., at
(footnote omitted}.
See also Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S.
661, (tribes cannot freely alienate to non-Indians the land they
occupy}; Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet., at 17-18 (tribes
cannot enter into direct commercial or foreign relations with
other nations} •
29 In Wheeler v. United States, supra, the Court held that
the power to prosecute its members for tribal offenses was not
"implicitly lost by virtue of their dependent status" and stated:
"The areas in which such implicit divestiture of
sovereignty has been held to have occurred are those
involving the relations between an Indian tribe and
nonmembers of the tribe.

*

*

*

*

*

These limitations rest on the fact that the
dependent status of Indian tribes within our
territorial jurisdiction is necessarily inconsistent
with their freedom independently to determine their
external relations. But the powers of self-government,
including the power to prescribe and enforce internal
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nonmembers is therefore of a different character than the broad
tribal power over internal affairs involving members.30

The

power to exercise control over nonmembers--and specifically the
power to tax recognized in Colville--presumably has a much more
limited derivation, tied specifically to the exercise of
particular powers, than the general retention of inherent
sovereignty to govern internal affairs.

We must therefore

examine the cases upholding the the power to tax to determine the
source of that power and then determine whether the tax imposed
in this case is consistent with that rationale.

III

The

sea~ch

for the source of the taxing power must focus on

the tribal power to tax nonmembers that existed in 1934 when the

criminal laws, are of a different type. They involve
only the relations among members of a tribe. Thus,
they are not such powers as would necessarily be lost
by virtue of a tribe's dependent status.
'[T]he
settled doctrine of the law of nations is, that a
weaker power does not surrender its independence--its
right to self government, by associating with a
stronger, and taking its protection.' Worcester v.
Georgia [6 Pet.], at 560-561."
435 U.S., at 326.
30 This lack of inherent sovereignty over nonmembers is
supported by the principle that "in this Nation each sovereign
governs only with the consent of the governed." Nevada v. Hall,
440 U.S. 410, 426. Because the tribe can completely exclude
nonmembers from participation in the tribal government, the power
exercised over those so excluded should be a limited one.
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any further erosion of Indian sovereign powers.31

Shortly after

the Act was passed, the Solicitor of the Department of the
Interior issued a formal opinion setting forth his understanding
of the powers that might be secured to an Indian tribe and

31 The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 confirmed but did
not enlarge the inherent sovereign powers of the Indian tribes.
Congress intended the Act to "stabilize the tribal organization
of Indian tribes by vesting such tribal organizations with real,
though limited, authority ..• " S. Rep. No. 1080, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 1 (1934). As one commentator interpreted section 16 of the
Act:
"[I]t would appear that powers originally held by
tribes that were recognized and allowed to be retained
by treaties or prior statutes, as well as any
additional powers conferred in the same manner, would
be retained by tribes that accepted the terms of the
1934 Act . . • • The provision is consistent with the
act's purpose of enhancing tribal government in that it
recognized and reconfirmed those powers a tribe may
already have had as a government." Mettler, A Unified
Theory of Indian Tribal Sovereignty, 30 Hastings L.
Rev. _?9, 97 (1978).
Moreover, although the power given by the Reorganization Act of
1934 to the Secretary of the Interior to approve or disapprove of
the exercise of tribal powers placed a limit on tribal
sovereignty, that power did not enable the Secretary to add to
the inherent powers that a tribe possessed before the Act was
passed.
On the other hand, the fact that an Indian tribe may never
have had the occasion to exercise a particular power over
nonmembers in its early history is surely not a sufficient reason
for denying the existence of that power. Accordingly, the fact
that there is no evidence that the Jicarilla Apache Tribe ever
imposed a tax of any kind on a nonmember does not require us to
conclude that it has no such taxing power. To the extent that
the power to tax was an attribute of sovereignty possessed by
Indian tribes when the Reorganization Act was passed, we believe
Congress intended the statute to preserve those powers for all
Indian tribes that adopted a formal organization under the Act.
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reference to powers vested in an Indian tribe "by existing
law."32

He concluded that among those powers was a power of

taxation and described the permissible exercise of this power:

"Except where Congress has provided otherwise, this
power may be exercised over members of the tribe and
over nonmembers, so far as such nonmembers may accept
privileges of trade, residence, etc., to which taxes
may be attached as conditions." 55 I.D. 14, 46.
Solicitor Margold cited three decisions in support of this

32 55 I.D. 14. Solicitor Margold described the scope of
this opinion as follows:
"My opinion has been requested on the question of
what powers may be secured to an Indian tribe and
incorporated in its constitution and by-laws by virtue
of the following phrase, contained in section 16 of the
Wheeler-Howard Act (48 Stat. 984, 987):
In addition to all powers vested in any Indian
tribe- or tribal council by existing law, the
constitution adopted by said tribe shall also vest *
* [Italics added.]

*

"The question of what powers are vested in an
Indian tribe or tribal council by existing law cannot
be answered in detail for each Indian tribe without
reference to hundreds of special treaties and special
acts of . Congress.
It is possible, however, on the
basis of the reported cases, the written opinions of
the various executive departments, and those statutes
of Congress which are of general import, to define the
powers which have heretofore been recognized as
lawfully within the jurisdiction of an Indian tribe.
My answer to the propounded question, then, will be
general, and subject to correction for particular
tribes in the light of the treaties and statutes
affecting such tribe wherever such treaties or statutes
contain peculiar provisions restricting or enlarging
the general authority of an Indian tribe." Id., at 1718.

-
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These three cases, Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947 (CAS

1905), app. dismissed, 203

u.s.

599; Morris v. Hitchcock, 194

U.S. 384; and Maxey v. Wright, 3 Ind. T. 243, 54 S.W. 807 (Ct
App. Ind. T.), aff'd., 105 Fed. 1003,

(CA8 1900), were decided

shortly after the turn of the century and are the three leading
cases considering the power of an Indian tribe to assess taxes
against nonmembers.33
in their reasoning.

The three cases are similar in result and
In each the court upheld the tax; in eac h

the court relied on the Tribe's power to exclude non-Indians from
its reservation and concluded that the Tribe could condition
entry or continued presence within the reservation on the payment
of a license fee or a tax; in each the court assumed that the
remedy for nonpayment would be exclusion from the reservation or
intervention by the Interior Department on behalf of the Tribe.

In the first of these cases, Maxey v. Wright, 54

s.w.

807

(1900), the Court of Appeal of Indian Territory affimed an order
by a federal territorial court dismissing a complaint filed by
non-Indian lawyers practicing in the Creek Nation.

They had

sought to enjoin the Indian agent for the Five Civilized Tribes
from collecting an annual occupation tax of $25.00 on each nonIndian lawyer residing and practicing his profession on the

33 Felix Cohen, in his Handbook on Federal Indian Law,
published in 1942, also relies on these cases in his discussion
of tribal taxation of nonmembers. Cohen 266-267. The Court in
Colville cited both Buster v. Wright and Morris v. Hitchcock in
upholding tribal power to tax.
447 u.s., at 153. See pp. 36-37,
infra.
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In rejecting the attorneys' claim, the Court of

Appeal first analyzed the relevant treaties between the United
States and the Creeks and noted that they had "carefully guarded
their sovereignty, and their right to admit, and consequently to
exclude, all white persons, except such as are named in the
Treaty."

rd., at 809.

The United States, pursuant to a treaty

with the Creeks, had agreed that all persons not expressly
excepted who were present in the Creek Nation "without the
consent of that nation are deemed to be intruders, and pledges
itself to remove them."

Ibid.

Because attorneys were not within

any excepted class,34 the Tribe had the authority to require them
to obtain permits or to require their removal as "intruders."35

34
"Attorneys practicing in the United 1States courts are
not persons who come within the exceptions, for they
are not 'in the employment of the government of the
United States,' or 'persons peaceably traveling or
temporarily sojourning in the country, or trading
therein under license from the proper authority of the
United States."
54 S.W., at 809.

35 In reaching this conclusion the court relied heavily on
two opinions of the Attorney General of the United States. In
the first opinion, issued in 1881, Attorney General McVeagh
upheld the validity of Indian permit laws regulating which
persons would be permitted to reside on the Choctaw and Chickasaw
reservations. 17 Op. Atty. Gen. 134. In his discussion of the
right of non-Indians to enter and remain on tribal lands Attorney
General McVeagh stated:
"Replying to your fourth question: it seems from
what has been already said that, besides those persons
or classes mentioned by you, only those who have been
permitted by the Choctaws or Chickasaws to reside
within their limits, or to be employed by their
citizens as teachers, mechanics, or skilled
agriculturists, have a right to enter and remain on the
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The Court thus held:

"[T]hat unless since the ratification of the treaty of
1856 there has been a treaty entered into, or an act of
congress passed, repealing it, the Creek nation had the
power to impose this condition or occupation tax, if it
may be so called, upon attorneys at law (white men)
residing and practicing their profession in the Indian
Territory. And inasmuch as the government of the
United States, in the treaty, had declared that all
persons not authorized by its terms to reside in the
Creek Nation should be deemed to be intruders, and had
obligated itself to remove all such persons from the
Creek Nation, the remedy to enforce this provision of
the treaty was a removal by the United States from the
Creek Nation of the delinquent as an intruder."
Id.,
at 809-810.36
---

lands of these tribes; and the right to remain is gone
when the permit has expired."
Id., at 136 (emphasis
added) •
In the second opinion, on the same subject, Attorney General
Phillips stated in 1884 that in the absence of a treaty or
statute, the power of the Indian tribe "to regulate its own
rights of occupancy, and to say who shall participate therein and
upon what conditions, can not be doubted." 18 Op. Atty. Gen. 34,
36. Although the treaties applicable to the Choctaw and
Chickasaw tribes excepted from the grant of self-government power
over nonmembers, the Attorney General did not construe this
provision to limit the tribes's power to exclude:
"I submit that whatever this may mean it does not
limit the right of these tribes to pass upon the
question, who (of persons indifferent to the United
States, i.e., neither employees, nor objectionable)
shall share their occupancy and upon what terms.
That
is a question which all private persons are allowed to
decide for themselves; ••. "
Id. , at 3 7.
36 In other parts of its opinion, the court restated the
proposition that the Tribe was "clothed with the power to admit
white men, or not, at its option, which as we hold, gave it the
right to impose conditions," id., at 811, and that a lawyer who
refused to pay for the privilege of remaining would become an
"intruder":
"On the whole case we therefore hold that a lawyer who
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u.s.

384, decided by this Court in

1904, also arose out of a challenge to legislation by one of the
Five Civilized Tribes requiring non-Indians to pay annual permit
fees.37

The complainants owned cattle and horses that were

is a white man, and not a citizen of the Creek Nation,
is, pursuant to their statute, required to pay for the
privilege of remaining and practicing his profession in
that nation the sum of $25; that, if he refuse the
payment thereof, he becomes, by virtue of the treaty,
an intruder, and that in such a case the government of
the United States may remove him from the nation; and
that this duty devolves upon the interior department.
Whether the interior department or its Indian agents
can be controlled by the courts by the writs of
mandamus and injunction is not material in this case,
because, as we hold, an attorney who refuses to pay the
amount r e quired by the statute by its very terms
becomes an intruder, whom the United States promises by
the terms of the treaty to remove, and therefore in
such cases the officers and agents of the interior
department would be acting clearly and properly within
the scope of their powers."
Id., at 812.
The court~lso reiterated that the Tribe could not collect the
tax without the intervention of the Federal Government:
"And when it is r e membered that up to the time that the
United States courts were established in the Indian
Territory the only remedy for the collection of this
tax was by r e moval, and that the Indian Nations had no
power to collect it, except through the intervention of
the interior department, it is quite clear that if, in
the best judgment of that department, it was deemed
wise to take charge of the matter, and collect this
money, and turn it over to the Indians, it had the
power to do so, under its superintending control of the
Indians, and the intercourse of white men with them
granted by various acts of congress;" Id., at 812.
37 J. George Wright, the Indian inspector, and J. Blair
Shoenfelt, the defendants in Maxey v. Wright, supra, were also
named as defendants in Morris v. Hitchcock. The other defendants
in the Hitchcock case were the Secretary of the Interior and the
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grazing on land in the Chickasaw Nation pursuant to contract with
individual members of the Tribe.

Complainants filed suit in the

District of Columbia praying for an injunction preventing the
defendant federal officials from removing their cattle and horses
from the Indian Territory because complainants refused to pay the
permit fees assessed by the Tribe.

An order dismissing the

complaint was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia and by this Court.

The Court's opinion first noted that treaties between the
United States and the Chickasaw Nation had granted the Tribe the
right "to control the presence within the territory assigned to
it of persons who might otherwise be regarded as intruders"38 and
that the United States had assumed the obligation of protecting
the Indians from aggression by persons not subject to their
jurisdiction.

Id., at 389.

The Court then reviewed similar

legislation that had been adopted by the Chickasaw Nation in
1876, and noted that the Senate Committee on the Judiciary had,
in 1879, specifically referred to such legislation requiring

Commissioner of Indian Affairs.
38

The Court stated:
"And it is not disputed that, under the authority of
these treaties, the Chickasaw Nation has exercised the
power to attach conditions to the presence within its
borders of persons who might otherwise not be entitled
to remain within the tribal territory." 194 U.S., at
389.
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licensed merchants and traders to obtain a permit and to pay a
fee of $25, and had expressed the opinion that such legislation
was not invalid.39

The Court then reviewed two recent opinions of the Attorney
General of the United States that had concluded that the powers
of the Civilized Tribes to impose permit fees had not been
withdrawn by Congress.40

Although Congress had subsequently

39
"Legislation of the same general character as that
embodied in the act of the legislature of the Chickasaw
Nation here assailed as invalid had been enacted by the
Chickasaw Nation before the passage of the Curtis Act.
The essential provisions of one such law, passed on
October 17, 1876, were recited in a report made to the
Senate by the Committee on the Judiciary, on February
3, 1879, from which we copy the following:
"'The law in question seems to have a twofold
object--to prevent the intrusion of unauthorized
persons into the territory of the Chickasaw Nation, and
to raise revenue. By its terms no citizen of any State
or Territory of the United States can either rent land
or procure employment in the Chickasaw country without
entering into a contract with a Chickasaw, which
contract the latter is to report to the clerk of the
county where he resides, and a permit must be obtained
for a time not longer than twelve months, for which the
citizen is to pay the sum of $25.
"'Every licensed merchant, trader, and every
physician, not a Chickasaw, is required to obtain a
permit, for which the sum of $25 is exacted.'
"Declaring in substance that under the existing
treaties with the tribe, the Chickasaws were not
prohibited from excluding from the territory of the
nation the persons affected by the act, the committee
expressed the opinion that the act which was the
subject of the report was not invalid." 194 U.S., at
389-390.
Footnote(s)

40 appear on following page(s).
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protecting them from being evicted as intruders, the Court noted
that no comparable protection had been given to owners of cattle
and horses.

194 U.S., at 392-393.

The Court accordingly

concluded that the Chickasaw legislation imposing grazing fees
was valid.

4 0 In the first opinion, by Attorney General John W. Griggs,
see 23 Op. Atty Gen. 214 (1900), the Attorney General stated:
"The treaties and laws of the United States make
all persons, with a few specified exceptions, who are
not citizens of an Indian nation or members of an
Indian tribe, and are found within an Indian nation
without permission, intruders there, and require their
removal by the United States. This closes the whole
matter, absolutely excludes all but the excepted
classes, and fully authorizes these nations to
absolutely exclude outsiders, or to permit their
residence or business upon such terms as they may
choose to impose, and it must be borne in mind that
citizens of the United States, have, as such, no more
right:or business to be there than they have in any
foreign nation, and can lawfully be there at all only
by Indian permission; and that their right to be or
remain or carry on business there depends solely upon
whether they have such permission.
As to the power or duty of your Department in the
premises there can hardly be a doubt.
Under the
treaties of the United States with these Indian nations
this Government is under the most solemn obligation,
and for which it has received ample consideration, to
remove and keep removed from the territory of these
tribes, all this class of intruders who are there
without Indian permission. The performance of this
obligation, as in other matters concerning the Indians
and their affairs, has long been devolved upon the
Department of the Interior." Id., at 218.
The Court also relied on 23 Op. Atty. Gen. 528

(1901).
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a suit by nonmembers of the Creek Nation against federal
inspectors to enjoin them from stopping the plaintiffs from doing
business within the reservation because they had refused to pay a
permit tax assessed by the Tribe.

The court of Appeals relied on

Morris v. Hitchcock and Maxey v. Wright in upholding the tax.
The opinion for the court by Judge Sanborn emphasized that the
tax was in the nature of a condition precedent to transacting
business within the reservation and that the plaintiffs had ample
notice of the tax:
"The permit tax of the Creek Nation, which is the
subject of this controversy, is the annual price fixed
by the act of its national council, which was approved
by the Pre s ident of the United States in the year 1900,
for the privilege which it offers to those who are not
citizens of its nation of trading within its borders.
The payment of this tax is a mere condition of the
exercise of this privilege. No noncitizen is r e quired
to exercise the privilege or to pay the tax. He may
refrain from the one and he remains free from liability
for the other. Thus, without entering upon an extended
discu~sion or consideration of the question whether
this charge is t e chnically a license or a tax, the fact
appears that it partakes far more of the nature of a
license than of an ordinary tax, because it has the
optional feature of the former and lacks the compulsory
attribute of the latter.
"Re peated decisions of the courts, numerous
opinions of the Attorneys General, and the practice of
years place beyond debate the propositions that prior
to March 1, 1901, the Creek Nation had lawful authority
to require the payment of this tax as a condition
prec e dent to the exercise of the privilege of trading
within its borders, and that the executive department
of the government of the United States had plenary
power to enforce its payment through the Secretary of
the Interior and his subordinates, the Indian
inspector, Indian agent, and Indian police. Morris v.
Hitchcock, 194 u.s. 384, 392, 24 Sup. Ct. 712, 48 L.
Ed. 1030; Crabtree v. Madden, 4 C.C.A. 408, 410, 413,
54 Fed. 426, 428, 431; Maxey v. Wright, 3 Ind. T. 243,
54 S.W. 807; Maxey v. Wright, 44 C.C.A. 683, 105 Fed.
1003; 18 Opinions of Attorneys General, 34, 36; 23
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528." 135 Fed., at 949-950.
Later in the opinion the court again stressed the fact that the
traders had entered the reservation with full knowledge of the
permit obligation, and therefore could be deemed to have accepted
the condition precedent.41

The court also held that even though

41 After citing the opinion of Attorney General Griggs from
which this Court had quoted at length in Morris v. Hitchcock,
Judge Sanborn wrote:
"Pursuant to this decision the civilized tribes
were charging, and the Indian agent was collecting,
taxes from noncitizens engaged in business in these
nations.
It was under this state of facts that the
United States and the Creek Nation made the agreement
of 1901. Did they intend by that agreement that the
Creek Nation should thereby renounce its conceded power
to exact these permit taxes? Both parties knew that
this power existed, and the United States, by the act
of its ?resident approving the law of the Creek
national council, and the Secretary of the Interior by
enforcing it, had approved its exercise. The subject
of these taxes was presented to the minds of the
contracting parties and was considered during the
negotiation of the agreement, for that contract
contains express stipulations that cattle grazed on
rented allotments shall not be liable to any tribal tax
(chapter 676, 31 Stat. 871, § 37), and that 'no
noncitizen renting lands from a citizen for
agricultural purposes as provided by law, whether such
lands have been selected as an allotment or not, shall
be required to pay any permit tax' (chapter 676, 31
Stat. 871, § 39). But they made no provision that
noncitizens who engaged in the mercantile business in
the Creek Nation should be exempt from these taxes. As
the law then in force required such noncitizens to pay
such taxes, as both parties were then aware of that
fact and considered the question, and as they made no
stipulation to abolish these taxes, the conclusive
presumption is that they intended to make no such
contract, and that the power of the Creek Nation to
exact these taxes, and the authority of the Secretary
of the Interior and of his subordinates to collect
them, were neither renounced, revoked, nor restricted,
but that they remained in full force and effect after
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noncitizens of the Tribe had lawfully acquired ownership of lots
within the Creek Nation, they had no right to conduct business
within the reservation without paying the permit taxes.42

Prior to the enactment of the Indian Reorganization Act in
1934, these three cases were the only judicial decisions
considering the power of an Indian tribe to impose a tax on
nonmembers.43

These cases demonstrate that the power to impose

as before the agreement of 1901."
42

135 Fed., at 954.

The court stated:
"The legal effect , however, of the law prescribing the
permit taxes is to prohibit noncitizens from conducting
business within the Creek Nation without the payment of
these taxes." 135 Fed., at 955.

43 Two decades after the Reorganization Act was passed the
problem was revisited by the Eighth Circuit.
In Iron Crow v.
Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge Reservation, 231 F.2d 89 (CA8
1956), the court held that the tribe had the power to assess a
tax on a nonmember lessee of land within the reservation for the
privilege of grazing stock on reservation land. And in Barta v.
Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge Reservation, 259 F.2d 553 (CA8
1958), the Court held that the United States could bring an
action on behalf of the tribe to collect a license tax of three
cents per acre per annum for grazing land and fifteen cents per
acre per annum for farm land levied on nonmember lessees. The
court held that the tax did not violate the constitutional rights
of the nonmember lessees stating, in part:
"The tribe by provisions of its treaty with the United
States has power to provide for the admission of
nonmembers of the tribe onto the reservation. Having
such power, it has the authority to impose restrictions
on the presence of nonmembers within the reservation."
259 F.2d, at 556.
Language in both Iron Crow and Barta suggests that the Court of

No. 80-11; 80-15
- 34 taxes on nonmembers of the tribe derives from the tribe's power
to exclude nonmembers from the reservation and to impose
restrictions and conditions on entry onto the reservation for any
purpose.44

This interpretation of these cases is further

Appeals, unlike the earlier courts, may not have rested the
taxing power solely on the power to exclude. The Court of
Appeals of course did not have the benefit of our decisions in
Oliphant, Wheeler, and Montana v. United States.
44 In his Handbook on Federal Indian Law, Felix Cohen
states:
"Though the scope of the power [to tax] as applied to
nonmembers is not clear, it extends at least to
property of nonmembers used in connection with Indian
property as well as to privileges enjoyed by nonmembers
in trading with the Indians. The power to tax
nonmembers is derived in the cases from the authority,
founded on original sovereignty and guaranteed in some
instances by treaties, to remove property of nonmembers
from the territorial limits of the tribe. Since the
tribal .government has the power to exclude, it can
extract a fee from nonmembers as a condition precedent
to granting permission to remain or to operate within
the tribal domain." Cohen 266-267 (footnotes omitted).
In another part of his treatise, cited by the government and
the Tribe here, Cohen describes the power of taxation as "an
inherent attribute of tribal sovereignty which continues unless
withdrawn or limited by treaty or by act of Congress ... " Id., at
142. After discussing Buster v. Wright, Cohen cites that case
for the proposition that "[t]he power to tax does not depend upon
the power to remove and has been upheld where there was no power
in the tribe to remove the taxpayer from the tribal
jurisdiction." Id., at 143. As we have seen, however, the
license tax in Buster was predicated on the tribe's right to
attach conditions to nonmembers conducting business on the
reservation, and the tribe could prevent such nonmembers from
doing business regardless of whether it could physically remove
those nonmembers from the reservation. Moreover, Cohen does
recognize that the tribal taxes have been upheld on the basis of
the tribe's power to remove nonmembers from the reservation, and
that "[i]t is therefore pertinent, in analyzing the scope of
tribal taxing powers, to inquire how far an Indian tribe is
empowered to remove nonmembers from its reservation."
Ibid.
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tax in all three cases was exclusion from the reservation.45
Moreover, tribal sovereign powers over nonmembers are
appropriately limited because nonmembers are foreclosed from
participation in tribal government.

See n. 30, supra.

If the

power to tax is limited to situations in which the tribe has the
power to exclude, then the nonmember is subjected to the tribe's
jurisdiction only if he consents by choosing to accept the
conditions of entry imposed by the tribe.46

The limited source

of the power to tax nonmembers--the power to exclude intruders-is thus consistent with this Court's narrow construction of the
power of Indian tribes over nonmembers in general.47

The source

The American Indian Policy Review Commission recognized that
the court decisions upholding the tribes' taxing powers "rely
largely upon the power of tribes to remove persons from the
reservation, and consequently, to prescribe the conditions upon
which they shall enter" but argued for a broader source of the
right to tax. AIPRC Final Report 178-179.
45 In Buster v. Wright, supra, the penalty for nonpayment of
the tax was the closing of the nonmember's business, enforced by
the Secretary of the Interior. See 135 F., at 954.
In Morris v.
Hitchcock, supra, the remedy was the removal of the nonmember's
cattle from the reservation, again enforced by the United States.
In Maxey v.Wright, supra, an attorney refusing to pay the license
fee to the Interior Department was subject to removal from the
reservation.
46 "No noncitizen is required to exercise a privilege or to
pay the tax. He may refrain from the one and he remains free
from liability for the other." Buster v. Wright, 135 F., at 949.
47 See pp. 18-21, supra. As we have indicated, see note 26,
supra, the treaties recognizing the inherent power of tribal
self-government have also deprived the tribes of jurisdiction
over nonmembers. Treaties with Indian tribes, however, often
specifically recognized the right of the tribe to exclude
nonmembers from the reservation and to attach conditions to their
entry. See~' Treaty with the Choctaw and Chickasaw, art. 7,
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this case is therefore not the Tribe's power of self-government,
but rather its power over the territory that has been reserved
and set apart for its use and occupation.48

11 Stat. 611 (1855); Treaty with the Creeks, art. 15, 11 Stat.
699 (1855). See II Kappler 7, 9, 12, 15, 17, 20, 21, 27, 30, 42,
75, 418, 682, 699, 703, 719, 761, 774, 779, 790, 794, 800, 866,
886, 888, 929, 985, 990, 998, 1008, 1016, 1021. Although such
treaties obviously have no effect on the Jicarilla Apache Tribe,
and although we assume that the 1934 Reorganization Act was
intended to preseve the same sovereign powers of tribes residing
on executive order reservations as those possessed by tribes
operating under treaties, such treaties are relevant here,
because the executive order creating a reservation clearly would
not permit a tribe to retain more inherent sovereign power than
would be permitted when a tribe places itself under the control
of the United States pursuant to a treaty.
48 The various tribes may have taken a similar view of their
power to tax at the time of the Indian Reorganization Act.
Cohen's treatise notes that:
"The power of an Indian tribe to levy taxes upon its
own members and upon nonmembers doing business within
the reservations has been affirmed in many tribal
constitutions approved under the Wheeler-Howard Act
[Indian Reorganization Act], as has the power to remove
nonmembers from land over which the tribe exercises
jurisdiction." Cohen 143.
The following clause from the 1935 Constitution of the Rosebud
Sioux Tribe, which Cohen cites as a "typical" statement of such
"tribal powers," indicates that the tribe perceived the scope of
its taxation powers over nonmembers to be narrower than the scope
of that power over members:
"(h) To levy taxes upon members of the tribe and to
require the performance of reservation labor in lieu
thereof, and to levy taxes or license fees, subject to
review by the Secretary of the Interior, upon nonmembers doing business within the reservation.
(i) To exclude from the restricted lands of the
reservation persons no legally entitled to reside
therein, under ordinances which shall be subject to
review by the Secretary of the the Interior."
Ibid.
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Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation,
supra.

In that case we held that the power to tax non-Indians

entering the reservation had not been divested by virtue of the
tribe's dependent status and that no overriding federal interest
would be frustrated by the tribal taxation.

The Court quoted

with approval, as an indication of the Executive Branch's
understanding of the taxing power, Solicitor Margold's 1934
opinion.

The Court noted further that "[f]ederal courts also

have acknowledged tribal power to tax non-Indians entering the
reservation to engage in economic activity" and cited Buster v.
Wright and Morris v. Hitchcock.
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u.s.,

at 153.

The tax in

Colville, which was applied to nonmembers who entered the
reservation and sought to purchase cigarettes, is clearly valid
under the rationale that the tribes' power to tax derives from
the right to exclude nonmembers from the reservation and the
right to attach conditions to the entry of such nonmembers
seeking to do business on the reservation.49

Thus the inherent

sovereign power of Indian tribes to tax nonmembers stems from the
tribes' power to exclude and the exercise of the power must be
consistent with its source.

49 A nonmember subjected to the tax could avoid the tax by
declining to do business on the reservation, and the "sanction"
to be imposed for refusal to pay the tax would be denial of
permission to buy cigarettes.
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The exercise of the power to exclude petitioners would have
supported the imposition of a tribal severance tax on petitioners
when they sought to enter the Jicarilla Apache Reservation to
---------------------~

engage in exploration, drilling, and extraction activities.SO
The Tribe did not impose the tax prior to petitioners' entry,
however, and therefore the tax is valid only if the Tribe retains
the power to exclude petitioners from the reservation.

The leases executed by the Tribe and petitioners are clearly
~

vc:_l_i_d_ and binding on both parties.

-

-

===--

The Tribe does not contend

--::-::.--~

that the leases were not the product of arms length bargaining.
Moreover, the leases were executed on a form prepared by the
Department of the Interior, the Department gave specific approval
to the terms of the leases, and they were executed pursuant to
explicit Congressional authority.Sl

Petitioners therefore have

50
"[A]s the the payment of a tax or license fee may be
made a condition of entry upon tribal land, it may also
be made a condition to the grant of other privileges,
such as the acquisition of a tribal lease." Cohen 143.
51 Congress intended the Act of March 3, 1927 to make
applicable to executive order reservations the leasing provisions
already applicable to treaty reservations pursuant to the Act of
May 29, 1924, 43 Stat. 244. S. Rep. No. 1240, 69th Cong., 2d
Sess. 3 (1927). The Act thus permitted the leasing of unallotted
Indian land for terms not to exceed ten years and as much longer
as oil and gas in paying quantities were found on the land.
44
Stat. 1347. Among the purposes of the 1927 statute were to
"[p]ermit the exploration for oil and gas on Executive-order
Indian Reservations," to ••[g]ive the Indian tribes all the oil
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business for the term of the lease.52

Because the execution of

these leases guaranteed the lessees such rights of access to the
reservation as might be necessary to enable them to perform the

and gas royalties," and to "[p)lace with Congress the future
determination of any changes of boundaries of Executive-order
reservations or withdrawals."
Ibid.
In light of these purposes,
it is clear that Congress intended leases executed pursuant to
the 1927 Act to be binding.
The Tribe contends that the leases in this case were
executed pursuant to the Act of May 11, 1938, 52 Stat. 347, and
not the 1927 Act. The Tribe notes that the lease with
petitioners in No. 80-15, which the District Court refused to
admit into evidence, see 617 F.2a, at 547-548, n. 5, states in
one of its provisions that it was executed pursuant to the 1938
Act. See App. 64. Petitioners note, however, that although the
Tribe argues that the 1938 Act, unlike the 1927 Act, does not
require that royalties be paid to the Secretary of the Interior
for the benefit of the Tribe, petitioners make their royalty
payments to the United States Geological Survey for the benefit
of the Tribe. Tr. 79-80. We need not resolve this question,
because for our purposes the provisions of the 1938 Act do not
vary significantly from the provisions of the 1927 Act. The 1938
Act, like the 1927 Act, permitted the leasing of Indian lands for
a period ·~ot to exceed 10 years and as long therefafter as
minerals are produced in paying quantities."
25 U.S.C. §396c.
One of the purposes of the 1938 Act was to establish uniformity
of the law relating to the leasing of tribal lands for mining
purposes by applying the law as to oil and gas leasing to the
leasing of land for the mining of other minerals. s. Rep. No.
985, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1937). Other purposes were to
"bring all leasing matters in harmony with the Indian
Reorganization Act," ia., at 3, ana to enact changes designed "to
give the Indians the greatest return from their property." Ia.,
at 2. There is no indication in the legislative history tha~he
purposes of the 1938 Act are in any way inconsistent with the
purposes of the 1927 Act ana prior legislation. Presumably the
purposes of the earlier legislation were incorporated into the
uniform scheme achieved by the 1938 Act.
52 As Attorney General Macveagh stated in 1881, only those
permitted by the tribe to remain on the reservation may do so,
"and the right to remain is gone when the permit has expired."
17 Op. Atty. Gen., at 136.

'

I
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remain in effect there is no basis for the claim that the Tribe
retains any power to exclude petitioners from the portions of the
reservation on which they acquired drilling and extraction
rights.53

we might reach a different conclusion if the petitioners, at
the time that they signed the leases, had some notice that a
severance tax might be imposed.54

53

If the petitioners had such

Solicitor Margold wrote regarding the power to exclude:
"Over tribal lands, the tribe has the rights of a
landowner as well as the rights of a local government,
dominion as well as sovereignty. But over all the
lands of the reservation, whether owned by the tribe,
by members thereof, or by outsiders, the tribe has the
sovereign power of determining the conditions upon
which persons shall be permitted to enter its domain,
to reside therein, and to do business, provided only
such determination is consistent with applicable
Federal laws and does not infringe any vested rights of
persons now occupying reservation land under lawful
authority. Morris v. Hitchcock (194 U.S. 384) ."
55
I.D., at 50 (emphasis added).

54 In Buster v. Wright, the court relied on the fact that
the taxpayers had ample notice of their potential liability
before they entered into the on-reservation activities that gave
rise to their obligation. The opinion repeatedly emphasized the
optional character of a tax imposed as a condition precedent to
engaging in business, see nn. 41, 46, supra, and the fact that
although both parties were aware of the obligation, they made no
agreement limiting or abolishing the tax:
"But they made no provision that noncitiz e ns who
engaged in the mercantile business in the Creek Nation
should be exempt from these taxes. As the law then in
force required such citizens to pay such t a xes, as both
parties were then aware of that fact and considered the
question, and as they made no stipulation to abolish
these taxes, the conclusive presumption is that they

7
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could be construed as a condition of entry or a condition to
remaining on the land to which petitioners would have consented
by virtue of executing the leases.55

There is a complete absence of any such notice in this case,

-----------

-·--...._

however, and petitioners had no reason to anticipate that the
tribe would attempt to impose an additional condition on the
exercise of the mining rights granted by the leases.56

At the

time the leases were executed the Jicarilla Apache Constitution
contained no authorization of severance taxes of this type.57

intended to make no such contract

"

In

135 F., at 29.

55 In Colville, for example, the nonmember desiring to
purchase cigarettes on the reservation knew that his right to do
so would be conditioned on his consent to pay the tax. Attorney
General Griggs, in his 1900 opinion on "Trespassers on Indian
Lands," diScussed the effect on tribal laws of a federal statute
providing for the sale of reservation lots to non-Indians:
"[T]he legal right to purchase land within an Indian
nation gives to the purchaser no right of exemption
from the laws of such nation, nor does it authorize him
to do any act in violation of the treaties with such
nation. These laws requiring a permit to reside or
carry on business in the Indian country existed long
before and at the time this act was passed. And if any
outsider saw proper to purchase a town lot under this
act of Congress, he did so with full knowledge that he
could occupy it for residence or business only by
permission from the Indians."
23 Op. Atty. Gen., at
217.
56 In 1977, the American Indian Policy Review Commission
stated that Indian tribes "do not both tax and receive royalties.
Usually they just receive royalties." AIPRC Final Report 344.
Footnote(s)

57 appear on following page(s).
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"[N]o regulation hereafter approved shall effect a
change in rate or royalty or annual rental herein
specified without the written consent of the parties to
this lease." App. 27.

Moroever, in 1953 petitioners might reasonably have relied on the
consideration of a comparable issue by Congress as an indication
of what conditions might be attached to the lease of tribal
lands.

When Congress enacted legislation in 1927 granting the

Indians the royalty income from oil and gas leases on
reservations created by executive order, it neither authorized
nor prohibited the imposition of any taxes by the tribes.

The

statute did authorize the collection of severance taxes by the
States.

Petitioners have argued that this authorization pre-

empted any tribal power to impose a comparable tax.

The

legislative history, however, indicates that Congress did not
consider the question of tribal taxes on mineral output from
reservation lands.58

If Congress had considered it possible that

57 The fact that the Tribe apparently believed such
authorization was necessary is indicated by the fact that the
Tribe amended its constitution in 1968, prior to the imposition
of the tax, to permit asse s sment of such severance taxes.
Although the power to exclude might have justified the imposition
of this tax when petitioners signed their leases, even a tribal
constitutional provision recognizing the power to exclude, see n.
48, supra, would not place petitioners on notice of the
possibility that a severance tax would be levied by the tribe in
the future. The 1937 Jicarilla Apache Constitution, however,
contained no reference to the power to exclude or the power to
tax members or nonmembers. See 1937 Constitution.
Footnote(s)

58 appear on following page(s).

No. 80-11; 80-15
- 43 the power to impose severance taxes on leases of this character
would be shared by the States and the tribes, the issue would
surely have been mentioned in the legislation or in its
history.59

58 The Court of Appeals rejected the pre-emption argument
because its reading of the legislative history convinced it "that
Congress simply did not think of the issue when it enacted the
statute." 617 F.2d, at 547.
59 Rep. Leavitt, the Chairman of the Committee on Indian
Affair stated in discussing the purpose of the 1927 Act:
"Briefly, the purpose, so far as the Indians are
concerned, is to make sure by act of Congress that
there can first be a development of possible oil
resources on these Executive-order lands; and, in the
second place, that with the development of the oil
resources the Indians themselves .•. shall have the
benefit of the development of the natural resources of
their reservation instead of having their lands
considered to be public lands of the United States with
the benefits of such development going to the white
people.
"Surely the Indians who once possessed all of this
country and who now have in their possession only those
portions that have been given to them by acts of
Congress, Executive order, and by treaties ought to get
whatever benefit there is from these remaining areas-the resources under the soil as well as above it-without having the white man come in and profit
entirely by these developments." 68 Cong. Rec. 4573.
Rep. Carter, in support of the bill, stated:
"Since we have taken much of their lands for homes for
white p e ople, since great States have been carved and
built from their domain, since they have re s ponded to
every call of their Government both during peace and
war, since by our own act, without their consent, via
et armis we have narrowed them down to a small
reservation, can it now justly lie in our mouths to say
that they are not entitled to all proceeds accruing or
that may accrue from the small patrimony they have
left?" 68 Cong. Rec. 4579.
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possibility that a tribe could grant lessees access to a
reservation for specific purposes in exchange for a specific
consideration and thereafter impose a tax on the exercise of the
granted authority had never occurred to Congress,60 to the

The House and Senate reports state that two of the purposes of
the act were to give th~ Indians "all of the oil and gas
royalties," and to "authorize the states to tax production of oil
and gas on such reservations." S. Rep. No. 1240, 69th Cong., 2d
Sess. 3 (1927); H.R. Rep. No. 1791, 69th Cong. 2d Sess. 3 (1927).
Thus Congress specifically recognized both the right of the
Indians to receive the benefits of all oil and gas resources on
reservation land and the right of the states to impose taxes on
the output yet made no mention of the possibility of tribal
severance taxes. Although the absence of such reference does not
indicate that Congress preempted the right of the tribes to
impose such taxes, the lack of any mention of tribal severance
taxes does nevertheless bear on petitioners awareness of the
possibility that such taxes might be imposed.
As we have noted, see n. 51, supra, the Tribe argues that
the 1938 Act, and not the 1927 Act, is the applicable statute
here. The Tribe argues that the 1938 Act, which makes no
reference ~o the states' right to impose severance taxes,
superceded the 1927 statute, and therefore the states no longer
have the authority to impose severance taxes on the mineral
output of Indian lands. The Court of Appeals did not need to
reach this question, because the state of New Mexico was not a
party, and because the court concluded that the Tribe's tax was
valid regardless of whether the state retained the right to tax
the oil and gas resources.
617 F.2d, at 547-548, n. 5. We also
need not reach this question, because the legislative history of
the 1938 Act, like the history of the 1927 Act, makes no mention
of tribal severance taxes. Even if the omission of the states'
power to impose taxes could be construed as a withdrawal of such
right from the states, there is certainly no indication in the
1938 statute or its history that Congress intended to vest such
power in the tribes or even considered the possibility of doing
so. See n. 51, supra.
60 Although the lack of Congressional recognition of such a
tax would not be relevant to the validity of of a severance tax
which the tribe either imposed at the outset of the lease
relationship or imposed after giving fair notice at the outset of
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Thus the conditions attaching to petitioners' right to extract
oil and gas from the land covered by the leases were not, in the
contemplation of the parties, subject to change during the terms
of the leases.62

The Tribe therefore had no authority to change

such relationship, we clearly do not have such a case here.
61 The Secretary of the Interior has cited cases holding
that a license or franchise issued by a governmental body does
not prevent the later imposition of a tax unless the right to tax
"has been specifically surrendered in terms which admit of no
other reasonable interpretation." St. Louis v. United Rys., 210
u.s. 266, 280; Ne w Orleans City & Lake R.R. v. City of New
Orleans, 143 U.S. 192, 195; New York Transit Corp. v. City of New
York, 303 u.s. 573, 590-593. The principal issue in these cases
was whether the retroactive imposition of the frachise tax
violated the contract clause of the Constitution or was so
fundamentally unfair as to constitute a denial of due process in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although this argument
was by no means frivolous, cf. Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 315
u.s. 610, no such issue is raised here. These cases are
distinguishable from the instant cases for the simple reason that
two different types of sovereigns are involved. The fundamental
differences in their powers have led us to conclude that tribes
do not have tne same attributes of sovereignty as do states and
their subdivisions. Therefore, the fact that a state or its
subdivision may impose taxes after the granting of a license
would neither give notice to petitioners that such a tax was
possible nor stand as authority for the proposition that such a
tax was within the sovereign power of an Indian tribe.
62 The Secre t ary also argues that petitioners should be
required to pay the tax as their contribution to tribal services
which benefit all residents of the Reservation, including
petitioners. Brief for the Secretary of the Interior 14. In
calendar year 1976 the Tribe received $3,995,469.69 in oil and
gas royalties. See n. 15, supra. The Tribe tells us that its
budget for fiscal 1976, which was tendered to the District Court
but not received in evidence, was $3,958,201. See Defendants'
Exhibit AA; Tr. 306; Brief for Respondent 7. Unlike the fixed
royalty used in some mineral leasing arrangements, see United
States v. Swank,
U.S.
, the royalty in these oil and gas
leases is a percentage of the amount produced and so will allow
the Tribe to benefit from a rising market.
Moreover, the tax is not merely an appropriate share of a
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form of a severance tax.63

The attempted exercise of the taxing power asserted by the
Tribe in this case extends so far beyond any exercise of Indian
~

--------..._______

-----------------

sovereignty over nonmembers that has been recognized in the past
that we have no hesitation in concluding that it is beyond the
pow~~--------

The judgment of the Court of Appeals should therefore be
reversed.

budget largely financed by the sovereign's taxation of its own
subjects. The principal components of the annual income of the
members of this Tribe--if the tax should be sustained--would be
the amount of approximately $4,000,000 of royalties and
approximately $2,000,000 in severance taxes received from the
same group of lessees.
63 We do not have in these cases a tax imposed on both
members and nonmembers. The economic burdens of the Jicarilla
Apache severance tax are imposed entirely on taxpayers over whom
the tribe has no jurisdiction except insofar as rights under the
leases are being exercised.
64 Because we rest our decision on the absence of inherent
tribal sovereignty to impose this severance tax, we need not
reach the federal preemption and interstate commerce questions
raised by petitioners.
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MEMORANDUM OF JUSTICE STEVENS

The Indian tribes that occupied North America before
Europeans settled the continent were unquestionably sovereigns.
They ruled themselves and they exercised dominion over the lands
that nourished them.

Many of those tribes, and some attributes

of their sovereignty, survive today.

This Court, since its

earliest days, has had the task of identifying those inherent
sovereign powers that survived the creation of a new nation and
the introduction of an entirely new system of laws applicable to
both Indians and non-Indians.

In this case we must decide

whether one such surviving attribute of tribal sovereignty is the
power to lease tribal property to a non-member and, after the
lease is signed, to impose a tax on the exercise of the rights
granted by the lease.

The lessor in this case is the Jicarilla Apache Tribe.

The

21 petitioner-lessees in these two consolidated cases are
extracting oil and gas from tribal lands pursuant to long-term
leases, some of which have been in effect since 1953.

In 1976

~
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- 2 the Tribe enacted an ordinance imposing a severance tax on the
oil and gas produced under these leases, and petitioners brought
suit to enjoin the collection of the tax.

The District Court

granted the injunction, but the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit reversed, upholding the tax.
certiorari

u.s.

617 F.2d 537.

We granted

Before addressing the legal issues, we

shall recount some of the history of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe,
the derivation of the Indian leasing power, and the facts of
these cases.

I

The 2100 members of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe live on a
reservation ·in northern New Mexico.l

Most of the residents of

the reservation live in the town of Dulce, New Mexico, near the
Colorado border.

The area encompassed by the Reservation became

a part of the United States when the Mexican War ended in the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848.

See 9 Stat. 922.

Between

1848 and 1871, the United States did not enter into any treaty
with the Jicarillas or, as far as we are advised, enact any
special legislation relating to them.

In 1871 Congress outlawed

any future treaties with Indian tribes.2

1

In 1887 President

See Plaintiff's Exhibit E p. 14.

2
"[H]ereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the
territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or
recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power
with whom the United States may contract by treaty:

•
No.
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- 4 The record does not indicate what leasing activity, if any,
occurred on the Jicarilla Reservation between 1887 and 1953.
During that period, however, the authority of Indian tribes to
enter into mineral leases was clarified.

In 1891 Congress passed

a statute permitting the mineral leasing of Indian lands.
February 28, 1891, 26 Stat. 795, 25

u.s.c.

§397.

Act of

Because the

statute applied only to lands "occupied by Indians who have
bought and paid for the same," the statute was interpreted to be
inapplicable to reservations created by executive order.

See

British-American Oil Producing Co. v. Board of Equalization, 299

u.s.

159, 161-162, 164.

Thus in 1922 the Secretary of the

Interior took the position that Indian reservations created by
executive order were public lands and that Indians residing on
such reservations had no right to share in the royalties derived.
from oil and gas leases on such lands.5

In 1927 Congress enacted

executive orders issued by President Theodore Roosevelt on
November 11, 1907 and January 28, 1908, and by President Taft on
February 17, 1912. See App. to Brief for Petitioners in No. 8015, at 22a-24a.
5 This decision held that the land on executive order
reservations was subject to leasing, as "lands of the United
States," under the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of February 25,
1920, 41 Stat. 437, 30 U.S.C. §181 et seq.
49 I.D. 139.
In
1924, Attorney General Stone rendered an opinion stating that the
Mineral Lands Leasing Act did not apply to Executive Order
reservations. 34 Op. Atty. Gen. 181 (1924). Then in 1925
Attorney General Stone instituted litigation in the District
Court of Utah to cancel certain leases that had been authorized
by the Secretary of the Interior pursuant to the Mineral Lands
Leasing Act. See United States v. Harrison, Equity No. 8288 (D.
Utah 1925). See H.R. Rep. No. 1791, 69th Cong., 2nd Sess. 5
(1927). The case was dismissed by stipulation after the 1927 Act
referred to in the text was passed. See United States v.
McMahon, 273 U.S. 782.
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a statute expressly providing that unallotted lands on any Indian
reservation created by executive order may be leased for oil and
gas mining purposes with the approval of the Secretary of the
Interior.6

The statute directed that all rentals, royalties, or

A later decision by this Court suggests that the Secretary's
position was correct.
In Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United
States, 316 u.s. 317, the Court held that an Indian tribe was not
entitled to any compensation from the United States when an
executive order reservation was abolished. The Court said:
"Perhaps the most striking proof of the belief
shared by Congress and the Executive that the Indians
were not entitled to compensation upon the abolition of
an executive order reservation is the very absence of
compensatory payments in such situations.
It was a
common practice, during the period in which
reservations were created by executive order, for the
President simply to terminate the existence of a
reservation by cancelling or revoking the order
establishing it. That is to say, the procedure
followed in the case before us was typical.
No
compensation was made, and neither the Government nor
the Indians suggested that it was due.

*

*

*

*

*

"We conclude therefore that there was no express
constitutional or statutory authorization for the
conveyance of a compensable interest to petitioner by
the four executive orders of 1875 and 1876, and that no
implied Congressional delegation of the power to do so
can be spelled out from the evidence of Congressional
and executive understanding. The orders were effective
to withdraw from sale the lands affected and to grant
the use of the lands to the petitioner. But the
interest which the Indians received was subject to
termination at the will of either the executive or
Congress and without obligation to the United States.
The executive orders of 1879 and 1884 were simply an
exercise of this power of termination, and the payment
of compensation was not required."
316 U.S., at 330331. See also Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States,
348 u.s. 272, 279-282.

Footnote(s)

6 appear on following page(s).

-
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- 6 bonuses from such leases should be paid to the Treasurer of the
United States for the benefit of the tribes.?

The statute

further provided that State taxes could be levied upon the output
of such oil and gas leases8 but made no mention of the

6 Section 1 of the Act of March 3, 1927, 44 Stat. 1347,
current version at 25 U.S.C. §398a, provided:
"Unallotted lands within the limits of any
reservation or withdrawal created by Executive order
for Indian purposes or for the use or occupancy of any
Indians or tribe may be leased for oil and gas mining
purposes in accordance with the provisions contained in
the Act of May 29, 1924 [25 u.s.c. § 398]. "
See also 25 U.S.C. §398. Unallotted land was land which had not
been allotted in severalty to individual Indians pursuant to the
formula prescribed in the General Allotment Act of 1887, 24 Stat.
388.
7

Section 2 of the Act provided:
"The proceeds from rentals, royalties, or bonuses of
oil and gas leases upon lands within Executive order
Indian reservations or withdrawals shall be deposited
in tne Treasury of the United States to the credit of
the tribe of Indians for whose benefit the reservation
or withdrawal was created or who are using and
occupying the land, and shall draw interest at the rate
of 4 per centum per annum and be available for
appropriation by Congress for expenses in connection
with the supervision of the development and operation
of the oil and gas industry and for the use and be nefit
of such Indians:
Provided, That said Indians, or their
tribal council, shall be consulted in regard to the
expenditure of such money, but no per capita p a yment
shall be made e xcept by Act of Congress." 25 U.S.C.
§398b.

8

Section 3 of the Act provided:
"Taxes may be levied and collected by the State or
local authority upon improvements, output of mines or
oil and gas wells, or other rights, property, or assets
of any lessee upon lands within Executive order Indian
reservations in the same manner as such taxes are

~o.
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- 7 possibility that the Indian tribes, in addition to receiving the
royalties, could impose taxes on the output.9

In 1934, Congress enacted the Indian Reorganization Act, 48
Stat. 984, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461 et seq., which authorized any Indian
tribe residing on a reservation to adopt a constitution and bylaws, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior.
The Act provided that in "addition to all other powers vested in
an Indian tribe or tribal council by existing law," the
constitution should also vest certain specific powers, such as
the power to e mploy legal counsel, in the Tribe.lO

25

u.s.c.

otherwise levied and collected, and such taxes may be
levied against the share obtained for the Indians as
bonuses, rentals, and royalties, and the Secretary of
the Interior is authorized and directed to cause such
taxes to be paid out of the tribal funds in the
Treasury:
Provided, That such taxes shall not become a
lien or charge of any kind against the land or other
propetty of such Indians." 25 u.s.c. § 398c.
9 In 1938, Congress passed the Act of May 11, 1938, 52
Stat. 347, 25 u.s.c. §396a-g, which was designed in part to
achieve uniformity for all mineral leases of Indian lands. Like
the 1927 Act, the statute also provided that the tribes were
entitled to the royalties from such leases. The statute made no
mention of state taxes. See nn. 51, 59, infra.
10

The statute provided, in part:

"Any Indian tribe, or tribes, residing on the same
reservation, shall have the right to organize for its
common welfare, and may adopt an appropriate
constitution and bylaws, which shall become effective
when ratified by a majority vote of the adult members
of the tribe, or of the adult Indians residing on such
reservation, as the case may be, at a special election
authorized and called by the Secretary of the Interior
under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe.
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The Act further authorized the Secretary of the Interior

to issue a charter of incorporation to an Indian tribe, and
provided that the charter may convey to the tribe the power to
purchase, manage and dispose of its property.ll
said nothing about the power to levy taxes.l2

*

*

The 1934 Act
The first

*

"In addition to all powers vested in any Indian
tribe or tribal council by existing law, the
constitution adopted by said tribe shall also vest in
such tribe or its tribal council the following rights
and powers: To employ legal counsel, the choice of
counsel and fixing of fees to be subject to the
approval of the Secretary of the Interior; to prevent
the sale, disposition, lease, or encumbrance of tribal
lands, interests in lands, or other tribal assets
without the consent of the tribe; and to negotiate with
the Federal, State, and local Governments."
25 U.S.C.
§ 476.
11

Section 477 provides:
"The Secretary of the Interior may, upon petition
by at least one-third of the adult Indians, issue a
charter of incorporation to such tribe: Provided, That
such charter shall not become operative until ratified
at a special election by a majority vote of the adult
Indians living on the reservation. Such charter may
convey to the incorporated tribe the power to purchase,
take by gift, or bequest, or otherwise, own, hold,
manage, operate, and dispose of property of every
description, real and personal, including the power to
purchase restricted Indian lands and to issue in
exchange therefor interests in corporate property, and
such further powers as may be incidental to the conduct
of corporate business, not inconsistent with law; but
no authority shall be granted to sell, mortgage, or
lease for a period exceeding ten years any of the land
included in the limits of the reservation. Any charter
so issued shall not be revoked or surrendered except by
Act of Congress."
25 u.s.c. § 477.

12 See F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 267 (1942)
(hereinafter Cohen) .
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the Interior in 1937.13

In 1953, the Tribe entered into an oil and gas lease with
the Phillips Petroleum Company.

App. 22-30.

The lease, which is

on a form prepared by the Bureau of Indian Affairs of the
Department of Interior, is presumably typical of later leases
executed between other companies and the Tribe.l4

The lease

provides that in return for a cash bonus of $71,345.99, to be
paid to the treasurer of the Tribe, and rents and royalties, the
Tribe as lessor granted to the lessee "the exclusive right and
privilege to drill for, mine, extract, remove, and dispose of all
the oil and natural gas deposits in or under" the described
tracts of land, together with the right to construct and maintain
buildings, plants, tanks, and other necessary structures on the
surface.

App. 22-23.

The lease is for a term of 10 years after

approval by the Secretary of the Interior "and as much longer
thereafter as oil and/or gas is produced in paying quantities
from said land."

Ibid.

The lessee is obligated to use

l3 The 1937 Constitution made no reference to any power to
assess taxes against nonmembers. See 1937 Constitution and ByLaws of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe, Defendants' Exhibit G
(hereinafter 1937 Constitution).
14 The original plaintifs in No. 80-11 operate under this
lease. The original plaintiffs in No. 80-15 also executed a
lease with the Tribe in 1953. See App. 62. Leases of Jicarilla
tribal property in the aggregate cover over 500,000 acres of
land, comprising almost 69% of the acreage within the Jicarilla
Reservation. Brief for Respondent 2.
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- 10 reasonable diligence in the development of the property and to
pay an annual rental of $1.25 per acre and a royalty of 12 1/2%
"of the volume or amount" of all oil and gas "produced and saved"
from the leased land.

App. 24, 26.

Oil and gas used by the

lessee for development and operation of the lease is royaltyfree.

Id., at 24.

The Tribe reserved the right to use free of

charge sufficient gas for any school or other building owned by
the Tribe on the leased premises and to take its royalty in kind.
Id., at 27-28.

The lease contains no reference to the payment of any taxes.
The lessee does, however, agree to comply with all regulations of
the Secretary of Interior

"[N]ow or hereafter in force relative to such leases:
Provided, That no regulation hereafter approved shall
effect a change in rate or royalty or annual rental
herein specified without the written consent of the
parties to this lease." Id., at 27.

The lease was approved by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs on
behalf of the Secretary of the Interior.

Id., at 32.

Both of

the 1953 leases described in the record are still producing.

In 1968 the Tribe adopted a revised constitution giving the
Tribal Council authority, "subject to approval by the Secretary
of the Interior, to impose taxes and fees on non-members of the
tribe doing business on the reservation."
Petitioners in No. 80-15, at 12a-13a.

App. to Brief for

Eight years later, on July
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- 11 9, 1976, the Tribal Council enacted an Oil and Gas Severance Tax
Ordinance, which was later approved by the Secretary of the
Interior.

The Tribal Ordinance provides that the severance tax

"is imposed on any oil and natural gas severed, saved and removed
from Tribal lands . . . • "

App. 38.

The rate of the tax is $.05

per million BTU of gas produced on the reservation and sold or
transported off the reservation and $0.29 per barrel of crude oil
or condensate produced on the reservation and sold or transported
off the reservation.

Royalty gas or oil taken by the Tribe, as

well as gas or oil used by the Tribe, is exempt from the tax.
App. 39.

Thus the entire burden of the tax apparently will fall

on nonmembers of the Tribe.

The tax, if sustained, will produce

over $2,000,000 in revenues annually.l5

Petitioners-lessees commenced two separate actions in the
United States District Court seeking to enjoin the tribal
authorities and the Secretary of the Interior from taking any
action to collect the tax.

The District Court consolidated the

two cases, allowed other lessees to intervene, and held the
taxing ordinance invalid on three separate grounds.

First, after

finding that the Tribe had never attempted to exercise a power of
taxation over nonresidents prior to its incorporation in 1937,

15 See District Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, Finding No. 32, App. 130. The Tribe's answers to
interrogatories indicate that in 1976 the royalties on the leases
received by the Tribe amounted to $3,995,469.69. See Plaintiff's
Exhibit E p. 7; Tr. 269.
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that power on the Tribe, the District Court concluded that the
attributes of sovereignty possessed by the Tribe did not extend
to the imposition of a severance tax on nonmembers.

Second, the

court held that the statute enacted by Congress in 1927, which
authorized oil and gas leases on reservations created by
executive order, had granted State and local authorities the
exclusive right to impose severance taxes on oil and gas
production from such reservations.

Finally, after finding that

approximately 80% of the oil and gas production from the
reservation is shipped interstate for sale outside of New Mexico,
that the tax burden amounts to a significant percentage of the
price of gas and oi1,l6 and that the tax is only imposed on gas,
oil, or condensate sold or transported off the reservation, the
court concluded that it discriminated against and created an
impermissible burden on interstate commerce.

Over the dissent of two judges, the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit, sitting en bane, reversed.

617 F.2d 537.

The

court held that the taxing power was an inherent attribute of
sovereignty possessed by the Tribe prior to the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934.

The court further held that that

16 Finding No. 36 reads:
"That if the Jicarilla Apache Oil
and Gas Severence Tax were valid the combined tax burden amounts
to more than 29% of the interstate price of old gas and over
12.5% of the price of old oil." App. 130. The Tribe contends
that this finding is not supported by the record, but the Court
of Appeals did not set it aside.

&o.
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- 13 power had not been voluntarily relinquished by the Tribe, had not
been divested by Congress, and was not inconsistent with any
superior interest of the United States.

The Court of Appeals

rejected the argument that the 1927 Act had pre-empted the
Tribe's power to levy a severance tax, because a review of the
legislative history indicated that "Congress simply did not think
of the issue when it enacted the statute."

Id., at 547.

The

Court of Appeals' reversal of the District Court's commerce
clause holding was based on the two courts' different readings of
the ordinance:

whereas the District Court had construed the

taxable event as removal of the oil or gas from the boundaries of
the reservation, the Court of Appeals construed severance from
the land as the critical event.

Id., at 546.

Under the Court of

Appeals' view, the ordinance would not discriminate against
interstate commerce because oil or gas sold within the
reservation as well as oil or gas transported off the reservation
would be taxed.

The court concluded that the fact that royalties

paid in kind are exempt did not render the tax discriminatory,
and that the fact that New Mexico had imposed separate taxes on
the same taxable event did not create an impe rmissible multiple
burden on commerce.

Id., at 545-546.

II

The powers possessed by Indian tribes stem from three
sources: federal statutes, treaties, or the tribe's inherent
sovereignty.

Neither the Tribe nor the federal government seeks

.
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to justify the Jicarilla Tribe's severance tax on the basis of
any federal statute,l7 and the Jicarilla Apaches, who reside on
an executive order reservation, executed no treaty with the
United States from which they derive any sovereign powers.
Therefore, if the severance tax is valid, it must be as an
exercise of the Tribe's inherent sovereignty.

Last Term, in

washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation,
447 U.S. 134, we held that a tribal tax on cigarettes sold on the
reservations of the Colville, Makah, and Lummi tribes to
nonmembers of the tribes was a permissible exercise of the
tribes' retained sovereign power to tax.lB

We must determine

whether the severance tax imposed on nonmembers of the tribe in
this case can likewise be characterized as a valid exercise of
the tribe's inherent powers.

To make this determination, we must

first consider the source and scope of tribal sovereignty and
more particularly the source and scope of the sovereign power to

17 Congress may delegate "sovereign" powers to the tribes.
See Mazurie v. United States, 419 U.S. 544. As we have
indicated, however, neither the 1927 statute permitting Indians
to receive royalties from the lease of tribal lands nor the
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 make any mention of the
authority of Indian tribes to tax. See pp.4-8, supra.
18

The Court stated:
"The power to tax transactions occurring on trust lands
and significantly involving a tribe or its members is a
fundamental attribute of sovereignty which the tribes
retain unless divested of it by federal law or
necessary implication of their dependent status."
447
u.s., at 152.
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Tribal sovereignty, unlike the sovereignty of the United
States and the individual states, is not derived from the
Constitution.l9

Rather, Indian tribes are assumed to have

retained powers of self-government that they possessed at the
time of their incorporation into the United States.

In Worcester

v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, the Court held unconstitutional a Georgia
criminal statute purporting to regulate residency of non-Indians
in the Cherokee Nation.

In an opinion by Chief Justice Marshall,

the Court held that the Cherokees, although submitting to the
protection of the United States, nevertheless retained some
aspects of sovereignty:
"By various treaties, the Cherokees have placed
themselves under the protection of the United States:
they have agreed to trade with no other people, nor to
invoke the protection of any other sovereignty. But
such engagements do not divest them of the right of
self ~overnment, nor destroy their capacity to enter
into treaties or compacts."
Id., at 581-582.20

19 The only reference to Indian tribes in the Constitution
is in Article I, §8(3), which provides that "[t]he Congress shall
have the Power to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian tribes." More
significant than this reference to Indian tribes is the absence
of any mention of the tribes in the Tenth Amendment, which
provides:
"The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people."
20

The Court also stated:
"At no time has the sovereignty of the country been
recognized as existing in the Indians, but they have
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United States retains plenary authority to divest the tribes of
any such attributes.21

Moreover, this Court's decisions since

Worcester have recognized that not all attributes of sovereignty
are consistent with the tribes' status as "domestic dependent
nations."22

In determining what sovereign powers the tribes

been always admitted to possess many of the attributes
of sovereignty. All the rights which belong to self
government have been recognized as vested in them.
Their right of occupancy has never been questioned, but
the fee in the soil has been considered in the
government. This may be called the right to the
ultimate domain, but the Indians have a present right
of possession."
31 u.s., at 580.
21 See United States v. Wheeler, 435 u.s. 313, 319; Winton
v. Amos, 255 u.s. 373, 391-392; Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 u.s.
553, 565; 1 American Indian Policy Review Commission, Final
Report, 106-107 (1977) (hereinafter AIPRC Final Report). Thus,
for example, Congress can waive the tribes' sovereign immunity.
See United States v. u.s. Fidelity, 309 u.s. 506, 512.
22 InThe Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1, 17, the
Court held that the tribes were not "foreign nations" within the
meaning of the Constitution:
"Though the Indians are acknowledged to have an
unquestionable, and, heretofore, unquestioned right to
the lands they occupy, until that right shall be
extinguished by a voluntary cession to our government;
yet it may well be doubted whether those tribes which
reside within the acknowledged boundaries of the United
States can, with strict accuracy, be denominated
foreign nations. They may, more correctly, perhaps, be
denominated domestic dependent nations. They occupy a
territory to which we assert a title independent of
their will, which must take effect in point of
possession when their right of possession ceases.
Meanwhile they are in a state of pupilage. Their
relation to the United States resembles that of a ward
to his guardian."

.
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Court has repeatedly recognized a fundamental distinction between
the right of tribes to govern their own internal affairs and the
right to exercise powers affecting nonmembers of the tribe.23

The Court has been careful to protect the tribes from
interference with tribal control over its members.
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 65.

See, e.g.,

The Court has

recognized that the power to preosecute members of the tribe for
violations of tribal criminal law does not derive from power
delegated by the United States but is an inherent attribute of
sovereignty.

United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313.

Furthermore, the Indian tribes retain the power to create
substantive law to govern their internal affairs.
v.Burney, 168 U.S. 218
29

See Roff

(membership); Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1,

(inheritance rules); Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382

(domestic relations and family law) .
law in tribal courts.
District Court, supra.

They also may enforce that

Williams v. Lee, 358 u.s. 217; Fisher v.
Moreover, the Indian tribes' sovereignty

2 3 In United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-382, the
Court stated that the tribes
"[W]ere, and always have been, regarded as having a
semi-ind e pendent position when they preserved their
tribal relations: not as States, not as nations, not as
possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty, but as
a separate people, with the power of regulating their
internal and social relations, and thus far not brought
under the laws of the union or of the State within
whose limits they resided."

.
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greater than the States' powers over their own citizens.

The

tribes' virtually absolute control over their own membership
carries with it the power to enforce discriminatory rules that
would be intolerable in a non-Indian community.24

Their criminal

jurisdiction over their own members is unconstrained by
constitutional limitations that are applicable to the States and
the Federal Government.25

Thus the use of the word "sovereign"

to characterize tribal powers of self-government is surely
appropriate.

In sharp contrast to the Tribe's broad powers over their own
members, tribal powers over nonmembers have always been narrowly
confined.26

The Court has emphasized that "exercise of tribal

24 Although the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 82 Stat.
77, 25 u.S:c. §§ 1301-1303, prohibits Indian tribes from denying
"to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
its laws," see id., §1302(8), the provisions of the United
States Constitution, including the Fourteenth Amendment, which
limit federal or state authority do not similarly limit tribal
authority. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 u.s. 49, 56
and n. 7. In Santa Clara Pueblo, the Court held that sovereign
immunity protected the tr1be from suit under the Indian Civil
Rights Act, that the Act did not create a private cause of action
cognizable in federal court, and that a tribal court was the
appropriate forum for vindication of rights created by the Act.
25 In Talton v. Mayes, 163 u.s. 376, the court held that the
restrictions of the Fifth Amendment did not apply to prosecutions
in tribal courts. See also United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S.,
at 328-329; Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354, 355.
26 Treaties which specifically granted the right of self
government to the tribes often also specifically excluded
jurisdiction over nonmembers. See, ~, Treaty with the
Cherokees, art. 5, 7 Stat. 478 (1835); Treaty with the Choctaws
and Chickasaws, art 7, 11 Stat 611 (1855); Treaty with the Creeks
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or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the
dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot survive without
express Congressional delegation."

u.s.

Montana v. United States,

In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S.

191, the Court held that tribes have no criminal jurisdiction
over crimes committed by nonmembers within the reservations.27
In Montana v. United States, supra, the Court, in holding that
the Crow Tribe could not prohibit hunting and fishing by
nonmembers on reservation land no longer owned by the Tribe,
indicated that the principle underlying Oliphant--limited tribal
power over nonmembers--was applicable in a civil as well as a

and Seminoles, art. 15, 11 Stat. 699 (1856).
27

The Court stated in support of that holding:
"Upon incorporation into the territory of the United
States, the Indian tribes thereby come under the
territorial sovereignty of the United States and their
exercise of separate power is constrained so as not to
conflict with the interests of this overriding
sovereignty.
'[T]heir rights to complete sovereignty ,
as independent nations, [are] necessarily diminished.'
Johnson v. M'Intosh, 8 Wheat. 543, 574 (1823).
"We have already described some of the inherent
limitations on tribal powers that stem from their
incorporation into the United States.
In Johnson v.
M'Intosh, supra, we noted that the Indian tribes'
'power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to
whomsoever they pleased,' was inherently lost to the
overriding sovereignty of the United States." 435 u.s.
at 209.

See also New York ex rel Ray v. Martin, 326 u.s. 496, 499 (state
court has jurisdiction to try a non-Indian for a crime committed
against non-Indian on reservation) •
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Thus the Court has recognized that it is

when the tribes attempt to impose controls on nonmembers that the
tribes' exercise of sovereign powers would be inconsistent with
their status.29

28
"The Court recently applied these general
principles in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435
U.S. 191, rejecting a tribal claim of inherent
sovereign authority to exercise criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians. Stressing that Indian tribes cannot
exercise power inconsistent with their diminished
status as sovereigns, the Court quoted Justice
Johnson's words in his concurrence in Fletcher v. Peck,
Cranch 87--the first Indian case to reach this Court-that the Indian tribes have lost 'any right to
governing every person within their limits except
themselves.'
Id., at 147, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe, supra, 435 U.S., at 209. Though Oliphant only
determined inherent tribal authority in criminal
matters, the principles on which it relied support the
general proposition that the inherent sovereign powers
of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of
nonmembers of the tribe."
Montana v. United States,
U.S., at
(footnote omitted).
See also Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 u.s.
661, (tribes cannot freely alienate to non-Indians the land they
occupy); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet., at 17-18 (tribes
cannot enter into direct commercial or foreign relations with
other nations) •
29 In Wheeler v. United States, supra, the Court held that
the power to prosecute its members for tribal offenses was not
"implicitly lost by virtue of their dependent status" and stated:
"The areas in which such implicit divestiture of
sovereignty has been held to have occurred are those
involving the relations between an Indian tribe and
nonmembers of the tribe.

*

*

*

*

*

These limitations rest on the fact that the
dependent status of Indian tribes within our
territorial jurisdiction is necessarily inconsistent
with their freedom independently to determine their
external relations. But the powers of self-government,
including the power to prescribe and enforce internal
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The tribes' limited authority to enact legislation affecting
nonmembers is therefore of a different character than the broad
tribal power over internal affairs involving members.30

The

power to exercise control over nonmembers--and specifically the
power to tax recognized in Colville--presumably has a much more
limited derivation, tied specifically to the exercise of
particular powers, than the general retention of inherent
sovereignty to govern internal affairs.

We must therefore

examine the cases upholding the the power to tax to determine the
source of that power and then determine whether the tax imposed
in this case is consistent with that rationale.

III

The search for the source of the taxing power must focus on
the tribal power to tax nonmembers that existed in 1934 when the

criminal laws, are of a different type. They involve
only the relations among members of a tribe. Thus,
they are not such powers as would necessarily be lost
by virtue of a tribe's dependent status.
'[T]he
settled doctrine of the law of nations is, that a
weaker power does not surrender its independence--its
right to self government, by associating with a
stronger, and taking its protection.' Worcester v.
Georgia [6 Pet.], at 560-561."
435 U.S., at 326.
30 This lack of inherent sovereignty over nonmembers is
supported by the principle that "in this Nation each sovereign
governs only with the consent of the governed." Nevada v. Hall,
440 U.S. 410, 426. Because the tribe can completely exclude
nonmembers from participation in the tribal government, the power
exercised over those so excluded should be a limited one.
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any further erosion of Indian sovereign powers.31

Shortly after

the Act was passed, the Solicitor of the Department of the
Interior issued a formal opinion setting forth his understanding
of the powers that might be secured to an Indian tribe and

31 The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 confirmed but did
not enlarge the inherent sovereign powers of the Indian tribes.
Congress intended the Act to "stabilize the tribal organization
of Indian tribes by vesting such tribal organizations with real,
though limited, authority ..• " S. Rep. No. 1080, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 1 (1934). As one commentator interpreted section 16 of the
Act:
''[I]t would appear that powers originally held by
tribes that were recognized and allowed to be retained
by treaties or prior statutes, as well as any
additional powers conferred in the same manner, would
be retained by tribes that accepted the terms of the
1934 Act . . . • The provision is consistent with the
act's purpose of enhancing tribal government in that it
recognized and reconfirmed those powers a tribe may
already have had as a government." Mettler, A Unified
Theory of Indian Tribal Sovereignty, 30 Hastings L.
Rev. 89, 97 (1978).

--

Moreover, although the power given by the Reorganization Act of
1934 to the Secretary of the Interior to approve or disapprove of
the exercise of tribal powers placed a limit on tribal
sovereignty, that power did not enable the Secretary to add to
the inherent powers that a tribe possessed before the Act was
passed.
On the other hand, the fact that an Indian tribe may never
have had the occasion to exercise a particular power over
nonmembers in its early history is surely not a sufficient reason
for denying the existence of that power. Accordingly, the fact
that there is no evidence that the Jicarilla Apache Tribe ever
imposed a tax of any kind on a nonmember does not require us to
conclude that it has no such taxing power. To the extent that
the power to tax was an attribute of sovereignty possessed by
Indian tribes when the Reorganization Act was passed, we believe
Congress intended the statute to preserve those powers for all
Indian tribes that adopted a formal organization under the Act.
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incorporated in its constitution by virtue of the statutory
reference to powers vested in an Indian tribe "by existing
law."32

He concluded that among those powers was a power of

taxation and described the permissible exercise of this power:

"Except where Congress has provided otherwise, this
power may be exercised over members of the tribe and
over nonmembers, so far as such nonmembers may accept
privileges of trade, residence, etc., to which taxes
may be attached as conditions." 55 I.D. 14, 46.
Solicitor Margold cited three decisions in support of this

32 55 I.D. 14. Solicitor Margold described the scope of
this opinion as follows:
"My opinion has been requested on the question of
what powers may be secured to an Indian tribe and
incorporated in its constitution and by-laws by virtue
of the following phrase, contained in section 16 of the
Wheeler-Howard Act (48 Stat. 984, 987):
In addition to all powers vested in any Indian
tribe~ or tribal council by existing law, the
constitution adopted by said tribe shall also vest *
* [Italics added.]

*

"The question of what powers are vested in an
Indian tribe or tribal council by existing law cannot
be answered in detail for each Indian tribe without
reference to hundreds of special treaties and special
acts of Congress.
It is possible, however, on the
basis of the reported cases, the written opinions of
the various executive departments, and those statutes
of Congr e ss which are of general import, to define the
powers which have heretofore been recognized as
lawfully within the jurisdiction of an Indian tribe.
My answer to the propounded question, then, will be
general, and subject to correction for particular
tribes in the light of the treaties and statutes
affecting such tribe wherever such treaties or statutes
contain peculiar provisions restricting or enlarging
the general authority of an Indian tribe."
Id., at 1718.
-

.
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These three cases, Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947 (CAS

1905), app. dismissed, 203 U.S. 599; Morris v. Hitchcock, 194
U.S. 3S4; and Maxey v. Wright, 3 Ind. T. 243, 54 S.W. S07 (Ct
App. Ind. T.), aff'd., 105 Fed. 1003,

(CAS 1900), were decided

shortly after the turn of the century and are the three leading
cases considering the power of an Indian tribe to assess taxes
against nonmembers.33
in their reasoning.

The three cases are similar in result and
In each the court upheld the tax; in each

the court relied on the Tribe's power to exclude non-Indians from
its reservation and concluded that the Tribe could condition
entry or continued presence within the reservation on the payment
of a license fee or a tax; in each the court assumed that the
remedy for nonpayment would be exclusion from the reservation or
intervention by the Interior Department on behalf of the Tribe.

In the first of these cases, Maxey v. Wright, 54 S.W. S07
(1900), the Court of Appeal of Indian Territory affimed an order
by a federal territorial court dismissing a complaint filed by
non-Indian lawyers practicing in the Creek Nation.

They had

sought to enjoin the Indian agent for the Five Civilized Tribes
from collecting an annual occupation tax of $25.00 on each nonIndian lawyer residing and practicing his profession on the

33 Felix Cohen, in his Handbook on Federal Indian Law,
published in 1942, also relies on these cases in his discussion
of tribal taxation of nonmembers. Cohen 266-267. The Court in
Colville cited both Buster v. Wright and Morris v. Hitchcock in
upholding tribal power to tax.
447 U.S., at 153. See pp. 36-37,
infra.

.
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In rejecting the attorneys' claim, the Court of

Appeal first analyzed the relevant treaties between the United
States and the Creeks and noted that they had "carefully guarded
their sovereignty, and their right to admit, and consequently to
exclude, all white persons, except such as are named in the
Treaty."

Id., at 809.

The United States, pursuant to a treaty

with the Creeks, had agreed that all persons not expressly
excepted who were present in the Creek Nation "without the
consent of that nation are deemed to be intruders, and pledges
itself to remove them."

Ibid.

Because attorneys were not within

any excepted class,34 the Tribe had the authority to require them
to obtain permits or to require their removal as "intruders."35

34
"Attorneys practicing in the United States courts are
not persons who come within the exceptions, for they
are not 'in the employment of the government of the
United States,' or 'persons peaceably traveling or
temporarily sojourning in the country, or trading
therein under license from the proper authority of the
United States."
54 S.W., at 809.

35 In reaching this conclusion the court relied heavily on
two opinions of the Attorney General of the United States. In
the first opinion, issued in 1881, Attorney General McVeagh
upheld the validity of Indian permit laws regulating which
persons would be permitted to reside on the Choctaw and Chickasaw
reservations. 17 Op. Atty. Gen. 134.
In his discussion of the
right of non-Indians to enter and remain on tribal lands Attorney
General McVeagh stated:
"Replying to your fourth question: it seems from
what has been already said that, besides those persons
or classes mentioned by you, only those who have been
permitted by the Choctaws or Chickasaws to reside
within their limits, or to be employed by their
citizens as teachers, mechanics, or skilled
·
agriculturists, have a right to enter and remain on the
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The Court thus held:

"[T]hat unless since the ratification of the treaty of
1856 there has been a treaty entered into, or an act of
congress passed, repealing it, the Creek nation had the
power to impose this condition or occupation tax, if it
may be so called, upon attorneys at law (white men}
residing and practicing their profession in the Indian
Territory. And inasmuch as the government of the
United States, in the treaty, had declared that all
persons not authorized by its terms to reside in the
Creek Nation should be deemed to be intruders, and had
obligated itself to remove all such persons from the
Creek Nation, the remedy to enforce this provision of
the treaty was a removal by the United States from the
Creek Nation of the delinquent as an intruder."
Id.,
at 809-810.36
-

lands of these tribes; and the right to remain is gone
when the permit has expired."
Id., at 136 (emphasis
added} •
In the second opinion, on the same subject, Attorney General
Phillips stated in 1884 that in the absence of a treaty or
statute, the power of the Indian tribe "to regulate its own
rights of occupancy, and to say who shall participate therein and
upon what conditions, can not be doubted."
18 Op. Atty. Gen. 34,
36. Although the treaties applicable to the Choctaw and
Chickasaw tribes excepted from the grant of self-government power
over nonmembers, the Attorney General did not construe this
provision to limit the tribes's power to exclude:
"I submit that whatever this may mean it does not
limit the right of these tribes to pass upon the
question, who (of persons indifferent to the United
States, i.e., neither employees, nor objectionable}
shall share their occupancy and upon what terms. That
is a question which all private persons are allowed to
decide for themselves; ... "
Id., at 37.
36 In other parts of its opinion, the court restated the
proposition that the Tribe was "clothed with the power to admit
white men, or not, at its option, which as we hold, gave it the
right to impose conditions," id., at 811, and that a lawyer who
refused to pay for the privilege of remaining would become an
"intruder":
"On the whole case we therefore hold that a lawyer who
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384, decided by this Court in

1904, also arose out of a challenge to legislation by one of the
Five Civilized Tribes requiring non-Indians to pay annual permit
fees.37

The complainants owned cattle and horses that were

is a white man, and not a citizen of the Creek Nation,
is, pursuant to their statute, required to pay for the
privilege of remaining and practicing his profession in
that nation the sum of $25; that, if he refuse the
payment thereof, he becomes, by virtue of the treaty,
an intruder, and that in such a case the government of
the United States may remove him from the nation; and
that this duty devolves upon the interior department.
Whether the interior department or its Indian agents
can be controlled by the courts by the writs of
mandamus and injunction is not material in this case,
because, as we hold, an attorney who refuses to pay the
amount required by the statute by its very terms
becomes an intruder, whom the United States promises by
the terms of the treaty to remove, and therefore in
such cases the officers and agents of the interior
department would be acting clearly and properly within
the scope of their powers."
Id., at 812.
The court also reiterated that the Tribe could not collect the
tax without the intervention of the Federal Government:
"And when it is remembered that up to the time that the
United States courts were established in the Indian
Territory the only remedy for the collection of this
tax was by removal, and that the Indian Nations had no
power to collect it, except through the intervention of
the interior department, it is quite clear that if, in
the best judgment of that department, it was deemed
wise to take charge of the matter, and collect this
money, and turn it over to the Indians, it had the
power to do so, under its superintending control of the
Indians, and the intercourse of white men with them
granted by various acts of congress;"
Id., at 812.
37 J. George Wright, the Indian inspector, and J. Blair
Shoenfelt, the defendants in Maxey v. Wright, supra, were also
named as defendants in Morris v. Hitchcock. The other defendants
in the Hitchcock case were the Secretary of the Interior and the
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grazing on land in the Chickasaw Nation pursuant to contract with
individual members of the Tribe.

Complainants filed suit in the

District of Columbia praying for an injunction preventing the
defendant federal officials from removing their cattle and horses
from the Indian Territory because complainants refused to pay the
permit fees assessed by the Tribe.

An order dismissing the

complaint was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia and by this Court.

The Court's opinion first noted that treaties between the
United States and the Chickasaw Nation had granted the Tribe the
right "to control the presence within the territory assigned to
it of persons who might otherwise be regarded as intruders"38 and
that the United States had assumed the obligation of protecting
the Indians from aggression by persons not subject to their
jurisdiction.

Id., at 389.

The Court then reviewed similar

legislation that had been adopted by the Chickasaw Nation in
1876, and noted that the Senate Committee on the Judiciary had,
in 1879, specifically referred to such legislation requiring

Commissioner of Indian Affairs.
38

The Court stated:
"And it is not disputed that, under the authority of
these treaties, the Chickasaw Nation has exercised the
power to attach conditions to the presence within its
borders of persons who might otherwise not be entitled
to remain within the tribal territory." 194 U.S., at
389.
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fee of $25, and had expressed the opinion that such legislation
was not invalid.39

The Court then reviewed two recent opinions of the Attorney
General of the United States that had concluded that the powers
of the Civilized Tribes to impose permit fees had not been
withdrawn by Congress.40

Although Congress had subsequently

39
"Legislation of the same general character as that
embodied in the act of the legislature of the Chickasaw
Nation here assailed as invalid had been enacted by the
Chickasaw Nation before the passage of the Curtis Act.
The essential provisions of one such law, passed on
October 17, 1876, were recited in a report made to the
Senate by the Committee on the Judiciary, on February
3, 1879, from which we copy the following:
"'The law in question seems to have a twofold
object--to prevent the intrusion of unauthorized
persons into the territory of the Chickasaw Nation, and
to raise revenue. By its terms no citizen of any State
or Territory of the United States can either rent land
or procure employment in the Chickasaw country without
entering into a contract with a Chickasaw, which
contract the latter is to report to the clerk of the
county where he resides, and a permit must be obtained
for a time not longer than twelve months, for which the
citizen is to pay the sum of $25.
"'Every licensed merchant, trader, and every
physician, not a Chickasaw, is required to obtain a
permit, for which the sum of $25 is exacted.'
"Declaring in substance that under the existing
treaties with the tribe, the Chickasaws were not
prohibited from excluding from the territory of the
nation the persons affected by the act, the committee
expressed the opinion that the act which was the
subject of the report was not invalid." 194 U.S., at
389-390.
.
Footnote(s)

40 appear on following page(s).
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protecting them from being evicted as intruders, the Court noted
that no comparable protection had been given to owners of cattle
and horses.

194 U.S., at 392-393.

The Court accordingly

concluded that the Chickasaw legislation imposing grazing fees
was valid.

4 0 In the first opinion, by Attorney General John w. Griggs,
see 23 Op. Atty Gen. 214 (1900), the Attorney General stated:
"The treaties and laws of the United States make
all persons, with a few specified exceptions, who are
not citizens of an Indian nation or members of an
Indian tribe, and are found within an Indian nation
without permission, intruders there, and require their
removal by the United States. This closes the whole
matter, absolutely excludes all but the excepted
classes, and fully authorizes these nations to
absolutely exclude outsiders, or to permit their
residence or business upon such terms as they may
choose to impose, and it must be borne in mind that
citizens of the United States, have, as such, no more
right:"" or business to be there than they have in any
foreign nation, and can lawfully be there at all only
by Indian permission; and that their right to be or
remain or carry on business there depends solely upon
whether they have such permission.
As to the power or duty of your Department in the
premises there can hardly be a doubt. Under the
treaties of the United States with these Indian nations
this Government is under the most solemn obligation,
and for which it has received ample consideration, to
remove and keep removed from the territory of these
tribes, all this class of intruders who are there
without Indian permission. The performance of this
obligation, as in other matters concerning the Indians
and their affairs, has long been devolved upon the
Department of the Interior." rd., at 218.
The Court also relied on 23 Op. Atty. Gen. 528

(1901).
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a suit by nonmembers of the Creek Nation against federal
inspectors to enjoin them from stopping the plaintiffs from doing
business within the reservation because they had refused to pay a
permit tax assessed by the Tribe.

The Court of Appeals relied on

Morris v. Hitchcock and Maxey v. Wright in upholding the tax.
The opinion for the court by Judge Sanborn emphasized that the
tax was in the nature of a condition precedent to transacting
business within the reservation and that the plaintiffs had ample
notice of the tax:
"The permit tax of the Creek Nation, which is the
subject of this controversy, is the annual price fixed
by the act of its national council, which was approved
by the President of the United States in the year 1900,
for the privilege which it offers to those who are not
citizens of its nation of trading within its borders.
The payment of this tax is a mere condition of the
exercise of this privilege. No noncitizen is required
to exercise the privilege or to pay the tax. He may
refrain from the one and he remains free from liability
for the other. Thus, without entering upon an extended
discu~sion or consideration of the question whether
this charge is technically a license or a tax, the fact
appears that it partakes far more of the nature of a
license than of an ordinary tax, because it has the
optional feature of the former and lacks the compulsory
attribute of the latter.
"Repeated decisions of the courts, numerous
opinions of the Attorneys General, and the practice of
years place beyond debate the propositions that prior
to March 1, 1901, the Creek Nation had lawful authority
to require the payment of this tax as a condition
precedent to the exercise of the privilege of trading
within its borders, and that the executive department
of the government of the United States had plenary
power to enforce its payment through the Secretary of
the Interior and his subordinates, the Indian
inspector, Indian agent, and Indian police. Morris v.
Hitchcock, 194 u.s. 384, 392, 24 Sup. Ct. 712, 48 L.
Ed. 1030; Crabtree v. Madden, 4 C.C.A. 408, 410, 413,
54 Fed. 426, 428, 431; Maxey v. Wright, 3 Ind. T. 243,
54 S.W. 807; Maxey v. Wright, 44 C.C.A. 683, 105 Fed.
1003; 18 Opinions of Attorneys General, 34, 36; 23
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528." 135 Fed., at 949-950.
Later in the opinion the court again stressed the fact that the
traders had entered the reservation with full knowledge of the
permit obligation, and therefore could be deemed to have accepted
the condition precedent.41

The court also held that even though

41 After citing the opinion of Attorney General Griggs from
which this Court had quoted at length in Morris v. Hitchcock,
Judge Sanborn wrote:
"Pursuant to this decision the civilized tribes
were charging, and the Indian agent was collecting,
taxes from noncitizens engaged in business in these
nations. It was under this state of facts that the
United States and the Creek Nation made the agreement
of 1901. Did they intend by that agreement that the
Creek Nation should thereby renounce its conceded power
to exact these permit taxes? Both parties knew that
this power existed, and the United States, by the act
of its President approving the law of the Creek
national council, and the Secretary of the Interior by
enforcing it, had approved its exercise. The subject
of these taxes was presented to the minds of the
contracting parties and was considered during the
negotiation of the agreement, for that contract
contains express stipulations that cattle grazed on
rented allotments shall not be liable to any tribal tax
(chapter 676, 31 Stat. 871, § 37), and that 'no
noncitizen renting lands from a citizen for
agricultural purposes as provided by law, whether such
lands have been selected as an allotment or not, shall
be required to pay any permit tax' (chapter 676, 31
Stat. 871, § 39). But they made no provision that
noncitizens who engaged in the mercantile business in
the Creek Nation should be exempt from these taxes. As
the law then in force required such noncitizens to pay
such taxes, as both parties were then aware of that
fact and considered the question, and as they made no
stipulation to abolish these taxes, the conclusive
presumption is that they intended to make no such
contract, and that the power of the Creek Nation to
exact these taxes, and the authority of the Secretary
of the Interior and of his subordinates to collect
them, were neither renounced, revoked, nor restricted,
but that they remained in full force and effect after

.
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within the Creek Nation, they had no right to conduct business
within the reservation without paying the permit taxes.42

Prior to the enactment of the Indian Reorganization Act in
1934, these three cases were the only judicial decisions
considering the power of an Indian tribe to impose a tax on
nonmembers.43

These cases demonstrate that the power to impose

as before the agreement of 1901."
42

135 Fed., at 954.

The court stated:
"The legal effect, however, of the law prescribing the
permit taxes is to prohibit noncitizens from conducting
business within the Creek Nation without the payment of
these taxes." 135 Fed., at 955.

43 Two decades after the Reorganization Act was passed the
problem was revisited by the Eighth Circuit.
In Iron Crow v.
Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge Reservation, 231 F.2d 89 (CA8
1956) , the court held that the tribe had the power to assess a
tax on a nonmember lessee of land within the reservation for the
privilege of grazing stock on reservation land. And in Barta v.
Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge Reservation, 259 F.2d 553 (CA8
1958), the Court held that the United States could bring an
action on behalf of the tribe to collect a license tax- of three
cents per acre per annum for grazing land and fifteen cents per
acre per annum for farm land levied on nonmember lessees. The
court held that the tax did not violate the constitutional rights
of the nonmember lessees stating, in part:
"The tribe by provisions of its treaty with the United
States has power to provide for the admission of
nonmembers of the tribe onto the reservation. Having
such power, it has the authority to impose restrictions
on the presence of nonmembers within the reservation."
259 F.2d, at 556.
Language in both Iron Crow and Barta suggests that the Court of
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to exclude nonmembers from the reservation and to impose
restrictions and conditions on entry onto the reservation for any
purpose.44

This interpretation of these cases is further

Appeals, unlike the earlier courts, may not have rested the
taxing power solely on the power to exclude. The Court of
Appeals of course did not have the benefit of our decisions in
Oliphant, Wheeler, and Montana v. United States.
44 In his Handbook on Federal Indian Law, Felix Cohen
states:
"Though the scope of the power [to tax] as applied to
nonmembers is not clear, it extends at least to
property of nonmembers used in connection with Indian
property as well as to privileges enjoyed by nonmembers
in trading with the Indians. The power to tax
nonmembers is derived in the cases from the authority,
founded on original sovereignty and guaranteed in some
instances by treaties, to remove property of nonmembers
from the territorial limits of the tribe. Since the
tribal government has the power to exclude, it can
extract a fee from nonmembers as a condition precedent
to granting permission to remain or to operate within
the tribal domain." Cohen 266-267 (footnotes omitted).
~

In another part of his treatise, cited by the government and
the Tribe here, Cohen describes the power of taxation as "an
inherent attribute of tribal sovereignty which continues unless
withdrawn or limited by treaty or by act of Congress .•. " Id., at
142. After discussing Buster v. Wright, Cohen cites that case
for the proposition that "[t]he power to tax does not depend upon
the power to remove and has been upheld where there was no power
in the tribe to remove the taxpayer from the tribal
jurisdiction." Id., at 143. As we have seen, however, the
license tax in BUSter was predicated on the tribe's right to
attach conditions to nonmembers conducting business on the
reservation, and the tribe could prevent such nonmembers from
doing business regardless of whether it could physically remove
those nonmembers from the reservation. Moreover, Cohen does
recognize that the tribal taxes have been upheld on the basis of
the tribe's power to remove nonmembers from the reservation, and
that "[i]t is therefore pertinent, in analyzing the scope of
tribal taxing powers, to inquire how far an Indian tribe is
empowered to remove nonmembers from its reservation." Ibid.

~
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tax in all three cases was exclusion from the reservation.45
Moreover, tribal sovereign powers over nonmembers are
appropriately limited because nonmembers are foreclosed from
participation in tribal government.

See n. 30, supra.

If the

power to tax is limited to situations in which the tribe has the
power to exclude, then the nonmember is subjected to the tribe's
jurisdiction only if he consents by choosing to accept the
conditions of entry imposed by the tribe.46

The limited source

of the power to tax nonm e mbers--the power to exclude intruders-is thus consistent with this Court's narrow construction of the
power of Indian tribes over nonmembers in g e neral.47

The source

The American Indian Policy Review Commission recognized that
the court decisions upholding the tribes' taxing powers "rely
largely upon the power of tribes to remove persons from the
reservation, and consequently, to prescribe the conditions upon
which they shall enter" but argued for a broader source of the
right to tax. AIPRC Final Report 178-179.
45 In Buster v. Wright, supra, the penalty for nonpayment of
the tax was the closing of the nonmember's business, enforced by
the Secretary of the Interior. See 135 F., at 954.
In Morris v.
Hitchcock, supra, the remedy was the r emoval of the nonmember's
cattle from the reservation, again enforced by the United States.
In Maxey v.Wright, supra, an attorney refusing to pay the license
fee to the Interior Department was subject to r emoval from the
reservation.
46 "No noncitizen is required to exercise a privilege or to
pay the tax. He may refrain from the one and he r e mains free
from liability for the other." Buster v. Wright, 135 F., at 949.
47 See pp. 18-21, supra. As we have indicated, see note 26,
supra, the treaties recognizing the inherent power of tribal
self-government have also deprived the tribes of jurisdiction
over nonmembers. Treaties with Indian tribes, however, often
specifically recognized the right of the tribe to exclude
nonmembers from the reservation and to attach conditions to their
entry. See~' Treaty with the Choctaw and Chickasaw, art. 7,

A
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this case is therefore not the Tribe's power of self-government,
but rather its power over the territory that has been reserved
and set apart for its use and occupation.48

11 Stat. 611 (1855); Treaty with the Creeks, art. 15, 11 Stat.
699 (1855). See II Kappler 7, 9, 12, 15, 17, 20, 21, 27, 30, 42,
75, 418, 682, 699, 703, 719, 761, 774, 779, 790, 794, 800, 866,
886, 888, 929, 985, 990, 998, 1008, 1016, 1021. Although such
treaties obviously have no effect on the Jicarilla Apache Tribe,
and although we assume that the 1934 Reorganization Act was
intended to preseve the same sovereign powers of tribes residing
on executive order reservations as those possessed by tribes
operating under treaties, such treaties are relevant here,
because the executive order creating a reservation clearly would
not permit a tribe to retain more inherent sovereign power than
would be permitted when a tribe places itself under the control
of the United States pursuant to a treaty.
48 The various tribes may have taken a similar view of their
power to tax at the time of the Indian Reorganization Act.
Cohen's treatise notes that:
"The power of an Indian tribe to levy taxes upon its
own members and upon nonmembers doing business within
the reservations has been affirmed in many tribal
const1tutions approved under the Wheeler-Howard Act
[Indian Reorganization Act], as has the power to remove
nonmembers from land over which the tribe exercises
jurisdiction." Cohen 143.
The following clause from the 1935 Constitution of the Rosebud
Sioux Tribe, which Cohen cites as a "typical" statement of such
"tribal powers," indicates that the tribe perceived the scope of
its taxation powers over nonmembers to be narrower than the scope
of that power over members:
"(h) To levy taxes upon members of the tribe and to
require the performance of reservation labor in lieu
thereof, and to levy taxes or license fees, subject to
review by the Secretary of the Interior, upon nonmembers doing business within the reservation.
(i) To exclude from the restricted lands of the
reservation persons no legally entitled to reside
therein, under ordinances which shall be subject to
review by the Secretary of the the Interior." Ibid.
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Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation,
supra.

In that case we held that the power to tax non-Indians

entering the reservation had not been divested by virtue of the
tribe's dependent status and that no overriding federal interest
would be frustrated by the tribal taxation.

The Court quoted

with approval, as an indication of the Executive Branch's
understanding of the taxing power, Solicitor Margold's 1934
opinion.

The Court noted further that "[f]ederal courts also

have acknowledged tribal power to tax non-Indians entering the
reservation to engage in economic activity" and cited Buster v.
Wright and Morris v. Hitchcock.

447 U.S., at 153.

The tax in

Colville, which was applied to nonmembers who entered the
reservation and sought to purchase cigarettes, is clearly valid
under the rationale that the tribes' power to tax derives from
the right to exclude nonmembers from the reservation and the
right to attach conditions to the entry of such nonmembers
seeking to do business on the reservation.49

Thus the inherent

sovereign power of Indian tribes to tax nonmembers stems from the
tribes' power to exclude and the exercise of the power must be
consistent with its source.

49 A nonmember subjected to the tax could avoid the tax by
declining to do business on the reservation, and the "sanction"
to be imposed for refusal to pay the tax would be denial of
permission to buy cigarettes.
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The exercise of the power to exclude petitioners would have
supported the imposition of a tribal severance tax on petitioners
when they sought to enter the Jicarilla Apache Reservation to
engage in exploration, drilling, and extraction activities.50
The Tribe did not impose the tax prior to petitioners' entry,
however, and therefore the tax is valid only if the Tribe retains
the power to exclude petitioners from the reservation.

The leases executed by the Tribe and petitioners are clearly
valid and binding on both parties.

The Tribe does not contend

that the leases were not the product of arms length bargaining.
Moreover, the leases were executed on a form prepared by the
Department of the Interior, the Department gave specific approval
to the terms of the leases, and they were executed pursuant to
explicit Congressional authority.51

Petitioners therefore have

50
"[A]s the the payment of a tax or license fee may be
made a condition of entry upon tribal land, it may also
be made a condition to the grant of other privileges,
such as the acquisition of a tribal lease." Cohen 143.
51 Congress intended the Act of March 3, 1927 to make
applicable to executive order reservations the leasing provisions
already applicable to treaty reservations pursuant to the Act of
May 29, 1924, 43 Stat. 244. S. Rep. No. 1240, 69th Cong., 2d
Sess. 3 (1927). The Act thus permitted the leasing of unallotted
Indian land for terms not to exceed ten years and as much longer
as oil and gas in paying quantities were found on the land.
44
Stat. 1347. Among the purposes of the 1927 statute were to
"[p]ermit the exploration for oil and gas on Executive-order
Indian Reservations," to "[g]ive the Indian tribes all the oil

No. 80-11; 80-15
- 39 the right under the leases to remain on the reservation to do
business for the term of the lease.52

Because the execution of

these leases guaranteed the lessees such rights of access to the
reservation as might be necessary to enable them to perform the

and gas royalties," and to "[p)lace with Congress the future
determination of any changes of boundaries of Executive-order
reservations or withdrawals."
Ibid.
In light of these purposes,
it is clear that Congress intended leases executed pursuant to
the 1927 Act to be binding.
The Tribe contends that the leases in this case were
executed pursuant to the Act of May 11, 1938, 52 Stat. 347, and
not the 1927 Act. The Tribe notes that the lease with
petitioners in No. 80-15, which the District Court refused to
admit into evidence, see 617 F.2d, at 547-548, n. 5, states in
one of its provisions that it was executed pursuant to the 1938
Act. See App. 64. Petitioners note, however, that although the
Tribe argues that the 1938 Act, unlike the 1927 Act, does not
require that royalties be paid to the Secretary of the Interior
for the benefit of the Tribe, petitioners make their royalty
payments to the United States Geological Survey for the benefit
of the Tribe. Tr. 79-80. We need not resolve this question,
because for our purposes the provisions of the 1938 Act do not
vary significantly from the provisions of the 1927 Act. The 1938
Act, like the 1927 Act, permitted the leasing of Indian lands for
a period "~ot to exceed 10 years and as long therefafter as
minerals are produced in paying quantities."
25 U.S.C. §396c.
One of the purposes of the 1938 Act was to establish uniformity
of the law relating to the leasing of tribal lands for mining
purposes by applying the law as to oil and gas leasing to the
leasing of land for the mining of other minerals. S. Rep. No.
985, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1937). Other purposes were to
"bring all leasing matters in harmony with the Indian
Reorganization Act," id., at 3, and to enact changes designed "to
give the Indians the greatest return from their property." Id.,
at 2. There is no indication in the legislative history tha~he
purposes of the 1938 Act are in any way inconsistent with the
purposes of the 1927 Act and prior legislation. Presumably the
purposes of the earlier legislation were incorporated into the
uniform scheme achieved by the 1938 Act.
52 As Attorney General Macveagh stated in 1881, only those
permitted by the tribe to remain on the reservation may do so,
"and the right to remain is gone when the permit has expired."
17 Op. Atty. Gen., at 136.

- 80-11; 80-15
No.
-

40 -

leases, petitioners are not intruders, and while the leases
remain in effect there is no basis for the claim that the Tribe
retains any power to exclude petitioners from the portions of the
reservation on which they acquired drilling and extraction
rights.53

We might reach a different conclusion if the petitioners, at
the time that they signed the leases, had some notice that a
severance tax might be imposed.54

53

If the petitioners had such

Solicitor Margold wrote regarding the power to exclude:
"Over tribal lands, the tribe has the rights of a
landowner as well as the rights of a local government,
dominion as well as sovereignty. But over all the
lands of the reservation, whether owned by the tribe,
by members thereof, or by outsiders, the tribe has the
sovereign power of determining the conditions upon
which persons shall be permitted to enter its domain,
to reside therein, and to do business, provided only
such determination is consistent with applicable
Federal laws and does not infringe any vested rights of
persons now occupying reservation land under lawful
authority. Morris v. Hitchcock (194 U.S. 384) ."
55
I.D., at 50 (emphasis added).

54 In Buster v. Wright, the court relied on the fact that
the taxpayers had ample notice of their potential liability
before they entered into the on-reservation activities that gave
rise to their obligation. The opinion repeatedly emphasized the
optional character of a tax imposed as a condition precedent to
engaging in business, see nn. 41, 46, supra, and the fact that
although both parties were aware of the obligation, they made no
agreement limiting or abolishing the tax:
"But they made no provision that noncitizens who
engaged in the mercantile business in the Creek Nation
should be exempt from these taxes.
As the law then in
force required such citizens to pay such taxes, as both
parties were then aware of that fact and considered the
question, and as they made no stipulation to abolish
these taxes, the conclusive presumption is that they

...
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could be construed as a condition of entry or a condition to
remaining on the land to which petitioners would have consented
by virtue of executing the leases.55

There is a complete absence of any such notice in this case,
however, and petitioners had no reason to anticipate that the
tribe would attempt to impose an additional condition on the
exercise of the mining rights granted by the leases.56

At the

time the leases were executed the Jicarilla Apache Constitution
contained no authorization of severance taxes of this type.57

intended to make no such contract

II

In

135 F., at 29.

55 In Colville, for example, the nonmember desiring to
purchase cigarettes on the reservation knew that his right to do
so would be conditioned on his consent to pay the tax. Attorney
General Griggs, in his 1900 opinion on "Trespassers on Indian
Lands," d~cussed the effect on tribal laws of a federal statute
providing for the sale of reservation lots to non-Indians:
"[T]he legal right to purchase land within an Indian
nation gives to the purchaser no right of exemption
from the laws of such nation, nor does it authorize him
to do any act in violation of the treaties with such
nation. These laws requiring a permit to reside or
carry on business in the Indian country existed long
before and at the time this act was passed. And if any
outsider saw proper to purchase a town lot under this
act of Congress, he did so with full knowledge that he
could occupy it for residence or business only by
permission from the Indians." 23 Op. Atty. Gen., at
217.
56 In 1977, the American Indian Policy Review Commission
stated that Indian tribes "do not both tax and receive royalties.
Usually they just receive royalties." AIPRC Final Report 344.
Footnote(s) 57 appear on following page(s).
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"[N]o regulation hereafter approved shall effect a
change in rate or royalty or annual rental herein
specified without the written consent of the parties to
this lease." App. 27.

Moroever, in 1953 petitioners might reasonably have relied on the
consideration of a comparable issue by Congress as an indication
of what conditions might be attached to the lease of tribal
lands.

When Congress enacted legislation in 1927 granting the

Indians the royalty income from oil and gas leases on
reservations created by executive order, it neither authorized
nor prohibited the imposition of any taxes by the tribes.

The

statute did authorize the collection of severance taxes by the
States.

Petitioners have argued that this authorization pre-

empted any tribal power to impose a comparable tax.

The

legislativ-e history, however, indicates that Congress did not
consider the question of tribal taxes on mineral output from
reservation lands.58

If Congress had considered it possible that

57 The fact that the Tribe apparently believed such
authorization was necessary is indicated by the fact that the
Tribe amended its constitution in 1968, prior to the imposition
of the tax, to permit assessment of such severance taxes.
Although the power to exclude might have justified the imposition
of this tax when petitioners signed their leases, even a tribal
constitutional provision recognizing the power to exclude, see n.
48, supra, would not place petitioners on notice of the
possibility that a severance tax would be levied by the tribe in
the future. The 1937 Jicarilla Apache Constitution, however,
contained no reference to the power to exclude or the power to
tax members or nonmembers. See 1937 Constitution.
Footnote(s) 58 appear on following page(s).

-
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would be shared by the States and the tribes, the issue would
surely have been mentioned in the legislation or in its
history.59

58 The Court of Appeals rejected the pre-emption argument
because its reading of the legislative history convinced it "that
Congress simply did not think of the issue when it enacted the
statute." 617 F.2d, at 547.
59 Rep. Leavitt, the Chairman of the Committee on Indian
AEfair stated in discussing the purpose of the 1927 Act:
"Briefly, the purpose, so far as the Indians are
concerned, is to make sure by act of Congress that
there can first be a development of possible oil
resources on these Executive-order lands; and, in the
second place, that with the development of the oil
resources the Indians themselves ... shall have the
benefit of the development of the natural resources of
their reservation instead of having their lands
considered to be public lands of the United States with
the benefits of such development going to the white
people.
"Surely the Indians who once possessed all of this
countiy and who now have in their possession only those
portions that have been given to them by acts of
Congress, Executive order, and by treaties ought to get
whatever benefit there is from these remaining areas-the resources under the soil as well as above it-without having the white man come in and profit
entirely by these developments." 68 Cong. Rec. 4573.
Rep. Carter, in support of the bill, stated:
"Since we have taken much of their lands for homes for
white p e ople, since great States have been carved and
built from their domain, since they have r e sponded to
every call of their Government both during peace and
war, since by our own act, without their consent, via
et armis we have narrowed them down to a small
reservation, can it now justly lie in our mouths to say
that they are not entitled to all proceeds accruing or
that may accrue from the small patrimony they have
left?" 68 Cong. Rec. 4579.
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possibility that a tribe could grant lessees access to a
reservation for specific purposes in exchange for a specific
consideration and thereafter impose a tax on the exercise of the
granted authority had never occurred to Congress,60 to the

The House and Senate reports state that two of the purposes of
the act were to give the Indians "all of the oil and gas
royalties," and to "authorize the states to tax production of oil
and gas on such r e servations." S. Rep. No. 1240, 69th Cong., 2d
Sess. 3 (1927); H.R. Rep. No. 1791, 69th Cong. 2d Sess. 3 (1927).
Thus Congress specifically recognized both the right of the
Indians to receive the benefits of all oil and gas resources on
reservation land and the right of the states to impose taxes on
the output yet made no mention of the possibility of tribal
severance taxes. Although the absence of such reference does not
indicate that Congress preempted the right of the tribes to
impose such taxes, the lack of any mention of tribal severance
taxes does nevertheless bear on petitioners awareness of the
possibility that such taxes might be imposed.
As we have noted, see n. 51, supra, the Tribe argues that
the 1938 Act, and not the 1927 Act, is the applicable statute
here. The Tribe argues that the 1938 Act, which makes no
reference ~o the states' right to impose severance taxes,
superceded the 1927 statute, and therefore the states no longer
have the authority to impose severance taxes on the mineral
output of Indian lands. The Court of Appeals did not need to
reach this question, because the state of New Mexico was not a
party, and b e cause the court concluded that the Tribe's tax was
valid regardless of whether the state retained the right to tax
the oil and gas r e sources. 617 F.2d, at 547-548, n. 5. We also
need not reach this question, because the legislative history of
the 1938 Act, like the history of the 1927 Act, makes no mention
of tribal severance taxes. Even if the omission of the states'
power to impose taxes could be construed as a withdrawal of such
right from the states, there is certainly no indication in the
1938 statute or its history that Congress intended to vest such
power in the tribes or even considered the possibility of doing
so. See n. 51, supra.
60 Although the lack of Congressional recognition of such a
tax would not be relevant to the validity of of a severance tax
which the tribe either imposed at the outset of the lease
relationship or imposed after giving fair notice at the outset of
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Thus the conditions attaching to petitioners' right to extract
oil and gas from the land covered by the leases were not, in the
contemplation of the parties, subject to change during the terms
of the leases.62

The Tribe therefore had no authority to change

such relationship, we clearly do not have such a case here.
61 The Secretary of the Interior has cited cases holding
that a license or franchise issued by a governmental body does
not prevent the later imposition of a tax unless the right to tax
"has been specifically surrendered in terms which admit of no
other reasonable interpretation." St. Louis v. United Rys., 210
u.s. 266, 280; New Orleans City & Lake R.R. v. City of New
Orleans, 143 u.s. 192, 195; New York Transit Corp. v. City of New
York, 303 u.s. 573, 590-593. The principal issue in these cases
was whether the retroactive imposition of the frachise tax
violated the contract clause of the Constitution or was so
fundamentally unfair as to constitute a denial of due process in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although this argument
was by no means frivolous, cf. Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 315
u.s. 610, no such issue is raised here. These cases are
distinguishable from the instant cases for the simple reason that
two different types of sovereigns are involved. The fundamental
differences in their powers have led us to conclude that tribes
do not have tne same attributes of sovereignty as do states and
their subdivisions. Therefore, the fact that a state or its
subdivision may impose taxes after the granting of a license
would neither give notice to petitioners that such a tax was
possible nor stand as authority for the proposition that such a
tax was within the sovereign power of an Indian tribe.
62 The Secretary also argues that petitioners should be
required to pay the tax as their contribution to tribal services
which benefit all residents of the Reservation, including
petitioners. Brief for the Secretary of the Interior 14. In
calendar year 1976 the Tribe received $3,995,469.69 in oil and
gas royalties. See n. 15, supra. The Tribe tells us that its
budget for fiscal 1976, which was tendered to the District Court
but not received in evidence, was $3,958,201. See Defendants'
Exhibit AA; Tr. 306; Brief for Respondent 7. Unlike the fixed
royalty used in some mineral leasing arrangements, see United
States v. Swank,
u.s.
, the royalty in these oil and gas
leases is a percentage of the amount produced and so will allow
the Tribe to benefit from a rising market.
Moreover, the tax is not merely an appropriate share of a
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form of a severance tax.63

The attempted exercise of the taxing power asserted by the
Tribe in this case extends so far beyond any exercise of Indian
sovereignty over nonmembers that has been recognized in the past
that we have no hesitation in concluding that it is beyond the
powers of the Tribe.64

The judgment of the Court of Appeals should therefore be
reversed.

budget largely financed by the sovereign's taxation of its own
subjects. The principal components of the annual income of the
members of this Tribe--if the tax should be sustained--would be
the amount of approximately $4,000,000 of royalties and
approximately $2,000,000 in severance taxes received from the
same group of lessees.
63 We do not have in these cases a tax imposed on both
members and nonmembers. The economic burdens of the Jicarilla
Apache severance tax are imposed entirely on taxpayers over whom
the tribe has no jurisdiction except insofar as rights under the
leases are being exercised.
64 Because we rest our decision on the absence of inherent
tribal sovereignty to impose this severance tax, we need not
reach the federal preemption and interstate commerce questions
raised by petitioners.
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You might remember that the vote at Conference on
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persuaded by this theory as it was presented in petr's brief,
but I think that Justice Stevens has done an excellent job of
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Blackmun, who has undertaken to write in this case and in
Commonwealth Edison v. Montana.

He was to argue that the Court

should reverse on the ground that the severance tax violated
the Commerce Clause.
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threshold matter) that the Tribe had sovereign authority to
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[June -, 1981]
Memorandum of JusTICE STEVENS.
The Indian tribes that occupied North America before
Europeans settled the continent were unquestionably sovereigns. They ruled themselves and they exercised dominion
over the lands that nourished them. Many of those tribes,
and some attributes of their sovereignty, survive today. This
Court, since its earliest days, has had the task of identifying
those inherent sovereign powers that survived the creation
of a new Nation and the introduction of an entirely new system of laws applicable to both Indians and non-Indians. In
this case we must decide whether one such surviving attribute
of tribal sovereignty is the power to lease tribal property to
a nonmember and, after the lease is signed, to impose a tax
on the exercise of the rights granted by the lease.
The lessor in this case is the Jicarilla Apache Tribe. The
21 petitioner-lessees in these two consolidated cases are extracting oil and gas from tribal lands pursuant to long-term
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leases, some of which have been in effect since 1953. In
1976, the Tribe enacted an ordinance imposing a severance
tax on the oil and gas produced under these leases, and petitioners brought suit to enjoin the collection of the tax. The
District Court granted the injunction, but the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, upholding the tax. 617
F. 2d 537. We granted certiorari, U. S. - . Before
addressing the legal issues, we shall recount some of the history of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe, the derivation of the Indian leasing power, and the facts of these cases.

I
The 2100 members of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe live on a
reservation in northern New Mexico. 1 Most of the residents
of the reservation live in the town of Dulce, N. M., near the
Colorado border. The area encompassed by the Reservation
became a part of the United States in 1848 when the Mexican War ended in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. See 9
Stat. 922. Between 1848 and 1871, the United States did
not enter into any treaty with the Jicarillas or. as far as we
are advised, enact any special legislation relating to them.
In 1871 Congress outlawed any future treaties with Indian
tribes. 2 In 1887, President Cleveland issued a simple Executive Order setting aside a tract of public lallds in the Territory
of New Mexico "as a reservation for the use and occupancy
of the Jicarilla Apache Indians." a Except for a provision
1

See Plaintiff':; Exhibit E, p. 14.
"[H]ereaftcr no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the
United States shall be acknowledged or recogniz~·d as an indepPndent nation, tribe, or power with whom the United Slatt•R may coutract by
treaty: Provided further, Thnt nothing lwrrin coutuinrcl ~hall bt: eonstnu:d
to invalidate or impair the obligatiou of auy trt'at~· lwrt'lofort• lawfully
made and ratified with any surh Indian nation or tribe." 16 Stat. 566,
current ver::;ion at 25 U. S. C. § 71.
8 Two previou:s Executive orders settiug aside laud as a res!:'rva tion for
the Jicarilla:s had been cancelled. In 1874 President Gruut :set aside laud
2
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protecting bona fide settlers from deprivation of any previously acquired valid rights, the Executive order contained no
special rules applying to the reservation. 4
The record does not indicate what leasing activity, if any,
occurred on the Jicarilla Reservation between 1887 and 1953.
During that period, however, the authority of Indian tribes
to enter into mineral leases was clarified. In 1891 Congress
passed a statute permitting the mineral leasing of Indian
lands. Act of February 28, 1891, 26 Stat. 795, 25 U. S. C.
§ 397. Because the statute applied only to lands "occupied
by Indians who have bought and paid for the same," the
statute was interpreted to be inapplicable to reservations
created by Executive Order. See British-American Oil Producing Co. v. Board of Equalization, 299 U. S. 159, 161-162,
164. Thus in 1922 the Secretary of the Interior took the
position that Indian reservations created by Executive Order
in an ordrr that he cancelled in 1876. See I C. Kapplrr, India11 Aft'air~,
Laws, and Treaties 874 (1904) (hereinafter Kappler). In 1880 Pre::;ident
Hayes el:>tabli::;hed a re~ervation in an order that Pre~:>ident Arthur cancelled in 1884. /d., at 875.
4 The entire executive order reads as follows:
"EXECUTIVE MANSION, FEBRUARY 11, 1887.
"It is hereby ordered that all that portion of the public domain in the
Territory of New Mexico which, when surveyed, will be embraced in the
following townships, viz: 27, 28, 29, and 30 north, rangeH 1 east and 1, 2,
and 3 wc~:>t; 31 and 32 north, rangeR 2 we~:>t and 3 wc?st, and the ~outh
half of township 31 north, range 1 wrst., be, and tlw same is hereby, set
apart as a. rel:!ervation for the m;e and occupation of tlw JieariUa Apa.r he
Indians: Provided, That this order shall not be so construed as to deprive
any bmm fide settler of any valid rights he may have acquired under th~
law of the United SttLtes providing for the disposition of the public
domain."
Grover Cleveland.
ld., at 875.
The boundaries of the Reservation were redefined or clarified by Executive
Orders iSl:!ued by President. Theodore Roosevelt on November 11, 1907 and
January 28, 1908, and by President Taft on February 17, 1912. See App.
to Brief for Petitioners in No. 80-15, at 22a-24a.
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were public lands and that Indians residing on such reservations had no right to share in the royalties derived from oil
and gas leases on such lands. 5 In 1927 Congress enacted a
5 This decision held tha.t the land on Executive Order reservation:; was
subject to leasing, as "lands of the United States," under the Mineral
Lands Leasing Act of February 25, 1920, 41 Stat. 437, 30 U. S. C. § 181
et seq. 49 I. D. 139. In 1924, Attorney General Stone rend<•red an opinion stating that the Mineral Lands Lea::;ing Act diduot appl~· to Executive
Order reservations. 34 Op. Atty. Gen. 181 (1924). Then in 1925 Attorney General Stone instituted litigation in the Di::>trict Court of Utah to
cancel certain lea:ses that had been authorized b~· the Secretar~· of the
Interior pursuant to the Mineral Land:; Leasing Act. SPe United States
v. Harrison. Equity No. 8288 (Utah 1925). SC'e H . R. Rep. No. 1791,
69th Con g., 2d Sess., 5 ( 1927). The case was di):lmis:;ed by :stipulation
after the 1927 Act referred to in the text wa::; pas..ed. See United States
v. McMahon , 273 U. S. 782.
A later deci:;:ion by thi:,; Court suggPsts that thP Secrptary's position was
correct. In Sioux T·ribe of Indians v. United States, 316 U. S. 317, the
Court hPld that an Indian tribe was not entitled to any compPnsation from
the United States when an Executive Order re::;ervation was aboli:;hecl
The Court said:
"Perhaps the mot striking proof of the belief shared by Congress and
the Executive that the Indians were not entitled to comJJPn~ation 11110n
the abolition of an executive order re:servation i:s the very ah:sPtH'e of compensatory payments in such :situations. It was a common practi ce, durirg
the period in which reservations were crPated by Pxecutive order, for the
President simply to terminate the existence of a rPservatiou by cancelling
or revoking the order establishing it. That is to say, the procedure followed in the case before u::; wa;; typi ca l. No compen::;ation was made, and
neither the Government nor the Indians suggested that it was due.

"We comlude therefore that there was no express constitutional or statutory authorization for the conve)'[tncp of a compensable intPrest to petitic'ner by the four executive orders of 1875 and 1876, and that no implied
Congresoional delegation of the power to do so can be ~Jwlled out from
the cvidPnce of CongrPs~ional and executive undPrstanding. The orders
were effective to withdraw from sale the land~ afi'ertrd and to grant the
nse of the lands to the petitioner. But the interest which the Indians
received was subjrct to termination at the will of Pither the executive or
Congress and without obligation to the United States. The executive

0-ll

&80-15--~1E~10 .

METUUON u, .JIC'A.RILLA APACHE TRIBE

·statute expressly providing that unallotted lands on any Indian reservation created by Executive Order may be leased
for oil and gas mining purposes with the approval of the
Secretary of the Interior. 0 The statute directed that all
rentals, royalties, or bonuses for such leases should be paid
to the Treasurer of the United States for the benefit of the
tribes. 7 The statute further provided that state taxes could
be levied upon the output of such oil and gas leases 8 but
ordC'rs of 1879 and 1884 were simp!~· an exrrci~e of thi:s powpr of termination, and the payment of rompcn~ation wm; not required." 316 U. S.,
at 3:30-331. SC'e nl::;o Tee-Hit-Ton Indians, v. United f:>tate8 , 34tl U. S.
272, 279-282.
6 Section 1 of the Aet of March 3, 1927, 44 Stat. 1347, current ver~ion
at 25 U . S. C. § 398a, provided:
"Unallotted land~ within the limits of any resc-rvation or withdrawal
created by Executive ordc-r for the use or occupancy of any Indian~ or
tribe may be lea~rd for oil and gas mining purpo~e:; in arcordance with
the provisions contained in the Act of May 29, 1924 L25 U. S. C. § 398] ."
See also 25 U. S. C. § 398. Unallotted land waH land whieh had not been
allotted in severalty to individual Indians pur~uant to the formula prescribed in the Geneml Allotment Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 388.
7 Section 2 of the Act provided:
"The proceeds from rentals, royaltie~, or bomtses of oil and gas leases
upon lands within Executive order Indian reservations or withdrawals
shall be deposited in the Treasury of the United States to the ercdit of
the tribe of Indians for whose benefit the reservation or withdrawal was
ereated or who are using and occupying the land, and shall draw interest
at the rate of 4 per centum per annum and be available for appropriation
by Congress for expensC's in connection with the supervision of the development and operation of the oil and gas industry alld for the use and
benefit of such Indians: Provided, That said Indians, or their tribal council, i:lhall be consulted in regard to the expenditure of such money, but no
per capita payment shall be made except by Act of Congress." 25
U. S. C. § 398b.
8 Section 3 of the Act provided:
"Taxes may be levied and collected by the State or local authority upon
improvements, output of mines or oil and gas wrlls, or other rights, property, or assets of any lessee upon lands within Ext:'cutive order Indian ·
reservations in the same manner as such taxe~ are otherwise levied and
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·made no mention of the possibility that the Indian tribes, in
addition to receiving the royalties, could impose taxes on the
output. 0
In 1934, Congress enacted the Indian Reorganization Act,
48 Stat. 984, 25 U. S. C. § 461 et seq., which authorized any
Indian tribe residing on a reservation to adopt a constitution
and bylaws. subject to the approval of the Secretary of the
Interior. The Act provided that in "addition to all other
powers vested in an Indian tribe or tribal council by existing
law," the constitution should also vest certain specific powers,
such as the power to employ legal counsel, in the Tribe. 10
25 U. S. C. § 476. The Act further authorized the Secretary
collected, and ::;uch taxes may be levied again::;t the share obtained for the
Inditms as bonuses, rentals, and roynltie::;, and the Secretary of the
Interior is authorized and directed to cum:e ~uch tuxes to be paid ont of
the tribal fund:;; in the Treasur~': P1'ovided, That such tuxel" ::;hall not
become a lien or charge of any kind against the land or other property
of such Indians." 25 U. S. C. § 398c.
0 In 1938, Cougress passed the Art of May 11, 1938, 52 Stat. 347, 25
U. S. C. § 396a-g, which was designed in part to achieve uniformity for
all mineral leases of Indian landR. Like the 1927 Act, ihe statute ulso
provided that the tribes were entitlrd to the royalties from surh leases.
The statute made no mention of state taxe::;. See nu. 54, 62, infra.
1 0 The stntute provided, in part:
"Any Indian tribe, or tribrs, residing on the samr reservation, ::;hall have
thr right to orgnnize for its common welfare, and may adopt an appropriate constitution and bYlaws, which l"hnll become effective when ratified
by a majority vote of the adult mrmbcrs of the tribe, or of the adult
Indians residing on such rrsrrvation, as the case mav be, at a special
election authorizrd and railed by the Secretary of the Interior under such
rules and regulations as he may prescribe.
"In addition to nil powers vested in any Indian tribe or tribal council
by exi~ting law, the constitution adOJJied by t<aid tribe shall abo ve~t in
such tribr or its tribal connril the following rights and power::;: To t•mploy
legal counsel, the choice of counsel anr! fixin~ of fees to be ::;ubjrrt to
the approval of thr Secretary of thr Interior: to prevent the sale, dispo~ition, lease, or encumbrance of tribal land:;, intere;;ts in land~, or other
tribal assets without the con::;ent of the tribe; and to negotiate with the'
Federal, State, and local Governments." 25 U. S. C. § 476.
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of the Interior to issue a charter of illcorporation to an Indian tribe, and provided that the charter may convey to the
tribe the power to purchase, manage and dispose of its property.11 The 1934 Act said nothing about the power to levy
taxes. 12 The first Jicarilla Apache Constitution was approved
by the Secretary of the Interior in 1937. 13
In 1953, the Tribe entered into an oil and gas lease with
the Phillips Petroleum Company. App. 22-30. The lease,
which is on a form prepared by the Bureau of Indian Affairs
of the Department of Interior, is presumably typical of later
leases executed between other companies and the Tribe. 14
11

Section 477 provides:
"The Secretary of the Interior may, upon petition by at least one-third
of the adult Indian:;, issue a charter of incorporation to :;uch tribe:
Provided, That such charter shall not become operative until ratified at a
special election by a majority vote of the adult Indians living on the
reservation. Such charter may convey to the incorporated tribe the
power to purchase, take by gift, or beque::;t, or otherwiS(', own, hold, manage, operate, and dispose of property of every description, real and personal, including the power to purchase re:;tricted Indian lands and to issue
in exchange therefor interests in corporate property, and such further
powers as mny be incidental to the conduct of corporate business, not inconsi:;tent with law; but no authority shall be granted to ::;ell, mortgage,
or lease for a period exceeding ten yean; any of the land included in the
limits of the reservation. Any charter so issued shall not be revoked or
surrendered except by Act of Congress." 25 U. S. C. § 477.
12 See F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 267 (1942) (hereinafter Cohen).
1 3 The 1937 Constitution made no reference to any power to assess taxes
against nonmembers. See 1937 Constitution and Bv-Laws of the Jicarilla
Aparhe Tribe, Defendants' Exhibit G (hereinafter 1937 Constituti0n).
14 This hasf' was attached to the complaint of ]lPtitioners in No. R0-11.
The lf'asP attarhrd to the complaint of petitionerH in :No. 80-15 wa~ abo
executed in 1953. Ser App. 62. The record i~ unclear a~ to wh<'ll most
of the IPasrs with prtitioneri:i were executed , but tlw record doP~ indicatP
that lrasrs were rxerntPcl a~ late m; 1967. Sf'P Plaintiff~' Exhibit 1. L<'ai:ir·~
of Jirarilla tr:bal property in the aggregate cover over 500.000 aerci:i of
J:.md, comprising almost 69% of the acreage within the Jicarilla He~erva
t.ion. Brief for Respondent 2.
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'l'he lease provides that in return for a cash bonus of
$71,345.99, to be paid to the treasurer of the Tribe, and rents
and royalties, the Tribe as lessor granted to the lessee "the
exclusive right and privilege to drill for, mine, extract, remove, and dispose of all the oil and natural gas deposits in
or under" the described tracts of land, together with the right
to construct and maintain buildings, plants, tanks, and other
necessary structures on the surface. App. 22-23. The lease
is for a term of 10 years after approval by the Secretary of
the Interior "and as much longer thereafter as oil and/ or
gas is produced in paying quantities from said land." Ibid.
The lcasee is obligated to usc reasonable diligence in the development of the property and to pay an annual rental of
$1.25 per acre and a royalty of 12%% "of the volume or
amount" of all oil and gas "produced and saved" from the
leased land. App. 24. 26. Oil and gas used by the lessee
for development and operation of the lease is royalty -free.
!d., at 24. The Tribe reserved the right to use free of charge
sufficient gas for any school or other building owned by the
Tribe on the leased premises and to take its royalty in kind.
ld., at 27-28.
The lease contains no reference to the payment of any
taxes. The lessee does, however, agree to comply with all
regulations of the Secretary of Interior
". . . now or hereafter in force relative to such leases:
Provided, That no regulation hereafter approved shall
effect a change in rate or royalty or amwal rental herein
specified without the written consent of the parties to
this lease." !d., at 27.
·
The lease was approved by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs on behalf of the Secretary of the Interior. ld:, at 32.
Both of the 1953 leases described in the record are still
producing.
In 1968 the Tribe adopted a revised constitution givinll; the
Tribal Council authority, "subject to approval by the Secre-
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tary of the Interior, to impose taxes and fees on non-members
of the tribe doing business on the re::oervation." 15 Eight years
later, on July 9, 1976, the Tribal Council enacted an Oil and
Gas Severance Tax Ordinance, which was later approved by
the Secretary of the Interior. The Tribal Ordinance provides
that the severance tax "is imposed on any oil and natural gas
severed, saved and removed from Tribal lands . . . ." App.
38. The rate of the tax is $.05 per million BTU of gas produced on the reservation and sold or transported off the reservation and $0.29 per barrel of crude oil or condensate produced on the reservation and sold or transported off the
reservation. Royalty gas or oil taken by the Tribe, as well
as gas or oil used by the Tribe, is exempt from the tax. App.
39. Thus the entire burden of the tax apparently will fall
on nonmembers of the Tribe. The tax, if sustained, will produce over $2 million in revenues annually. 1G
Petitioners-les~ees commenced two separate actions in the
United States District Court seeking to enjoin the tribal authorities and the Secretary of the Interior from taking any
action to collect the tax. The District Court consolidated
thr two cases, allowed other lessees to intervene, and held the
taxing ordinance invalid on three separate grounds. First.
after finding that the Tribe had never attempted to exercise
a power of taxation over nonresidents prior to its incorporation in 1937. and that the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934
did not confer that power on the Tribe. the District Court
concluded that the attributes of sovereignty possessed by the
Tribe did not extend to the imposition of a severance tax on
App. to Brief for Petitioners in No. 80-15, at 12a-13a. The Tribe'~
Hl60 Constitution contained a Rimilnr provi~ion permitting "taxeH ami
fer:;; rn prrsons doing business on the reservation." See 1960 Con~titulion
of thr Jicarilla Apache Tribr, Art. VI, § 5, DrfPudant'~ Exhibit A.
16 See District Court.'~ Findings of Fact and Conclu~ion~ of Law, Finding
No. 32, App. 130. Tho Tribe's answrrs to intprrogatorics indicate that in
1976 the royaltirs on the lea~es received by the Tribe amounted to
$3,995,469.69. See Plaintiff's Exhibit E, p. 7; Tr. 269.
15
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nomnembers. Second. the court held that the statute enacted by Congress in 1927. which authorized oil and gas leases
on reservation created by Executive Order, had granted state
and local authorities the exclusive right to impose severance
taxes on oil and gas production from such reservations. Finally, after finding that approximately 80% of the oil and
gas production from the reservation is shipped interstate for
sale outside of New Mexico, that the tax burden amounts to
a significant percentage of the price of gas and oil, 17 and that
the tax is only imposed on gas, oil, or condensate sold or
transported off the resPrvation, the court concluded that it
discriminated against and created an impermissible burden
on interstate commerce.
Over the dissent of two judges, the Court of Anpeals for
the Tenth Circuit, sitting en bane. reversed. 617 F. 2d 537.
The court held that the taxing power was an inherent attribute of sovereignty possessed by the Tribe prior to the
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. The court further held
that the power had not been voluntarily relinquished by the
Tribe. had not been divested by Congress, and was not inconsistent with any superior interest of the United States. The
Court of Appeals rejected the argument that the 1927 Act
had pre-empted the Tribe's power to levy a severance tax,
because a review of the legislative history indicated that
"Congress simply did not think of the issue when it enacted
the statute." !d., at 547. The Court of Appeals' reversal of
tlw District Court's Commerce Clause holding was based on
the two courts' different readings of the ordinance: whereas
the District Court had construed the taxable event as removal
of the oil or gas from the boundaries of the reservation, the
Court of Appeals construed severancE' from the ]and as the
17 Finding No. 3G rrud::.: "Thnt if the Jiearilla Apaehr Oil and Om;
Severance Tax wrrc valid the eombined tax bnrdrn amount~ to more than
~9% of the iuter~:~tate price of old gm; and m·rr 12.5% of the prie<' of old
oil." App. 180. The Tribe eontend~ that thii:i finding j;;; not supported
by the record, but the Court of Appeals did not :::ct it a~ide.
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critical event. I d., at 546. Under the Court of Appeals'
view, the ordinance would not discriminate against interstate
commerce because oil or gas sold within the reservation as
well as oil or gas transported off the reservation would be
taxed. The court concluded that the fact that royalties paid
in kind are exempt did not render the tax discriminatory,
and that tho fact that New Mexico had imposed separate
taxes on the same taxable event did not create an impermissible multiple burden on commerce. !d., at 545-546.

II
The powers possessed by Indian tribes stem from three
sources: federal statutes. treaties, or the tribe's inherent sovereignty. Neither the Tribe nor the Federal Government
seeks to justify the Jicarilla Tribe's severance tax on the
basis of any federal statute/ 8 and the Jicarilla Apaches, who
reside on an Executive Order reservation, executed no treaty
with the United States from which they derive any sovereign powers. Therefore, if the severance tax is valid. it must
be as an exercise of the Tribe's inherent sovereignty. Last
'l'erm. in Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville
Reservation, 447 U. S. 134, we held that a tribal tax on
cigarettes sold on the reservations of the Colville, Makah,
and Lummi tribes to nonmembers of the tribes was a permissible exercise of the tribes' retained sovereign power to tax. 1 '
We must determine whether the severance tax imposed on
1s Congres~ mn.y cll·legnte "sovereign" powers to the tribes. See Mazw-ie
v. United States, 419 U. S. 544. As we have indicated, however, neither
the 1927 statute permitting Indians to receive roynlties from the lease of
tribal lando nor the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 make nny mention
of the authority of Indian tribes to tax. See pp. 4-7, supra.
1 U The Court stated:
"The power to tax transactions occurring on trust lands and i'i~nifieantly
involving a tribe or its members is a fundamental attribute of soverPignty
which the tribl'S retnin unless divested of it by frdernl law or necessary
implication of their dependent status." 447 U. S., at 152.

·.
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nonmembers of the tribe in this case can likewise be characterized as a valid exercise of the tribe's inherent powers. To
make this determination, we must first consider the source and
scope of tribal sovereignty and more particularly the source
and scope of the sovereign power to levy taxes.
Tribal sovereignty is neither derived from nor protected by
the Constitution. 20 Rather, Indian tribes are assumed to have
retained powers of self-government that they possessed at the
time of their incorporation into the United States. In W orcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, the Court held unconstitntional
a Georgia criminal statute purporting to regulate residency
of non-Indians in the Cherokee Nation. In an opinion by
Chief Justice Marshall, the Court held that the Cherokees,
although submitting to the protection of the United States,
nevertheless retained some aspects of sovereignity:
"By various treaties, the Cherokees have placed themselves under the protection of the United States: they
have agreed to trade with no other people, nor to invoke
the protection of any other sovereignty. But such engagements do not divest them of the right of self government, nor destroy their capacity to enter into treaties or
compacts." Id., at 581-582. 21
Cou~;titution is in Art. I,
t>hall have the Power to
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States,
and with the Indian tribes." More significant than this rcfereuce to
Indian tribe~ i~ the ab~ence of any mention of the tribe~; in the Tenth
Amendment, which provides:
"The powers note delegated to the United State~; by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people."
21 The Court also :;tated:
"At no time has the sovereignty of the country bern recognized as existing
in the Indians, but they have been alwa~·H admittrd to pO!:i!:iess mnuy of
the attributes of sovereig11ty. All the rights which helon~~: to self government have bPen recognized as vestl'd in thl'm. Their right of occnpanry
has never been que!:itioned, but thr fee in the soil hns been considered
20

The only refcrencr to Indiun

tribe~

§ 8 (a), which provides that "rtllw

in the

Congre;;~
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Although Indian tribes retained some elements of sovereignty,
the United States retains plenary authority to divest the
tribes of any such attributes. 2 ~ Moreover, this Court's decisions since Worcester have recognized that not all attributes
of sovereignity are consisteut with the tribes' status as "domestic dependent nations." ~a In determining what sovereign powers the tribes retained in submitting to the authority
of the United States, the Court has repeatedly recognized
a fundamental distinction between the right of tribes to govern their own internal affairs and the right to exercise powers
affecting nonmembers of the tribe.~ 1
in the govemment. This may be called the right to the ultimate domain,
but the Indians have a present right of po~~e ·~ion." 6 Pet., at 51'0.
~"See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U. S. 313, 319; Winton v. Amos,
255 U. S. 373, 391-392; Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock , 187 U. S. 553, 565; 1
American Indian Policy Review Commission, Final Report, 106-107 (1977)
(hereinafter AIPRC Final Report). Thus, for example, C011gre~s can
waive the tribes' sovereign immunity. See Uuited States v. U. S. Fidelity,
309 U. S. 506, 512.
"a The term "domestie dependent nation;," was fir:st used in 'l'he Cherokee Nation v. Georgia. 5 Pet. 1, 17, in which the Court held that the
tribes were not "foreign nation::;" within the meaning of the Com;t itution:
"Though the Indians are acknowledged to have an unquestionable, and,
heretofore, unquestioned right to the land~ they occupy, until that right
shall be extinguished by a volunlar~· ce;;siou to our government; yet it
may well be doubted whether those tribel:l which reside within the
acknowledged boundaries of the United States can, with striet accuracy,
be denominntrd foreign nations. They may, more corrrctly, perhaps, be
denominated domestic dependent nations. They occupy a territory to
which we nssert a title indrpendent of tlwir will , which must take effect
in point of posF<eHRion when their right of posse::;;;ion ceasrs. Meanwhile
they are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the United Stales
resrmbleR that of a ward to his guardian."
24 In United States v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375, 381-382, the Court staLed
that the tribes:
"[W]cre, and always have been, regarded as having a ::;emi-independent
position when they preserved their tribal relation:;; not as States, not as
nation;;, not as possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty, but as a
separate people, with the power of regulating their internal and social
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The Court has been careful to protect the tribes from interference with tribal control over their members. See, e. g.,
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U. S. 65. The Court has
recognized that the power to prosecute members of the tribe
for violations of tribal criminal law does not derive from
power delegated by the United States but is an inherent
attribute of sovereignty. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U. S.
313. Furthermore, the Indian tribes retain the power to create substantive law to govern their internal affairs. See Roff
v. Burney, 168 U. S. 218 (membership); Jones v. Meehan,
175 U. S. 1. 29 (inheritance rules); Fisher v. District Court,
424 U. S. 382 (domestic relations and family law). They
also may enforce that law in tribal courts. Williams v. Lee,
358 U. S. 217; Fisher v. District Court, supra. Moreover, the
Indian tribes' sovereignty over their own members is, in many
respects, significantly greater than the States' powers over
their own citizens. The tribes' virtually absolute control over
their own membership carries with it the power to enforce
discriminatory rules that would be intolerable in a non-Indian community. 25 Their criminal jurisdiction over their own
members is unconstrained by constitutional limitations that
are applicable to the States and the Federal Govermnent.~ 0
relations, and thus far not brought under the law:; of the Union or of the
State within whose limits thry rPsided."
25 Although the Indian Civil Right:; Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 77, 25
U. S. C. §§ 1301-1303, prohibit:; Indian tribPs from denying "to any
pPrson within its jurisdiction the equal protec-tion of its law," see id.,
§ 1302 (8), the provisions of the United States Con:;titution, including , the
Fourteenth Amendment, which limit federal or state authority do not
similarly limit tribal authority. Sre Sa1tta Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436
U. S. 49, 56, and n. 7. In Santa Clam Pueblo, the Court held that
sovereign immunity protected the tribe from suit under the Iudian Civil
Rights Act, that the Act dicluot create a private cause of artion cognizable
in federal court, and that a tribal court was the appropriate forum for
vindication of rights creatPd by the Act.
20 In Talton v. Mayes, 163 U. S. 376, tht• Court held that the re:>trictions of the Fifth Amendment did not apply to prosecutions iu tribal
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Thus the use of the word ffsovereign" to characterize tribal
powers of self-government is surely appropriate. 27
In sharp contrast to the tribes' broad powers over theirown members, tribal powers over nonmembers have always
been narrowly confined. 28 The Court has emphasized that
"exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect
tribal self-government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes, and so
cannot survive without express Congressional delegation."
Montana v. United States,- U. S. - , - . In Oliphant
v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U. S. 191, the Court held
that tribes have no criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed by nonmembers within the reservations. 20 I_n M micourts. See also United States v. Wheeler, 435 U. S., at 328-329; 'l'urner
v. United States, 248 U. S. 354, 355.
~7

Tlmi:! although the States have "plenary power over rei:!identi:l within
their borderi:!," the States may not tax ineome of member:; of: the tribe
derived from reservation sources. See McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax
Comrn'n, 411 U. S. 164, Hi5. This immunity from taxalion-ewn ·for
tribal enterprii:le:::>-doei:! not apply beyond the boundariei:! of the reservation. See M e8calero Apache 'l'ribe Y. Jones, 411 U. S. 145. · ·. · ·
2 8 Certain treaties which sprcifirally gr;mt~·d tlw right of ;;elf government to the tribe;; have al;;o specifically rxcluded jurii:!dietion over nonmember;;. See, e. g., Treaty with the Clwrokcei:!, art. 5, 7 Stat. 478
(1835); Treaty with the Choctaws and Chicka;;aw;;, art. 7, 11 Stat. 611
( 1855); Treaty with the Creeks and Seminolci:!, art. 15, 11 Stat. 699
( 1856).
29 The Court stated in support of that holding:
"Upon incorporation into the territory of the Un it ed States, thr Indian
tribes thereby come under the territorial sovereignty of the United States
and their exercise of separate power is con;;trained so ns not to conflict
with the interests of this overriding sovereignty. 'i'T]lwir rights to
complete sovereignty, as independent nat ions, [are] uccef.>sarily dimiuished.'
Johnson v. M'Intosh, 8 Wheat. 543, 574 (1823).
"We have already described some of the iuhercut limitations on tribal
powers that stem from their incorporation into the United States. In
Johnson v. M'lntosh , supra, we noted that the Indian tribes' 'power to
dispose of the soil at their own will , to whomsoever they pleased,' was
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tana v. United States, supra, the Court, in holding that the
Crow tribe could not prohibit hunting and fishing by nonmembers on reservation land no longer owned by the Tribe,
indicated that the principle underlying Oliphant-Iimited
tribal power over nonmembers-was applicable in a civil as
well as a criminal context. 30 Thus the Court has recognized
that it is when the tribes attempt to impose controls on nonmembers that the tribes' exercise of sovereign powers would
be inconsistent with their status.~ 1
inherently lost to the overriding sovereignty of the United States." 435
U. S. at 209.
Sec al;.;o New York ex rel Ray v. Martin, 326 U. S. 496, 499 (~tate court
has juri:>diction to try a non-Indian for a crime committed again~l I1onIndian on re~ervation).
80 "The Court recently applied the~e gt'nt'ral principlrs in Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian 'l'Tibe, 435 U. S. 191, rejecting a tribal claim of inherent
sovereign authority to exercise criminal juri~dictiou ovrr non-Indians.
Stre!i!iing that Indian tribes cannot exrrcise power inconsi!itent with their
diminishrd status a!i !iovereign~, the Court quoted .Justice .Tohn~on's words
in his concurrence in Fletcher v. Peck, Cranch 87-the firHt Indian <·a~e to
reach thi~ Court-thnt the Indian tribes have lo!it 'any right to goveming
every per~on within their limit:,; except themselve~.' !d., at 1-17, Oliphant
v. Suquamish Indian T1ibe. supra, 435 U. S., at 209. Though Oliphant
only determined inherent tribal authorit~· in crimiual matters, the principles on which it relied :,;upport the general propo~itiou that the inherent
sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not exteud to the activitic~ of llonU. S., at members of the tribe." Montana v. United State~;, (footnote omitted).
See also Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, -114 U. S. 661, (tribes
cannot freely alienate to non-Indian~ the la!1d they oecupy); Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet., at 17-18 (tribl'~ ennnot enter into direct commercial or foreign rrlations with other nation,;).
31 In Wheeler v. United States. supra, the Court h<·ld that. the power to
prosecute its members for tribal offe11~<·~ was noi "implicitly lost by virtue
of their dependent 8tatus" and stated:
"The areas in which such implicit clive~titure of ;;oVPreignty har:: bPell held
to have occurred are tho:;c involviug the relation~ between an Indian tribe
and nonmembers of the tribe.
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The tribes' limited authority to enact legislation affecting
nonmembers is therefore of a different character than the
·broad tribal power over internal affairs involving members. 32
The power to exercise control over nonmembers-and specifically the power to tax recoguized in Colville-presumably has
a much more limited derivation, tied specifically to the exercise of particular powers, than the ge11eral ~etention of
inherent sovereignty to govern internal affairs. We must
therefore examine the cases upholding the power to tax to
determine the source of that power and then determine
whether the tax imposed 111 this case is consistent with that
rationale.

III
The search for the source of the taxing power must focus
on the tribal power to tax nonmembers that existed in 1934
when the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 had the effect
of preventing any further erosion of Indian sovereign powers. 33
"These limitations rrst on the fact that the dependent Htatus of Indian
tribes within our territorial jurisdiction i~::~ necessarily incon~i~tPnt with
their freedom independently to determine their external relation:;. But the
powers of self-government, including the power to prescribe and enforce
internal criminal Jaws, are of a difl'erent type. The~· involve only the
relations among members of a tribe. Tlm~;, they are not ~::~uch powers
as would neces:;arily be lost by virtue of a tribe's drpendent status.
'[T]he settled doctrine of the law of nation:; is , that a weaker power dces
not surrender its indrprndence--its right to self government, by a~so
ciating with a stronger, and taking its protection.' Worcester v. Georgia
[6 Pet .l, at 560-561." 435 U. S., at 32G.
3 2 This lack of inherent 80vereignty over nonmembers is supported by
the principle that " in thi~::~ Nation each l:iOvrreign governs only with the
consent of the governed." Nevada v. Jlall, 440 U. S. 410, 426. Because
the tribe can exclude nonmember::; from participation in the tribal government. the power exE'!'cised over those so excluded Hhou 1d bo' a limited one.
3a The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 confirmed but did not. enlarge·
the inherent sovereign powers of the Indian tribe~. Congress intrndrd the
Art to "stabilizP the tribal organization of Indian tribes by ve~tiPg such
tribal organizations with real, though limited, authority . .. .'' S. Rep ,
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Shortly after the Act was passed, the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior issv:ed a formal opinion setting forth
his understanding of the pqwers that might be secured to an
Indian tribe and incorporated in its constitution by virtue
of the statutory reference to powers vested in an Indian tribe
"by existing law." 3-l He concluded that among those powers
No. 1080, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1934). As one commenator interpreted

§ 16 of the Act:
"[I]t would ap])(•ar that powers originally held by tribes that were recognized and allowed to be retained b,~· treaties or prior statutes, as well as
any additional powers conferred in the same manner, would be retained
by tribe~ that accepted the terms of the 1934 Act. . . . The provi:-:ion is
conl'i~tenL with the act's purpo~e of enhancing tribal government in that it
recognized aud reconfirmed tho::;e powers a tribe may already have had as
a government." Mettler, A Unified Theory of Indian Tribal Sovereignty,
30 Ha~tings L. Rev. 89, 97 (1978).
Moreover, although the power given by the Reorganization Act of 1934
to the Secretary of the Interior to Hpprove or disapprove of the rxercise
of tribal power~ placed a limit on tribal sovereignty, that power did not
enable the Secretary to add to the inherent powers thHt a tribe po::;sessed
before the Act was pas~ed.
On the other hand, the fact that an Indian tribe may never have had the
occasion to exercise a particular power over nonmembers in its early history is surely not a sufficient reason for denying the exi~tence of that
power. Accordingly, the fact that there is no evidemc that the Jicarilla
Apache Tribe ever imposed a tax of any kind on a nonmember doe;; not
require us to conclude that it has no such taxing power. To the extent
that the power to tax was an attribute of sovereignty po~;;e~::;ed b~r Indian
tribe::; when the Reorgnaization Act wa::; pas;;ed, we believe Congress
intended the statute to preserve those power;; for all Indian tribes that
adopted a formal organization under the Act.
34 55 I. D. 14.
Solicitor Margold described the scope of thi;; opinion
as follows:
"My opinion has been requested on the que::;tion of what powers may be
secured to an Indian tribe and incorporated i11 its con::;tit uti on and by-laws
by virtue of the following phrase, contained in section 16 of the WheelerHoward Act (48 Stat. 984, 987):
"In addition to all power-s vest,ed in any Indian tribe or tribal council
by exi8ting law, the constitution ttdopted by ;;aid tribe shall al::;o ve::;t ...•
[Italics added.]
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was a power of taxation and described the permissible exer~
cise of this power:
"Except where Congress has provided otherwise, this
power may be exercised over members of the tribe and
over nonmembers, so far as such nonmembers may accept privileges of trade. residence, etc.. to which taxes
may be attached as conditions." 55 I. D. 14, 46.
Solicitor Margold cited three decisions in support of this
opmwn. These three cases, Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947
(CAS 1905), app. dismissed. 203 U. S. 599; Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U. S. 3S4; and Maxey v. Wn:ght, 3 Ind. T. 243. 54
S. W. S07 (Ct. App. Ind. T.). aff'd. 105 F. 1003 (CAS 1900),
were decided shortly after the tum of the celltury and are
the three leading cases considering the power of an Indian
tribe to assess taxes against noHmembers. 0 " The three cases
are similar in result and in their reasoning. In each the
court upheld the tax; in each the court relied on the Tribe's
power to exclude non-Indians from its reservation and concluded that the Tribe could condition entry or coutinued
presence within the reservation on the payment of a license
"The question of what powers nrc vested in nn Indian tribe or tribal
council by exi~ting law cannot be answered in detail for ea<'h Indian i ribe
without reference to hundreds of Rpecial treaties and HJweial a<'b of Cungre~s . It is po~~ible, however, on the ba~is of the reportnl casrs, the
written opinions of the various executive department~, and tlw~e statutes
of Congre~s which are of general import, to define the power8 which have
heretofore been recognized as lawfnlly within thr jnri~di<:tioll of an Indian
tribe. My answer to the propoundrd question, then, will be g!:'ncral, and
subject to correction for particular tribe~ in the light of the trraties and
statutes affecting such tribe wherever such treatie~ or statutes contuin
peculiar provi~ionR restricting or enlarging the general authority of an
Indian tribe." Id., at 17-18.
:JG Felix Cohen, in his Handbook on Federal Indiau Law. publi~ht'd in
1942, also relies on these cases in his di~cu~~ion of tribal laxation of nonmembers. Cohen 266-267. The Court in Colville cited both Bu~te?' v,
Wright and Morris v. Hitchcock In upholding tribal power to tax. 447
U. S., at 153. Ser p. 30, infra.

'
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fee or a tax; in each the court assumed that the remedy for
nonpayment would be exclusion from the reservation or intervention by the Interior Department on behalf of the Tribe.
In the first of these cases. Maxey v. Wright, 54 S. W. 807
(1900), the Court of Appeal of Indian Territory affirmed an
order by a federal territorial court dismissing a complaint
filed by non-Indian lawyers practicing in the Creek Nation.
They had sought to enjoin the Indian agent for the Five Civilized Tribes from collecting an annual occupation tax of $25
on each non-Indian lawyer residing and practicing his profession on the reservation. In rejecting the attorneys' claim,
the Court of Appeal first analyzed the relevant treaties between the United States and the Creeks and noted that they
had "carefully guarded their sovereignty, and their right to
admit, and consequently to exclude, all white persons, except
such as are named in the Treaty." Id., at 809. The United
States, pursuant to a treaty with the Creeks. had agreed that
all persons not expressly excepted who were present in the
Creek Nation "without the consent of that Nation are deemed
to be intruders, and pledges itself to remove them." Ibid.
Because attorneys were not within any excepted class,~ 6 the
Tribe had the authority to require them to obtaiu permits or
to require their removal as "intruders.'' a7 The Court thus
held:
"rTlhat unless since the ratification of the treaty of
1856 there has been a treaty entered into, or an act of
30 "Attorney practicing in tlw United StatPH courts are not persons
who eome within the exceptions, for the~· are not 'in the employment of
the government. of t11P Unitrd Statp~,' or 'p<·r~on~ JWHCPabl~· traveling or
temporarily sojourning in the country, or trading therein under license
from the proper authority of the UuitPd State~." 54 S. W., at 809.
37 In reaching thi::; conclu:;ion thr eourt rclitd heavily on two opiuion$
of the Attorney General of thP United StatPs. In the first opinion. i~~ued
in 1881 , Attorney General McVPagh upheld the validity of Indian permit
law::; regulating which persons would be permitted to re:;idc on the Choctaw and Chicka::;aw rcJ:<ervationR. 17 Op. Atty. Geu. 1:34. In his di::;cu8-
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congress passed, repealing it, the Creek nation had the
power to impose this condition or occupation tax, if it
may be so called, upon attorneys at law (white men)
residing and practicing their profession in the Indian
Territory. And inasmuch as the govemment of the
United States, in the treaty, had declared that all persons not authorized by its terms to reside in the Creek
Nation should be deemed to be intruders. and had obligated itself to remove all such persons from the Creek
Nation, the remedy to enforce this provisioll of the treaty
was a removal by the United States from the Creek Nation of the delinquent as an intruder." ld., at 809-810."~
siou of the right of non-Indians to enter and rPmain on tribal land~
Attorney GenPntl MrVeagh ~tatPd:
"Replying to your fourth question: it srems from what has bren already
said that, beside~ those per:;on:s or classc::; mPntioucd b~· yon, on!~· those
who have bePn permitted by thP ChoctawH or Chicka~aws to l'<'sidr withiu
their limits, or to be employed b~· tlwir citizen:;; as teachers, mechanic::;, or
skilled agriculturists, have a right lo enter and remain on the lands of
the~e tribes; and the 1ight to remain is gone when the penn-it has expired."
ld., at 136 (empha~is added).
In the second opinion, on the same Rubjret, Atlonu?~· G<>ueral Phillip.~
stat<>d in 1884 that in tlw abHencr of u treat~· or siatuieR, thr power of
the Indian tribe "to regulate its own rightH of occupancy, and to say who
shall participate therein and upon what condition~, can not be doubted.''
18 Op. Atty. Gen. 34, 36. Although the tmtties applieablr to the Choctaw
and Chicka~aw tribes excepted from the grant of self-government power
over nonmember::;, the Attorne~· General did nol construe this provision
to limit the tribes' power to exclude:
"I submit that whatever this may mean it docH not limit the right of
these tribes to pass upon the que~tion, who (of prr~ous iudifferent to the
United States , i. e., neithrr employee~, nor objectionable) ~hall ~hare their
occupancy and npon what trrm:>. That ~~ a que~tion whieh all private
persons are allowed to decidC' for them~elveH; .. .'' I d., at 87.
3o In other parts of its opinion, thr romt n·~taiPd the propoo<ition that
the Tribe was "clothed with the power to admit white men, or not, at its
option, which as we hold, gave it the right to impose conditions," id, at

..
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Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U. S. 384, decided by this Court
in 1904, also arose out of a challenge to legislation by one of
the Five Civilized Tribes requiring non-Indians to pay anual permit fees. 30 The complainants owned cattle and horses
that were grazing on land in the Chickasaw Nation pursuant
to contract with individual members of the Tribe. Complainants filed suit in the District of Columbia prayilll!: for
an injunction preventing the defendant federal officials from
811, and that a lawyer who refused to pay for the privilege of remaining
would become an "intruder":
"On the whole case we therefore hold that a lawyer who is a white man,
and not a citizen of the Creek Nation. i~, pur~uant to their :statute, required to pay for the privilege of remaining aud practicing hi~ proft'~~ion
in that nation the ~urn of $25; that, if he refuse the payment therPof, he
becomes, by virtue of the treaty, an intruder, and that iu mrh a ca~e thr
gm·ernment of the United State::> may remove him from the nation: and
that this duty devolves upon the interior department. Whether the interior dcpartrll<'nt or it::; Indian agents can be controlled by the courts by
the writs of mandamus and injunction is not material in this case. berause,
as we hold, an attorney who refuses to pay the amount required by the
statute b~· its very terms beeames an intruder, whom the United :3tates
promises by the terms of the treaty to reman,, and then•fon• in such
rases the officer~ and 11gent::> of the interior department would be acting
dearly and proJwrl~· within the scope of their power8."
The court also reiterated that the Tribe could not collect the tax without
the intervention of the Fl'dentl Government:
"And when it is remembered that up to the time that the UnitPd States
courts were established in thl' Indian Territory the on!~, remedy for the
collection of this tax wa~ by removal, and that the Indian Natiom; had
no power to collect it, except through the intervention of the interior
department , it is quite clear that if, in the best judgment of that department, it was deemed wi~e to lake charge of the matter, and collect this
money, and turn il over to the Indian~, it had the power to do so, under
it~ superintending control of the Indians, and the illtl'rcour~e of white
men with thrm granted h~' various acts of congres::>;" id., at 812.
au J. George Wright, tlw Indian in:;pector, and J. Blair Shoenfelt, the
defendants in Maxey Y. Wright. supra, were also named as defendants in
Morris v. Ilitchcock. The other defendant::> in the Hitchcock ca~e were
the Secretary of the Interior and the Commi~~ioner of Indiau Affairs.
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·removing their cattle and horses from the Indian Territory
because complaiuants refused to pay the permit fees assessed
by the Tribe. An order dismissing the complaint was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
and by this Court.
The Court's opinion first noted that treaties between the
United States and the Chickasaw Nation had granterl the
Tribe the right "to control the presence within the territory
assigned to it of persons who might otherwise be regarded as
intruders" ·lo and that the United States had assumed the
obligation of protecting the Indians from aggression by persons not subject to their jurisdiction. !d., at 389. The
Court then reviewed similar legislation that had been adopted
by the Chickasaw Nation in 1876. and noted that the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary had, in 1879, specifically referred
to such legislation requiring licensed merchants and traders
to obtain a permit and to pay a fee of $25, and had expressed
the opinion that such legislation was not iuvalid ..u
4o The Court stated:
'And it is not di~puted that, under the authority of thel'e treatie>', the
Chickasaw Nation hal' exerri~ed the power to at tach condition~ to the
presence within ils borders of pt·r~onH who might otlwrwi::;c not be entitled to rt>main within tht> tribal territory." 194 U. 8., at 889.
41 "legislation of thr same grneral charaeter as that embodied iu the
act of thr legi~lature of the Chirka~aw Nation herr a~~ailed as invalid had
been enacted by the Chicka:,;aw ration before the pas~agr of tlw Curtis
Art. The essential 11rovi~ionH of onr such law, passed on October 17, 1870,
wen• recited in a report made to the Senate by the Committee on the
Judiciary, on Frbruary 3, 1R79, from which we cop~· the following:
"'The Jaw in que~tion srrm~ to have a twofold objrd-to prev<•nt the
intrusion of unauthorized per::>Olll:i into the territory of the Chirka~aw
Nation, and to raise n•venue. B~· it" term:; no citizen of an~· State or
Territory of the United State:,; ca11 eitlwr rent land or proeure ('lllJlloymPnt
in the Chickasaw country without entrring iuto a contral'! with a Chickasaw, which coutract till' latter i~ to report to the clerk of the eotmty whrre
he re"idcs, and a permit mu~t be obtained for a time no longer than twelve
months, for which the <"it izen is to pay the i:lUlll of $:25.
"'Every liren"ed mNehant, tradrr, nnd every phy::;ieian, not a Chicka-
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The Court then reviewed two recent opinions of the AttornE'y General of the United States that had concluded that the
powers of the Civilized Tribes to impose permit fees had not
been withdrawn by Congress.42 Although Congress had subsequently created an express exception in favor of owners of
town lots. protecting them from being evicted as intruders,
the Court noted that no comparable protection had been given
to owners of cattle and horses. 194 U. S., at 392-393. The
Court accordingly concluded that the Chickasaw legislation
imposing grazing fees was valid.
saw, is required to obtain a permit, for which the sum of §25 i~ ~:>xaded.'
"Declaring in ::;ub~tance that under the existin~ treatirs with the tribe,
the Chicka~aw:o wrre not prohibited from exrludin~ from the t(·rritory
of the nation the per::;ons afl'ected by the art, the committ<:>(' expre~sed
the opinion that the act which was the ::;ubject of tlw report \\'as Bot
invalid." 194 U. S., at 389-390.
4
~ In the finst opinion, by Attorne~' Gmrral John W. Grigg:;, see 23
Op. Atty. Gen. 214 (1900), the Attorne~· Grnrra] stated:
"The treatie:; and law:; of the United Statr::; makr all p<:>r~ons, with a
few specified exceptions, who are not citizens of an Indian nation or
member:; of an Indian trib<:>, and are found within an Indian nation without
prrmi:;:;ion, intrudrro thrre, and require thrir rrmoval by tiH' United
State~. This clo:oPs the whole mntter, absolutely exl'ludes all but the
excepted classes, nnd fully authorizrs thr~r nationR to nb~olutd~· exdude
out:;idPrs, or to prrmit their re;;idence or bu~inesH upon ~urh trrm~ n~ tlwy
may choose of the United StatPs, haw, as Rurh, no more right or hu:sine~s
to be there than they havt> in any foreign nntion, and can lawfully bP there
at all only by Indian pPrmi~~ion; and that their right to be or remain
or carry on bu~inec~ there depends sole]~· upon whether they have :such
permi~Rion.
"A~ to the power or duty of your Department in the premi:st•o there
can hadly bP a doubt. Und<:>r the trt>aties of the United Stat!:'~ with the~e
Indian nation~; this Government is under thr mo;.:t ROI!:'mn obligation,
and for which it has rN'Pived amplt> considt>ra tion, to remove and keep
removed from the territory of the;.:p trib!:'~, all thiH cla~H of illtrud('I'H who
are there without Indian permic~ ion. The perfonnanc!:' or thiH obligation,
as in other matters concerning the Indian~ and their affair:;, hat> Joug
been devolved upon the Department of the Interior." Jd., aL 21 .
The Court also relied on 23 Op. Atty. G<:>11 . 528 (1901).
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The third case, Buster v. Wright, 135 Fed. 947 (CA8 1905) 1
was a suit by nonmembers of the Creek Nation against fed . .
eral inspectors to enjoin them from stopping the plaintiffs
from doing business within the reservation because they had
refused to pay a permit tax assessed by the Tribe. The Court
of Appeals relied on Morris v. Hitchcock and Maxey v. Wright
in upholding the tax. The opinion for the court by Judge
Sanborn emphasized that the tax was in the nature of a condition precedent to transacting business within the reservation and that the plaintiffs had ample notice of the tax:
"The permit tax of the Creek Nation, which is the
subjrct of this controversy. is the annual price fixed by
the act of its national council, which was approved by
the President of the United States in the year 1900. for
the privilege which it offers to those who are not citizens
of its nation of trading within its borders. The payment
of this tax is a mere condition of the exercise of this privilege. No noncitizen is required to exercise the privilege
or to pay the tax. He may refrain from the one and he
remains freC' from liability for the other. Thus, without
entering upon an extended discussion or consideration of
the question whether this charge is technically a license
or a tax. the fact appears that it partakes far more of the
nature of a license than of an ordinary tax. because it
has the optional feature of the former and lacks the compulsory attribute of the latter.
"Repeated decisions of the courts. numerous opinions
of the Attorneys General. and the practice of years place
beyond debatP the propositions that prior to March 1,
1001, the Creek Nation had lawful authority to require
the payment of this tax as a condition precedent to the
exercise of the privilege of trading within its borders,
and that thP executive department of the government
of the Unitt>d States had plenary power to enforce its
payment through the Secretary of the Interior and his
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subordinates, the Indian inspector, Indian agent. and Indian police. Morris v. Hitchcock. 194 U.S. 384. 392. 24
Sup. Ct. 712. 48 L. Ed. 1030; Crabtree v. Madden, 4
C. C. A. 408. 410. 413. 54 Fed. 426, 428. 431; M axev v.
Wright, 3 Ind. T. 243, 54 S. W. 807; Maxey v. Wright,
44 C. C. A. 683, 105 Fed. 1003; 18 Opinions of Attorneys
GPneral 34. 36: 23 Opinions of Attorneys General, 214,
217, 219, 220, 528." 135 Fed., at 949-950.
Later in the opinion the court again stressed the fact that
the traders had entered the reservation with fu11 knowledge
of the permit obligation, and therefore could be deemed to
have accepted the condition prececlcnt. 13 The court also held
43 After c·it ing thr opinion of Attorn<'~' Grneral Gril!g~ from \\'hic·h this
Court had quoted at length in Morris v. Ilitchcock Judge Sanbom wrote:
"Pur~uant to thi;,; deci~ion the eivilized tribe~ were charging, and the
Indian agent wa~ collecting, taxr~ from noncitizfJW engagt>d in bu~inesH in
the~e nation~. It wn::; nndc•r thi::< :-tate of fact::; that tht> Fnitt>d State~
and the Creek Nation made the agreement of 1901. Did the~· intPml by
that agreement that tlw Creek Nation should thereby renoum·r it~ conceded power to exact tlw~e permit taxe~? Both partie::< knew that this
power exi~ted, nnd the United StnteH, b~· the aet of its Prel:lidt>nt :tpproviug
the law of the Creek national couneil. and the Seeretar~· of the Intrrior hy
enforeing it, had approvrd it~ exerci~r. The !"ubject of thes(' taw~ was
prr::;ented to the mind::; of the contracting parties and waF con~idrred duri11g
the negotiation of the a~reement, for that contrnrt rontaiu~ expre~:; stipulation:,: that cattle grazed on rented allotments shnll no( h(' liable to any
tribal tax (ehapter 676, :31 Stat. 871, § 37), and thnt 'no JIOJICiti~en renting land~ from a citizen for agricultural purposes as provided b~· law,
whet her ~neh land~ have been ~elected a~ nn nllotment Ol' not, ,;hall be
required to pay an~· permit tax' (rhapter 676, 31 Stat. R/1, § a!:J). But
thr~· maclc no provi~ion that. noncitizen~ who rngagrd iu the mPrcantile
bu~ine~~ in the CrePk Nation 8hould be exempt from these taxe~ . A~ the
law thf'n in force n•quired l:l\!Ch nomit izen,; to pn~· sueh tnxe~, a~ both
part it>~ wpre then awa rc of that fad and cou8idered t hl' qne~tiou, aud ns
they made 110 stipulation to abolish the~e taxes, the eomlu::<iw pn•stunption
is that they intended to make no such contract, :\lid that thr power of
the Creek Natiou to exact the~e taxeH. and the authorit~· of th<· Secretar~'
of the Interior and of hi::; ~:>ubordiuate::; to collect them, were neither re-
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that even though noncitizens of the Tribe had lawfully acquired ownership of lots within the Creek Nation. they had
no right to conduct business within the reservation without
paying the permit taxes. 41
Prior to the enactment of the Indian Reorganization Act in
1934, these three cases were the only judicial decisions considering the power of an Indian tribe to impose a tax on nonmemhers.4G These cases demonstrate that the power to impose taxes on nonmembers of the tribe derives from the tribe's
power to exclude nonmembers from the reservation and to
impose restrictions and conditions on entry onto the reservanounecd, rcvokrd, nor re~tricted, but that thP~' rema!nE'd in full force and
effect after a~ bE'forc t.he ugreement of 1901." 135 F., at 954.
41 The court lSta ted:
"The legal effeet, however, of the law prPseribing the permit taxc~ i::; to
prohibit noncitizens from conducting bu~ine::;:; within the Cn·ek Nation
without the paymeut of the::>e taxe:s." 135 F., at 055.
4 " Two dreadE'::> after the Rrorganization Act wa~ pa::;Hed Ow problem
was revisited by the Eighth Circuit. In Iron Cmw v. Oglala Sioux 'l'ribe
of Pine Ridge Reservation, 231 F. 2d 89 (CAS 195G), the court held thal
the tribe had the power to a:;;:;ess a tax on a nomnrmber lc::;:,:ee of land
within the n~::;ervation for the privilegE' of grazing stoek on rPscrvation
land. And in Barta v. Oglala Sioux '1'1ibe of Pine Ridge Reservation, 259
F . 2d 553 (CAS 1!)58), tlw Court ht:>ld that thr Unitt>d State::; eould bring
an aetion on behalf of the tribe to collect a Jiern~e tax of thrt>e ecnts per
acre per annum for grazing land and fiftren Cl'nt~ pE'r acre per annum
for farm hmd levied on nonmember !PssePs. The eourt held that the tax
did not violate the con::;titutional right::; of the nonmember l&;::;ee::; stating,
in part:
"The tribe by provi~ions of its treaty with the United States ha;; power
to providE' for the admi~sion of nonmrmbcrH of the tribe onto the rc~erva
tion . Having such power, it has the authority to impo~c rp::;tridions on
the prt:>;:;ence of 11onmember::; within the rcHervation." 259 F. 2d, at 556.
Language in both Iron Crow and Barta Huggr~ts that thP Court. of ApJWal:::, unlike the rarlier court:-;, ma~· not haw rP:<t<'d thr taxin~ pow!'r
l:iolrly 011 the power to exc· lucle . TbP Court of Appeal~ of rour"c' did uot
haw tlw lwnefit of our decisions in Oliphant, Wht>eler, and M o11tana v.
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tion for any purpose. 40 This interpretation of these cases is
further supported by the fact that the remedy for the nonpayment of the tax in all three cases was exclusion from the ·
reservationY Moreover, tribal sovereign powers over nonIn tllC' rh11ptrr of hi~ treHtisr entitled "Taxation," Felix C'ohrn statr~:
"Though the scope of the power [to tax] liS applied to nonmember~ iH not
clear, it extend~ 11t least to property of nonmembers tts('d in com>('<'tion
with Indian property liS well liS to privileges enjo~·ed by nonmcmberH in
trading with the Indians. The power to tax nonmembers i~ derived in
the easel> from the authority, founded on origin11l sovereignty aud guanmteed in Rome instance:; by treaties, to remove I>roperty of noumemben;
from the territorial limits of the tribe. Since the tribal gownmwnt has
the power to exclude, it cau extract a fer from llOI>member~ aH a coudit ion
precetlt>nt lo granting permi~:;ion to remain or to orwrate within the tribal
domain." Cohen 266-267 (footnotes omitted).
In another chapter, entitled "The Scope· of Tribal Self-C:overmumt," · f
cited by the Secretary of the Intrrior and thr Tribe hen·, Cohen deserib~s
the power of taxation as "an inherent attribute of tribal sovereignty
which contiuue~ unless withdrawn or limitPd by treaty or by ad of
Congrel:'::; . . . . " ld., at 142. After di~euH::;ing Bu~>ter Y. }l'riyht, Coheu
citl'i:i that case for the proposition that "[t]he powrr to tax does uot depend upon the power to rrmove and ha~ bee11 uphrld where then• wal-l no
power in the tribe to remove the taxpayer from the tribal juri:sdiction."
!d., at 143. As we haw sc•en, howrver, the liceni:it' tax in Busler wa:,; prec!icated on the t.ribe's right to attach eoll(lit ionH to uonmember:,; conducting
busiues::; on the re::;ervation, and the triht• could pn•vent ~uch nonmember:;
from doing business regardle~~ of whrther it could ph~· Hieally remove tho:oe
nonmembers from the rPservation. Mo)'(•over, in thr chapter 011 tribal
::;elf-government, Cohen dors rrrogilizP that tribal taxc•;; haw been upheld
ou the ba:si::; of thr tribr'~ power to rrmow nonmember~ from the re~en·a
tion, and that "[i]t is therefort• prrtineut, in analyzing the i:iCOpe of tribal
taxing power:;, to inquirr how far an I11dian tribe i)i cmpower('d to rmwve
nonmember::; from it::; reservation." Ibid.
The American Indian Policy Review Commi~::;ion recognized that the
court decisions upholding the tribes' taxing power:; "rely largely upon
the power of tribeH to remove per><ons from thr reservation, nncl coll:sequently, to prescribe the coudition::; upon which they ::;hall e11tcr" but
argued for a broader ::;ource of the right to tax. AIPRC Final Hcport
178-179.
17 In Buster v. Wright, supm, the penalty for nonpayment of the tax
was the closing of the nonmelllber's bu><ine8", enforced by the Secretary
40
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-members are appropriately limited because nonmembers are
foreclosed from participation in tribal govemment. See n.
32, supra. If the power to tax is limited to situations iH which
the tribe has the power to exclude. then the nonmember is
subjected to the tribe's jurisdiction only if he consents by
choosing to accept the conditions of entry imposed by the
tribe! 8 The limited source of the power to tax nonmembers-the power to exclude intruders-is thus consistent with
this Court's narrow construction of the power of Indian tribes
over nonmembers in general. 411 The source of the taxing authority asserted by the Jicarilla Apache Tribe in this case is
thPrefore not the Tribe's power of self-government but rather
its power over the territory that has been reserved and set
apart for its use and occupation. 50
of thf' Interior. See 135 F., at 954. In Morris v. Hitchcock, supra, the
remedy was the removal of the nonmember's cattle from the re,.;ervation, again enforced by the Unitrd Statt's. In Maxey v. Wright, supm,
an attorney refusing to pay the license fee to the Interior Department
was ~ubject to removal from the re~ervation.
4
~ "Ko noncitizPn is required to exerei,.;e a privilegt' or to pay the tax.
He mny refrain from the one and lw remains free from liability for the
other." Buster v. Wright, 135 F., at 949.
49 Sec pp. 15-17, supra.
A" we have indicated. ~re n. 2R, supra,
treatir~ recognizing the inherrnt power of tribal self-government have also
deprived the tribes of jurbdietion over nonmembers. Treat ie~ with Indian tribes, however, often specifically reeognizt•d the right of the tribe
to exclude nonmembers from the re~ervation and to attach conditions to
their entry. See, e. g, Treaty with the Choctaw and Chicka~aw, art. 7,
11 Rtat. 611 (1855); Treaty with the Creeks, art. 15, 11 Stat. 699 (1855).
Ree II Kappler 7, 9, 12, 15, 17 , 20, 21, 21, 30, 42, 75, ·!18, ()82, ()99, 703,
719, 761, 774, 779, 790, 794, 800, 866, 886, 888, 929, 985, 9YO, 998, 1008,
1016, 1021.
50 The various tribes may have taken a similar view of their powt'r lo
tax at the time of the Indian Reorganization Att. Cohen';; treati~e note~

that:
"The power of an Indian tribe to levy taxes upon it~ own member~ and
upon nonmembers doing bu~inc,.;s within the re~ervation;; ha · been affirmed in many trihal con~titutiom; approved under the Wheeler-Howard
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This conclusion is entirely consistent with our decision in
Washington v. Confederate¢ Tribes of the Colville Reserva~
tion, supra. In that case we held that the power to tax nonIndians entering the reservation had not been divested by
virtue of the tribe's dependent status and that no overriding
federal interest would be frustrated by the tribal taxation.
The Court quoted with approval, as an indication of the Executive Branch's understanding of the taxing power, Solicitor
Margold's 1934 opinion. The Court noted further that
" [ f] ederal courts also have acknowledged tribal power to tax
non-Indians entering the reservation to engage in economic activity" and cited Buster v. Wright and Morris v. Hitchcock. 51
447 U. S., at 153. The tax in Colville, which was applied to
nonmembers who entered the reservation and sought to purchase cigarettes, is clearly valid under the rationale that the
tribes' power to tax derives from the right to exclude nonmembers from the reservation and the right to attach conditions to the en try of such nonmembers seeking to do business
on the reservation. 52 Thus the inherent sovereign power of
Indian tribes to tax nonmembers stems from the tribes' power
Act [Indian Reorganization Aet], as ha~ the power to rC'move nonmember
from land over which the tribe cxerci~r;; juril:idietiou." Cohen 143.
The following clause from the 1935 Conl:ititutiou of the llo::;ebud Sioux
Tribe, which Cohen cite~ a::; a "typical" ::;tatement of :;uch "tribal power ·,"
indicates that the tribe perceived the :;cope of it::; taxation power8 over
nonmember::; to be narrower than the ::;cope of that power over member~:
"(h) To levy taxes upon members of the tribe and to require tlw performance of re:;ervation labor iu lieu thereof, and to levy tnxel:i or licen:;e
fee:;, subject to review by the Secretary of the Interior, upon nonmembers
doing business within the reservation.
"(i) To exclude from the re::;tricted land:; of the re~ervation per~ons
not legally entitled to reside therein, under ordinance~ which shall be
subject to review by the Secretary of the Iut!:'rior." Ibid.
51 The Court abo cited, without di~eu~sion, the Eighth Circuit':; dcci:-;iou
in Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, .suwa 11. 45.
5 2 A nomnember Hubjectl•d to the tax could avoid the tax b~· declining
to do bu~incss on the re:;ervation, and the "sanction" to be imposed for ·
refusal to pay the tax would be denial of permis;;ion to buy cigarettes.
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of the power must be consistent

IV
The exercise of the power to exclude petitioners would have
supported the imposition of a tribal severance tax on petitioners when they sought to enter the Jicarilla Apache Reservation to engage in exploration. drilling, and extraction
activities.":l The Tribe did not impose the tax prior to petitioners' entry, however. and therefore the tax is valid only
if the Tribe retains the power to exclude petitioners from the
reservation.
The leases executed by the Tribes and petitioners are
dearly valid and binding on both parties. The Tribe does
not contend that the leases were not the product of arms
length bargaining. Moreover, the leases were executed on a
form prepared by the Department of the Interior. the Department gave specific approval to the terms of the leases,
and they were execut(>d pursuant to explicit congressional authority.54 Under the leases petitioners therefore have the
5 a "f A]H the prtYment of a tax or lir·en~e fpc may ur marll' a <'Oil!lition
of Pntr~· upon tribal land. it mar abo br made a condition to thP J!l'1111t of
othrr privilrgrs, smh as tlw acqui~;tion of a tribal bt;;r·." Colwn 14:3.
5 '1 Congrrss intrndNI the Aet of l\IarC'h :3, 1027 to make appliC'ablr to
Exrrutiw OrdPr rrsrrvatiom; the leasing proviHion:; <dread~· applicable to
treat~· resernttions pursuant to the Act of Ma~· 29. 1924, 43 Stat. 244 . S.
Rrp. No. 1240, 69th Cong., 2d Se~"·• 3 (1927). The Aet tl1UH permitted
the !caRing of unallotted Indian land for terms not to exceed 10 ~rears
nnd as murh longer as oil and gns in paying quantitic·s were found on
the lnnd. 44 Stat. 1347. Among the Jlllrposes of the 1927 statutP wNe
to "fplermit the Pxnloration for oil and gas on Executiw-ord('r Inclit~n
RPRrrvations" to "fglive the Indian tribr:-; Hll thr oil and ga~ royaltie,.;.''
nnd to "l'pllarr with Congre~s the future determination of any rhaJJge~
of boundaries of Executive-order re"ervHtions or withdrHwab." Ibid.
In light. of the<e purposes. it is clear that Congress intended leases exerutrd pursuant to the 1927 Act to bE' binding.
The tribe rontends that the lem;es in this ra.r were rxer:•utPd pursuant
to the Art of Mav 11, Hl38, 52 Stat. 347, and not thr 1927 AC't. The
Tribe notes that the IPasr with prtitimwr~ in No. 80-15 ~tatPs in one of
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right to remain on the reservation to do business for the dura~
tion of the leases."" Because the execution of these ]eases
guaranteed the lessees such rights of access to the reservation
as might be necessary to enable them to perform the leases,
petitioners are not intruders. and while the leases remain in
effect there is no basis for claiming that the Tribe retains
any power to exclude petitioners from the portion of the res~
ervation on which they acquired drilling and extraction
rights. 5°
ito;

provi~ion~

that. it was executed puro;uant to the Hl38 Act. SPe App.
Petitioners note, however, that. although the Tribe argues that the
19;~8 Act, unlike the 1927 Act, doe;; not require that royal tie:; be· paid to
the Secretary of the Interior for the bene>fit of the· Tribr, petitioner,; make
their royalty payment;; to the United Statf'H Geological Survpy for the
benefit of the Tribe. See Tr. 79-80. We need not resolvr thi" fjll<';-;fion,
brcau::w for our purpo:::e;; the provi;;ion::; of the 1988 Act do not var~· ..;ignificantly from the provi::;ion::; of the 1927 Art. The 198~ Ac:t, like the 1927
Act, permitted the lea;;ing of Indian lands for n period "not to pxeeed 10
yean; and w,; long thereafter a;; minerab arc prodnred in paying qnautitieH." 25 U. S. C. § 396c. One of the purpo;;rs of thr 1938 AeL waH to
establiHh uniformity of the law relating to the lra~ing of tribal lamb for
mining purpo:;e::; by applying the law a;; to oil and ga.!' !rasing to tht> lea::;ing of land for the mining of other minerals. S. Hep. No. 985, 75th Co11g.,
1st Ses;;., 1-2 (1937). Other purpo;;e;; wrrr to "bring all )pasing matters
in harmony with the Indian Heorganization Act," id. at 3, and to enact
change;; de;;igned "to give the Indian;; the grente~t return from 11wir property." !d., at 2. There i~ no indication in the legi~Iativr hi~tory that the
purposes of the 1938 Act are in an~· way inconsi~tl'nt with tlw purpoti<·s
of the 1927 Act and prior legi;;lu.tion. Pre~nmably the purpo::>eH of the
earlier legi;;lation were incorporated into the uniform ~clwme achieved by
tho 1938 Act.
"" Ai; Attorney General MacVeagh ::;tatccl in 1881, only thm;r permittPcl
by the tribe to remain on the re~ervation may do so. "and the right to
remain i::; gone when the permit hm; expired." 17 Op. Atty. Gen., at 130.
" 6 Solicitor Margold wrote regarding the power to cxeluclo:
"Over tribal land;;, the tribe has the right~,; of a landowner a~ well as the
right;; of a !oral government, dominion as well a::; ~overeignty. But all
the laud;; of the rel:iervation, whrther owned by the tribe, b~· members
thereof, or by out;;ider::;, the tribe ha;; the ~>overcign power of detcnuining

64.
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We might reach a different conclusion if the petitioners, at
the time that they signed the leases. had uotice that a severance tax might be imposed. 57 If the petitioners had such
notice, then the possibility that such a tax would be imposed
could be construed as a condition of entry or a condition to
remaining on the land to which petitioners would have consented by virtue of executing the leases,Gs
the condition~ upon which per~oni' >:hall be permitted to enter it~ domain,
to re!'ide therein, am! to do bu~ine;,;s, provided only such determiuation
is cou~i~leut with applicable Federal laws and does not infriuge any
ve~Jtetl rights of pe?'IJOns now ocr·upying reservation land urtde1· lawful
authority. Morris v. llitchcock (194 U. S. :3~4)." 55 I. D., at 50 (cmphasi~ ncldrd).
!; 7 In Buster v. Wright. the court rplied on the fact that the taxpa~·er::;
had ::nnplP notice of their poteutial liability before they entered into the
on-re"crvation adivitie~ that. gave ri,.;e to their obligation. The opinion
rl'JWHlPdl~r l'lllpha~izPd thP optional character of a tax imposed ns a comlition prrePdrn1. to Pngnging; in bu~inPRs, ~:~ee n. 43, 48 supra, and the fact
that al1houg;h both partip,.; were aware of the obligation, they made no
ngrcrmpnt, limiting or aholi"hing tlw tax:
"But tlH·~· made no provi~ion that noncitizens who engaged in the merrantill· hu~ine~~ in the Creek Nation ~:;houlu be exempt from the~e taxes.
Ai' thP law tlwn in force required ~ueh <·itizem; to pay such taxe~, as both
partie~ were then aware of that faet and ron~idered the que~tion, and as
they nwde no stipulntion to aboli~h tlw~e taxe~, the conclu~ive presumption i~ that thl'y intpnded to makc no ~uch contract . . . ." 135 F., at 29.
r.& In Colville, for example, thl' nonmrmbrr desiring to purchm;e cigarrttr~ on thP rr~Prvation kuew that hi::; right to do so would be conditioned on his rom:cnt to pay the tax. Attorney General Griggs, in his
lDOO opinion on "Trcspa~srr~ on Indian Lnml::;," discussed the effect on
tribal law~ of a federal Rtatute providing for the ~ale of reservation lots
to 11011-Inuians:
"[T]hr legal right to purchnse land within an Indian nation gives to the
purehm-er no right of exemption from the laws of such nation, nor does
it authorize him to do nny net in violatiou of the treaties with such
nation. The~e laws requiring a permit to re~ide or carry on business in
the Indian rountr~' exi::;ted long before and nt the time this act was pnssed.
And if any out~>idPr saw proper to purcha~e a town lot uuder thi::; act of
Congress, he did so with full knowledge that he could occupy it for resi~
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In this case, however, there is a complete absence of any
such notice; petitioners had no reason to anticipate that the
tribe would claim that exercise of the mining rights granted
by the leases was subject to an additional conditio11. 5 u At the
time the leases contained in the record were executed the
Jicarilla Apache Constitution contained no taxing authorization whatever. and the severance tax ordinance was not enacted until many years after all lessees had been gran ted tho
unlimited right to extract oil and gas from the resorvation.uo
In addition, the written leases unambiguously stated:
"[N] o regulation hereafter approved shall effect a change
in rate or royalty or annual rental herein specified without the written consent of the parties to this lease."
App. 27.
Moreover, in 1953 petitioners might reaso11ably have relied
on the consideration of a comparable issue by Congress as an
indication of what conditions might be attached to the lease
of tribal lands. When Congress enacted legislation in 1927
granting the Indians the royalty income from oil and ~as
leases on reservations created by Executivr Order. it 11either
authorized nor prohibited the imposition of any taxes by the
tribes. The statute did authorize the collection of severance
taxes by the States. Petitioners have argued that this audencc or bnsine::;s only by permi~~ion from the Indian~." 23 Op. Atty.
Gen., at 217.
50 In 1977, the American Indian Polir~· RPviPw Commi:s;;io11 ~tatPd that
Iudian tribe;; "do not both tax and reeeive royalties. U:sually they just
receive royalties." AIPRC Final Report 344.
uu Although the power to rxrlnclr might havr ju::;tified thr impo::;ition of
this tax when petitioner:; ~ignPd thrir lease~, ('\'1' 11 a tribal eon::<titutioual
provision recognizing the powrr to exrludr, ~<'l' 11. 50, 8Upra, would not
pluet• petitioner::> on notice of the po::;sibility that a "evNauee tax would be
levied by the tribe in the futurr. Althongh tlw 19fi0 and 196R tribal eon- ~
~t itutiou::> both contained provi~ions granting tlw power to tax, ~ueh power
of course could be no greater tflan the powPr to exclude from whieh it
wa~ derived.
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thorization pre-empted any tribal power to impose a comparable tax. The legislative history, however, indicates that
Congress did not consider the question of tribal taxes on
mineral output from reservation lands. 61 If Congress had
considered it possible that the power to impose severance
taxes on leases of this character would be shared by the States
and the tribes. the issue would surely have been mentioned
in the legislation or in its history. 0 ~
The Court of Appeal~ rejected the pre-emption argumeul Ol'rau:-;e it~
reading of the legi~lative hi~tory convinced it "that Congre~s :-;imply did
·not think of the i~sue when it enacted the statute." 617 F. 2cl, at 547.
6
~ Hepre::;entative Leavitt, the Chairmau of 1he Commit lee 011 Indian
Affair:-;, "tated in di~cu~~ing the purpose of the 1927 Act:
"Briefly, the purpo~e, so far as the IndianR are eoncerned, i~ to 111ake
sure by act of Congre;;;; that there can first be a dewlopmPul of pos;;ible
oil rr:;omce~ on thr:,;e Executive-order landR: nnd, in the ~el'oml place,
thnt with the development of the oil resource;; the Indium; themselves ...
~hall have the benefit of the development of the natural re~ouree~ of their
reservation iustead of having their land~ considered to be public lands
of the United States with the benefits of such developmeut going to the
·white people.
"Snrely the Indians who once po~se;;sed all of thi~ <'otmtr~· and who
now have in thPir pos~eH~ion only t hol;'e portions that ha vr been given
to them by acts of Congre;;s , Executive order, nnd b~· t n·a t i(·~ ought to
get whatever benefit there is from the!:ie remaining area~-the n •Hourl'es
under the soil as well as above it-without having the white man l'Ome
in and profit entirely by the"e devPlopmC'nts." 68 Cong. Rec. 4573.
Repre~entative Carter, in !:iupport of the bill, stated:
01

"Since we have taken much of their lands for homes for white people,
since great StateH have been carved and built from their domain, sinee
they have reRpon<led to every call of their Government both dming pence
and war, since by our own act, without their consent, via et armis we
have narrowed them down to a small re!:iervation, can it now juRtly lie in
our mouth,; to ~ay that they are not entitled to all proceed" aeeruing or
that may accrue from the small patrimony they have left'?" 68 Cong.
Rec. 4579.
The Hou"e and Senate reports state that two of the purposes of the act
were to give the Indian~; "all of the oil and gas royaltie~," and to "authorize the states to tax produc'tion of oil and gas on such reservations.'r
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When the leases in this case were executed, the possibility
that a tribe could grant lessees access to a reservation for
specific purposes in exchange for a specific consideration and
tlwreaftcr imposf' a tax on the exercise of the granted authority had newr occurred to C'ongress.r.~ to the States, to the
Indian tribes. or to any potential lessef'S. 64 Thus the condi, . Rrp. l'\o. 12--10, fi9th Cong .. 2d Sr~~., 3 (1927): H. R. Rrp. No. 1791,
fiflth Cong., 2d Sr~~., 3 (1927). Tlm8 Congrr~~ ~pecifically rrcognized
both t hP right of thr Indian~' 1o rrcrive t hP brnrfits of all oil and gas
l'l'Homrr~ on rr~rr\'a tion land and the right of thr Stntrs to impose taxes
on the output ~·rt made no mention of thr po~sibility of t ribnl severance
tnxrR. Although thr nb~encr of such refrrrnce docs not indicate that
Congnw J1rr-rmptl'd the right of the tribeR 1o impose such taxes, the
lac·k of any mention of tribal Rrvrrancr taxes doe~ nevrrthelel:iiS bear on
prtiti01wrs' awnrrnr~~ of thr po~~ibilit~· that such 1axrs might hr impo!:>ed.
As wr haw notNI, ~rr 11. 54, supm, the Tribr argues that the 19:38 Act,
nnd not thr 1927 Act. i~ the applicable f'tatutc here. The Tribe argues
thai the 1938 Act, which make~ no reference to the States' right to impose
sewrnnee taxe,, "uperceded the 1927 ~;tatute, and therefore the States no
longer have the authority to impo~e l:'everancc· taxe~ on the mineral output of Indian Iauck The Court of Appeal~:~ did not need to rrach this
que~tion, Lecau~e the State of New Mexico was not a party, and because
the (•ourt concluded that the Tribe'~ tax wa~ valid regardless of whether
thP Stnte rct:~itwd tlw right to t:~x the oil and gas re~ources. 617 F. 2d, at
5-17-5-18, n. 5. We abo need not reach this que:stion, becau~r the legi~la
tiv(' hi~tory of tlJP 19:38 Act, like the hil:ltory of the 1927 Act, makes no
meution of tribal ~everamr taxe~. Even if thP omi~~ion of the Statr's
powrr to impo~e taxeH could be con~trued ns a withdrawal of such right
from the State~, there is certainly no indication in the 1938 ~tntute or
it ~ hi~tory that Congre~s intended to vest ::mrh power in the tribes or
cwn eon~iden·d the po~sibility of doing ::~o. Ser 11. 54, supra.
03 Although the lack of congre~:sioual recognitiou of such a tax would
uoi bP relevant to the validity of a severancr tax which the tribe either
impo:-;rd at the out,.,et of the Jea~e relationship or impo~ed after giving
fair notice at the outl"et of such relationship, we clearly do not have such
a cn;,;c here.
0 4 The Secn·tary of the Interior has cited ca"es holding that. a lirensc
or franchise i~surd by a governmental body does not prrvent thr Inter
impo;;ition of n tax unle~s the right to tax "has been sperifirally l'Urrendered in terms which admit of no other reasonable interpretation."·
St . Louis v. United Rys., 210 U.S. 265, 280; New Orleans City(~ Lake

, 0-11 & 80-15-MEMO.
MEIUUON v. JICARILLA APACHE TIUBE

37

tions attaching to petitioners' right to extract oil and gas
from the land covered by the leases were not. in the contemplation of the parties, subject to change during the terms of
the leases.u" The Tribe therefore had no authority to change
the terms of the bargain by adding au additional condition in
the form of a severance tax. 66
R. R. v. City of New Orleans, 143 U. S. 192, 195; New York 1'mnsit
Corp. v. City of New York, 303 U. S. 573, 590-593. The principal i~~ue
in these ca~es was whether the retroactive impo~ition of the frauchise tax
violated the Contract Clau~e of thr C'onstitutio11 or wa~ ~o fundamentally
unfair a~ to constitute a dena! of due proce~r- in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although this argumeut w:~s by no mean~ friYoloul:l,
cf. Puerto Rico v. Russell c~ Co .. 815 U. S. 610, no Huch i::;;,;ue i~ raiHrd
here. These cases are distiugui~hable from the inl:llant cal:le~ for the
simple reason that two different t~·pc~ of sovcr<:'igns are involved. The
fundamental difference~ in their powers have led us to conclude thal
tribes do not have the same attributes of sovPreignty Hi' do States and
their ~ubdivisions. Therefore , the faet that a Statr or itl:l ~ubdivi~ion may
impose taxes aftrr the grantiug of a licen~e would neither give uotiee to
petitionerl:l that f<ueh a tax was po~~ible uor ~tam! a~ aui horit~· for the
proposition that such a tax was within the sovereign power of an , Iudian
tribe.
az The Secrrtary abo argue~ that }WtitioJ>er:; ~houlll be n·4uirl'd to pa~'
the tax as their contribution to tribal service~ which benefit all re~idents
of the Re~ervation, includin~ petiiion('r~. HriPl' for the Seeretary of the
Interior 14. In ralrndar year 197G tiH' Tribr n•ceivPd $0,!:195,469.69 in oil
and ~~~s roynlties. See n. 15, supra. The Tribe tell:, u~ that it::; budget
for fi~ral 1976, whieh wn~ tendered to the Di:;trict Court but 110! received
in evidence, wa::; $:3,958.201. See DefrlldantH' Exhibit AA; Tr. :106: Brief
for Respondent 7. Pnlike the fixed royalty med in some miueral lea;,;iug
nrrnngements, see United States v. 8tl'ank, U. S. - , the royalty in
these oil and ~as leases i::; a 1wrcentage of the amount produced and ::;o
will allow the Tribe to benefit from a rising market.
Moreover, the taxi~ not llll'rel~· an appropriate share of a budgl>t largely
finanrecl by the soverei~n';,; taxation of it~ owu ~ubjerts. The principal
component~ of thP annual iueome of the lllPmbers of ihi::; TriLl'-if the
tnx should be sustninrcl-would be the amounl of approximatPl~· $4 milliou
of royalties and approximately $2 million in severame taxe::; received from
the smne ~roup of lessees.
00 We do not havr iu these ca::;e~ n tax impo~ed on both membrr::; and
nonmembers. The economic burden~ of the Jicarilla Apaehe sevPrance tax
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The attempted exercise of the taxing power asserted by the
Tribe in this case extends so far beyond any exercise of Indian sovereignty over nonmembers that has been recognized
in the past that we have no hesitation in concluding that it
is beyond the powers of the Tribe. 67
The judgment of the Court of Appeals should therefore be·

Reversed.
JusTICE STEWART

took no part in the consideration or deci-

sion of these cases.

are imposed entirely on taxpaypr~ over whom the 1ribe lllt~ no juri~dic
tion except in~ofar as right:; under the lea~p;,; arc being Pxer<"i::<ed.
07
Because we re<>t our dreision on the a.hsrnec of inhc·rrnt tribal ~over
eiguty to lmpo~:;e thi~ Sl'\'eraJICe tax, we Jl<'rcl not rPaeh the federal preemption and interstate commerce rnJP:;tion::; rai:oecl by petitioner:;.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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Nos. 80-11 AND 80-15

J. Gregory Merrion and Robert L.
Bayless, etc., et al. , Petitioners,
80-11
v.
Jicarilla Apache Tribe et al.

On Writs of Certiorari to
the United States Court
of Appeals for the
Amoco Production Company and
Marathon Oil Company,
Tenth Circuit.
Petitioners,
80-15
v.
Jicarilla Apache Tribe et al.
[June -, 1981]
Memorandum of JusTICE STEVENS.
The Indian tribes that occupied North America before
Europeans settled the continent were unquestionably sover~
eigns. They ruled themselves and they exercised dominion
over the lands that nourished them. Many of those tribes,
and some attributes of their sovereignty, survive today. This
Court, since its earliest days, has had the task of identifying
those inherent sovereign powers that survived the creation
of a new Nation and the introduction of an entirely new system of laws applicable to both Indians and non-Indians. In
this case we must decide whether one such surviving attribute
of tribal sovereignty is the power to lease tribal property to
a nonmember and, after the lease is signed, to impose a tax
on the exercise of the rights granted by the lease.
The lessor in this case is the Jicarilla Apache Tribe. The
21 petitioner-lessees in these two consolidated cases arc extracting oil and gas from tribal lands pursuant to long-term
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leases, some of which have been in effect since 1953. In
1976, the Tribe enacted an ordinance imposing a severance
tax on the oil and gas produced under these leases, and petitioners brought suit to enjoin the collection of the tax. The
District Court granted the injunction, but the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, upholding the tax. 617
F. 2d 537. We granted certiorari, U. S. - . Before
addressing the legal issues, we shall recount some of the history of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe, the derivation of the Indian leasing power, and the facts of these cases.

I
The 2100 members of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe live on a
reservation in northern New Mexico. 1 Most of the residents
of the reservation live in the town of Dulce, N. M., near the
Colorado border. The area encompassed by the Reservation
became a part of the United States in 1848 when the Mexican War ended in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. See 9
Stat. 922. Between 1848 and 1871, the United States did
not enter into any treaty with the Jicarillas or, as far as we
are advised, enact any special legislation relating to them.
In 1871 Congress outlawed any future treaties with Indian
tribes. 2 In 1887. President Cleveland issued a simple Executive Order setting aside a tract of public lauds in the Territory
of New Mexico "as a reservation for the use and occupancy
of the Jicarilla Apache Indians." 8 Except for a provision
See Plaintiff'~ Exhibit E , p . 14.
"[RJereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the
United States shall be arkuowleclged or rerogni~ed a>' an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom lhc Unil('cl SlateR may coutraet by
treaty: Provided j'Urthcr, Thnt nothing herein coutuinecl ~hull bl; C'on~trm·d
to invalidate or impair thr obligation of :.uJ~' treat~· lwrl'lofon· lawfully
made and ratified with any ~urh Indian nation or tribe." 1U Stat. 566,
current. ver~ion at 25 U. S. C. § 71.
8 Two previous Executive orders setting aside land as a rcserva tion for
the Jicurillas had been cancelled. In 1874 President Grant set u:~ide land
1
2

·.
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protecting bona fide settlers from deprivation of any previously acquired valid rights, the Executive order contained no
special rules applying to the reservation. 4
The record does not indicate what leasing activity, if any,
occurred on the Jicarilla Reservation between 1887 and 1953.
During that period, however, the authority of Indian tribes
to enter into mineral leases was clarified. In 1891 Congress
passed a statute permitting the mineral leasing of Indian
lands. Act of February 28, 1891, 26 Stat. 795, 25 U. S. C.
§ 397. Because the statute applied only to lands "occupied
by Indians who have bought and paid for the same," the
statute was interpreted to be inapplicable to reservations
created by Executive Order. See British-American Oil Producing Co. v. Board of Equalization, 299 U. S. 159, 161-162,
164. Thus in 1922 the Secretary of the Interior took the
position that Indian reservations created by Executive Order
in an ordrr that he cancrllrd in 1876. Ser I C. Kapplrr, Indian Ati'air~,
Laws, and Treatie;; 874 (1904) (hereinafter Kappler). In 1880 Pre~ident
Hayes established a re~ervation in an order that Prc::~ident Arthur cancelled in 1884. feZ., at 875.
• The entire executive order reads a;,; follows:
"EXECUTIVE MANSION, FEBRUARY 11, 1887.
"It is hereby ordered that all that portion of the public domain in the
Territory of New Mexico which, when surveyed, will be embraeed in the
following townships, viz: 27, 28, 29, and 30 north, rangeH 1 east a11d 1, 2,
and 3 we;,;t; 31 and 32 north, rangr~ 2 we;,;t and 3 wr~:>t, and the ~:>outh
half of township 31 north, range 1 wrst, hr, and tlw same i;; hereby, Het
apart as a re~:;ervation for the usc and oc(·upa.tion of thP Jiearilla Apa.ehe
Indians: Provided, That this order shnll not be so constnwd m; to drprive
any bona fide settler of any valid rights he may havp aequirrd under the
law of the United States providing for the di;,;position of the IJUblic
domain."
Grover Cleveland.
!d., at 875.
The boundaries of the Reservation were redefined or clarified by Executive
Orders issued by President Theodore Roosevelt on November 11, 1907 and
January 28, 1908, and by President Taft on February 17, 1912. See App.
to Brief for Petitioners in No. 80-15, at 22a-24a.
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·were public lands and that Indians residing on such reservations had no right to share in the royalties derived from oil
and gas leases on such lands. 5 In 1927 Congress enacted a
5 This decision held that the land on Exeeutive Order m;ervations was
subject to leasing, as "lands of the United States," under the Mineral
Lands Leasing Act of February 25, 1920, 41 Stat. 437, 30 U. S. C. § 181
et seq. 49 I. D. 139. In 1924, Attorney General Stone r0ndert>d an O]Jinion stating that thC' Mineral Land:; Lea:;ing Act did not appl~· to Executive
Order reservation~. 34 Op. Atty. G<:>n. 181 (1924). Then in 1925 Attorney General Stone instituted litigation in the Di:strict Court of Utah to
cancel certain lea;ses that had been authorized b~· the Secrctar~· of the
Interior pursuant to the Mineral Lands Leasing Acl. See United States
v. Harrison, Equity No. 8288 (Utah 1925). S0e H. R. Rep. No. 1791,
69th Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1927). The ca:;e was di:;mi:s:;ecl by :;tipulation
after the 1927 Act referred to in the text wa:s pa ·;sed. Sec United States
v. McMahon, 273 U. S. 782.
A later deci:;ion by thi:; Court suggrsts that the Secretary's position was
correct. In Sioux 'l'ribe of Indians v. Uuited States, 316 U. S. 317, the
Court held that an Indian tribe was not entitled to any compem;ation from
the United States when an Executive Order m;ervation was aboli;shed
The Court said:
"Perhaps the most striking proof of the belief shared by Congress nnd
the Exerutive that the Indians were not entitled to compen:;ation upon
the abolition of an Pxecutive order reservation i:; the very absence of compensatory paymentR in surh ~ituations. It was a common pra<"tice, durirg
the period in whirh re;;ervations were created by executive order, for the
Pr0sident oimply to terminate the C'xistence of a re:;ervatiou by cmwPlling
or revoking the order establishing it. That is to ~ay, the procedure followed in the ca8e before us wa::; tn1ical. No compen;;ation wa:; made, and
neither the Government nor the Indians sugge:sted that it was due.

"We conclude therefore that there was no exprrss constitutional or ~tutu
tory authorization for the convpyanre of a compensable interest to petiticner by the four expcutive orders of 1875 and 1R76, and that no implied
CongrPsoional delegation of the powC'r to do ~o can be i:iJWll<'d out from
lhe evidence of Congrc~:;ioual and executive under:;tanding. The orders
were diertive to withdraw from salP the land:; affected and to grant the
use of th0 land::; to the petitioner. But the interPst which the Indian8
received wa:; subject to termination at the will of either i he executive or
Congress and without obligation to the Unit eel States. The executive
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·statute expressly providing that unallotted lands on any Indian reservation created by Executive Order may be leased
for oil and gas mining purposes with the approval of the
Secretary of the Interior. 6 The statute directed that all
rentals, royalties, or bonuses for such leases should be paid
to the Treasurer of the United States for the benefit of the
tribes. 7 The statute further provided that state taxes could
be levied upon the output of such oil and gas leases s but
orders of 1879 and 1884 were simply an exrrcil:ie of this powpr of termination, and the payment of eompemmtion was not rrquirecl." 316 U.S.,
at 330-331. Sec also Tee-Jlit-'l'on Indiaus, v. United .State8, 348 U. S.
272, 279-282.
6 Section 1 of the Art of March 3, 1927, 44 Stat. 1347, c·urrent version
at 25 U . S. C. § 398a, provided:
"Unallottecl lands within tlw limits of any resrrvution or withdrawal
created by Executive order for the use or occupaney of any Indians or
tribe may be least'd for oil and gas mining purpOl:iE'ii in accordanee with
the provisions contained iu the Act of May 29, 1924 L25 U. S. C. § 39 ] ."
SeE' also 25 U. S. C. § 398. Unallotted land waH land which had not been
allotted in severalty to individual Indians pursuant to the formula prescribed in the Grneral Allotmrnt Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 38 .
7 Section 2 of the Act provided:
"The proceeds from rentals, royalties, or bonuses of oil and p;as lea;;e
upon lands within Executive order Indian reservation:; or withdrawals
shall be deposited in the TreaRury of the United Statr::: to the credit of
the tribe of Indians for whose benefit the reservation or withdrawal was
crrated or who are using and orrupying thP land, and shall draw iutt•rest
at the rate of 4 per centum prr annum and be available for appropriation
by Congress for expenses in connection with the ::;upervi::;ion of the development and operation of the oil and ga::; industry and for the use and
benefit of such Indians: Provided, That said Indian::;, or their tribal council, shall be consulted in regard to the expenditure of such money, but no
per capita payment shall be made except by Act of Congress." 25
U. S. C. § 398b.
s Section 3 of the Act provided:
"Taxes may be levied and collected by the State or local authority upon
improvements, output of mines or oil and gas welll:l, or other rights, property, or a::;sets of any lessee upon lands within Executive order Indian ·
reservations in the same manner as such taxes are otherwise levied and
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made no mention of the possibility that the Indian tribes, in
addition to receiving the royalties, could impose taxes on the
output. 9
In 1934, Congress enacted the Indian Reorganization Act,
48 Stat. 984, 25 U. S. C. § 461 et seq., which authorized any
Indian tribe residing on a reservation to adopt a constitution
and bylaws. subject to the approval of the Secretary of the
Interior. The Act provided that in "addition to all other
powers vested in an Indian tribe or tribal council by existing
law," the constitution should also vest certain specific powers,
such as the power to employ legal counsel, in the Tribe. 10
25 U. S. C. § 476. The Act further authorized the Secretary
collected, and ~uch taxes may be levied again~t the share obt£1ined for the
Indim1s as bonuses, rentals, and roynltie:;, and the Secretary of the
Interior i~ authorized and directed to eaui"P surh taxes to be paid ont of
the tribal funds in the Treasury: Provided, That such tnxe:; shall not
become a lien or charge of any kind against the land or other property
of such Indians." 25 U. S. C. § 398c.
9 In 1938, Congress pa~sed the Act of May 11, 1938, 52 Stat. 347, 25
U. S. C. § 396a-g, which was designed in part to achieve uniformit~r for
all mineral leases of Indian landR. Like the 1927 Act, the statute al~o
provided that the tribes wrre rntitled to the royalties from ~urh leases.
The Htatute made no mention of state taxe::;. See 1111. 54, 62, infra.
to The statute provided, in part:
"Any Indian tribe, or tribes, residing on the same reservation, ::;hall have
the right to organize for its eommou welfare, and may adopt an appropriate con~titution and b~·laws, which ~hall become effective whrn ratified
by a mnjority vote of tlw adult mrmbers of the tribe, or of the adult
Indians residing on such resrrvation, as the case may be, at a sprrial
election authorizrd and called b~· the Secretary of the Interior under such
rules nnd regulations as he may pre~cribe.
"In addition to all powers vestrd in nuy Indian tribe or tribal council
by exi~ting law, the constitution adopted by ~aid tribe shall al~o w~t in
sueh tribe or it~ tribal council the following rights and powers: To employ
legal counsel, the choicr of coun~el and fixing of fees to be ::;ubjt>d to
the approval of the Secretary of the Interior: to prevent the ~ale, dispo~ition, leaHe, or encumbrance of tribal laud~, iutere::>tf' in land~, or other
tribal assets without the com;ent of the tribe; and to negotiate with theFederal, State, and local Governmeuts." 25 U. S. C. § 476.

-.
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of the Interior to issue a charter of incorporation to an Indian tribe, and provided that the charter may convey to the
tribe the power to purchase, manage and dispose of its property.11 The 1934 Act said nothing about the power to levy
taxes. 12 The first Jicarilla Apache Constitution was approved
by the Secretary of the Interior in 1937. 13
In 1953, the Tribe entered into an oil and gas lease with
the Phillips Petroleum Company. App. 22-30. The lease,
which is on a form prepared by the Bureau of Indian Affairs
of the Department of Interior, is presumably typical of later
leases executed between other companies and the Tribe. 14
11 Section 477 provides:
"The Secretary of the Interior rna~·. upon petition by at lea ~t om•-third
of the adult Indians, issue a charter of incorporation to ~uch tribe:
Provided, That such charter shall not become operative until ratified at a
special election by a majority vote of the adult Indians living on the
reservation. Smh charter may convey to the incorporated tribe the
power to purchase , take by gift, or brqneHt, or otherwi~e, own, hold, manage, operate, and di~11ose of property of every dcl:lcriptiou, real and J1ersonal, including the power to purchasc rel:ltricted Indian land:> and 1o i~Rue
in exchange therefor interests in corporate propcrty, and such further
powers as may bc incidental to the conduct of corporate bu;;iness, not inconsbtent with law; but no authority ~hall be granted to ::;ell, mortgtlge,
or lease for a period exceeding ten ~·ea r~ any of the land includt>d in the
limits of the reservation. Any charter so issued shall not be revoked or
surrendered except by Act of Congres::;." 25 U. S. C. § 477.
1 2 See F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 267 (1942) (hereinafter Cohen).
13 The 1937 Constitution made no reference to nny power to a::;::;ess tnxes
ngainst nonmembers. See 1937 Constitntion and Bv-Lawl:l of the Jicarilla
Apache Tribe, Defendants' Exhibit G (hereinafter 1937 Con~tituti0n).
11 This lea~e wn~ attached to the complaint of pt>titiout>rs in 1\'"o. R0-11.
The lra~;e attachrcl to 1hr complaint of petitiou!'l'~ in ~o. il0-15 wa~ al~o
executrcl in 1953. Srr App. 62. The record i~ nnelear a~ to wlwu mo;;t
of thr lra~c~ with prtitionrr~ were executed, but tlw record doe~ imlieatr
that lrasr~ were rwrn1ecl a~ late as 196i. SeP Plaintiff~ ' .Exhibit 1. Lc•a t;P~
of .Tirarilla tr'bal propt>rty in the aggn•gatt• eover over 500,000 aere~ of
land, rompri~ing almost 69% of the acreage within the Jicarilla He~erva
t.ion. Brief for ReHpondent 2.
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The lease provides that in return for a cash bonus of
$71,345.99, to be paid to the treasurer of the Tribe, and rents
and royalties, the Tribe as lessor granted to the lessee "the
exclusive right and privilege to drill for, mine, extract, remove, and dispose of all the oil and natural gas deposits in
or under" the described tracts of land, together with the right
to construct and maintain buildings, plants, tanks, and other
necessary structures on the surface. App. 22-23. The lease
is for a term of 10 years after approval by the Secretary of
the Interior "and as much longer thereafter as oil aud/ or
gas is produced in paying quantities from said land." Ibid.
The leasee is obligated to usc reasonable diligence in the development of the property and to pay an annual rental of
$1.25 per acre and a royalty of 12lj~% "of the volum0 or
amount" of all oil and gas "produced and saved" from the
leased land. App. 24, 26. Oil and gas used by the lessee
for development and operation of the lease is royalty -free.
/d., at 24. The Tribe reserved the right to use free of char2;e
sufficient gas for any school or other building owned by the
Tribe on the leased premises and to take its royalty in kind.
Id., at 27-28.
The lease contains no reference to the payment of any
taxes. The le~see does, however, agree to comply with all
regulations of the Secretary of Interior
11
• • • now or hereafter in force relative to such leases:
Provided, That no regulation hereafter approved shall
effect a change in rate or royalty or amlllal rental hC'rein
specified without the written consent of the parties to
·
this lease." I d., at 27.
The lease was approved by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs on behalf of the Secretary of the Interior. I d:, at 32.
Both of the 1953 leases described in the record are still
producing.
In 1968 the Tribe adopted a revised constitution givinl!; the
Tribal Council authority, "subject to approval by the Secre-
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tary of the Interior, to impose taxes and fees on non-members
of the tribe doing business on the reservation." 15 Eight years
later, on July 9, 1976, the Tribal Council enacted an Oil and
Gas Severance Tax Ordinance, which was later approved by
the Secretary of the Interior. The Tribal Ordinance provides
that the severance tax "is imposed on any oil and natural gas
severed, saved and removed from Tribal lands ...." App.
38. The rate of the tax is $.05 per million BTU of gas produced on the reservation and sold or transported off the reservation and $0.29 per barrel of crude oil or condensate produced on the reservation and sold or transported off the
reservation. Royalty gas or oil taken by the Tribe, as welt
as gas or oil used by the Tribe, is exempt from the tax. App.
39. Thus the entire burden of the tax apparently will fall
on nonmembers of the Tribe. The tax, if sustained, will produce over $2 million in revenues annually.w
Petitioners-lessees commenced two separate actions in the
United States District Court seeking to enjoin the tribal authorities and the Secretary of the Interior from taking any
action to collect the tax. The District Court consolidated
the two cases, allowed other lessees to intervene, and held the
taxing ordinance invalid on three separate grounds. First,
after finding that the Tribe had never attempted to exercise
a power of taxation over nomesidents prior to its incorporation in 1937, and that the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934
did not confer that power on the Tribe, the District Court
concluded that the attributes of sovereignty possessed by the
Tribe did not extend to the imposition of a severance tax on
App. to Brief for Petitioners in No. 80-15, at 12a-l:k The Tribe'~ \
1960 Constitution contained a <;imilar provitlion IH'nnitting "taxe::; and
fer)'; rn person~ doing busineRs on the rrservation." SeP 1960 Con:;titution
of thr Jicarilla Apache Tribe, Art. VI, § 5, Defrudant'H Exhibit A.
16 See District Court.'s Findings of Fact and Conrlu~iom: of Law, Finding
No . 32, App. 130. The Tribe's answers to intcrrogatorie~ indicatP that in
1976 the royalties on thr ]eases rrceiV('d by the Tribe amounted to
$3,995,469 .69 . Sec Plaintiff's Exhibit E, p. 7; Tr . 269.
15
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nonmembers. Second. the court held that the statute enacted by Congress in 1927. ·which authori:~:ed oil and gas leases
on r<:'servation created by Executive Order, had granted state
and local authorities the exclusive right to impose severance
taxes on oil and gas production from such reservations. Finally, after finding that approximately 80% of the oil and
gas production from the reservation is shipped interstate for
sale outside of New Mexico, that the tax burden amounts to
a significant percentage of the price of gas and oil, 11 and that
the tax is only imposed on gas, oil, or condensate sold or
transported off the reservation. the court concluded that it
discriminated against and created an impermissible burden
on interstate commerce.
Over the dissent of two judges, the Court of Aopeals for
the Tenth Circuit, sitting en bane, reversed. 617 F. 2d 537.
The court held that the taxing power was an inherent attribute of sovereignty possessed by the Tribe prior to the
Indian Reorgani:~:ation Act of 1934. The court further held
that the power had not been voluntarily relinquished by the
Tribe, had not been divested by Congress. and was not inconsistent with any superior interest of the United States. The
Court of Appeals rejected the argument that the 1927 Act
had pre-empted the Tribe's power to levy a severance tax.
because a review of the legislative history indicated that
"Congress simply did not think of the issue when it enacted
the statute." Id., at 547. The Court of Aopeals' reversal of
the District Court's Commerce ClausC' holding was based on
the two courts' different readings of the ordinance: whereas
the District Court had construed the taxable event as removal
of the oil or gas from the boundaries of the reservation, the
Court of Appeals construed severancC' from the land as the
1 7 Fillding No. 3G n• ad ~ : "That if the .Tirarilln. Apnrhr Oil and Gas
Severnnee Tax were valid the ('Ombined tax bnrden amount ~ to more than
29 % of the illh· r~ ta te price of old ga~ and ovrr 12.5% of t ]!(' pri('(• of old
oil." App. 130. The Tribe cont t•nd~ that t.hi~ finding iR not :,;upported
by the record, but the Court of Appeals did not ~;e t it aside.
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critical event. Id., at 546. Under the Court of Appeals'
view, the ordinance would not discriminate against interstate
commerce because oil or gas sold within the reservation as
well as oil or gas transported off the reservation would be
taxed. The court concluded that the fact that royalties paid
in kind are exempt did not render the tax discriminatory,
and that the fact that New Mexico had imposed separate
taxes on the same taxable event did not create an impermissible multiple burden on commerce. Id., at 545-546.

II
The powers possessed by Indian tribes stem from three
sources: federal statutes. treaties, or the tribe's inherent sovereignty. Neither the Tribe nor the Federal Government
seeks to justify the Jicarilla Tribe's severance tax on the
basis of any federal statute, 18 and the Jicarilla Apaches, who
reside 011 an Executive Order reservation, executed no treaty
with the United States from which they derive any sovereign powers. Therefore, if the severance tax is valid, it must
be as an exercise of the Tribe's inherent sovereignty. Last
Term, in Washington Y. Confederated 'l'ribes of the Colville
Reservation, 447 U. S. 134, we held that a tribal tax on
cigarettes sold on the reservatio11s of the Colville, Makah,
and Lummi tribes to nonmembers of the tribes was a permissible exercise of the tribes' retained sovereign power to tax. 18
We must determine whether the severance tax imposed ou
18 Congrps~ mn.y cll•lrgatc "Rove reign" powers to th<' tribes.
See Mazurie
v. United States, 419 U. S. 544. As we have indicated, however, neither
the 1927 statute permitting Indians to receive royalties from thl:' Jpase of
tribal lands nor thl:' Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 make any mention
of the authority of Indian tribes to tax. See pp. 4-7, supra.
10 The Court stated:
"The power to tax transactions occurring on trust landH and i"il!;nifieantly
involving a tribe or it;; members is a fundamental attribute of RoverPignty
which the tribes retain unless dive::;ted of it by frdNnl law or necessary
implication of their dependent status." 447 U. S., at 152.
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nonmembers of the tribe in this case can likewise be charactE'rized as a valid exercise of the tribe's inherent powers. To
make this determination, we must first cons;der the source and
scope of tribal sovereignty and more particularly the source
and scope of the sovereign power to levy taxes.
Tribal sovereignty is neither derived from nor protected by
the Constitution. 20 Rather, Indian tribes are assumed to have
retained powers of self-government that they possessed at the
time of their incorporation into the United States. In Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, the Court held unconstitutional
a Georgia criminal statute purporting to regulate residency
of non-Indians in the Cherokee Nation. In an opinion by
Chief Justice Marshall, the Court held that the Cherokees,
although submitting to the protection of the United States,
nevertheless retained some aspects of sovereignity:
"By various treaties, the Cherokees have placed themselves under the protection of the United States: they
have agreed to trade with no other people, nor to invoke
the protection of any other sovereignty. But such engagements do not divest them of the right of self government, nor destroy their capacity to enter into treaties or
compacts." Id., at 581-582.~
1

20

The only rpfert>ncr to Indian

tribe~

in the Com,;titution ii:i in Art. I,

§ 8 (3), which provides that "[t]lw Congrel:is "hall have ihe Power to
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the sevPral Stall's,
and with the Indian tribt>R." MorE' ~ignificant than thi~ referellCE' to
Indian tribe~ iR thE' ab~enct> of any mention of the tribei:i in the Tenth
Amt>ndment, which provides:
"The powers notE' drlt>gnted to tlw United StatE's by tlw Constitutiou,
nor prohibited b~· it to the Statei:i, are rel:ierved to the States respectively,
or to the people."
21 The Court n!so r;taterl:
"At no timP has the sovereignty of thr country bern rt>cognizc·d af' exii:iting
in the Indians, but they have bt>en alwa~·~ admitted to pO::il:ir~s many of
the attributes of Roverrignty. All thr rights which belong to self government have been rccognizrcl as vested in thrm. Their right of occupnnry
has never been quei:itioned, but the fee in the soil hm; been considered
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Although Indian tribes retained some elements of sovereignty,
the United States retains plenary authority to divest the
tribes of any such attributes. ~ Moreover, this Court's decisions since Worcester have recognized that not all attributes
of sovereignity are consisteut with the tribes' status as "domestic dependent nations." ~a In determining what sovereign powers the tribes retained in submitting to the authority
of the United States, the Court has repeatedly recognized
a fundamental distinction between the right of tribes to govern their own internal afl"airs and the right to exercise powers
afl"ecting nonmembers of the tribe.~!
2

in the government. Thi~ may be called the right to the ultimate domain,
but the Indians have a present. right of po:s:;e ·sion." 6 Pet., at 5i10.
~~See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U. S. 313, 319; Winton v. Arnos,
255 U. S. 373, 391-392; Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U. S. 553, 565; 1
American Indian Policy Review Commission, Finn! Report, 106-107 (1977)

(hereinafter AIPRC Final Report). Thus, for example, Congtws can
waive the tribes' sovereign immunity. See United States v. U. S. Fidelity,

309 U. S. 506, 512.
~a The term "domestic deprndent nation::-" was fir:st u;;ed in 'l'he Cherokee Nation v. Georgia. 5 Pet. 1, 17, in whirh the Court hrld that the

tribes were not "foreign nation:;" within tlw meaning of the Constitution:
"Though the Indians are acknowledged to have an unquestionable, and,
heretofore, unquestioned right to the land~ t!JP,v occupy, until that right
shall be extinguished by a voluntary cession to our government; yet it
may well be doubted whether those tribes which reside within the
acknowledged boundaries of the United States can, with strict accuracy,
be denominated foreign nations. They may, more correctly, perhaps, be
denominated domE>stic dependent nations. They occupy a territory to
which we assert a title independent of their will, which must take effect
in point of po~session when their right of po;;session ceasrs. Meanwhile
they are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the United Stales
resemble>~ that of a ward to his guurdiau."
~ 4 In United States v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375, 381-382, the Court ::;tated
that the tribes:
"[W] ere, and always have been, regarded as having a semi-independent
position when they prrserved their tribal rcla1iou::;; not as Stnte::;, not as
natious, not as possessed of the full attribute" of sovereignty, but as a
separate people, with the power of regulating their intemal nne! social
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The Court has been careful to protect the tribes from interference with tribal control over their members. See. e. g.,
Santa Clara Pueblo v. M art?'nez, 436 U. S. 65. The Court has
recognized tha.t the power to prosecute members of the tribe
for violations of tribal criminal law does not derive from
power delegated by the United States but is an inherent
attribute of sovereignty. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U. S.
313. Furthermore, the Indian tribes retain the power to create substantive law to govern their internal affairs. See Roff
v. Burney, 168 U. S. 218 (membership); Jones v. Meehan,
175 U. S. 1, 29 (inheritance rules); Fisher v. District Court,
424 U. S. 382 (domestic relations and family law). They
also may enforce that law in tribal courts. Williams v. Lee,
358 U. S. 217; Fisher v. District Court, supra. Moreover, the
Indian tribes' sovereignty over their own members is, in many
respects, significantly greater than the States' powers over
their own citizens. The tribes' virtually absolut€ control over
their own membership carries with it the power to enforce
discriminatory rules that would be intolerable in a non-Indian community. 25 Their criminal jurisdiction over their own
members is unconstrained by constitutional limitations that
are applicable to the States and the Federal Governmeut." 6
relations, and thus far not brought under the law~ of the Union or of the
State within whose limits they rP~ided."
25 Although the Indian Civil Right.-; Act of 1958, 82 Stat. 77, 25
U. S. C. §§ 1301- 13G:3, prohibits Indian tribrs from denying "to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of it~:~ law," i:iee id.,
§ 1302 (8), the provi~ions of the United States Constitution, inc-luding, the
Fourteenth Amendment, which limit. federal or state authority do not
similarly limit tribal authority. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez , 436
U. S. 49, 56, and n. 7. In Santa Clara Pueblo, the Court held that
sovereign immunity protected the tribe from suit under the Indian Civil
Rights Act, that the Act did not ereate a private eause of action cognizable
in federal court, and that a tribal court was the appropriate forum for
vindication of rights created by the Act.
26 In Talton v. Mayes, 163 U. S. 376, the Court held that the re:;trictions of the Fifth Amendment did not apply to proi:lecutious in tribal

..
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Thus the use of the word ffsovereign" to characterize tribal
powers of self-government is surely appropriate. 27
In sharp contrast to the tribes' broad powers over theirown members, tribal powers over nonmembers have always
been narrowly confined. 28 The Court has emphasized that
"exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect
tribal self-government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes, and so
cannot survive without express Congressional delegation."
Montana v. United States,- U.S.-,-. In Oliphant
v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U. S. 191, the Court held
that tribes have no criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed by nonmembers within the reservations. 29 I_n M oricourts. See also United States v. Wheeler, 435 U. S., at 328-329; 'l'umer
v. United States, 248 U. S. 354, 355.
Thu~ although the Stl.ttrs have "plenary power over re::;ident::; within
their border::;," the States may not tax income of m(•mber~ of· the tribe
derived from reservation sources. Sec M cC'lanahan v. Ariz una .State Tax
Comm'u, 411 U. S. 164, 165. Thi>~ immunity from taxatiou-evm ' for
tribal enterprise:;-does not apply beyond the boundariP~ of the rcsel'Vation. See Mescalero Apache Tribe Y. Jones. 411 U. S. 145: · ·. · · . '
~ 8 Certain treaties which sprcifirally granted thP right of sPlf government to the tribes have also sp<>cifically C'xcluded juriHdietion over nonmPmbers. See, e. g .. TrC'aty with tlw ChProkee~:~, art. 5, 7 Stat. 478
(1835); Treaty with the Choctaws and Chicka;,aw~:~, art. 7, 11 Stat. 611
( 1855) ; Treaty with the Creeks and Seminoles, art. 15, 11 Stat. 699
(1856).
29 The Court stated in support of that holding:
"Upon incorporation into the territory of the United States, thC' Indian
tribes thereby come under the territorial :>ovcreignty of the United States
and their exerci:,;e of separate power is co11strained so as not to eonfiict
with the interests of thiR overriding sovereignty. '[T]heir rights to
complete sovereignty, ns independent nations, [are] uece~sarily diminished!
Johnson v. M'Intosh, 8 Wheat. 543, 574 (1823).
"We have already described some of the inherent limitations on tribal
powers that stem from their incorporation into the United States. In
Johnson v. M'Intosh, supra. we notrd that the Indian tribes' 'power to
dispose of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever they pleased,' was
2'
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tana v. United States, supra, the Court, in holding that the
Crow tribe could not prohibit hunting and fishing by nonmembers on reservation land no longer owned by the Tribe,
indicated that the principle underlying Oliphant-limited
tribal power over nonmembers-was applicable in a civil as
well as a criminal context. 30 Thus the Court has recognized
that it is when the tribes attempt to impose controls on nonmembers that the tribes' exercise of sovereign powers would
be inconsistent with their status. 81
inherently loHt to the overriding sovereignty of the United States." 435
U. S. at 209.
Sec nl~o New Yo1'k ex rel Ray v. Ma1'tin, 326 U. S. 496, 499 (state rourt
has juri~diction to try a non-Indian for a crime commit ted ngain~t IlonIndian on reservation).
Sil "The Court recently applied the;;e general J1rinriple::; in Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U. S. 191. rejecting a tribal claim of inherent
sovereign authority to exercise rriminal jurisdirtion ovPr non-Incliaus.
Stressing that Indian tribes cannot exercise power inconsistent with their
diminished status as sovereigns, the Court quoted Justice .Tohn~on's words
in hi::; concurrence in Fletcher v. Peck, Cranch 87-thP first Indian <·a~c to
reach thi::; Court-that the Indian tribes have lost 'any right to governing
every person within their limits except themselves.' /d. , at 147, Oliphant
v. Suquamish Indian 1'1'ibe. supra, 435 U. S., at 209. Though Oliphant
only determined inherent tribal authorit~· in crimi11al matters. the principles on which it relied support the general propo::;ition that the inherent
sovereign power::; of an Indian tribe do not exteud to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe." Montana v. Unitl'd States, U. S., at (footnote omitted).
See also Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, (tribes
cannot freely alienate to non-Indian~ the land they oecupy); Chl'rokee
Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet., at 17-18 (tribe;,; eannol enter into direct commerrial or foreign relations with other nation~).
31 In Wheele1' v. United States. suwa. the Comt held that the JlOWer to
prosecute it::; mE-mbers for tribal offen::;p::; was not "implicitly lost by virtue
of their dependent status" and Rtated:
"The areas in which sueh implieit clive~titmc of ><overcignty has beeu held
to have occurred are tho::;e involving the relationl:i bctwePn an Indian tribe
and nonmembers of the tribe.
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The tribes' limited authority to enact legislation affecting
nonmembers is therefore of a different character than the
·broad tribal power over internal affairs involving members.a 2
The power to exercise control over nonmembers-and specifically the power to tax recognized in Colville-presumably has
a much more limited derivation, tied specifically to the exercise of particular powers, than the general ~etention of
inherent sovereignty to govern internal affairs. We must
therefore examine the cases upholding the power to tax to
determine the source of that power and then determine
whether the tax imposed in this case is consistent with that
rationale.

III
The search for the source of the taxing power must focus
on the tribal power to tax nonmembers that existed in 1934
when the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 had the effect
of preventing any further erosion of I11dian sovereign powers.aa
"These limitations rest on the fact that the drpendent ~tatu~ of Indian
tribes within our territorial juri~diction i~:> necessarily inconi:>ii:>tent with
their freedom independeutly to determine their external relationD. But the
powers of srlf-govPI'nment, including the power to pre;,;cribe and enforce
internal criminal laws, are of a difl'crent type. They involve only the
relations among member~ of a tribe. Thni:>, they are not l:luch powers
as would necei:l~arily be lost by virtue of a tribe's dependent status.
'[T]he settled doctrine of the law of nations is, that a weaker power dces
not F'urrender its indrpcndence--its right to self govemment, by a~so
ciating with a stronger, and taking its protection.' Worcester v. Georgia
r6 Pet.l, at 560-561." 435 U. S., at 326.
82 This lack of inherent sovrreignty over nonmcmbPrs is supported by
the principlr that " in this Nation Pach tiOVereign governti only with the
consent of the governed." Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S. 410, 426. Because
the tribr can exclude nonmcmbC'ri:l from participation in the tribal government. the power exercised over thotir so excluded :;hould b ? a. limitrd one.
as The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 confirmed but did not. enlarge
the inherent overeign powers of the Indian tribes. Congresi:l intC'nded the
Art to "stabilize thr tribal organization of Indian tribes by vel:ltir>g such
tribal organizations with real, though limited, authority . . . . " S. Rep,
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Shortly after the Act was passed, the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior issp:ed a formal opinion setting forth
his understanding of the pq\vers that might be secured to an
Indian tribe and incorporated in its constitution by virtue
of the statutory reference to powers vested in an Indian tribe
"by existing law." 34 He concluded that among those powers
No. 1080, 73cl Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1934).

As one commenator interpreted

§ 16 of the Act:
"LI]t would appt?ar that powers originally ht?lcl by tribes that were recognized and allowed to be retained
treaties or prior statutt'~, m; well as
any additional powers conferred in the same manner, would be retained
by tribe;; that aerepted the terms of the 1934 Act. . . . The provi~ion is
con~i~tent with the act's purpo~e of t?nhancing tribal goverument in that it
recognized and reconfirmed tho~e powers a tribe may already have had as
a govemment." Mettler, A Unified Theory of Indian Tribal Sovereignty,
30 Ha~ting:; L. Rev. 89, 97 ( 1978).

qy

Moreover, although the power given by the Reorganization Act of 1934
to the Secretary of the Interior to approve or di~approve of the rxerc·i~e
of tribal powrr~ plact?cl a limit on tribal sovereignty, that JlOwer did 11ot
enable the Secretary to add to the inherent powers that a tribe po~sel:l~ed
before the Act was pas~ed.
On the other hand, the fact that an Indian tribe may never have had the
occal:lion to exereif'e a particular power over nomncmberl:l in its early history il:l surt?ly not a sufficient reason for denying the exi~tmee of that
power. Aecordingly, the fact that tht?re is no evidenec that thr Ji!'arilla
Apnehe Tribe ever impo::;ed a tax of any kind on a nonrnt?mbrr does not
require Ul:i to conclude that it has no such taxing power. To the extent
that the power to tax was an attribute of ~overeignty po~:;p:;~ccl b~· Indian
tribes when the Reorgnaization Act wa~ pas:;ed, we brlieve Congrc:;s
intended the :;tatute to pre::;erve those power::; for all Indian tribe~ that
adopted a formal organization under the Act.
8 '1 55 I. D. 14.
Solicit.or Margold described the scope of thi:; opinion
as follows:
"My opinion has been requested on the que:;tion of what powt?rs may be
secured to au Indian tribe and incorporated in it8 con::;titution and by-laws
by virtue of the following phra~e, contained iu :;ection 16 of the WheelerHoward Act (48 Stat. 984, 987) :
"In addition to all powers vest.ed in any Indian tribe o1· tribal council
by existing law, the constitution ~\dopted by :;aid tribe ::;hall abo ve::;t ...•
[Italics added.]
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was a power of taxation and described the permissible cxer~
cise of this power:
"Except where Congress has provided otherwise, this
power may be exercised over members of the tribe aud
over nonmembers. so far as such nonmembers may ac~
cept privileges of trade. residence, etc., to which taxes
may be attached as conditions." 55 I. D. 14, 46.
Solicitor Margold cited three decisions in support of this
opnuon. These three cases, Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947
(CAS 1905), app. dismissed. 203 U. S. 599; Morris v. Hitch~
cock, 194 U. S. 384; and Maxey v. Wright, 3 Ind. T. 243. 54
S. W. 807 (Ct. App. Ind. T.). aff'd. 105 F. 1003 (C'A8 1900),
were decided shortly after the turn of the celltury and are
the three leading cases considering the power of an Indian
tribe to assess taxes against noumembers. ~" The three cases
are similar in result and in their reasoning. In each the
court upheld the tax; in each the court relied on the Tribe's
power to exclude non-Indians from its reservation and concluded that the Tribe could condition entry or continued
presence within the reservation on the payment of a license
"The qnei:lt ion of what powers arr vrstrd in an Indian t rihe or tril)Hl
council by existing law cannot be an~wrred in detail for ea<"h Indian t rihe
without rrference to hundrrd~ of ~perial treatiPs and spP<"ial a<"t,.; of Congre~s. It is pol:l;;ible, however, on the ba~is of tlw report<·d <'aH<'s, the
written opinion~ of the various exf'eutivc d<'partments, and tlwse ~tatutei:l
of Congret;s which are of general import, to cJpfine the powerl:l which have
herf'toforf' bePn recognized a~ lawfully within thr jnri~dietiotl of an Indian
tribe. My answrr to thr propounded quel:ltion, then, will Le gem'ral, and
subject to correction for particular tribe~ iu ihe light of thr irratie~ and
statutes affecting such tribe wherever ~\l('h treatir;,; or statuteH eontain
pec·uliar provi~ion~ restricting or enlarging the general authority of an
Indian tribP." !d., at 17-18.
~ 5 Felix Cohru, in his Handbook on FedPral Indian Law. publi~lll'd in
1942, al~o rrliel:! on these ca~es in hit> di~cu~,;ion of tribal taxation of nonmembPri5. Cohen 266-267. The Court in Colville cited both Bu1>ter v.
Wright and Morris v. Hitchcock In npholding tribal power to tax. 447
U. S., at 153. See p . 30, infra.
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fee or a tax; in each the court assumed that the remedy for
nonpayment would be exclusion from the reservation or intervention by the Interior Department on behalf of the Tribe.
In the first of these cases, Maxey v. Wright, 54 S. W. 807
(1900), the Court of Appeal of Indian Territory affirmed an
order by a federal territorial court dismissing a complaint
filed by non-Indian lawyers practicing in the Creek Nation.
They had sought to enjoin the Indian agent for the Five Civilized Tribes from collecting an annual occupation tax of $25
on each non-Indian lawyer residing and practicing his profession on the reservation. In rejecting the attorneys' claim,
the Court of Appeal first analyzed the relevant treaties between the United States and the Creeks and noted that they
had "carefully guarded their sovereignty, and their right to
admit, and consequently to exclude, all white persons, except
such as are named in the Treaty." Id., at 809. The United
States, pursuant to a treaty with the Creeks, had agreed that
all persons not expressly excepted who were present in the
Creek Nation "without the consent of that Nation are deemed
to be intruders, and pledges itself to remove them." Ibid.
Because attorneys were not within any excepted class, 3 " the
Tribe had the authority to require them to obtain permits or
to require their removal as "intruders." a7 The Court thus
held:
"rTl hat unless since the ratification of the treaty of
1856 there has been a treaty entered into, or an act of
ao "Attorney practicing in tlw 1Tnitcd StatrH courts are uot twrsons
who come within the exceptions, for they arE' not 'in the Pmployruent of
the government of the United State~,' or 'pC'l'HOil~ pt•acPabl~· travPliug or
temporarily sojourning in the country, or irading thPrPin unc!Pr license
from the proper authority of the United State~." 54 S. W., at 809.
3 7 In reaching this conclusion thr court rcliPd hravil~ · on two opillions
of the Attorney General of the UnitPd States. In the firHt opillion, i~~ued
in 1881, Attorney General McVeagh upheld the validity of Indian permit
lawt> regulating which person::; would be permitted io re;;idP on the Choctaw and Chickasaw reservation~ . 17 Op. Atty. Gen. 134. ln hiH diseus-

..
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congress passed, repealing it, the Creek nation had the
power to impose this condition or occupation tax, if it
may be so called, upon attorneys at law (white men)
residing and practicing their profession in the Indian
Territory. And inasmuch as the government of the
United States, in the treaty, had declared that all persons not authorized by its terms to reside in the Creek
Nation should be deem.ed to be intruders. and had obligated itself to remove all such persons frorn the Creek
Nation, the remedy to enforce this provision of the treaty
was a removal by the United States from the Creek Nation of the delinquent as au intruder." I d., at 809-Slo.as
sion of the right of non-Inr!ians to enter and rrmain on tribal lando
Attorney General McVeagh stated:
"Replying to your fourth question: it seem:> from what ha~ bern already
said that, besides those persons or cht~:>e~> mentioned by yon. ouJ~· tho8e
who have been permitter! by the Choctaw~ or Chicka~aw~ to re~ide within
their limits, or to be employed by their citizens a~ teacher~, meehanic8, or
skilled agriculturists, have a right to enter and remain on the lands of
thr~e tribes; and the right to remain is gone when the permit has expired."
!d., at 136 (emphasis mlded).
In the 8econd opinion, on the same ~ub,jpet, AttonH?~· G('ucral Phillip<1
stated in 1884 that in tlw absrncr of a treat~ · or i:iiatutes, the powrr of
the Indian tribe "to rel-'(ulate its own righi~ of occupancy, and to say who
shall participate therein and upou what eondition~. ean not be doubted."
18 Op . Ally. Gen. 34, 36. Although tlw lrratie~ applieable io the Choctaw
nnd Chickasaw tribes excepted from the grant of se!f-govermncnt power
over noumembers, the Attorney General did uoL construe this provision
to limit the tribes' power to exclude:
"I submit that whatever thi~ may menu it doeH not limit tht• right of
these t1·ibes to pass upon the qu!:'~tion , who (of prr~ons indifferent to the
United .States, i. e., neithrr !:'mployers, uor objPctionaiJJt>) ~hall share their
occupancy and upon what terms. That ~~ a que::;tion whirh all J>rivate
pers:llls arc allowed to decidr for them~clve::;; . . . " !d., at :37.
3o In other ]Jarti:i of its opinion, thr comt rc·ktai<•d the propo::<ition that
the TribP wa s "clothed with the power to admit white meu , or not, at its
option, which as we hold, gave it the right to impose conditiOJl~>," id, at
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Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U. S. 384, decided by this Court
in 1904, also arose out of a challenge to legislation by one of
the Five Civilized Tribes requiring non-Indians to pay anual permit fees. 30 The complainants owned cattle and horses
that were grazing on land in the Chickasaw Nation pursuant
to contract with individual members of the Tribe. Complainants filed suit in the District of Columbia praying for
an injunction preventing the defendant federal officials from
811, and that a law~·er who refused to pay for the privilege of remaining
would become an "intruder":
"On the whole case we therefore hold that a lawyer who is a white man,
and not a citizen of the Creek Nation, i~, pursuant to their l:ltatute, required to pay for the privilt>ge of remaining and practicing hil:l profc~~ion
in that nation the l:lUJU of $25; that, if he refuse the pa~·ment thert>of, he
becomes, by virtue of the treaty, an intruder, and that in mch a ca~e the
goYernment of the United State::; may remove him from the nation: and
that this duty devolves upou the interior department. Whether the interior department or its Indian agents can be controlled by the rourts b~·
the writ~:; of mamlamu~:; and i11junction is not material in this case. berause,
as we hold, an attorney who refuses to pay the amount r equired by the
statute by its very terms becamcs an intruder, whom the United States
promises b~· the terms of the treaty to reman•, and thereforl:' in such
ca~:;e::; the offirers and agents of the inlt>rior departmPnt would be acting
clearly and proper]~· within the ~eope of tlwir power.·."
The court al~o reiterated that the Tribe eould not collect the tax without
the intervention of the Fl:'deral Gowrnment:
" And when it is remembered that up to the time that the Unitt>d Statrs
courts wrre cstabli~:;hed in tht> Indian Territor~· the only reml:'d~ · for the
collection of this tax wa::; by removal, and that the Indian Nation::; had
no power to collect it, excepl through the intervention of tht> interior
department , il is quite elear that if, in thl:' bPsl judgment of that department, it wa s deemed wi~e to take charge of the matter, and eollect thi::;
mone~r, and turn it over to the Indimll:l, it had tht> powpr to do ~o. m1der
it::; superintending control of lhl:' Indian::;, and the intercour~e of whit e
men with thPm grantt>d b~· varim1s ads of congrc::;~;" id., at 812.
su J . George Wright , tlw Indian in~pPC'tor, and J. Blair Shoen felt, the
defendant::; in Maxey v. Wright. supra, were al~o named a::; ddrndant::; in
Morris v. Hitchcock. The other defendant::; in the Hitchcock ca~e were
the Secretary of the Interior and the Commi::;:;ioner of Indian Affairl:l.

.~
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·removing their cattle a.nd horses from the Indian Territory
because complainants refused to pay the permit fees assessed
by the Tribe. An order dismissing the complaint was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
and by this Court.
The Court's opinion first noted that treaties between the
United States and the Chickasaw Nation had granted the
Tribe the right "to control the presence within the territory
assigned to it of persons who might otherwise be regarded as
intruders" 40 and that the United States had assumed the
obligation of protecting the Indians from aggression by persons not subject to their jurisdiction. ld., at 389. The
Court then reviewed similar legislation that had been adopted
by the Chickasaw Nation in 1876, and noted that the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary had, in 1879, specifically referred
to such legislation requiring licensed merchants and traders
to obtain a permit and to pay a fee of $25, and had expressed
the opinion that such legislation was not iuvalid. 11
40

The Court i:itatecl:

'And it is not di~puted that, under the authority of the1<e treatie~, the
Chickasaw Nation has exerri~ed the power to attach condition::: to the
presence within its borders of Jll'rHon~ who might otherwi~e not be entitled to remain within the tribal territory." 194 U. S., al 889.
41 "Lrgii:ilation of thr same general character ai:i that embodied iu the
act of thr lrgi~laturc of the Chicka~aw Nation hrre a~~ailed ai:i invalid had
been enacted by the Chicka~aw Nation before the pai:iHage of the Curtis
Act. The eHsential proYision~ of onr i:iuch law, pa~><ed on October 17, 1876,
were recited in a report made to the Senate by the Committee on the
Judiciary, on February 3, 1R79, from which we cop~· the following:
"'The law in que~tion ~ePm~ to have a twofold object-to pr('VPilt the
intrusion of unauthorized JWr~otli:i into the tl'rritory of the Chirka~aw
Nation, and to mise rrvemte. B~· it~:~ tt•rm~ 110 citizen of any State or
Territory of the United Statt·~ can either rent land or proeun• rmploymmt
in the Chickasaw conntr~· wit hunt enteriug into a rontraet with a ChickaHaw, which coutrnct the latter i~ to report to the rlerk of the couuty whPre
he re~ides, and a 1wrmit mu~t be obtained for a time no longer than twelve
monthi:i, for whirh thr C"it izPn i::; to pay the ~mn of $:25.
"'Every liren~ed mNchant, tradPr, and every phy:::ieian, not a Chirka-
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The Court then reviewed two recent opinions of the Attorney General of the United States that had concluded that the
powers of the Civilized Tribes to impose permit fees had not
been withdrawn by Congress. ~ Although Congress had subsequently created an express exception in favor of owners of
town lots. protecting them from being evicted as intruders,
the Court noted that no comparable protection had been given
to owners of cattle and horses. 194 U. S., at 392-393. The
Court accordingly concluded that the Chickasaw legislation
imposing grazing fees was valid.
4

saw, is required to obtain a permit, for which the sum of §25 i~ exaetcd.'
"Dt>claring in :mb~tance that under the exi~ting treaties with the tribe,
the Chicka~aw~ wrre not prohibited from excluding from the tl'rritory
of the nation the per~on~ affeetcd by the art, the committee expre~~ed
the opinion that the act whirh wa~ the ~ubject of the report mts not
invalid." 194 U. S., at 389-390.
42 In the first opinion, by Attorne~· Grurral John W. Grigg:.:, see 23
Op. Atty. Gen. 214 (1900), the Attorne~· Grnernl Rtntrd:
"The trentic:; and law~ of the United Stnte~ make all per~on~, with a
few specified exceptions, who nre not eitizenH of nn Indian nation or
members of an Indian tribe, and nre found within nn Indian nation without
permis~ion, intruders there, nnd require thrir removal by the United
Stales. This rlo~;es the whole matter, absolutely exeludes all but the
exceptt>d classes, and fully authorize;;: theRr nations to ab~olult·l~· exelude
out;;ider~, or to permit their re;;idenee or business upon smh trrm~ a;;: they
may choose of tlw United StatP~, hnv<', as Hueh, no more right or bu~inc~s
to be there than they have in any foreign nation, and ean lawfully be there
at all only by Indian permi~~ion; and that their right to bt• or remain
or carry on bu;,iner:;~ there depends solely upon whether they have ~ueh
permi~8ion.

"A;, to the power or duty of your Departmr11t in the premi~r~ 1lwre
can badly bE' a doubt. Under the treaties of the United Statp~ with these
Indinn nations this Government is under the mol:'! ~olemn obligation,
and for which it has reerived ample con~ideration, to remove ami keep
removed from the territory of the~<' tribe~, all thi:-; elal:'~ of intruder~ who
are there without Indian perrni~sion. The performance of thi~ obligation,
as in other matter~ concerning the Indian~ and their afl'air~, has long ·
heen devolved upon the Department of the Interior." Id., at 218.
The Court al~o relied on 23 Op. Atty. Gen . 52 ' (1!:101).
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The third case, Buster v. Wright, 135 Fed. 947 (CAS 1905),
was a suit by nonmembers of the Creek Nation against fed~
eral inspectors to enjoin them from stopping the plaintiffs
from doing business within the reservation because they had
refused to pay a permit tax assessed by the Tribe. The Court
of Appeals relied on Morris v. Hitchcock and Maxey v. Wright
in upholding the tax. The opinion for the court by Judge
Sanborn emphasized that the tax was in the nature of a condition precedent to transacting business within the reservation aud that the plaintiffs had ample notice of the tax:
"The permit tax of the Creek Nation, which is the
subject of this controversy, is the amJUal price fixed by
the act of its national council, which was approved by
the President of the Fnited States in the year 1900. for
the privilege which it offers to those who are not citizens
of its nation of trading within its borders. The payment
of this tax is a mere condition of the exercise of this privilege. No noncitizen is required to exercise the privilege
or to pay the tax. He may refrain from the one and he
remains free from liability for the other. Thus, withou~
entering upon an extended discussion or consideration of
the question whether this charge is technically a license
or a tax. the fact appears that it partakes far more of the
nature of a license than of an ordinary tax, because it
has the optional feature of the former and lacks the compulsory attribute of the latter.
"Repeated decisions of the courts, numerous opinions
of the Attorneys GeneraL and the practice of years place
beyond debate the propositions that prior to March 1,
1901, the Creek Nation had lawful authority to require
the payment of this tax as a condition precedent to the
exercise of the privilege of trading within its borders,
and that the executive department of the government
of the United States had plenary power to enforce its
payment through the Secretary of the Interior and his
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subordinates. the Indian inspector, Indian agent. and Indian police. Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U. S. 384. 392. 24
Sup. Ct. 712. 48 L. Ed. 1030; Crabtree v. Madden, 4
C. C. A. 408, 410. 413. 54 Fed. 426, 428. 431; M axeu v.
'Wright, 3 Ind. T. 243, 54 S. W. 807; Maxey v. Wright,
44 C. C. A. 683, 105 Fed. 1003; 18 Opinions of Attorneys
Qpneral 34. 36: 23 Opinions of Attorneys General, 214,
217, 219, 220, 528." 135 Fed., at 949-950.
Later in the opinion the court again stressed the fact that
the traders had entered the reservation with full knowledge
of the permit obligation. and therefore could be deemed to
have accepted the condition prccedent.~ 3 The court also held
After c·iting thr opinion of Att.ornry Grnrral Gri!!g~ from whieh this
Court had quoted at length in Morris v. Hitchcock Judge Sanbom wrote:
"Pur~uant to thi~ deci~ion the eivilized I ribeR were charging, and the
Indian agent was collrcting, taxes from nonritizrn~ Cllgaged in bu~ille~~ in
the~e nations. It wa~ under thi~ )<tatr of fact:; that lht> 1Tuilt>d Stall'S
and the Creek Nation made the agreement of 1901. Did the~· iulrnd by
that agreement that thr Creek Nation should lhNeby rt•nouncr it8 eonceded power to rxact thr!<e prrmit taxe~? Both partie~ knew that this
power exi~ted, and the United State~. by thr act of its Pre~idt•nt HpproYing
the law of the Crerk national council. and thr Sreretary of the Interior by
enforeing il, had approved it~ exrrcise. The >:ubject of t lw;;e taxeH was
pre:;euted to the mind~ of thr contracting partirs and wa>: eou;;idert>d during
thr nrgotiation of thr ngrrement, for that contract contains expre~l' :;tipubtion~ that rattle grazed on rented allotment~ shall not he liable to any
tribal tax (chapter G7G , :n Stat. 871, § 37), and that 'no noncitizen renting land~ from a citizen for agrirultmal purpo~e~ ao; provided h~· law,
whethrr ~ueh land;.: have been selected aR an allotment or uot, :<hall be
required to pay an~· permit tax' (chapter 676, 31 Stat. Sil, § :3!:!) . But
thr~' made no provi;;ion that noncitizen:; who rngagrd in the nH·rcantile
bu~inc~H in the Crr<>k Nation ~-;hould be exempt from these tax<•s. As the
law then iu force required ~ueh noneit izrn~ to pay 8ueh tax('~, ~~~ both
parties were then awarr of that faet and con~iderrd the que10tion, and ns
they made 110 :;tipulalion to aboli:,;h the~e taxr;,;, the conclusive Jll'l'SIImption
is that they intended to make uo !<uch contract , and that the power of
the Crel'k Nation to exact theR<• taxeR, and thr authorit~· of tlw Seeretar~~
of the Interior and of hi::; :;uLordiuale::; to collect them, were neither re43
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that even though noncitizens of the Tribe had lawfully acquired ownership of lots within the Creek Nation. they had
no right to conduct business within the reservation without
paying the permit taxes. 44
Prior to the enactment of the Indian Reorganization Act in
1934, these three cases were the only judicial decisions consiuering the power of an Indian tribe to impose a tax on nonmembers.'" These cases demonstrate that the power to impose taxes on nonmembers of the tribe derives from the tribe's
power to exclude nonmembers from the reservation and to
impose restrictions and conditions on entry onto the reservanouneed, revoked, nor re;;lricted, but that they rt!ma!ned in full foree and
cfft•ct. after a.~ before t.he agreement of 1901." 135 F., aL 054.
41 The court. :ola ted:
"The legal effeet, however, of the law prescrihing the permit taxe~ is to
prohibit noncitizens from conducting bu~inesfi within the Creek Nation
wifhout the payment of the::>e taxe::;." 135 F., at 055.
'10 Two decade;; aft!:'r the Rrorgm1ization Act wa~ p<t::;::;ed the problem
waR revi~ited by the Eighth Circuit. In Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux 'l'ribe
of Pine Ridge Reservation, 231 F. 2d 89 (CAS 195G), the court held that
the tribe had the power to a~~e::;!:i a tax on a nonmember lP::;see of land
withiu the re::;Prvation for the privilege of grazing ~loek on re;;ervation
laud. And in Barta v. Oglala Sioux '1'1ibe of Pine Ridge Reservation, 259
F. 2d 553 (CAS 1958), tlw Court held that the Pnitt'd State~> could bring
an action on behalf of the tribe to collect a liernse tax of three cent~ per
acre per annum for grazing land and fifteen cPuls per acre per annum
for farm laud levied on nonmember lessees. The court !wid that the tax
did not violate the con::;titutional right::; of the nonmember I~~:~ce::; stating,
in part:
"The tribe by provil"ion:s of its treaty with the United States has power
to provide for the admiosion of nonmember:-< of the tribe onto the re~erva
tion . Having such power, it has the authority to impo:::e re::;trictions on
the presence of nonmembers within the re»ervaliou." 259 F. 2d, at 556.
Language in both Iron Crow and Barta Huggr~ts that tht' Court of ApIWal:::, unlike the earlier court::;, mny not haw rr~ted thr tnxing powPr
::;olrly on the power to exelude. The Court of AppPalti of cour::;e did not
have the benefit of our decisions in Oliphant, Wheeler, and Montana v.
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tion for any purpose. 10 This interpretation of these cases is
further supported by the fact that the remedy for the nonpayment of the tax in all three cases was exclusion from the ·
rcservation. 47 Moreover, tribal sovereign powers over nonIn thr chaptrr of hi~ trf'atisf' entitlf'd "Taxation," FPlix C'olwn statr~:
"Though thr scope of the power [to tax] as applied to nonmembN~ iH not
clear, it rxtend,; at least to property of nonmember~ mwd in conne<·tion
with Indian property as well as to privileges enjo~·ed by nonmPmlwr~ in
trMiing with the Indians. The power to tax nonmPmbers i~ derived in
the ca~cs from the authority, founded on original ~overeignty am! guaranteed in ;;ome instances by treaties, to remove property of nonmember~
from the territorial limits of the tribe. Since the tribal gowmnwnl has
the power to exclude, it ean extrart a fep from nonmembt•r::< a~ a condition
precedent lo granting permi~::>ion to remain or to op<·ratc within lhc tribal
domain." Cohen 266-267 (footnotes omitted).
In a not her chapter, pntitled "The Sropc· of Tribal Self-Government," ·
cited by the Secretary of thr Intrrior and thr Tribe hPrP, Cohen de::;eribe::;
tlw power of taxation as "an inhf'!'rnt att.ribntp of tribal ::;overPignty
whieh continue::; unlr;,~ withdrawn or limit<'d by trf'aly or b~· ad of
Congre;;~ . . . . " !d., at 142. Aftf'r diH<·ns::>ing Bu~ter \". Wriyht, Coht'n
cite~ that ca::;e for the propo~ition that "[t]he puwrr to tax dol'::; not deJWnd upon the power to rrmovr and ha,; been uphrld wherp thpn• wa~ no
power in the tribe to remove the taxpayer from the tribal juri~dietion."
Id., at 143. A::; we have' ~ern, howrver, the liePn::>P tax iu Buster wa:,( predicated on the tribe's rip;ht to attach eoll(litiou~ to Jwnmember~ eumlurling
business on the re::;ervation, and the trilw eould prt•vPnt such nonmember::;
from doing busine~::; regardlP~;.; of whetlwr it could phy~icall~· rPmove tho-,;e
nonmembers from the rr~ervation. MorPOVPr, in thr chapter on tribal
::;elf-govprnment, Cohen dors rrrognize that tribal taxP~ have bPPn upheld
011 the ba::;i~ of tlw tribr'1< power to remoV<' nonmrmbrr:< from the n·~erva
tion, and that "[i]t i~ therefon' prrtiJWJlt, in analyzing the ::;cope of tribal
taxing power::;, to inquirr how far an Indian tribe i:; empowered to rmwve
nonmember::; from it::; reservation." Ibid.
The American Indian Policy RPview Commi~~ion recognized that the
court deci::;ions upholding the tribes' taxing power::; "rPly largely upon
the power of tribe::; to remove per"oJJ;.; from the reservation, and COJJ::;equently, to prescribe the eondition~ upon which they ::;hall enter" but
argued for a broader :;ource of the right to lax. AIPRC Final Report
178-179.
H In Buster v. lFJ'"ight, supra, the JWnally for 11onpu~·mpnt of the tax
was the clo::;ing of the nonmember's lm:<ine::~~, enforced by the Secretary
4G
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·members are appropriately limited because nonmembers are
foreclosed from participation in tribal government. See n.
32, supra. If the power to tax is limited to situations in which
the tribe has the power to exclude, then the nonmember is
subjected to the tribe's jurisdiction only if he consents by
choosing to accept the conditions of entry imposed by the
tribe. 48 The limited source of the power to tax nonmembers-the power to exclude intruders-is thus consistent with
this Court's narrow construction of the power of Indian tribes
over nonmembers in geueral.·'u The source of the taxing authority asserted by the Jicarilla Apache Tribe in this case is
thC'refore not the T~ibe's power of self-government but rather
its power over the territory that has been reserved and set
apart for its use and occupation. 50
of tht> Interior. See 135 F., at 954. In Morris v. Hitchcock, supra, the
remedy waR the removal of the nonmember's cattle from the re8ervution, again enforced by the United Slates. In Ma:rey v. Wright, supra,
an attorney refusing to pay the license fee to the Interior Department
was l"ubject to removal from the re~ervation.
4
~ "No noncitizen i~ requirrd to exerei:;p a privilegt• or to pay the tax.
He may refrain from the one and he remains free from liability for the
other." Buster v. Wright, 135 F., ut 949.
4 v See pp. 15-17, supra.
Ao wr haw indiratrd. i:'PP n. 2R, supra,
treatir~ recognizing the inhrrrnt power of tribal ~elf-government have also
deprived the tribes of juristlirtion over nonmembt•rs. Trratie~< with Indian tribrs, however, often specifically reeognized the right of the tribe
to exclude nonmemberR from the re~ervation and to attaeh conditions to
their entr~'· Ree, e. g, Treat~· with the Choctaw nnd Chicka~aw, art. 7,
11 Stat. 611 (1855); Treaty with the Creeks, arl'. 15, 11 StHt. 099 (1855).
Ree II Kappler 7, 9, 12, 15, 17 , 20, 21, 27, 30, 42, 75, 41H , ()82, 099, 703,

719, 761, 774, 779, 790, 794, 800, 860, 886, 888, 929, 985, 990, 998, 1008,
1016, 1021.
' - ~

so The various t ribr;; mn~· hnYe tHken H •·imilar view of tlll•ir power lo
lax at the time of the Iudian Heorganization Aet. Cohen'::; treati;;e notes
that:

"The power of an Indian tribe to l<>vy tuxes upon its owu member::. all(t
upon nonmembers doing busine,;;; within the reservation;; hal:l been <Iffirmed in many trihnl eon~tit ution~ approved under the Wheelrr-Howard
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This conclusion is entirely consistent with our decision in
Washington v. Confederate~ Tribes of the Colville Reserva~·
tion, supra. In that case we held that the power to tax nonIndians entering the reservation had not been divested by
virtue of the tribe's dependent status and that no overriding
federal interest would be frustrated by the tribal taxation.
The Court quoted with approval, as an indication of the Executive Branch's understanding of the taxing power, Solicitor
Margold's 1934 opinion. The Court noted further that
" [ f] ederal courts also have acknowledged tribal power to tax
non-Indians entering the reservation to engage in economic activity" and cited Buster v. Wright and Morris v. Hitchcock. 51
447 U. S., at 153. The tax in Colville, which was applied to
nonmembers who entered the reservation and sought to purchase cigarettes, is clearly valid under the rationale that the
tribes' power to tax derives from the right to exclude nonmembers from the reservation and the right to attach conditions to the en try of such nonmembers seeking to do business
on the reservation. 52 Thus the inhere11t sovereign power of
Indian tribes to tax nonmembers stems from the tribes' power
Act [Indian Reorganization Act], a:; has the power to remove nonmembers
from land over which the tribe cxerci~e~ juri~diction." Cohen 143.
The following clause from the 1935 Con~t itution of the Rosebud Sioux
Tribe, which Cohen cite~ a:; a "t~·pical" ;;tatement of such "tribal power~,"
indicates that the tribe perceived the ::;cope of it::; laxation power::; over
nonmembers to be narrower than the ;;cope of that power over member8:
"(h) To levy taxel' upon members of the tribe and to require the performance of reservation labor iu lieu thereof, and to levy taxe~ or lieen::;e
fee!:i, ::;ubject to review by the Secretary of the Interior, upon nonmembers
doing business within the reservation.
"(i) To exclude from the re~tricted land:; of the reservation pcr~ons
not legally entitled to reside therein, under ordinances which shall be
subject to review by the Secretar)· of the Interior." Ibid.
5r The Court abo cited, without. di~eu;;:;ion, 1he Eighth Circuit'::; dcci::;iou J
in Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux 'l'ribl', :;u]JI'a 11. 45.
"~A nonmember :;ubjectPd to the lax could avoid the tax b~· declining
to do bu~inc~s on the re:oervatiou, and the "~auction" to be impo~ed for
refu::;al to pay the tax would be denial of permi~~ion to buy cigarettes.
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of the power must be consistent

IV
The exercise of the power to exclude petitioners would have
supported the imposition of a tribal severance tax ou petitioners when they sought to enter the Jicarilla Apache Reservation to engage in exploration, drilling, and extraction
activities. 53 The Tribe did not impose the tax prior to petitioners' entry, however, and therefore the tax is valid only
if the Tribe retains the power to exclude petitioners from the
reservation.
The leases executed by the Tribes and petitioners are
dearly valid and binding on both parties. The Tribe does
not contend that the leases were not the product of arms
length bargaining. Moreover, the leases were executed on a
form prepared by the Department of the Interior. the Departmeilt gave specific approval to the terms of the leases,
and they were executt>d pursuant to explicit congressional authority.54 Under the leases petitioners therefore have the
53 "I' A]:; the pllYmrnt of a tax or liC'ell~t· f<:>e ma~· Lr madr a eoudition
of rntrY upon tribal land . it maY ahm br madr a. condition to the grant of
other privileges, suf'h as tlw acqui:;;tiou of a tribal lea:;('." Coht'll 14;),
5 4 Congres~ intendPd the Aet of l\larl'h 3, Hl27 to make appliC'abk to
Exerutive Order reservations the leasing provi::;iom; <dread~· applicable to
treaty rrsrrnttions pur~uant to the Act of ~Jay 29. 1924, 43 Stal. 244 . S.
Rep . No. 1240, 69th Cong., 2d Se~::;., 3 (1927). The Act thuN prrmitted
the lea~ing of unallott ed Indian land for term:; not to pxceed 10 years
and as much longer as oil and gas in paying fjuantiti<-'8 were found ou
the land . 44 Stat. 1347. Among the purpo~e s of the 1927 :>latut(' wrre
to " rpJermit the exnlorfltion for oil and ga s on Exeeutivc-ordt•r I11dia1l
RPsrrvations" to " rgJive thr Indian tribe~ all thr oil and gas ro~·altit•s.' 1
nnd to "rpllaC'e with Congre;,;~ th e future determination of any change~
of boundaries of Executivr-order reservatiou~ or withdra\\'ab." Ibid.
In light of the8e purposes. it is clear that Congre~s intended leaseH exeC'Iltrd pursuant to the 1927 Act to be binding.
The tribe contends that the !rases in this case were rxeC'utrd pursuant
to the Art of Mav 11, 1938, 52 Stat. 347, and not the 1927 Act. Th e
Tribe notes that the lease with petitionrr~ iu No. 80-15 ~tfltes in one of
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right to remain on the reservation to do business for the duration of the leases."" Because the execution of these leases
guaranteed the lessees such rights of access to the reservation
as might be necessary to enable them to perform the leases,
petitioners are not intruders. and while the leases remain in
effect there is no basis for claiming that the Tribe retains
any power to exclude petitioners from the portion of the reservation on which they acquired drilling and extraction
rights. 5°
it,; provi):iion~ that it wa::, executed pursunnt to the Hl38 Act. SPt' App.
64. Petitioupr:; note, however, that although the Tribe argues that the
19:38 Act, uulike the 1927 Act, doe::> not require that. royaltir~ b<· paid to
th<' Srcretary of the Interior for the ben<'fit of tlw Tribe, ])('titioner:o make
their royalty payments to the United StateH 0<-'ological Smvey for the
b<'n<'fit of the Tribe. See Tr. 79-80. We need not r('~olve thi~ qu<·~tion,
because· for our purpo~e!:l the provision::; of the 19a8 Act do not vary .-;ignificantly from the provisions of the 1927 Act. The HJ:3~ Ad, like the 1927
Act, permitted the lea::;ing of Indian lands for n period "not to <'xcet•d 10
yean; and as long thereafter as minerab arc produced in paying qnautities." 25 U. S. C. § 396c. One of the pmpors<';; of the 1938 AtL was to
c:,:tablish uniformity of the law relating to the Jca~ing of tribal lamls for
mining purpo::;es by appl~·ing the law m; to oil aml gal" l(•asing to the l~·ai:i
illg of lm1d for the mining of other minerals. S. Rep. No. 985, 75th Cong.,
1st Ses::;., 1-2 (1937). Other purpose::; were to "bring all leasing matterR
in harmony with the Indian Heorganization Art," -irl. at 3, ami to enact
change~ de ·!gned "to give the Indian~ the great<'::;t rrturn from th(•ir property." !d., at 2. There is no indication in thr legislative hi~tory that the
puq1oses of the 1938 Act arc in an~' way inconsi~tent with the }Htrpo::;(•S
of the 1927 Act and prior legi~lation. l'reHnmabl~· the JlllfJ>OHl'H of the
earlirr legislation were incorporated into the uniform ~cheme athicved by
the 1938 Act.
fiG A.,; Attorney General MacVeagh ::;tated in 1881, only thosP permiltPd
by the tribe to remain on the reHervation may do so, "and the right to
remain is gone when the permit hns expired." 17 Op. Att~·. Gen., at 136.
fiG Solicitor Margold wrote regarding the power to exclude:
"Over tribal lands, the tribe ha~ the rights of a landowner as well as the
right:; of a local government, dominion a~ well aH ~overeignty. But all
tlw lands of the reservation, wh<'ther owned b~· the tribe, b~· membrrs
thereof, or by out:;ider::;, the tribe has the sovereign power of detcnnining
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We might reach a different conclusion if the petitioners, at
the time that they signed the leases. had uotice that a severance tax might be imposed. 5 ' If the petitioners had such
notice, then the possibility that such a tax would be imposed
could be co11struecl as a condition of entry or a condition to
remaining on the land to which petitioners would have consented by virtue of .executing the leases." 8
the condition~ upon which perRon~ l:ihall be permitted to enter it~ domain,
to rel:lide therein, and to do bu:;ine~:>s, provided only :;uch determiuation
il:l cousil:lleut with applicable Federal laws and does not infringe any

Veiiterl rights of persons now occupying reservation land under lawful
au.lhoritu. Morris v. Ifitchcock (194 U. S. :384)." 55 I. D., at 50 (emphasi~

nrlrled).
In Buster v. Wright. the court relied on the fact that the taxpn~·ers
had mnple not ice of thPir J>oteutial liability before they entered into the
on-rc~ervntion aetiviiic~ that gave rise to their obligation. The opinion
rcJwnledly emphaRized the optional character of a tax impo:;ed as a conclition prc•c·pdcnL to C'ngaging in btt~inrRs, :;ee n. 43, 48 supra, and the fact
thnt although both partiP~ were aware of the obligation, they made no
agreement limiting or abolilihing the tax:
"But thp~· mmle no provision that noncitizens who engaged in the mercantile' huHiue~R in the Creek Nation should be exempt from the:;e taxes.
As lhe law tlwu in force required such citizeus to pay such taxe~, as both
partie~ were then aware of that fart and con~idered the que;,;tion, and as
thP~' umdP no :;tipulation to abolish the~e taxes, the conclu~:>ive presumption i~ that they intendPd to make uo such contract . . . . " 135 F., at 29.
" 8 In Colville, for exnmple, tlw nonm(·mber dei:>iring to purchase ciga·
ret tc~ on the reservation kuew that his right to do so would be conditioned on his consent to pay the tax. Attorney General Griggs, in his
1!)00 opinion on '"l'reRpa~l:iers on Indian Lancb," discussed the effect on
tribal law~ of n, federal statute providing for the sale of reservation lots
to non-Indians:
" [T]he legal right to purchasr land within nn Indian nation gives to the
purcha~er no right of exemption from the laws of such nation, nor does
it authorize him to do any act in violation of the treaties with such
nation. Thc~e htwR requiring a permit to re:;ide or carry on business in
the Indian country rxisted long before and at the time this act was passed.
And if nny out~idPr saw proper to purchase n, town lot under this act of
Congress, he did so with full knowledge that he could occupy it for resi~
57
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In this case, however, there is a complete absence of any
such notice; petitioners had no reason to anticipate that the
tribe would claim that exercise of the mining rights grauted
by the leases was subject to an additional conditio11. 5 v At the
time the leases contained in the record were executed the
Jicarilla Apache Constitution contained no taxillg authorization whatever, and the severance tax ordinance was not enacted until many years after all lessees had been granted the
unlimited right to extract oil and gas from the reservation. 00
In addition, the written leases unambiguously sta.t ed:
"[N]o regulation hereafter approved shall effect a change
in rate or royalty or annual rental herein specified without the written consent of the parties to this lease."
App. 27.
Moreover, in 1953 petitioners might reasonably have relied
on the consideration of a comparable issue by Congress as an
indication of what conditions might be attached to the lease
of tribal lands. When Congress enacted legislation in 1927'
granting the Indians the royalty income from oil and gas
leases on reservations created by Executive Order. it lleither·
authorized nor prohibited the imposition of any taxes by the
tribes. The statute did authorize the collection of severance
taxes by the States. Petitioners have argued that this audcnce or business only by permission from the Iudians." 23 Op. Atty.
Gen., at 217.
59 In 1977, the American Indian Policy Review Commi~;,;ion stated that
Indian tribes "do not both tax and receive royalties. Usually they just
receive royalties." AIPRC Final Hcport 344.
00 Although the power to exclude might. hav<· jutitified the impo~ition of
this tax when petitioners signed thrir leaseR, evrn a tribal const.itutioual
provi~ion recognizing the power to exclude, ;,;ee 11. 50, ~'upm, wonld not
place petitioner,; on notice of the possibility that a ~evrntiJcc tnx would be
levied by the tribe in the future. Although tlw 19GO and 1968 tribal constitution~ both eontained provisions granting the· power to i ax, ~uch power
of course could be no greater than the power to exclude from whieh it
was derived.
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thorization pre-empted any tribal power to impose a comparable tax. The legislative history, however, indicates that
Congress did not consider the question of tribal taxes on
mineral output from reservation lands.u 1 If Congress had
considered it possible that the power to impose severance
taxes on leases of this character would be shared by the States
and the tribes, the issue would surely have been mentioned
in the legislation or in its history. 0 ~
The Court of Appeals rejected the prr-emption argmnrnt berau;;e it~
reading of the legi~lative hi~tory convinced it "that Congre~s ;,imply did
·not think of the i;,;me when it enactPd the statute." 617 F. 2cl, at 547.
0
~ HE"prt>HPntative Leavitt, the Chairm:m of 11H' Committee on ludian
Affair~, ~tatPd in di~ru~~in~ thr purpo;;e of the HJ:27 Act:
"Briefly, the purpo~e, so far as the Indians arc concerned, i~ to make
sure by act of Cougress that there ('an first be a developnH'Ilt of po~;;ible
oil re~:>onrces on t!H:':>c Executive-order land~: and, in the ~e<·orul place,
that with lhP development of the oil resources thr Indians them~clw~ ...
~hall have the benefit of the development of the nalural rr~ouree~ of their
reservation instead of having their lands considPr<:'d to be public lands
of the United States with the benefits of :>uch development going to the
·white people.
"Surely the Indians who once possessed all of thifl country all() who
now have in thPir po:s~e;;~ion only those portions that have heen given
to them by actb of Congre~s, Executive order, and b~· tmtt it•H ought to
get whatever benefit there is from these remainin~ arPa:::-the re~ourees
under the soil as welJ as above it-without having the white man eome
in and profit entirely by these developments." 68 Cong. Rec. 4573.
Repre~eutativc Carter, in support of the bill, stated:
"Since we have taken much of their lands for homes for while people,
since great States have been carved and built from their domain, since
they have rP~potHled to every call of their Government both during peace
and war, since by our own act, without thPir consent, vin et armis we
have narrowed them down to a small re:>ervation, ran it now ju~lly lie in
our mouths to ~ay that they are not entitled to all proceeds acerniug or
that may accrue from the small patrimony they have left?" 68 Cong.
Rec. 4579.
The Hou~e and Smate reports state that two of the purposes of the act
were to give the Indian:; "alJ of the oil and gas royaltiP~," and to "authorize the states to tax production of oil and gas on ~:>nch reservations.'r
01
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Whrn the leases in this casr wen' executed. the possibility
that a tribe could grant lessees access to a reservation for
specific purposrs in exchange for a spf'cific consideration and
thrreafter imi)OS<' a tax on the exercise of the granted authority had nrwr occurrf'd to C'ongress.r.~ to the States. to the
Indian tribes, or to any potential lessers. 64 Thus the condiSr~;;., 3 (1927): H. R. Urp. No. 1791,
60th C'ong., 2d Sr""·• 3 (1927). Thus Congrr~R ~Jlecificnlly recognized
hot h t hr right of tbr Indinn::< to rrrrivr thr brndits of nil oil nnd gas
rpsome<':; on rP:'Pt-vntion lnnd nnd the right of thr StnteR to impo~r tnxes
on thr output ~·rt mnde no mention of thr po~sibility of tribal ;;everance
taws. Although thr nb~Pnce of F<ueh refrrrnce does not indicate that
Congn'"" J1rr-empt!'d the right of the tribe~< to impose such taxes, the
lark of any mrntiou of tribal ~everancr taxPI' doe" nevertheles;; bear on
petitionPr~' nwnrrnr"~ of the po,.~ibility that such taws might be imposed.
As w<· h;we nofPd, ~e<' n. 54, supra. the Tribr argues that the 19:38 Act,
nnd not the 1927 Act. i" the npplicable ~;tatute here. The Tribe argues
that the 193, Ad, which mah" no refermce to the States' right to impose
:::everance !axe~. ~uperceded tlH:' 1927 statute. and therefore thP States no
longer have the authority to impose severance taxc::; ou the mineral output of Indian landJ;. Tlw Court of Appeal::; did not need to reach thi8
que~tion, Lecau>'e the State of New Mexico wa~ not a part~', and because
tlw court coneluded that the Tribe'~< tax wa~ valid regardle&; of whether
thl' State retaim'd the right to tax the oil and ga~ re~ourees. 617 F. 2d, at
547-548, n. 5. We al~o ueed not reaeh thi::; que::;tion, becau~e the Jegi~la
tive hi~tory of t lw 1938 Act, like the· hi~tor~' of tin• 1927 Act, makes no
meution of tribal "everanee tax<'~. Even if the omission of ilw State's
powrr to impo~P taxer-: could be con~trued as a withdrawal of surh right
from the States, there if: certainly no indication in the 1938 ~;tatHte or
iti-i hi"tory thnt Congre>'s intPnded to ve~t :-mch power in the tribes or
even eon~iderPcl t hr pos;:;ibility of doing :;o. SeP n. 54, supra.
0 3 Although the lack of congre~sional recognition of surh n tax woulu
not be relevant to the validity of a severance tax which the tribe either
imposed at the out::;et of the lease relation::;hip or imposed after gh·ing
fair notice at the out:;et of ~uch relationship, we clearly do not have such
a ca~c here.
o1 The Secn·tary of thE' Interior has citeu ra::;e~ holding that. n lirensr
or franchise issued by a governmental body doe::; not prewut the Inter
imposition of a tax unles::; the right to tax "has been sperifirally ~ur
rendered in terms which admit of no other remsonable interpretntion." ·
St . Louis v. United Rys., 210 U. S. 266, 280; New Orlean,s City <~ Lake
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tions attaching to petitioners' right to extract oil and gas
from the land covered by the leases were not. in the conternplation of the parties, subject to change during the terms of
the leases. 0 " The Tribe therefore had uo authority to change
the terms of the bargain by addillg an additional condition in
the form of a severance tax. ua
R. R. v. City of New Orleans, 143 U. S. 1\:12, 195; New York Transit
Corp. v. City of New York, 303 U. S. 573, 590-5H3. The principal i~~ue
in the~e ca~es was whether the retroactive impo~itiou of the franr'hiHe tax
violated the Contract Clau~:;e of the Constitution or wa~ :;o fundamental!~·
unfair as to con:;titute a dena! of duP proce~~ in violation of the Fourtet•nth Amendment. Although this argtum·nt wa~ by no mean~ J'rivolouR,
cf. Puerto R-ico v. Russell & Co., 315 U. S. (.llO, no Huch i~~ue i~ raisrd
here. The~:;e ca~:;e:; are distiugni:;hable from the instaut ca~e;.: for the
simple reason that two differeut typrH of ;;overeiguH arc involved. The
fundamental differences in their power~:; have led us to condude that
tribes do not have the ~amc attribute:; of sovereignt~· ai" do States and
their ~:;ubdivi:;ions. Thrrefore, the fa<:l that a Stale or it:; i"ubdivi~iou may
imposE taxes aftpr the !!:rantiu11: of a liceu~e would neither give not ic·e to
petitioner:; that ~uch a tax was po~~il>lc nor stand a~ authority for the
propor:;ition that suth a tax was within the sovereign power of an Imlian
tribe.
6 " The Secrchtr~· nbo argm·~ that pt'titioner::; should be rpquin·d to pa~'
the tax as their contribution to tribal serviet·~ which Lell(·fit all re~idents
of the Re~:;ervation, inelucling petiti01wr~. Briel' for the Secretar~· of the
Interior 14. In calendar year 1976 the Tribe received $:~,9\:.15,469.69 in oil
and gas roynlties. Src n. 15, supra. The Tribe tell" u~ that it" budget
for fi::;eal 1976, which waH t(')ltlerecl to the Di::;trict Court Lut 11ot received
in evidence, was $3,958.201. St•e Defendant,.;' Exhibit AA; Tr. :106; Brief
for Respondent 7. Unlike thP fixl'd royalty u~ed in some miueral ]C'a~iug
arrangements. sec United States v. Stmuk, U. S. - , the royalty in
these oil and gas lca~:;c·s is a percentage of the amount produced and ~o
will allow the Tribe to benefit from a ri::;ing markcl.
:Moreover, the tax i~ not mprel~r an appropriate share of a budgt>t largely
finanred by the sovereign's tuxaliou of its owu ~ubjects. The principal
componentP of the annual income of the nwmlwr~ of thi::> TribP-if the
tax ~:;hould b e ~:;u~:;taiiJcd-would be the amouut of approximately $4 million
of royalties nnd approxirnatPly $2 million in severauce taxe~ reteived from
the ~arne group of les~ees.
uu We do not huvc in theRe casr~ a tax im]lo~etl on both membPrs and
nonmember~:;. The economic burdrn~ of the Jiearilla Apache ~everance tax
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The attempted exercise of the taxing power asserted by the·
Tribe in this case extends so far beyond any exercise of Indian sovereignty over nonmembers that has been recogni~ed
in the past that we have no hesitation in concluding that it
is beyond the powers of the Tribe.G 7
The judgment of the Court of Appeals should therefore be·

Reversed.
Jm;TICE STEWART

took no part in the consideration or deci-

sion of these cases.

are impo~ed entirely on taxpayPr~ over whom the tribe ha~ no juri:sdictiou except inl:'ofar as right:,; under the lra~eH are being exerei~ed.
07
Because we re:st our d<'ci~<ion on the uh:<rnc·e o[ inhrrrnt tribal ~O\'l'r
eignty to impo~e thi~ scvernncr. lax, we 1wed not rrach the federal preemption and interstate c·ommcrce q~w:<tion:s ra i:sed by petitioners.

..Suvrtmt <!fomt of tqt ~b ~fattg
.:utlfingt~ ~.

<!f.
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

June

17,7

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re:

No. 80-11 - Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe
No. 80-15 - Amoco Production Company v.
Jicarilla Apache Tribe

Because I agreed with Thurgood at Conference that the
Jicarilla possess the sovereign power to levy the challenged
severance tax, I shall await his dissent on this point. As
my dissent in Commonwealth Edison indicates, however,
Thurgood and I are not in agreement on the Commerce Clause
issue presented in both of these cases.
I expect,
therefore, that I shall write a short opinion explaining my
view that Jicarilla should be remanded to determine whether
the tax was "fairly related" within the meaning of the
. fourth-prong of the Complete Auto Transit test.
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2nd DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

1

. Gregory Merrion and Rober .
Bayless, etc., et al., Petitioners,

80-11
I

v.

On Writs of Certiorari tq
the United States Cour~
Amoco Production Company and
of Appeals for the
Marathon Oil Company,
Tenth Circuit.
Petitioners,
Jicarilla Apache Tribe et al.

~0-15

~

Jicarilla Apache Tribe et

1981]
.l'Jnw+t-I-I"'T''70

JUSTICE STEVENS.

tribes that occupied North America before
Europeans settled the continent were unquestionably sovereigns. They ruled themselves and they exercised dominion
over the lands that nourished them. Many of those tribes,
and some attributes of their sovereignty, survive today. This
Court, since its earliest days, has had the task of identifying
those inherent sovereign powers that survived the creation
of a new Nation and the introduction of an entirely new system of laws applicable to both Indians and non-Indians. In
this case we must decide whether one such surviving attribute
of tribal sovereignty is the power to lease tribal property to
a nonmember and, after the lease is signed, to impose a tax
on the exercise of the rights granted by the lease.
The lessor in this case is the Jicarilla Apache Tribe. The
21 petitioner-lessees in these two consolidated cases are extracting oil and gas from tribal lands pursuant to long-term
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.leases, some of which have been in effect since 1953. In
1976, the Tribe enacted an ordinance imposing a severance
tax on the oil and gas produced under these leases, and petitioners brought suit to enjoin the collection of the tax. The
.District Court granted the injunction, but the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, upholding the tax. 617
F. 2d 537. We granted certiorari, U. S. - . Before
addressing the legal issues, we shall recount some of the history of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe, the derivation of the Indian leasing power, and the facts of these cases.

,...

'

..

•'

I
The 2100 members of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe live on a
reservation in northern New Mexico. 1 Most of the residents
of the reservation live in the town of Dulce, N. M., near the
Colorado border. The area encompassed by the Reservation
became a part of the United States in 1848 when the Mexican War ended in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. See 9
Stat. 922. Between 1848 and 1871, the United States did
not enter into any treaty with the Jicarillas or, as far as we
are advised, enact any special legislation relating to them.
In 1871 Congress outlawed any future treaties with Indian
tribes. 2 In 1887, President Cleveland issued a simple Executive Order setting aside a tract of public lands in the Territory
of New Mexico "as a reservation for the use and occupancy
of the Jicarilla Apache Indians." 3 Except for a provision
See Plaintiff's Exhibit E, p . 14.
"[H]ereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the
United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract by
treaty : Provided further, That nothing herein contained ~ hall be con ~ tru e d
to invalidate or impair the obligation of any treaty heretofore lawfully
made and ratified with any such Indian nation or tribe." 16 Stat. 566,
current version at 25 u. s. c. § 71.
3 Two previous Executive orders setting aside land as a reservation for
the Jicarillas had been cancelled. In 1874 President Grant se t aside land1

2
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protecting bona fide settlers from deprivation of any previously acquired valid rights, the Executive order contained no
special rules applying to the reservation. 4
The record does not indicate what leasing activity, if any,
occurred on the Jicarilla Reservation between 1887 and 1953.
During that period, however, the authority of Indian tribes
to enter into mineral leases was clarified. In 1891 Congress
passed a statute permitting the mineral leasing of Indian
lands. Act of February 28, 1891, 26 Stat. 795, 25 U. S. C.
§ 397. Because the statute applied only to lands "occupied
by Indians who have bought and paid for the same," the
statute was interpreted to be inapplicable to reservations
created by Executive Order. See British-American Oil Producing Co. v. Board of Equalization, 299 U. S. 159, 161-162,
164. Thus in 1922 the Secretary of the Interior took the
position that Indian reservations created by Executive Order
in an order that he cancelled in 1876. See I C. Kappler, Iudian AtTair~,
Law::; and Treaties 874 (1904). In 1880 Pn'sident Haye~ c~tabli~hed a
re~:>ervation in au order that President Art,hur cancelled iu 1884. Jd.,
at 875.
4 The entire exeeutive order reads as follows:
" EXECUTIVE MANSION, FEBRUARY 11, 1887.
"It is hereby ordered that all that portion of the public domain in the
Territory of New Mexico which, when surveyed, will be embraced in the·
following townships, viz: 27, 28, 29, and 30 north, nwges 1 eal:lt ami 1, 2,
and 3 west; 31 and 32 north, mnge;; 2 west and 8 we::;t, and the llouth
half of township 31 north, range 1 west., be, and the :oame i:,; hereby, set
apart as a re:,;ervation for the use and oceupa.tiou of the .Jicarilla Apa.che·
Indian;;: Provided, That this order shall not be so eoustrued m; to deprive
ally bona fide rsettler of any valid rights he may hnve acquired under the
law of the Unjteq State;:; providing for the di~po~;ition of the publiu
domain."
Grover Cleveland.
ld., at 875.
The boundaries of the Reservation were redefined or clarified by Executive
Orders is~;ued by Prersident Theodore Roo~evelL on Novembet· 11, 1907 amf
January 28, 1908, and by Pre~ideut Taft ou .February 17, 1912. lll C ..
~appler, Indian Affair·::;, Laws aud . Tr.eatie::; 681, ol:l2, ol:l4 (1916),

.,
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were public lands and that Indians residing on such reservations had no right to share in the royalties derived from oil
and gas leases on such lands. 5 In 1927 Congress enacted a

..

s This decision held that the land on Executive Order reservations was
subject to leasing, as "lands of the United States," under the Mineral
Lands Leasing Act of February 25, 1920, 41 Stat. 437, 30 U. S. C. § 181
et seq. 49 I. D. 139. In 1924, Attorney General Stone rendered an opinion stating that the Mineral Lands Leasing Act did not apply to Executive
Order reservations. 34 Op. Atty. Gen. 181 (1924). Then in 1925 Attorney General Stone instituted litigation in the District Court of Utah to
cancel certain leases that had been authorized by the Secretary of the
Interior pursuant to the Mineral Lands Leasing Act. See H. R. llC:'p. No.
1791 , 69th Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1927). The ca8c wn~ di~mi~l:ied Ly l:itipulation after the 1927 Ad referred to in the text wn:; passed. See United
States v. McMahon, 273 U. S. 782.
A later decision by this Court suggests that the Secretary's position was
correct. In Sioux Tribe of Indians v. Un-ited States, 316 U. S. 317, the
Court held that a.n Indian tribe was not entitled to any compensation from
the United States when an Executive Order reservation was Hboli::;hed.
The Court said:
"Perhaps the most striking proof of the belief shared by Congress and
the Executive that the Indians were not entitled to compensation upon
the abolition of an executive order reservation is the very absence of compensatory payments in such situations. It was a common practice, during
the period in which reservations were created by executive order, for the
President simply to terminate the existence of a reservation by cancelling
or revoking the order establishing it. That is to say, the procedure followed in the case before us was typical. No compensation was made, and
neither the Government nor the Indians suggested that it was due.

.•

''

1·.

•.

"We conclude therefore that there was no express constitutional or statutory authorization for the conveyance of a compensable interest to petitioner by the four executive orders of 1875 and 1876, and that no implied
Congres~ional delegation of the power to do so can be spelled out from
the evidence of CongrC:'::;::;ional and executive understanding. The orders
were effective to withdraw from sale the lands affected and to grant the
use of the lands to the petitioner. But the interest which the Indians
received was subject to termination at the will of either the executive or
Congress and without obliga'tion i:o the United States. The executive

..
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statute expressly providing that unallotted lands on any Indian reservation created by Executive Order may be leased
for oil and gas mining purposes with the approval of the
Secretary of the Interior. 6 The statute directed that all
rentals, royalties, or bonuses for such leases should be paid
to the Treasurer of the United States for the benefit of the
tribes. 7 The statute further provided that state taxes could
be levied upon the output of such oil and gas leases 8 but
orders of 1879 and 1884 were simply an exerci:oe of this power of tennination, and the payment of compensation was not required." 316 U. S.,
at 330-331. See also Tee-Hit-Ton Indians, v. United States, 348 U. S.
272, 279-282.
6 Section 1 of the Act of March 3, 1927, 44 Stat. 1347, current version
at 25 U. S. C. § 398a, provided:
"Unallotted lands within the limits of any reservation or withdrawal
created by Executive order for the use or occupancy of any Indians or
tribe may be leased for oil and gas mining purposes in accordance with
the provisions contained in the Act of May 29, 1924 [25 U. S. C. § 398]."
See also 25 U. S. C. § 398. Uuallotted land was land which had nut. been
allotted in severalty to individual Indiaus pur:suant to the formula prescribed in the General Allotment Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 388.
7 Section 2 of the Act provided:
"The proceeds from rentals, royalties, or bonuses of oil and gas leases
upon lands within Executive order Indian reservations or withdrawals
shall be deposited in the Treasury of the United States to the credit of
the tribe of Indians for whose benefit the re1:>ervation or withdrawal was
created or who are using and occupying the laud, and ~hall draw interest
at the rate of 4 per centum per annum and be available for appropriation
by Congress for expenses in connection with the supervision of the development and operation of the oil and gas industry and for the use and
benefit of such Indians: Provided, That said Indians, or their tribal council, shall be consulted in regard to the expenditure of such money, but no
per capita payment shall be made except by Act of Congres~." 25
U. S. C. § 398b.
8 Section 3 of the Act provided:
"Taxes may be levied and collected by the State or local authority upon
imJJrovements, output of mines or oil and gas well:;, or other right::;, Jn·operty, or assets of any lessee upon lands within Executive order Indian
reservations in the eame manner as such taxes are otherwise levied and
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made no mention of the possibility that the Indian tribes, in
addition to receiving the royalties, could impose taxes on the
output.9
In 1934, Congress enacted the Indian Reorganization Act,
48 Stat. 984, 25 U. S. C. § 461 et seq., which authorized any
Indian tribe residing on a reservation to adopt a constitution
and bylaws, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the
Interior. The Act provided tha.t in "addition to all other
powers vested in an Indian tribe or tribal council by existing
law," the constitution should also vest certain specific powers,
such as the power to employ legal counsel, in the Tribe. 10
25 U. S. C. § 476. The Act further authorized the Secretary
eollected, and such taxes may be levied against the share obtained for the
Indians as bonuses, rentals, and royalties, and the Secretary of the
Interior is authorized and directed to cause such taxes to be paid out of
the tribal funds in the Treasury: Provided, That such taxes shall not
become a lien or charge of any kind against the land or other property
vf such Indians." 25 U. S. C. § 398c.
9 In 1938, Congress passed the Act of May 11, 1938, 52 Stat. 347, 25
U. S. C. § 396a-g, which was designed in part to achieve uniformity for
all mineral leases of Indian lands. Like the 1927 Act, the statute also
provided that the tribes were entitled to the royalties from such leases.
The statute made no mention of state taxes. See nn. 54, 58, infra.
to The statute provided, in part:
11
Any Indian tribe, or tribes, residing on the same reservation, shall have
the right to organize for its common welfare, and may adopt an appropriate constitution and bylaws, which shall become effective when ratified
by a majority vote of the adult members of the tribe, or of the adult
Indians residing on such reservation, as the case may be, at a special
election authorized and called by the Secretary of the Interior under such
rules and regulations as he may prescribe.

....

11

In addition to all powers vested in any Indian tribe or tribal council
by existing law, the constitution adopted by said tribe shall also vest in
such tribe or its tribal council the following rights and powers: To employ
legal counsel, the choice of counsel and fixing of fees to be subject to
the approval of the Secretary of the Interior; to prevent the sale, disposition, lease, or encumbrance of tribal lands, interests in lands, or other
ttibal assets without the consent of the tribe; and to negotiate with the·
Federal, State, and local Governments." 25 U. S. C. § 476.
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pf the Interior to issue A- ch!irtel' of incorporation to an Indian tribe, and provided that the charter may convey to the
tribe the power to purchase, manage and dispose of its property.11 The 1934 Act said nothing about the power to levy
taxes. 12 The first Jicarilla Apache Constitution was approved
by the. Secretary of the Interior in 1937.13
In 1953, the Tribe entered into an oil and gas lease with
the Phillips Petroleum Company. App. 22-30. The lease,
which is on a form prepared by the Bureau of Indian Affairs
of the Department of Interior, is presumably typical of later
leases executed between other companies and the Tribe. 14
11

Section 477 provides:
"The Secretary of the Interior may, upon petition by at least one-third
of the adult Indians, issue a charter of incorporation to such tribe:
Provided, That such charter shall not become operative until ratified at a
special election by a majority vote of the adult Indians living on the
reservation. Such charter may convey to the incorporated tribe the
power to purchase, take by gift, or bequest, or otherwise, own, hold, manage, operate, and dispose of property of every description, real and personal, including the power to purchase restricted Indian lands and to issue
in exchange therefor intrrests in corporate property, and such further
powers as may be incidental to the eo11duct of corporate business, not inconsistent with law; but no authority shall be grunted to sell, mortgage,
or lease for a period exceeding ten years any of the land included in the
limits of the reservation. Any charter so issued shall not be revoked or
surrendered except by Act of Congress." 25 U. S. C. § 477.
12 See F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 267 (1942) (hereinafter Cohen).
18 The 1937 Constitution mnde no reference to any power to assess taxes
against nonmembers. See 1937 Constitution and B:v-Laws of the .Jicari!la
Apache Tribe, Defendants' Exhibit G (hereinafter 1937 Constitution).
14 This lease was attachrd to the complaint of petitioners in No. 80-11 .
The lease attached to the complaint of petitioners in No. 80-15 was also
executed in 1953. See App. 62. The record is unclrar as to when most
of the leases with petitioners were rxecuted, but the record does indicate
that leasrs were executed as late as 19fi7. See Plaintiff~' Exhibit 1. Leases
of Jicarilla tr;bal property in the aggregate cover over 500.000 acres of
land, comprising almost 69% of the acreage within the Jica.rilla Re~erva
tion. Brief for Respondent 2.

.::
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The lease provides that in return for a cash bonus of
$71,345.99, to be paid to the treasurer of the Tribe, and rents
and royalties, the Tribe as lessor granted to the lessee "the
exclusive right and privilege to drill for, mine, extract, remove, and dispose of all the oil and natural gas deposits in
or under" the described tracts of land, together with the right
to construct and maintain buildings, plants, tanks, and other
necessll,ry structures on the surface. App. 22-23. The lease
is for a term of 10 years after approval by the Secretary of
the Interior "and as much longer thereafter as oil and/ or
gas is produced in paying quantities from said land." Ibid.
The leasee is obligated to use reasonable diligence in the development of the property and to pay an annual rental of
$1.25 per acre and a royalty of 12%% "of the volume or
amount" of all oil and gas "produced and saved" from the
leased land. App. 24, 26. Oil and gas used by the lessee
for development and operation of the lease is royalty-free.
ld., at 24. The Tribe reserved the right to use free of charge
sufficient gas for any school or other building owned by the
Tribe on the leased premises and to take its royalty in kind.
!d., at 27-28.
The lease contains no reference to the payment of any
taxes. The lessee does, however, agree to comply with aU
regulations of the Secretary of Interior
" . . . now or hereafter in force relative to such leases:
Provided, That no regulation hereafter approved shall
effect a change in rate or royalty or annual rental herein
specified without the written consent of the parties to
this lease." !d., at 27.
The lease was approved by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs on behalf of the Secretary of the Interior. !d., at 32.
Both of the 1953 leases described in the record are still
producing.
In 1968 the Tribe adopted a revised constitution giving the
Tribal Council authority, "subject to approval by the Secre-
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tary of the Interior, to impose taxes and fees on non-members
of the tribe doing business on the reservation." 15 Eight years
later, on July 9, 1976, the Tribal Council enacted an Oil and
Gas Severance Tax Ordinance, which was later approved by
the Secretary of the Interior. The Tribal Ordinance provides
that the severance tax "is imposed on any oil and natural gas
severed, saved and removed from Tribal lands .... " App.
38. The rate of the tax is $.05 per million BTU of gas produced on the reservation and sold or transported off the reservation and $0.29 per barrel of crude oil or condensate produced on the reservation and sold or transported off the
reservation. Royalty gas or oil taken by the Tribe, as well
as gas or oil used by the Tribe, is exempt from the tax. App.
39. Thus the entire burden of the tax apparently will fall
on nonmembers of the Tribe. The tax, if sustained, will produce over $2 million in revenues annually. 16
Petitioners-lessees commenced two separate actions in the
United States District Court seeking to enjoin the tribal authorities and the Secretary of the Interior from taking any
action to collect the tax. The District Court consolidated
the two cases, allowed other lessees to intervene, and held the
taxing ordinance invalid on three separate grounds. First,
after finding that the Tribe had never attempted to exercise
a power of taxation over nonresidents prior to its incorporation in 1937. and that the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934
did not confer that power on the Tribe, the District Court
concluded that the attributes of sovereignty possessed by the
Tribe did not extend to the imposition of a severance tax on

,,

1 5 App. to Brief for Petitioners in No. 80-15, at 12a-13a. The Tribe's
1960 Constitution contained a Bimila.r proviBion permitting "taxes and
fees en persons doing bmine::;s on the reservation ." See 1960 Constitution
of the J :carilla Apache Tribe, Art. VI , § 5, Defendant'::; Exhibit A.
1 6 See District Court'l:i Findings of Fac t and Conclusions of Law, Finding
No . 32, App. 130. The Tribe's answers to interrogatories indicate that in
1976 the royalties on th e lenses received by the Tribe amounted to
$3,995,469.69. See Plaintiff's Exhibit E, p. 7 ; Tr. 269.

.
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nonmembers. Second, the court held that the statute enacted by Congress in 1927, which authorized oil and gas leases
on reservations created by Executive Order, had granted state
and local authorities the exclusive right to impose severance
taxes on oil and gas production from such reservations. Finally, after finding that approximately 80% of the oil and
gas production from the reservation is shipped interstate for
sale outside of New Mexico, that the tax burden amounts to
a significant percentage of the price of ga,s and oil, 17 and that
the tax is only imposed on gas, oil, or condensate sold or
transported off the reservation, the court concluded that it
discriminated against and created an impermissible burden
on interstate commerce.
Over the dissent of two judges, the Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit, sitting en bane, reversed. 617 F. 2d 537.
The court held that the taxing power was an inherent attribute of sovereignty possessed by the Tribe prior to the
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934.. The court further held
that the power had not been voluntarily relinquished by the
Tribe, had not been divested by Congress, and was not inconsistent with any superior interest of the United States. The
Court of Appeals rejected the argument that the 1927 Act
had pre-empted the Tribe's power to levy a severance tax,
because a review of the legislative history indicated that
"Congress simply did not think of the issue when it enacted
the statute." !d., at 547. The Court of Appeals' reversal of
the District Court's Commerce Clause holding was based on
the two courts' different readings of the ordinance: whereas
the District Court had construed the taxable event as removal
of the oil or gas from the boundaries of the reservation, the
Court of Appeals construed severance from the land as the

·'

17 Finding No. 36 reads: "That if the Jicarilla. Apache Oil and Gas
Severance Tax were valid the combined tax burden amounts to more than
29% of the interstate price of old gas and over 12.5% of the price of old
oil." App. 130. The Tribe contends that t.his finding is not supported
by the 'record, but the Court ·of Appeals did not set it aside.
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critical event. ld., at 546. Under the Co4rt of Appeals'
view, the ordinance would not discriminate against interstate
commerce because oil or gas sold within the reservation as
well as oil or gas transported off the reservation would be
taxed. The court concluded that the fact that royalties paid
in kind are exempt did not render the tax discriminatory,
and that the fact that New Mexico had imposed separate
taxes on the same taxable event did not create an impermis~
sible multiple burden on commerce. !d., at 51:5-546.

II
The powers possessed by Indian tribes stem from three
sources: federal statutes, treaties, or the tribe's inherent sovereignty. Neither the Tribe nor the Federal Government
seeks to justify the Jicarilla Tribe's severance tax on the
basis of any federal statute,18 and the Jicarilla Apaches, who
reside on an Executive Order reservation, executed no treaty
with the United States from which they derive any sovereign powers. Therefore, if the severance tax is valid, it must
be as an exercise of the Tribe's inherent sovereignty. Last
Terml in Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville
Reservation, 447 U. S. 134, we held that a tribal tax on
cigarettes sold on the reservations of the Colville, Makah,
and Lummi tribes to nonmembers of the tribes was a permissible exercise of the tribes' retained sovereign power to tax. 10
We must determine whether the severance tax imposed on
te Congress ma.y delegate "sovereign" powers to t.he tribes. See Mazurie
:v. United States, 419 U. S. 544. As we have indicated, however, neither

the H}27 statute permitting Indians to receive roynlties from the lease of
tribal lands nor the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 make any mention
of the authority of Indian tribes to tax. See pp. 4-7, supra.
1 9 The Court stated:
"The power to tax transactions occurring on trust lands and significantly
involving a tribe or its members is a fundamental attribute of sovereignty
which the tribes retain unless divested of it by federal law or necessary
implication of their dependent status." 447 U. S., at 152.
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nonmembers of the tribe in this case can likewise be characterized as a valid exercise of the tribe's inherent powers. To
make this determination, we must first consider the source and
scope of tribal sovereignty and more particularly the source
and scope of the sovereign power to levy taxes.
Tribal sovereignty is neither derived from nor protected by
the Constitution. 20 Rather, Indian tribes are assumed to have
retained powers of self-government that they possessed at the
time of their incorporation into the United States. In Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, the Court held unconstitutional
a Geor~ia criminal statute purporting to regulate residency
of non-Indians in the Cherokee Nation. In an opinion by
Chief Justice Ma.rshall, the Court held that the Cherokees,
although submitting to the protection of the United States,
nevertheless retained some aspects of sovereigni ty:
"By various treaties, the Cherokees have placed themselves under the protection of the United States: they
have agreed to trade with no other people, nor to invoke
the protection of any other sovereignty. But such engagements do not divest them of the right of self government, nor destroy their capacity to enter into treaties or
compacts." Id., at 581-582. 21
2 B The only reference to Indian tribes in the Constitution is in Art. I,
§8 (3), which provides that "[t]he Congress shall have the Power to
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States,
and with the Indian tribes ." More significant than this reference to
Indian tribes is the absence of any mention of the tribes in the Tenth
Amendment, which provides:
"The powers not delegated to the United State~ by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people."
21 The Court also stated:
"At no time has the sovereignty of the country been recognized as existing
in the Indians, but they have been alwnys admitted to possess many of
the attributes of sovereignty. All the rights whirh belong to self government have been recognized as vested in them . Their right of occupancy
has never been questioned, but the fee in the soil has been considered·
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Although Indian tribes retained some elements of sovereignty,
the United States retains plenary authority to divest the
tribes of any such attributes. 2 z Moreover, this Court's decisions since Worcester have recognized that not all attributes
of sovereignity are consistent with the tribes' status as "domestic dependent nations." 23 In determining what sovereign powers the tribes retained in submitting to the authority
of the United States, the Court has repeatedly recognized
a fundamental distinction between the right of tribes to govern their own internal affairs and the right to exercise powers
affecting nonmembers of the tribe. 24
in the government. This may be called the right to the ultimate domain,
but the Indians have a present right. of pos~ession." 6 Pet.., at 580.
22 See United States v. Wheelel', 435 U. S. 313, 319; Winton v. Amos,
255 U. S. 373, 391-392; Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U. S. 553, 565; 1
American Indian Policy Review Commission, Final Report, 106-107 (1977)
(hereinafter AIPRC Final Report). Thus, for example, Congress can
waive the tribes' sovereign immunity. See United States v. U. S. F-idelity,
309 U. S. 506, 512.
23 The term "domestic dependent nations" was first used in The Chel'okee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1, 17, in which the Court held that the"
tribes were not "foreign nations" within the meaning of the Constitution:
"Though the Indians are acknowledged to have an unquestionable, and,
heretofore, unquestioned right to the lands they occupy, until that right
shall be extinguished by a voluntary cession to our government; yet it
may well be doubted whether those tribe~ which reside within the
acknowledged boundaries of the United States can, with strict accuracy,
be denominated foreign nations. They may, more correctly, perhaps, be
denominated domestic dependent nations. They occupy a territory to
which we assert a title independent of their will, which must take effect
in point of possession when their right of possession ceases. Meanwhile
they are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the United States
resembles that of a ward to his guardian."
24 In United States v. Kagmm1, 118 U. S. 375, 381-382, the Court stated
that the tribes
"were, and always have been, rPgarded as having a semi-independent
position when they preserved their triLal rela1ions; not as States, not as
nations, not as possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty, but as a
separate people, with the power of regulating their internal and social
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The Court has been careful to protect the tribes from interference with tribal control over their members. See, e. g.,
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U. S. 65. The Court has
recognized that the power to prosecute members of the tribe
for violations of tribal criminal law does not derive from
power delegated by the United States but is an inherent
attribute of sovereignty. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U. S.
313. Furthermore, the Indian tribes retain the power to create substantive law to govern their internal affairs. See Roff
v. Burney, 168 U. S. 218 (membership); Jones v. Meehan,
175 U. S. 1, 29 (inheritance rules); Fisher v. District Court,
424 U. S. 382 (domestic relations and family law). They
also may enforce that law in tribal courts. Williams v. Lee,
358 U. S. 217; Fisher v. District Court, supra. Moreover, the
Indian tribes' sovereignty over their own members is, in many
respects, significantly greater than the States' powers over
their own citizens. The tribes' virtually absolute control over
their own membership carries with it the power to enforce
discriminatory rules that would be intolerable in a non-Indian community. 25 Their criminal jurisdiction over their own
members is unconstrained by constitutional limitations that
are applicable to the States and the Federal Government. 20
relations, and thus far not brought under the laws of the Union or of the
State within whose limits they resided."
25 Although the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 77, 25
U. S. C. §§ 1301-1303, prohibits Indian tribes from denying "to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its law," see id.,
§ 1302 (8), the provisions of the United States Constitution, including, the
Fourteenth Amendment, which limit. federal or state authority do not
similarly limit tribal authority. See Santa Clara P·ueblo v. Martinez, 436
U. S. 49, 56, and n. 7. In Santa Clara Pueblo, the Court held that
sovereign immunity protected the tribe from suit under the Indian Civil
Rights Act, that the Act did not create a private cause of action cognizable
in federal court, and that a tribal court was the appropriate forum for
vindication of rights created by the Act.
2o In Talton v. Mayes, 163 U. S. 376, the Court held that the restrictions of the Fifth Amendment did not apply to prosecutions in tribaf
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Thus the use of the word "sove~·eign" to characterize tribal
powers of self-government is surfly appropriate. 27
In sharp contrast to the tribes' broad powers over their
own members, tribal powers over nonmembers have always
been narrowly confined. 28 The Court has emphasized that
"exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect
tribal self-government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes, and so
cannot survive without express Congressional delegation."
Montana v. United States,- U.S.-,-. In Oliphant
v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U. S. 191, the Court held
that tribes have no criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed by nonmembers ·within the reservations. 20 In Moncourts. See also United States v. Wheelet·, 435 U. S., at 328-329; Turner
v. United States, 248 U. S. 354, 355.
27

Thus although the States have "plenary power over residents within
their borders," the States may not tax ineome of members of the tribe
derived from rt>servation sources. Sec McClanahan v. Arizona State 1'ax
Comm'n, 411 U. S. 164, 165. This immunity from taxation-even for
tribal enterprises-does not apply be~·oncl the boundaries of the reservation. See Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U. S. 145.
28 Certain treaties which specifically granted the right of self government to the tribes have also specifically excluded juri:sdiction over nonmembers. See, e. (J., Treaty with the Cherokl'es, art. 5, 7 Stat. 478
(1835); Treaty with the Choctaws and Chickasaws, art. 7, 11 Stat. 611
( 1855); Treaty with the Creeks and Seminole;;, art. 15, 11 Stat. 699
(1856).
29 The Court stated in support of that holding:
"Upon incorporation into the territory of the United States, the Indian
tribes thereby come under the territorial sovereignty of the United States
and their exercise of separate power is constrained so as not to conflict
with the interests of this overriding sovereip;nty. '[T]heir rights to
complete sovereignty, as independent nation~, [urc] necessarily diminished.'
Johnson v. M'Intosh, 8 Wheat. 543, 574 (1823).
"We have already described some of the inherent limitations on tribal
powers that stem from their incorporation into the United States. In
Johnson v. M'Intosh, supra, we noted that the Indian tribes' 'power to
dispose of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever they pleased,' was
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tana v. United States, supra, the Court, in holding that the
Crow tribe could not prohibit hunting and fishing by nonmembers on reservation land no longer owned by the Tribe,
indicated that the principle underlying Oliphant-1imited
tribal power over nonmembers--was applicable in a civil as
well as a criminal context. 30 Thus the Court has recognized
that it is when the tribes attempt to impose controls on nonmembers that the tribes' exercise of sovereign powers would
be inconsistent with their status. 31
inherently lost to the overriding sovereignty of the United States." 435
U. S. at 209.
See also New York ex rel Ray v. Martin, 326 U. S. 496, 499 (state court
has jurisdiction to try a non-Indian for a crime committed against nonIndian on reservation).
80 "The Court recently applied these general principles in Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U. S. 191, rejecting a tribal claim of inherent
lilovereign authority to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.
Stressing that Indian tribes cannot exercise power inconsistent with their
diminished status as sovereigns, the Court quoted Justice Johnson's words
in hi~ concurrence in Fletcher v. Peck, Cranch 87-the first Indian case to
reach this Court-that the Indian tribes have lost 'any right to governing
every person within their limits except themselves.' /d., at 147, Oliphant
v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, supra, 435 U. S., at 209. Though Oliphant
only determined inherent tribal authority in criminal matters , the principles on which it relied support the general proposition that the inherent
sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe.'' Montana v. United States, U. S., at (footnote omitted).
See also Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U. S. 661, (tribes
cannot freely alienate to non-Indians the land they occupy) ; Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet., at 17-18 (tribes cannot enter into direct commercial or foreign relations with other nations) .
8 1 In Wheeler v. United States, supra, the Court held that the power to
prosecute its members for tribal offenses was not "implicitly lost by virtue
of their dependent status" and stated:
"The areas in which such implicit divestiture of sovereignty has been held
to have occurred are those involving the relations between an Indian tribe
and nonmembers of the tribe.
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The tribes' limited authority to enact legislation affecting
nonmembers is therefore of a different character than the
broad tribal power over internal affairs involving members. 32
The power to exercise control over nonmembers--and specifically the power to tax recognized in Colville-presumably has
a much more limited derivation, tied specifically to the exercise of particular powers, than the general retention of
inherent sovereignty to govern internal affairs. We must
therefore examine the cases upholding the power to tax to
determine the source of that power and then determine
whether the tax imposed m this case is consistent with that
rationale.

III
The search for the source of the taxing power must focus
on the tribal power to tax nonmembers that existed in 1934
when the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 had the effect
of preventing any further erosion of Indian sovereign powers. 33
"These limitations rest on the fact that the dependent status of Indian
tribes within our territorial jurisdiction is necessarily inconsistent with
their freedom independently to determine their external relations. But the
powers of self-government, including the power to prescribe and enforce
internal criminal laws, are of a difl'erent type. They involve only the
relations among members of a tribe. Thus, they are not such powers
as would necessarily be lost by virtue of a tribe's dependent status.
'[T]he settled doctrine of the law of nations is, that a weaker power dces
not surrender its independence--its right to self government, by associating with a stronger, and taking its protection.' Worcester v. Georgia
[6 Pet.l, at 560-561.'' 435 U. S., at 326.
3 2 This lack of inherent sovereignty over nonmembers is supported by
the principle that "in this Nation each sovereign governs only with the
consent of the governed." Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S. 410, 426. Because
the tribe can exclude nonmember~ from participation in the tribal government, the power exerci~ed over those so excluded should be a limited one.
sa The Indian Reorganization Act. of 19~~4 confirmed but did not enlarg<t
the inherent sovereign powers of the Indian tribes. Congress intended the
Act to "stabilize the tribal organiz[]tion of Indian tribes by vestiPg such
tribal organizations with real, though limited , authority . . . . " S. Rep.
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Shortly after the Act was passed, the Solicitor of the De~
partment of the Interior issued a formal opinion setting forth
his understanding of the powers that might be secured to an
Indian tribe and incorporated in its constitution by virtue
of the statutory reference to powers vested in an Indian tribe
"by existing law." 84 He concluded that among those powers
No. 1080, 73d Cong., 2d Scss., 1 (1934) . As one commenator interpreted

§ 16 of the Act:
"[I] t would appear that powers originally held by tribes that were recognized and allowed to be retained by treaties or prior statutes, as well as
any additional powers conferred in the same manner, would be retained
by tribes that accepted the terms of the 1934 Act. . . . The provision is
consistent with the act's purpose of enhancing tribal government in that it
recognized and reconfirmed those powers a tribe may already have had as
a government." Mettler, A Unified Theory of Indian Tribal Sovereignty,
30 Hastings L. Rev. 89, 97 (1978) .
Moreover, although the power given by the Reorganization Act of 1934
to the Secretary of the Interior to approve or disapprove of the exercise
of tribal powers placed a limit on tribal sovereignty, that power did not
enable the Secretary to add to the inherent powers that a tribe possessed
before the Act was passed.
On the other hand, the fact that an Indian tribe may never have had the
occasion to exercise a particular power over nonmembers in its early history is surely not a sufficient reason for denying the existence of that
power. Accordingly, the fact that there is no evidence that the Jicarilla
Apache Tribe ever imposed a tax of any kind on a nonmember does not
require us to conclude that it has no such taxing power. To the extent
that the power to tax was an attribute of sovereignty possessed by Indian
tribes when the Reorgnaization Act was passed, we believe Congress
intended the statute to preserve those powers for all Indian tribes that
adopted a formal organization under the Act.
84 55 I. D. 14.
Solicitor Margold described the scope of this opinion
as follows :
"My opinion has been requested on the question of what powers may be
secured to an Indian tribe and incorporated in its constitution and by-laws
by virtue of the following phrase, contained in section 16 of the WheelerHoward Act (48 Stat. 984, 987):
"In addition to all powers vested in any Indian tribe or tribal council
by existing law, the constitution adopted by said tribe shall also vest ..• .
[Italics added.]
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was a power of taxation and described the permissible exercise of this power:
"Except where Congress has provided otherwise, this
power may be exercised over members of the tribe and
over nonmembers, so far as such nonmembers may accept privileges of trade, residence, etc., to which taxes
may be attached as conditions." 55 I. D. 14, 46.
Solicitor Margold cited three decisions in support of this
opmwn. These three cases, Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947
(CAS 1905), app. dismissed, 203 U.S. 599; Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U. S. 3S4; and Maxey v. Wright, 3 Ind. T. 243, 54
S. W. S07 (Ct. App. Ind. T.), aff'd, 105 F. 1003 (CAS 1900),
were decided shortly after the turn of the century and are
the three leading cases considering the power of an Indian
tribe to assess taxes against nonmembers. 8 " The three cases
are similar in result and in their reasoning. In each the
court upheld the tax; in each the court relied on the Tribe's
power to exclude non-Indians from its reservation and concluded that the Tribe could condition entry or continued
presence within the reservation on the payment of a license
"The question of what powers are vested in an Indian tribe or tribal
council by existing law cannot be nnswered in detail for each Indian tribe
without reference to hundreds of special treatie~ and o;pecial acts of Congress. It is possible, however, on the basis of the reported cn8es, the
written opinions of the various executive departments, and those statutes
of Congress which are of general import, to define the powers which have
heretofore been recognized as lawfully within the jurisdiction of an Indian
tribe. My answer to the propounded question, then, will be general, and
subject to correction for particular tribes in the light of the treaties and
statutes affecting such tribe wherever such treaties or statutes contain
peculiar provisions restricting or enlnrging the genernl authority of an
Indian tribe." Id., at 17-18.
35 Felix Cohen, in his Handbook on Federal Indian Law, published ill
1942, also relies on these cnses in his discussion of tribal taxation of non•
members. Cohen 266-267. The Court in Colv·ille cited both Buster v.
Wright and Morris v. Hitchcock in upholding tribal power to tax. 447
U. S., at 153. See p. 30, infra.
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fee or a tax; in each the court assumed that the remedy for
nonpayment would be exclusion from the reservation or intervention by the Interior Department on behalf of the Tribe.
In the first of these cases, Maxey v. Wright, 54 S. W. 807
(1900), the Court of Appeal of Indian Territory affirmed an
order by a federal territorial court dismissing a complaint
filed by non-Indian lawyers practicing in the Creek Nation.
They had sought to enjoin the Indian agent for the Five Civilized Tribes from collecting an annual occupation tax of $25
on each non-Indian lawyer residing a.nd practicing his profession on the reservation. In rejecting the attorneys' claim,
the Court of Appeai first analyzed the relevant treaties between the United States and the Creeks and not€d that they
had "carefully guarded their sovereignty, and their right to
admit, and consequently to exclude, all white persons, except
such as are named in the Treaty." !d., at 809. The United
States, pursuant to a treaty with the Creeks, had agreed that
all persons not expressly excepted who were present in the
Creek Nation "without the consent of that Nation are deemed
to be intruders, and pledges itself to remove them." Ibid.
Because attorneys \Vere not within any excepted class,8 6 the
Tribe had the authority to require them to obtain permits or
to require their removal as "intruders." 3 7 The Court thus
held:
"[Tlhat unless since the ratification of the treaty of
1856 there has been a trea.ty entered into, or an act of
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86 "Attorneys practicing in th e United States courts are not persons
who come within the exceptions, for th ey are not 'in the employment of
the government of the United States,' or 'persons peaceably traveling or
temporarily sojourning in the country, or trading therein under license
from the proper authority of the United States ." 54 S. W., at 809.
37 In reaching this conclusion the court relied heavily on two opinions
of the Attorney General of the United States. In the first opinion , issued
in 1881 , Attorney General McVeagh upheld the validity of Indian permit
laws regulating which persons would be permitted to reside on the Choctaw and Chickasaw reservations. 17 Op. Atty. Gen. 134. In his discus-
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congress passed, repealing it, the Creek nation had the
power to impose this conditio11 or occupation tax, if it
may be so called, upon attorneys at law (white men)
residing and practicing their profession in the Indian
Territory. And inasmuch as the government of the
United States, in the treaty, had declared that all persons not authorized by its terms to reside in the Creek
Nation should be deemed to be intruders, and had obligated itself to remove all such persons from the Creek
Nation, the remedy to enforce this provision of the treaty
was a removal by the United States from the Creek N ation of the delinquent as an intruder." Id., at 809-810. 88
sion of the right of non-Indinns to enter and remain on tribal lands
Attorney General McVeagh stated:
"Replying to your fourth question: it seems from what has been already
said that, besides those persons or classes mrntioned by you, only those
who have been permitted by the Choctaw~:> or Chickasaws to reside within
their limits, or to be employed by their citizens as teachers, mechanics, or
skilled agriculturists, have a right to enter and remain on the lands of
these tribes; and the right to remain is gone when the permit has expired."
ld., at 136 (emphasis added).
In the second opinion, on the same subject, Attorney General Phillips
stated in 1884 that in the absence of a treaty or statutes, the power of
the Indian tribe "to regulate its own rights of occupancy, and to say who
shall participate tlll'rrin and upon what conditions, can not be doubted."
18 Op. Atty. Gen. 34, 36. Although the treaties applicable to the Choctaw
and Chickasaw tribes excrpted from the grant of self-government power
over nonmembers, the Attorney General did not construe this provision
to limit the tribes' power to exclude:
"I submit that whatever this may mean it does not limit the right of
these tribes to pass upon the question, who (of persons indifferent to the
United States, i. e., neither employees, nor objectionable) shall share their
occupancy and upon what terms. That is a question which all private
persons are allowed to decide for themselve~; ... " I d., at 37.
ss In other part::; of its opinion, the court restuted the proposition that
the Tribe was "clothrd with the power to admit white men, or not, at its
option, which as we hold, gave it the right to impo~r conditions," id., at
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Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U. S. 384, decided by this Court
in 1904, also arose out of a challenge to legislation by one of
the Five Civilized Tribes requiring non-Indians to pay anual permit fees. 39 The complainants owned cattle and horses
that were grazing on land in the Chickasaw Nation pursuant
to contract with individual members of the Tribe. Complainants filed suit in the District of Columbia praying for
an injunction preventing the defendant federal officials from
811, and that a lawyer who refused to pay for the privilege of remaining
would become an "intruder":
"On the whole case we therefore hold that a lawyer who is a white man,
and not a citizen of the Creek Nation, is, pmsuant to their statute, required to pay for the privilegP of remaining and practicing his profession
in that nation the sum of $25; that, if he refuse the payment thereof, he
becomes, by virtue of the treaty, an intruder, and that in such a case the
government of the United States may remove him from the nation; and
that this duty devolves upon the interior department. Whether the interior department or its Indian agents can be controlled by the courts by
the writs of mandamus and injunction is not material in this case, because,
as we hold, an attorney who refuses to pay the amount rrquired by the
statute by its very terms becames an intruder, whom the United States
promises by the terms of the treaty to remove, and therefore in such
cases the officers and agents of the interior department would be acting
clearly and properly within the scope of their powers."
The court also reiterated that the Tribe could not collect the tax without
the intervention of the Federal Government:
"And when it is remembered that up to the time that the United States
courts were established in the Indian Tenitory the only remedy for the
collection of this tax was by removal, and that the Indian Nations had
no power to collect it, except through the intervention of the interior
department, it is quite clear that if, in the bPst judgment of that department, it was deemed wise to take charge of the matter, and collect this
money, and turn it over to the Indians, it had the power to do so, under
its superintending control of the Indians, and the intercourse of white
men with them granted by various acts of congress;" id., at 812.
S 9 J. George Wright, the Indian inspector, and J . Blair Shoenfelt, the
defendants in Maxey v. Wright, supra, werP also named as defendants in
Morris v. Hitchcock. The olher defendants in the Hitchcock case were
the Secretary of the Interior and the Commi~~ioncr of Indian Affairs.
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removing their cattle and horses from the Indian Territory
because complainants refusPd to pay the permit fePs assessed
by the Tribe. An order dismissing the complaint was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
and by this Court.
The Court's opinion first noted that treaties between the
United States and the Chickasaw Nation had granted the
Tribe the right "to control the presence within the territory
assigned to it of persons who might otherwise be regarded as
intruders" 40 and that the United States had assumed the
obligation of protecting the Indians from aggression by persons not subject to their jurisdiction. !d., at 389. The
Court then reviewed similar legislation that had been adopted
by the Chickasaw Nation in 1876, and noted that the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary had, in 1879, specifically referred
to such legislation requiring licensed merchants and traders
to obtain a permit and to pay a fee of $25, and had expressed
the opinion that such legislation was not invalid.n
to The Court stated:
"And it is not disputed that, under the authority of thesr treaties, the
Chickasaw Nation has exerci:sed the power to attach condition::; to the
presence within its borders of perRon~ who might otherwi:;e not be entitled to remain within the tribal territory." 194 U. S., at 389.
H "Legislation of the same grneral chnrader as that embodied in the
act of the legislature of thr Chirkasnw Nation hen• a~::;ailecl as invalid hnd
been enacted by the Chirkasaw Nation before the ]Xt~Rnge of the Curtis
Act. The essential provisions of one ~uch law, passed on October 17, 1876,
were recited in a report made to the S!'nnte by tht• Committee on the
Judiciary, on February 3, 1879, from whic·h wr copy the following:
"'The law in question l:'e!'tn~ to lwve a twofold objPrt-to prevent the
intrusion of unauthoriz~>d per~o!IS into the territory of the Chickasaw
Nation, and to raise revenue. Ry its tenm; 110 eitizen of any State or
Territory of the United States can either rent land or procure employment
in the Chickasaw country without Pntering iuto a contract with a Chickaeaw, which contract the latter is to rPport to tlw clerk of the county where
he resides, and a permit mu~t be obtained for a tillll' no longer tlwu twelve
months, for whirh the ritizen is to pay the :;wn of $25.
"'Every licensed merr·haut, trader, and ever ' phy~ieian, not a Chirka•
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The Court then reviewed two recent opinions of the Attorney General of the United States that had concluded that the
powers of the Civilized Tribes to impose permit fees had not
been withdrawn by Congress. 42 Although Congress had subsequently created an express exception in favor of owners of
town lots, protecting them from being evicted as intruders,
the Court noted that no comparable protection had been given
to owners of cattle and horses. 194 U. 8., at 392-393. The
Court accordingly concluded that the Chickasaw legislation
imposing grazing fees was valid.
1aw, is required to obtain a permit, for which the sum of §25 is exacted.'
"Declaring in substance that under the existing treaties with the tribe,
the Chickasaws were not prohibited from excluding from the territory
of the nation the persons affected by the act, the committee expressed
the opinion that the act which was the subject of the report was not
invalid." 194 U. S., at 389-390.
• 2 In the first opinion, by Attorney General John W. Griggs, see 23'
Op. Atty. Gen. 214 (1900), the Attorney General stated:
"The treaties and laws of the United States make all persons, with a
few specified exceptions, who are not citizens of an Indian nation or
members of an Indian tribe, and are found within an Indian nation without
permission, intruders there, and require their removal by the United
States. This closes the whole matter, absolutely excludes all but the
excepted classes, and fully authorizes these nations to absolutely exclude
outsiders, or to permit their residence or business upon such terms as they
may choose of the United States, have, as such, no more right or business
to be there than they have in any foreign nation, and can lawfully be there
at all only by Indian permission; and that their right to be or remain
or carry on business there depends solely upon whether they have such
permission.
"As to the power or duty of your Department in the premises there
can hardly be a doubt . Under thE' treaties of the United StatE's with these·
Indian nations this Government is under the most solemn obligation,
and for which it has received ample consideration, to remove and keep
removed from the territory of these tribes, all this class of intruders who
are there without Indian permission. The performance of this obligation,
as in other matters concerning the Indians and their affairs, has long ·
been devolved upon the Department of the Interior." !d., at 218~
Tlae Court als.o relied on 23 Op. Atty. Gen. 528 (1901).
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The third case, Buster v. Wright, 135 Fed. 947 (CAS 1905) 1
was a suit by nonmembers of the Creek Nation against fed~
eral inspectors to enjoin them from stopping the plaintiffs
from doing business within the reservation because they had
refused to pay a permit ta.x assessed by the Tribe. The Court
of Appeals relied on Morris v. Hitchcock and Maxey v. Wright
in upholding the tax. The opinion for the court by Judge
Sanborn emphasized that the tax was in the nature of a condition precedent to transacting business within the reserva..
tion and that the plaintiffs had ample notice of the tax:
"The pennit tax of the Creek Nation, which is the
subject of this controversy, is the annual price fixed by
the act of its national council, which was approved by
the President of the United States in the year 1900, for
the privilege which it offers to those who are not citizens
of its nation of trading within its borders. The payment
of this tax is a mere condition of the exercise of this privilege. No noncitizen is required to exercise the privilege
or to pay the tax. He may refrain from the one and he
remains free from liability for the other. Thus, without
entering upon an extended discussion or consideration of
the question whether this charge is technically a license
or a tax, the fact appears that it partakes far more of the
nature of a license than of an ordinary tax. because it
has the optional feature of the former and lacks the compulsory attribute of the latter.
"Repeated decisions of the courts, numerous opinions
of the Attorneys General, and the practice of years place
beyond debate the propositions that prior to March 1,
1901, the Creek Na,tion had lawful authority to require
the payment of this tax as a condition precedent to the
exercise of the privilege of trading within its borders,
and that the executive department of the government
of the United States had plenary power to enforce its
payment through the Secretary of the Interior and hie
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subordinates, the Indian inspector, Indian agent, and Indian police. Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384. 392, 24
Sup. Ct. 712, 48 L. Ed. 1030; Crabtree v. ~Madden, 4
C. C. A. 408, 410, 413, 54 Fed. 426, 428. 431; Ma."CeJt v.
Wright, 3 Ind. T. 243, 54 S. W. 807; Maxcy v. Wright,
44 C. C. A. 683, 105 Fed. 1003; 18 Opinions of Attorneys
General 34. 36; 23 Opinions of Attorneys General, 214,
217, 219, 220, 528." 135 Fed., at 949-950.
Later in the opinion the eourt noted that the traders. who had
purchased town lots on the Creek Nation pursuant to a 1901
agreement between the Crreks and the United States, could
not rely on that agreement as an implied divestiture of a preexisting power to tax. 4 " The court also held that even though
43

After citing the opinion of Attorney Gc>neral Griggs from which this
Court had quotc>d at length in Morris v. Hitchcock Judge Sanborn wrote:
"Pursuant to this decision the civilized tribes \\Ue charging, and the
_Indian agent wns collecting, tnxes from noncitizens engaged in business in
tpese nations . It. wns under this state of fncts that- the United States
and the Creek Nation mnde the ngrecment of 1901. Did the~- intend by
that agreement that the Creek Nntion should the.r eby renounce its conceded power to exact these permit tnxes? Both ·pnrties knew that this
po\\·er e:-.isted, and the United States, b~r the net of its President npproving
the law of the Creek national council. and the Secretary of the Interior by
enforcing it, had approved its exercise. Tl1e subject of these taxes was
pre~ented to the minds of the contmcting parties and was considered during
the negotiation of the agreement, for that contract cont::~ins express stipulations that cattle grazed on rented nllotments ~hnll not be liable to any
tribal t:1x (chapter 676, 31 St:1t. 871, § 37), and that 'no noncitizen renting lands from a citizen for agricultural purposes as proYidrd by law,
whether such lands have been selected as nn nlloiment or not, :::hall be
required to pay any permit tax' (chapter 676, 31 Stnt.. 871, § 39). But
they made no provi~ion that noncitizens wi10 engng('d in the mercnntile
business in the Creek Nation should be exempt from these taxes. As the
law then in force required such non cit izcns to pny such taxes, ns both
parties were then aware of that fact nne! considered the question, nnd as
they made no stipulation to abolish thc·se taxe~, the conclusin pre::umption
is that they intended to make no such contrnct, nnd that the power of
the Creek Nation to exact these taxes, and the authority of the Secretary·

•'

S0--11 & S0--15-MEMO.

MEHIUON v. JICAIULLA APACHE TRIBE

27

noncitizens of the Tribe had Ia,,·fu1ly acquired ownership of
lots pursuant tD the 1901 agrel,ment and could not be eYicted
from those lots, they had no right to conduct business within
the reservation without paying the permit taxes. 44
Prior to the enactment of the Indian Reorganization Act in
1934, these three cases were the only judicial decisions considering the power of an Indian tribe to impose a tax on nonmembers.15 These cases demonstrate that the po\Yer to impose taxes on nonmembers of the tribe derives from the tribe's
power to Pxclude nonmembers from the reservation and to
impose restrictions and conditions on entry onto the resen·a-

.'·

of the Int erior nnd of l1is subordinates to collect them, were neither renouneed, reYohd, nor r c~ trirted, but that they remnincd in full force and
effect after as before th e agreement of 1901." 135 F., at 954.
44
See ibi-d. The <.:omt ~::tated:
"The legal effect, however, of the l:n1· prc~ l'ribing the permit taxes i~ to
prohibit noncitizens from cm1ducting buoiness within the Creek Nation
without. the payment. of thc:::r tnxrs." 135 F., nt 055.
45
Two dec!ldc•s nfter the Reorg:anizat ion Ad. mts pas~ecl Ow prohl<'tn
was revi~ited by the Eighth Circuit. In /run Cww v. Oglala Sioux Tribe
of Pine Ridge Reservation, 231 F. 2d 89 (CAS 1950), the ('ourt held that
the tribe had the po\rer to a8sess a tnx on a nonmt•nJlJer ll'~see of land
within the rest' rYn tion for the priYilege of grazing stock on re~erva t ion
land. And in Barta v. Oglala Sio-ux Tribe of Pine Ridge Resen·ntion, 259
F. 2d 553 (CAS 1958), the Court held thnt the Unit rd States c-ould bring
an action on behalf of the tribe to collect a license tax of thrre tents per
acre per annum for grazing land and fifteen cents per aerc per nnnum
for farm land levied on nonmember lessees. The eourt held that the tax
did not violate the constitutional rightl:: of the nonmember le~~ecs stating,
1n part:
"The tribe by provisions of its treaty '"ith the United States has power
to provide for the adp1i so:ion of JlOllmembers of the tribe onto tlJe resernttion. Having such power, it has tl1c authority to impose W'lrictions on
the presence of nonmt·mbers within the reFen·at ion." 259 F. 2d, at 556.
Language in both Iron Crow nnd Barta ongge,ts that. the Court of Appeals, unlike the earlier courts, may not. hnve rc;;tcd the taxing power
solely on the powc·r to exclude. Tl1c Court of Appenl." of <·our~e did not
have the benefit of our deei:;ions in Olipha11t, Wheeler, and Mo1tfmw v.
Uuited States.
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tion for any purpose. 40 This interpretation of these cases is
further supported by the fact that the remedy for the nonpayment of the tax in all three cases was exclusion from the
reservation. 47 Moreover, tribal sovereign powers over nonIn the chapter of his treatise entitled "Taxation," Felix Cohen ~tates:
"Though the scope of the power [to tax] as applied to nonmembers is not
clear, it extends at least to property of nonmembers used in connection
with Indian property as well as to privileges enjoyed by nonmembers in
trading with the Indians. The power to tax nonmembers ib derived in
the cases from the authority, founded on original sovereignty and guaranteed in some instances by treaties, to remove property of nonmembers
from the territorial limits of the tribe. Since the tribal government has
the power to exclude, it can extract a fee from nonmembers as a condition
precedent to granting permission to remain or to operate within the tribal
domain." Cohen 266-267 (footnote omitted).
In another chapter, entitled "The Scope of Tribal Self-Government,"
cited by the Secretary of the Interior and the Tribe here, Cohen dE'~cribes
the power of taxation as "an inherent attribute of tribal sovereignty
which continues unleb'S withdrawn or limited by treaty or by act of
Congress . . . ." !d., at 142. After discussing Bu~ter v. Wright, Cohen
cites tha.t case for the proposition that "[t]he power to tHX docs not depend upon the power to remove and has been upheld where there was no
power in the tribe to remove the taxpayer from the tribal jurisdiction."
!d., at 143. As we have seen, however, the license tnx in Buster was predicated on the tribe's right. to attach conditions to nonmembers conducting
business on the reservation, and the tribe could prevPnt such nommmbers
from doing business regardless of whether it could pby~ically remove those
nonmembers from the reservation. Moreover, in the cbaptE'r on tribnl
self-government, Cohen does recognize that tribal tnxel:l have been upheld
on the basis of the tribe's power to remove nonmembNs from the re~erva
tion, and that "[i]t is therefore pertinent, in analyzing the scope of tribal
taxing powers, to inquire how fa.r an Indian tribe is empowered to remove
nonmembers from its reservation." Ibid.
The American Indian Policy Review Commission recognized that the
court decisions upholding the tribes' taxing powers "rely l:ugely upon
the power of tribes to remove pE'rsons from the reservation, and <'onsequently, to prescribe the conditions upon which they shall enter" but
argued for a broader source of the right to tax. AIPRC Final Report
178-179.
41 In Buster v. Wright, .~upra, the penalty for nonpayment of the tax
was the closing of the nonmember's business, enforced by the Secretary
'
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;members are appropriately limited because nonmembers are
foreclosed from participation in tribal government. See n,
32, supra. If the power to tax is limited to situations in which
the tribe has the power to exclude, then the nonmember is
subjected to the tribe's jurisdiction only if he consents by
choosing to accept the conditions of entry imposed by the
tribe. 48 The limited source of the power to tax nonmembers-the power to exclude intruders-is thus consistent with
this Court's narrow construction of the power of Indian tribes
over nonmembers in general. 40 The source of the taxing authority asserted by the Jicarilla Apache Tribe in this case is
therefore not the Tribe's power of self-government but rather
its power over the territory that has been reserved and set
apart for its use and occupation. 50
o: the Interior. See 135 F., at 954. In 111 orris v. Hitchcock, supra, the
remedy was the removnl of the nonmember's cattle from the reservation, again enforced by the United States. In Maxey v. Wright, supra,
an attorney refusing to pay the license fee to the Interior Department
was subject to removal from the reservation.
48 "No noncitizen is required to exl·rei~c a privil<>gc or to pay the tax.
He may refrain from the one and he remains free from liability for the
other." Buster v. Wright, 135 F., at 949.
40 See pp. 15-17, supra.
As we hnw indicated. r,:t•e n. 28, supra,
treaties recognizing the inherent power of tribal self-government have also
deprived the tribes of jurisdiction over nonmembers. Treatief' with Indian tribes, however, often specifically recognized the right of the tribe
to exclude nonmembers from the reservation and to attach conditions to
their entry. See, e. g, Trraty with the Choctaw and Chickasaw, mt. 7,
11 Stat. 611 (1855); Treaty with the Crerks, art. 15, 11 Stat. 699 (1855).
See II C. Kappler, Indian Affair::: Lnw~ and Treatie~ 7. 9, 12, 15, 17, 20,
21, 27, 30, 42, 75, 418, 682, 699, 7Ga. 719, 7(H, 774, 77!:1,. 7UO, 7!:14, 800, 866,
886, 888, 929, 985, 9!:10, 9\!8, 1008, 1016, 1021 (1904).
no The various tribes may have takPn a similar view of their power to
tax at the time of the Indian Reorganization Act. Cohen'~ treatil:le notes
that:
"The power of an Indinn tribP to Jr,·y 1axi'S upon its own member::; and
upon nonmembers doing bushw::;:-; within tlw re»ervations ha~ bPen affirmed in mnny tribal con~titution:> Hpprovcd under the Wheckr-Howard
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This conclusion is entirely consiotent with our derision in
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reserva~
tion, supra. In that case we held that, the power to tax nonIndians entering the reservation hnd not b<>en divested by
virtue of the tribe's dependent status and that no m erriding
federal interest would be frustrated by the tribal tnxntion.
The Court quoted with approval, as an indication of the Executive Branch's understanding of the taxing poYver, Solicitor
Margold's 1934 opinion. The Court noted further that
"[f]ederal courts also have acknowledged tribal powrr to tax
non-Indians entering the reservation to Pnv;agr in economic activity" and cited Buster v. Wright and Morris Y. Ilitchcock. 51
447 U. S., at 153. The tax in Colville, which was applied to
nonmembers who entered the reservation and sought to purchase cigarettes, is clearly valid under the rationale that the
tribes' power to tax derives from the right to exrludc nonmembers from the reservation and the right to attach conditions to the entry of such nonmembers seeking to do bu~iness
on the reservation. 52 Thus the inherent sovereign power of
Indian tribes to tax nonmembers stems from the tribe. ' powCJ'
Act [Indian Reorganization Act], as has the power to remove nonmembers
from land over which the tribe exer('i::;es jurisdiction." Cohen 1-13
The following clause from the 1935 Con~tilution of the Hosebud Sionx
Tribe, which CohC:'n cites as a "t~rpical" statement of ;,\l('h "tribal power~,"
indicates that the tribe perceived the seope of its luxation puwer~:; over
nonmembers to be narrower than the scope of that power over members:
"(h) To levy taxes upon members of the tribe :llld to require the performance of reservation labor in lieu thereof, and to lc1·y taxes or Iic· ense
fees, subject to review by the Secretary of the Iuterior, upon nonmembers
doing busine~:;s within the re~:>ervation.
"(i) To exclude from the restricted landl:l of the n~~erva tion per~ons
not legally entitled to reside therein, under ordinances which shall be
ubject to review by the Secretary of the Interior." Ibid.
51 The Court al;;o cited, without cii::;c·u:,;~ion, the Eighth Cireu it ·, Lkci,.;JOn
in Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe. supra n. 15.
52 A nonmember ·ubjectcd to tile lax could :n 01d Ihe lax b~· dcdllling·
to do business on the reservation, and the "sanction" to be impol:led for
refusal to pay the tax would be denial of penni5sion lo buy ci"arettrl.'.
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to exclude and the cNepcis of the power must be

consisten~
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with its ource,

IV
The exercise of the power to exclude petitioners would have
supported the imposition of a tribal severance tax on petitioners when they sought to enter the Jicarilla Apache Reservation to engage in exploration, drilli11g, and extraction
activities. 53 The Tribe did not impose the tax prior to peti~
tioners' entry, however, ami therefore the tax is valid only
if the Tribe retains the power to exclude petitioners from the
reservation.
The leases executed by the Tribes and petitioners are
clearly valid and binding on both parties. The Tribe does
not contend that the leases were not the product of arms
length bargaining. Moreover. the leases were executed on a
form prepared by the Department of the Interior. the Department gave specific approval to the terms of the leases.
and they were executed pursuant to explicit congressional authority.G1 Under the leases petitioners therefore have the
33 "[ A]s

the payment of a tax or lit·<•nse fee may be made a l.'ondition
of entD· upon tribal land, it mn? ul~o bE> madE> a ('omlition to tlw ~rant of
other privileges, such as the acquiHition of a trih:d leal:le." Cohen 143.
54
CongresH intendc•d the Act of l\1ard1 3, 1927 to make appli('able to
Exc>cutive Order re~ervutions the lc·a ·ing proviHion;, already applicable to
treaty reservation!' pnr~uant to the Act of May 29 , 1924, 43 Stal. 244. S.
Rep. No. 1240, 69th Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1927). The Act lhu~ permitted
the leasing of una !lotted Indian land for term~ not to cxeePd 10 ) ear~
nnd ns murh longer as oil and gas in paying quantities were found on
the land. 44 Stat. 1347. Among the purpoHes of the 1927 statute were
to " [p]ermit the exnloration for oil and grts on Executive-order Indian
Rrservations" to "[g]ive the Indian tribes all the oil and ga~ ro~·aJtie:s ."
and to "[pllace with Congre::;s the future determination of auy ('hangel:l
of boundaries of Executive-order reservations or withdrawab." Ibid.
In light of these purposes. it i~ ch•ar thut Congre;;s intt•nded lease:< executed pursuant to the 1927 Act to be binding.
The tribe contend~ that the lea;,;c:; iu this ca~e were exeeuted purt:-uant
to the Act of May 11 , 193 , 52 Stat. 347, and not the 1927 Atl. The
':frib~ notl(s thnt the lea.~e with petitioners in
o. O-J5 state;, in one o£"
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right to remain on the reser\'ation to do business for the duration of the leases. 55
~
Furthermore, petitioners had no reason to anticipate that tltc
tribe would claim that exercise of the mining rights granted
by the leases was subject to an additional conclition.r.c At the

--

its provisions that it was executed pursuant to the 1938 Act. See App.
64. Petitioners note, howe\'er, that. although the Tribe argues th:~t the
1938 Act, unlike the 1927 Act, does not require that royalties be paid to
the Secretary of the Interior for the benefit of the Tribe, petitioners m:-tke
their royalty pnyments to th'e United States Geological Sun·ey for the
benefit of the Tribe. See Tr. 79-80. We need not re~oh·e thi" quc,tion,
becau~e for our purpo~es the prO\·isions of the 1938 Act do not nry :-ignificantly from the prorisions of the 1927 Act. The 1938 Act, like the 1927
Act, permitted the leasing of Indian lands for a period "not. to rxeeeo 10
years and :~s long thereafter as minerals are prooucrd in p[l~·ing quantities." 25 U. S. C. § 39Gc. One of the purposes of the Hl38 Art was to
est;1blish uniformity of the law relating to the le:~sing of trib:ll lands for
mining purposes by applying the lnw as to oil [llld gas leasing to the leasing of land for the mining of other minerals. S. Rep. No. 985, 75th Cong.,
1st St:'ss., 1-2 (1937 ) . Other purposrs \\'t:'re to "bring all lensing matters
in harmony \rith the Indian Reorganiz:1tion Act," id., at 3, and to enact
changes designed "to give the Inoinns the greate::;t. return from tlwir property ." !d., at. 2. There is no indication in the lrgi:;lative hi~tory that the
purposes of the 1938 Act are in any way inconsi,:tent with the purpo,es
of the 1927 Act and prior legislation. Pre~umably the pnrposes of the
earlier legislation were incorporated into the uniform s~heme :1chieYcd by
the 1938 Act.
fi 5 As Attorney G0neral MacVeagh stated in 1881, only those permitted
by the tribe to remain on the resen·ation may do !OO, "and the right to
remnin i::; gone when the permit has expired." 17 Op. Atty. Gen., at 13~
~u In Cvlville, for example, the noJimember cle:;iring to pur('h:i.<r cigarettes on the n~~e r\'ation knew that hi:; right to do so \I'Otlld be conditioned on his consent to pay the tax. Attorney Genrr:-tl Grigg~ , in his
1\JOO opinion on "Trespa,:;crs on Indian Lands," cliscn>'sr·d thr efTect on
tribal laws of a federal 1::tatute providing for the sale of resen·ation lots
to non-Indian.;;:
"[T]he legal right to purchase land within an Indinn nation gives to the
pureha~er no right of exemption from the laws of "'uch nation, llOr does
it autl1orizc him to do any act in Yiolation of the treaties with such
nation. The~e laws re4uiring a permit to n ::;idc or carry on bu, iness in

~

O"Y>~

..
..

·'

·'

8~11

MEIUUON

t-~:

&

80-15~1\IF...\:10.

1ICARILL..\ APACHE TRIBE

33

time the leases contained in the record were exeeuted th()
Jicarilla Apache Constitution contained no taxing authorization whatever, and the ~everance tax ordinanee was not. enacted until many years after all lessees had been granted the
unlimited right to extract oil and gas from the rcs(·n·a tion.
In addition, the 'vritten leases unambiguously stated:
"[N]o regulation hereafter approved shall effect a change
in rate or royalty or annual rental herein specified without the written consent of the parties to this lease."
App. 27.
Moreover, in 1953 petitioners might reasonably have relied
on the consideration of a comparable issue by Congress as an
indication of what conditions might be attached to the lease
of tribal lands. \Vhen Congress enacted legislation in 1927
granting the Indians the royalty income from oil and gas
leases on reservations created by Executive Order, it neither
authorized nor prohibited the imposition of any taxes by the
tribes. The statute did authorize the collection of severance
taxes by the States. Petitioners have argued that this authorization pre-empted any tribal power to irnpose a comparable tax. The legislative history, however, indicates that
Congress did not consider the question of tribal taxes on
minrral output from rcs('rvation lands." 7 If Congress had
considered it possible that the power to impose severance
taxes on leases of this chara~.ter would be shared by the States
the Indian country exi;otPd long brfore and at. the time thio act was p:lE~ed.
And if any ontl'idrr f':tl\' proper to pm('ha:;c a town lot under this net of
Congrel'~, he die! f'O with fnll knowledge that, he could oecupy it fur rC'sidl·nce or bu~ineEs only by permission from the Indians." 23 Op. Atty.
Gen., at 217.
In 1077, thr Am('rir·an Incli:-~n Polif'y ReYicw Conm1i;;,ion ~t:ltC'd that
!lillian tribE's "do not both tax nnd reepive royalties. Usually they just
re('eive ro)·aHies." AIPTIC Fin:tl Report 344.
..,(--. G7 The Court nf Appr·nl.< n ·jr·drd thr Jll'l'-t'll1]ltion ~trgmnPnt bl'c:tn~e it~
Tt'arliug of t ht, lPgi~lat iYe hi~t ory convinf'erl it "that. Cougrpss l'impl)· did
uot think of 1lJC i~~tJC \l'hcn it en;letccl the ;;tatute." Gl7 F. 2d, at. 547.
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and the tribes, the issue would surely have been mentioned
in the legislation or in its history." 8
When the leases in this case were executed, the possibility
that a tribe could grant lessees access to a reservation foi·
Rrpl'Psrnifliivc Lrnviit, i"llP Chnirman of ihc Commltice on I~~tlian
Affairs, stated in discu~sing the purpose of the 1927 Act:
"Briefly, the purpose, so far as the Indians are coneerued. iR to make
sure by act of Congress that there can first be a developnWJlL of po~8ible
oil resources on these Executive-order lands; and, in the seeond place,
that with the development of the oil resources the IndiaJlS themselves ...
shall have the benefit of the development of the natural re;;onrces of their
reservation insteHd of having their lands considered to be public lands
of the United States with the benefits of such development going to the
while people.
"Surely the Indians who once possessed all of thi;; country and who
now have in their possession only those portions that have bet-'ll given
to them by acts of Congress, Executive order, and by treaties ought to
get whatever benefit there is from these remaining area15-the resources
under the soil as well as above it-without having the white man eome
ln and profit entirely by these developments." 68 Cong. Rec. 4573.
Representative Carter, in support of the bill, stated:
11
Since we have taken much of their lands for homes for white people,
since great States have been carved and built, from their domain, since
they have rPsponded to every call of their Government both duriug peace
and war, since by our own act, vithout. their consent, via et armis we
have narrowed them down to a Rmall reservation, eun il 11ow ju~tly lie in
our month:; to sny that they are not entitled to all procerds ac<·ruing or
that may accrue from the small patrimony they have left¥" 68 Cong.
Rec. 4579.
The House and Senate reports state that two of the purposeR of the act
were to give the Indians "all of the oil aud gns roya!Lie:;," and to "au~
thorize the sta tcs to tax production of oil and gas on ~uch re~prva t ions."
S. Rep. No. 1240, 69th Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1927); H. R. Hep. No. 1791,
69th Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1927). Thus Congress specifically recognized
both the right of the Indians to receive the benefits of all oil aud gas
resources on reservation land and the right of the States to impose taxes
on the output yet made no mention of the possibility of tribal severance
taxes. Although the absence of such reference does not indicate that
Congress pre-empted the right of the tribes to impose such tuxes, the
lack of any mention of tribal severance tuxes does neverthele::,s bear on
58

/

80-ll & 80-15-MEMO.
l'viEHlUON v. JICARILLA APACHE TJUBE

35

specific purposes in exchange for a specific consideration and
thereafter impose a tax on the exercise of the granted authority had never oecurred to Congress/ 9 to the States, to the
the po<oibility of ~urh taxe~ wa~ nn nddition:-tl condition to the
of the le:-t.oes.
have noted, see n. 54, snpra, the Tribe arguP~ that the 1938 Act,
the 1927 Act, is the applicable statute here. The Tribe argues
1938 Act, ,,·hich make~ no reference to the States' right to impose
~eYerance taxes, superceded the 1927 statute, and therefore the States no
longer have the authority to impose seYernnce taxes on the mineral output of Indian bnds. The Court of Appeal~ did not need to reac·h this
que5tion, because the Stnte of New Mexico wns not a party, and bec:1t1se
the court conrluded that the Tribe's tnx was valid regard!Pss of whether
the State retained thp right to tax the oil :Jnd gns rf'somres. G17 F. 2d, at
547-548, n. 5. We al~o need not reach this question, bec:1usc the legislative history of the 1938 Act, like the history of the 1927 Act, makes no
mention of tribal severance taxes. Even if the omiP~ion of the State's
power to impose taxes could be ron~trued as a withdrawal of ~urh right
from the States, there is certainly no indication in the 1938 statute or
its history that Congress intended to vest such power in the tribes or
even considered the possibility of doing so. S0e n. 54, supra.
59 Although the lnck of congressional recognition qf ~mh a tax would
not be relevant to the validity of n severance tax whic·h the tribe either
imposed at the out::::et of the lease relationship or impo~ccl :tfter !'011ditioning the lease on a retnined power to levy ~urh a 1:tx, \H' clf':lrl~· do
not hnve such n c:~se here. Thus tlw Natmal G:-ts Polity Act of 1971',
Pub. L. 95-621, §§ 110 (a), (c) (1), 92 Stat. 33(58, 15 U.S. C.§§ 3:320 (a},
(c)(1), cited by JF::-Tll'E l\lAFlSHALL, po~t. fit 5, whif'h wa~ PJJaCtPd lung
after the leases in thc;;e cases were executed, i~ irrelr,·:-tnt to the i::::'tW
of what collclitions wPre contained in the lenoe. lVTorroYr'f. that 1-'t:ltute
provides no authority for the Jll'OJ!Oi'iiion thnt Congre~s h:1~ TPf'ogni~.c·cl
tribal sovereign power to impo~l' srver:1nce tnxrs on nonmember;:: of the
tribe. Although the st:-~tute provides that Jndi:~n ~eYrrancc· taxrs m:t~· be
recowred through frdrral energy pricing, the lrgi,..ht ive hi.-:t ory rll'arl~·
indicates that Congres~ took 110 pooition on the v.11idit~· of ~mh taxes:
"\Ybile sew ranee taxes which may be impo~t>d by an Indi:-tn tribe are to
be treated in the same manner as State impo~rd ~everanr·e taxes, the !'Onferees do not intend to prejudge the outf'omr of the ca,;t•::: on appPal hc·forc
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appenls rt>::::perting the right of Indian tribe~
to impose taxes on persons or organizations other thau I11cli:ms who an::
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Indian tribes, or to any political 1Pssces.Go Thus the conditions attaching to petitioners' right to extract oil and gas
from the land covered by the leases were not, in the contemplation of the parties. subject to change during the terms of
the leases.() 1 The Tribe therefore had no authority to change
engnged in bn~ines.;: nctiYities on Indian r<'."rn·ations. The outcome of the
cases on nppral will drtermine the lrg,ality of impo~ing such taxes." S.
Con f. Rep. I\' o. 95-409, p. 91 ( 1978). i

.---

The Brief for the Secretary of thr Int crior ilrknowledges that "Congress's
enactment of this proyi,ion does not rqmfirm the Tribe's inlwrrnt 11owrr to
impose scYerance taxes on petitioners." Brief for Seeretary of the Interior
34-35.
I
vo The Srcretnry of the Interior ha! citrd casr;: holding that n liernse
or franchise issued by a governmentql body does not preYent the later
imposition of a tax unless the right. to tax "has been specifically Eurrendered in terms which admit of np other reasonable interpretation."
St. Louis v. United Rys., 210 U. S. :!M, 280; New Orleans City & Lake
R. R. v . City of New Orleans, 143 U. S. 192, 195; New York Transit
Corp. v. City of New York, 303 U. S. 573, 590-593. The principal issue
in these cases was whether the retroaqtive impo8ition of the franchise tax
violated the Contra.ct Clauf'e of the Cppstitution or was so fundamentally
unfair as to constitute a dena! of due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although this argunwnt was by no means frivolous,
cf. Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 315 U. S. 610, no such issue is raised
here. Thrse ca~es are distinguishable from the instant ca,;es for the
simple reason that two different types: of sovereigns are involved. The
fundamental differences in their powers have Jed us to conclude that
tribes do not have the same attributes of soverE-ignty as do Stntes and
their subdiYi~ions. Therefore, the nuthority of a State or its subdiYi::ion
to impose t:nes after the granting of a license does not depend on the
power to rxcludc and therefore doc~ not Et:md as authority for the proposition th[lt such a tax was within the soven•ign power of an Indian tribe.
01 The Srcret:uy also argues that pet'i tioners should be required to pay
the tax as their contribution to tribal services which benefit all residents
of the Reservation, including petitioner~. Brief for the Secretary of the
Interior 14. In calendar year 197G the Tribe receiYed S3,995,4G9.G9 in oil
and gns royalties. See n. 15, supra. 'The Tribe tells us that its budget
for fiscal 1976, which was tendered to .the District Court bnt 11ot received
in evidence, was $3,958,201. See Defe~1dants' Exhibit AA; Tr. 306; Brier
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the terms of the bargain by adding an additional condition in
the form of a severance tax.u 2 Because the execution of these
leases guaranteed the lessees s.uch rights of access to the reservation as might be necessary to enable them to perform the
leases, petitioners are not intruders, and 'vhile the leases remain in effect there is no basis for claiming that the Tribe
retains any power to exclude petitioners from the portion of
the reservation on which they :1rquired drilling and extraction
rights. 63
The attempted exercise of the taxing power asserted by the
Tribe in this case extends so far beyond any exercise of Indian sovereignty over nonmembers that has been recognized
for Respondent 7. Unlike the fixrd ro~·alt)· u~rd in some mineral ]rasing
arrangrments, see United States v. 8·wank, U. S. - , the royalty in
the;;e oil and gas leases is a percentw:·<· of the amount produeed and so
will allow the Tribe to benefit fron 1 a rising market.
Moreover, the tax is not merely :111 ~ ppropriate o:hare of a budgrt largely
financed by the sovereign's taxation of its own subjects . The principal
componenL of the annual income of thr member;:: of this Tribe-if the
t~tx should be sustained- would be the :unonnt of approximately $4 million
of royalties and approximately $2 million in severance taxes rei:eind from
the ~ame group of lessees.
92 We do not have in these raRcs :i. tax impo;;ed on both mrmlJC'r::: and
nonmembers. The economic bnrdrn~ of thc .Ticnrilla Apache severance tax
are imposed entirely on taxpayers over whom 1he tribe has no jurisdiction exrept in8ofar as rights under the l en~es are being exercised.
63 Solicitor Margold wrote rcgnrding the power to exclude:
"Over trib3l lands, the tribe has the 'rights of a landowner as well as the
rights of a ]oral government, dominion ns well as oovercignty. But all
the lands of the reservation, whethEir ownrd by the tribe, b~' members
thereof, or by outsiders, the tribe hns the :sovereign power of determining
the conditions upon which persons shall ue pnmittrd to entrr its domain,
to resi de therein, and to do hu s inc~s, jJfOYidecl only such determination
is con~istent with applicable Federal laws nnd does not infringe any

vested n'ghts of persons now occupying reserl!ation land under lawful
authority. Morris v. Hitchcock (194 U. S. 384)." 55 I. D., at 50 (emphasis added).

(Y\ 0 l)(?'j)

fr~ .'Y'l

y, .3:1..
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in the past that we have no hesitation in concluding that it
is beyond the powers of the Tribe. 64
The judgment of the Court of Appeals should therefore be

Reversed,
JusTICE STEWART

took no part in the consideration or deci-.

sion of these cases.
.. '

04

Because we rest our decision on the absence of inherent tribal sover-

~ignty to impose this severance tax, we need not reach the federal pr~
emption and interstate commerce questions raised by petitioners.

...
'

2 5 JUN lSBJ
80-11; 80-15 - Amoco Production Co v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe;
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe
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MEMORANDUM OF JUSTICE MARSHALL

The boundaries of Indian lana and the scope of Indian
sovereignty often are disputed by those seeking for themselves
the benefits of resources within Indian dominion.

JUSTICE

STEVENS properly emphasizes the breadth of authority enjoyed by
each Indian tribe to govern its own affairs, ana to protect tribe
members ana their lana through the power to tax members ana
nonmembers doing business on tribal lands.
STEVENS, at 17-18, 19-20.1

Memorandum of JUSTICE

He concludes, however, that the

Jicarilla Apache Tribe may not exercise its sovereign power to
tax petitioners, who lease tribal lands for the purpose of mining
the resources therein.

This conclusion rests on the novel notion

that an Indian Tribe's sovereign power to tax nonmembers engaging
in economic acitivity on its reservation may lapse in the absence
of contractual terms reaffirming that power or particularized
notice to ana acceptance by persons subject to it.
agree that the

~ribe's

I cannot

power to tax is contingent on the

expectations of private parties.

Instead, I am convinced that

the Tribe retained the power to impose the severance taxes
involved here, and I agree with the Court of Appeals for the

2

Tenth Circuit that the other objections raised by petitioners are
unavailing.

I
t
A

Last Term, this Court concluded that Indian tribes enjoy
the authority to impose taxes as an inherent attribute of Indian
sovereignty.

We held in Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the

Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 135,

(1980), that

"[t]he power to tax transactions occurring on trust lands and
significantly involving a tribe or its members is a fundamental
attribute of sovereignty which the tribes retain unless divested
of it by federal law or necessary implication of their dependent
status."

In my view, the power to tax is an essential attribute

of Indian sovereignty because it is a necessary instrument of

--

self-government and territorial management.

This power enables
-"

the tribal government to raise revenues for its essential
services.

The source of this taxing power is the general

authority inherent in a sovereign to control economic activity
within its jurisdiction, and to defray the cost of providing
governmental services by requiring contributions from persons or
enterprises engaging in economic acitivities within that
jurisdiction.

See,

~'

Compania General De Tabacos de

Filipinas v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 275 U.S. 85 (1927);
Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 199

(1824) .2

The petitioners in these cases avail themselves of the
"'substantial privilege of carrying on business'" on the

reservation, Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S.
425, 437 (1980), quoting Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S.
435, 444-445 (1940).

They benefit from the provision of police

protection and other governmental services, as well as the
"'advantages'of civilized society'" that are assured by the
existence of tribal government.
of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 228
County of Los Angeles, 441

Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't

(1980), quoting Japan Line, Ltd. v.

u.s.

434, 445 (1979).

For similar

benefits, numerous other governmental entities levy the same type
of general revenue tax imposed by the Jicarilla Tribe.

In these

circumstances, there is nothing exceptional in requiring nonIndians like petitioners to contribute through taxes to the
general cost of tribal government.
v. Montana, ante, at

(1981)

~

Cf. Commonwealth Edison Co.
ante, at

- --- -

(Blackmun,

~.,
.)

dissenting)~

Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, supra,

at 220,

Mobil Oil Corp v. Commissioner of Taxes, supra, at

437~

228~

General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436; 440-441

(1964) .3

As we observed in Washington v. Confederated Tribes,

supra, at 156-157, the tribes' interest in levying taxes on
nonmembers as a means of "raising revenues for essential
governmental programs ... is strongest when the revenues are
derived from value generated on the reservation by activities
involving the Tribes and when the taxpayer is the recipient of
tribal services."

This surely is the case here.

The mere fact

that the government imposing the tax also happens to be the
lessor of the mineral lands does not undermine the validity of
the tax.

The royalty payments from the mineral leases are paid

4

to the Tribe in its role as partner in petitioners' commercial
venture.

The severance tax, in contrast, is petitioners'

"contribut[ion] to the general cost of providing governmental
services," Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana,

ante, at

State governments commonly receive both royalty payments and
severance taxes from lessess of mineral lands within their
borders.
This view of the taxing power of Indian tribes as an
essential instrument of self-government and territorical
management has been a "shared presumption" of all three branches
of the federal government.
Tribe, 435

u.s.

191, 206

Cf. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian

(1978).

In washington v. Confederated

Tribes, supra, we relied in part on the opinion of the Solicitor
of the Department of Interior, who in 1934 recognized that the
tribes' sovereign power to tax ' "'may be exercised over members of
the tribe and over nonmembers, so far as such nonmembers may
accept privileges of trade, residence, etc., to which taxes may
be attached as conditions,'" absent contrary action by Congress.
447 U.S., at 153, quoting Powers of the Indian Tribes, 55 I.D.
14, 46 (1934).

We furhter noted that official executive

pronouncements have repeatedly recognized this that "Indian
tribes possess a broad measure of civil jurisdiction over the
activities of non-Indians on Indian reservation lands in which
the tribes have a significant interest, 17 Op. Atty. Gen. 134
(1881); 7 Op. Atty. Gen. 174 (1855), including jurisdiction to
tax, 23 Op. Atty. Gen. 214 (1900) ."

437

u.s.,

at 152-153.

5

Similarly, Congress has acknowledged that the tribal power
to tax is included among the tools necessary to self-government
and territorial control.

As far back as l879, the Senate

Judiciary Committee acknowledged the validity of a tax imposed by
the Chickasaw Nation on non-Indians legitimately within its
territory:
We have considered [Indian tribes] as invested with the
right of self-government and jurisdiction over the
persons and property within the limits of the territory
they occupy, except so far as that jurisdiction has
been restrained and abridged by treaty or act of Congress. Subject to the supervisory control of the
Federal Government, they may enact the requisite
legislation to maintain peace and good order, improve
their condition, establish school systems, and aid
their people in their efforts to acquire the arts of
civilized life: and they undoubtedl~ possess the
inherent right to resort to taxation to raise the
necessary revenue for the accomplishment of these
vitally important obiects--a right not in any sense
derived from the Government of the United States. S.
Rep. No. 698, 45th Cong., 3d Sess. 1-2 (1879)(emphasis
added) •
Recently, Congress provided that mineral severance taxes imposed
by an Indian tribe may be included in the costs recoverable
through federal energy pricing.

Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978,

Pub. L. No. 95-621, Sections 110 (a),

u.s.c.

(c) (1), 92 Stat. 3368, 15

(1976 ed. ,Supp. III) § 3320 (a),

(c) (1).

Thus, the views of all three federal branches and general
principles of taxation confirm that Indian tribes enjoy authority
to finance their governmental services through taxation of nonIndians who benefit from those services.

No other conclusion

comports with the conception of Indian sovereignty reaffirmed
time after time by this Court.
v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557

As we observed in United States
(1975), "Indian tribes within

6

'Indian country' are a good deal more than 'private, voluntary
organizations.'"

Rather, the "Indian tribes are unique

aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their
members and their territory, Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515,
557

(1832). See McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411

i64, 173 (1973) ."
U.S. 261 (1901);

Ibid.

u.s.

See also Montava v. United States, 180

u.s.

Talton v. Maves, 163

376 (1896);

Iron

Crow v. Oglgala Sioux Tribe of the Pine Ridge, 231 F.2d 89, 92,
99

(CA 8 1956);

429 (CAB 1893).

Reservation Crabtree v. Madden, 54 F. ·426, 428See F. Cohen, "Spanish Origin of Indian Rights,"

in The Legal Conscience 234 (L. Cohen ed. 1960).

Adhering to

this understanding, I would confirm the Tribe's authority to tax
as necessary to self-government and territorial management.
JUSTICE STEVENS, however, attempts to limit the Indian tribes'
authority to tax non-Indians engaging in economic activity on the
reservation by tracing its source exclusively to their power to
exclude such persons from tribal lands.

Perhaps this view is a

response to a perceived need for some clear guide to help
litigants and courts negotiate the trails of overlapping federal,
state, and tribal taxing authority.

But the principle announced

is far removed from common understanding of the taxing power, and
from the conception of Indian tribes as domestic dependent
nations.
JUSTICE STEVENS claims support for his thesis may be found
in three early cases upholding tribal power to tax nonmembers.
Memorandum, at 24-33, discussing Morris v. Hitcock, l94 U.S. 384
(1904);

Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947

(CA 8 1905), appeal

7

dismissed, 203 U.S. 599
54 S.W. 807, 809
1900).

(1906);

Maxey v. Wright, 3 Ind. T. 243,

(Ct. App. Ind. T.), aff'd, lOS F. 1003 (CAB

This discussion correctly notes ·that a hallmark of Indian

sovereignty is the power to exclude non-Indians from Indian
lands, and that this authority has been used in decisions
recognizing the tribal power to tax.

None of these cases,

however, establishes that the power to tax derives solely from
the power to exclude.

Morris v. Hitchcock, for example, suggests

to the contrary that the taxing power is a legitimate instrument
for raising revenue and it may properly be wielded where nonIndians receive privileges from the Tribe, such as the right to
trade on Indian land.

There, the Court approved a tax on cattle

grazing and relied in part on a report to the Senate by the
Committee on the Judiciary, which found no legal defect in
previous tribal tax legislatiort having "a twofold object--to
prevent the intrusion of unauthorized persons into the territory
of the Chickasaw Nation, and to raise revenue." 194 U.S., at 389390 (emphasis added).

In Maxey v. Wright, the question of Indian

sovereignty was not even raised, for the case turned on the
construction of a Treaty expressly denying the Tribe any
governing or jurisdictional authority over nonmembers.
243,

, 54 S.W. 807, 809

3 Ind. T.

(Ct. App. Ind. T.), aff'd, 105 F.

1 0 0 3 ( CA 8 19 0 0 ) . 4
Finally, the decision in Buster v. Wright
undermines JUSTICE STEVENS' theory.

actually

JUSTICE STEVENS concludes

his discussion of the cases with the assertion that "the inherent
sovereign power of Indian tribes to tax nonmembers stems from the

,.

tribes' power to exclude and the exercise of the power must be
consistent with its source."

Memorandum, at 37.

Under this

conception, a non-Indian who establishes lawful presence in
Indian territory can then avoid a tax levied by the tribe by
claiming

tha~

supports it.

no residual portion of the power to exclude
This exact result was rejected in Buster v. Wright.

There, deeds to individual land lots in Indian territory were
sold to non-Indian residents, and cities and towns were
incorporated, with the result of prohibiting the Indians from
removing non-Indian residents.

Yet even though the creation of

non-Indian land-ownership and local government evidenced the
legitimate presence of non-Indians on Indian land, the court held
that the tribe retained its power to tax.

The court concluded

that "[n)either the United States, nor a state, nor any other
sovereignty loses the power to ·govern the people within its
border by the existence of towns and cities therein endowed with
the usual powers of municipalities, nor by the

ownersh~p

nor

occupancy of the land within its territorial jurisidictions by
citizens or foreigners."

135 F., at 952 (emphasis added) .5

The

simple fact of the non-Indian's legitimate presence on Indian
land did not in that case deprive the Tribe of the power to tax.
Indeed, the power to tax was preserved even through Congress had
expressly prohibited the Tribe from excluding the non-Indians
from the tribal lands.

See ibid.

This result follows not from

the Tribe's power to exclude but from the Tribe's power to govern
and raise revenues to pay for the costs of government.

I would

follow the logic of Buster v. Wright and the demonstrable support

of the federal branches and general

prin~iples

of taxation,

rather than embrace a new restriction on the extent of the tribal
authority to tax.

f

B

Even if JUSTICE STEVENS is correct in asserting that the
power to tax derives from to the power to exclude, this premise
does not by itself lead to the conclusion that petitioners may
elude the tax levied by the Jicarilla Apache Tribe.

His

Memorandum concedes that a different result might be reached "if
the petitioners, at the time that they signed the leases, had
some notice that a severance tax might be imposed."
at 40.

Memorandum,

JUSTICE STEVENS thus posits an unusual kind of sovereign

power that requires for its preservation particularized notice.6
By granting such importance to ~ctual notice, he implies that the
power to tax depends on the consent of the taxed as well as on
the Tribe's power to exclude non-Indians.

JUSTICE STEVENS

expressly relies on a consent requirement in reasoning as
follows:
"If the power to tax is limited to situations in which
the tribe has the power to exclude, then the nonmember
is subjected to the tribe's jurisdiction only if he
consents by choosing to accept the conditions of entry
imposed by the tribe."
Id., at 35.
I cannot accept this conclusion, for I find both the actual
notice and consent requirements incompatible with sovereignty,
whatever its source.

Imposition of the requirement of consent

stems from a confusion about the Tribe's roles.

According to

JUSTICE STEVENS, the tribe has lost the power to exclude

~u

petitioners, because it has leased to them the use of the mineral
lands and such rights of access to the reservation as might be
necessary to enjoy the leases.?

This reasoning mistakes the

Tribe's role as commercial partner with its role as sovereign,B
and in so doJng turns the inherent powers of sovereignty over to
the bargaining process undertaken in each of the sovereign's
commercial agreements.

For it is one thing to find that the

Tribe has agreed to sell the right to use the land and take from
it valuable minerals: it is quite another to find that ·the Tribe
has abandoned its sovereign powers simply because it has not
expressly reserved them through a contract.9
results denigrates Indian sovereignty.

Confusing these two

Indeed, requiring the

consent of the entrant deposits in the hands of the excludable
non-Indian the source of the tribe's power, when that power
instead derives from the fact of sovereignty itself.

Only the

Federal government may limit a tribe's exercise of its sovereign
authority, whatever its source.

~,

United States

-V.

Wheeler, 435 U.S., at 322: McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax
Comm'n, 411 U.S., at 112.10

Even if the sovereign authority to

tax is derived from the power to exclude, that authority inheres
in the Indian tribe, not in the assent of a nonmember.
Nonmembers who lawfully enter tribal lands therefore remain
subject to the tribe's the power to exclude them.

By entering

the jurisdiction, the nonmember assumes the risk that the
governing sovereign will exercise its sovereign power even if
this power arises from the power · to exclude.

This surely is the

rule by which States are permitted to impose taxes on foreign
corporations or individuals without their "consent."
JUSTICE STEVENS, however, reasons that the Tribe's authority
to impose the severance tax could have been preserved had the
leases so specified, or had the contemporaneous ordinances,
tribal constitution, or Federal law specifically so prescribed.
This notice analysis turns the concept of sovereignty on its
head, for it presumes a waiver of a sovereign power occurs absent
express reservation, rather than the reverse.

The absence from

the leases of any mention of the Tribe's taxation authority
should be of no moment.

All contracts in issue here are

conditioned on compliance with prevailing law.

Contractual

arrangrnents remain subject to subsequent legislation by the
presiding sovereign.

See,

Loan Ass'n of Newark, 310
Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290

~,

u.s.

u.s.

Veix v. Sixth Ward Building &

·32 (1940); Home Building & Loan

398

(1934).

Even where the contract

at issue requires payment of a royalty for a license - or· franchise
issued by the governmental entity, the government's power to tax
remains unless it "has been specifically surrendered in terms
which admit of no other reasonable interpretation." City of St.
Louis v. United Rs., 210

u.s.

266, 280

(1908) .11

Deriving the

Tribe's taxation authority from its power to exclude does not
undermine these principles; the enduring presence of that
sovereign power--even when unexercised--governs all contracts
subject to its jurisdiction.

And no claim is asserted here, nor

could one be, that petitioners' leases enuciate the "clear and

'

..

unmistakable" surrender of the taxing power required for its
extinction.
Similarly, the lack of a provision authorizing a severance
tax in the Jicarilla Apache Constitution in place at the time
petitioners signed their leases hardly affects the power itself.
That power, as JUSTICE STEVENS concedes, is inherent 1n the fact
of Indian sovereignty, even if linked solely to the power to
exclude non-Indians.

Neither the federal constitution nor the

Tribe's own constitution is the font of Indian sovereignty,
although both documents recognize it.
Tribe of the Pine Ridge Reservation,
Wright, 135 F., at 950.

Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux
231 F.2d, at 94; Buster v.

As the Tribe retains all inherent

attributes of sovereignty that have not been divested by the
Federal Government, the proper inference from silence on this
point is that the sovereign power to tax remains intact.

The

Tribe's Constitution was amended to authorize the tax before the
tax was imposed, and that is the critical event necessary to
effectuate the tax.

See Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine

Ridge Reservation, supra, at 556;

Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux

Tribe of the Pine Ridge Reservation, supra, at 99.
By the same token, the omission of an express federal
statement reserving the Indians' power to tax does not impair the
vitality of the power.

Inherent powers of Indian tribes may be

restricted only by congressional action, and silence on the
subject must be presumed to leave the power intact.

We concluded

in Washington v. Confederated Tribes that the "widely held
understanding within the Federal Government has always been that

federal law to date has not worked a div,e stiture of Indian taxing
power."

447 U.S., at 152. _As JUSTICE STEVENS properly points

out, the 1927 Act of Congress relied on :by petitioners "neither
authorized nor prohibited the imposition of any taxes by the
tribes," andr in fact "Congress did not consider the question of
fribal taxes on mineral output from reservation lands."
Memorandum, at 42, discussing Act of March 3, 1927, 44 Stat.
1347, 25 U.S.C. § 398.12

If there were any ambiguity on this

point, the doubt would benefit the Tribe, for "[a)mbiguities in
federal law have been construed generously in order to comport
with [the) traditional notions of sovereignty and with the
federal policy of encouraging tribal independence."
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracher, 448

u.s.

White

136, 143-144 (1980).

Furthermore, the challenged tax which was imposed pursuant to the
amended constitution of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe, complied with
the provisions of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 48 Stat.
987, 25

u.s.c.

§

476, 477.

See Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe

of the Pine Ridge Reservation, supra, at 99, and received the
requisite approval from the Secretary of the Interior.
Appendices to Petition by Amoco Production Co. and Marathon Oil
Co., No. 80-15, 5n.l3
supra, at 153.

See Washington v. Confederated Tribes,

Accordingly, I see no reason to preclude in this

instance the Tribe's exercise of its inherent power to tax the
mining activities on its lands.
Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973).

Cf. Mescalero Apache Tribe v.

Only by constructing new

requirements of actual notice and consent by private parties does
JUSTICE STEVENS reach a contrary result.

II

Because I find no defect in the Tribe's exercise of its
taxing power, I must reach the further constitutional challenge
pretermitted'by JUSTICE STEVENS:

does the tax violate the

Commerce Clause?

A

The Commerce Clause grants Congress the power to "regulate
Commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and
with the Indian Tribes."

u.s.

Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

Because the Clause expressly treats the Indian tribes as a
distinct category, it cannot be assumed that the judicial
standards for analyzing state tax burdens on interstate commerce
govern challenges to taxes imposed by an Indian tribe.

So,

although the Interstate Commerce Clause has been unders-tood to
limit the States from interfering with the free flow of commerce,
the same constraint need not apply to the Indian Tribes.

"As

separate sovereigns pre-existing the Constitution, tribes have
historically been regarded as unconstrained by those
constitutional provisions framed specifically as limitations on
federal or state authority."

u.s.

49, 56

Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436

(1978).

In this spirit, I believe the limitations imposed by the
interstate Commerce Clause on State regulation have little
relevance to the exercise of Tribal taxation authority.

Any

purpos~

other conclusion is belied by the

and history of the

"Indian Commerce Clause," and by the Indian tribes' unique
status.

Just as the Foreign Nations Clause provides for federal

control of commercial relations with foreign nations, the Indian
Commerce Clause embodies a grant of singular authority to
Congress to regulate intercourse and trade with Indian tribes.
United States v. Forty-Three Gallons of Whiskey, supra, at 194;
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, supra, at 18.

Historically, the

Clause marked a change from the Articles of Confederation under
which the Federal Government shared with the States the authority
to regulate trade with Indians.
(J. Madison).

Id. See The Federalist, No. 42

By turning this authority · over to exclusive

federal control, the Indian Commerce Clause in effect recognizes
the tribes' unique position as nations-within-a-nation, see Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436

u.s.

49, 56 (1978);

Worcester v.

Georgia, supra, at 559; Cherokee Nation v. Georqia, 5 Pet. 1, 18
(1831) , and offers them Federal protection from State and local
interference.

Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552 (1974);

United States v. Antelope, 430

u.s.

641, 645-650 &

n. 11 (1977).

Their unusual position has also justified extensive congressional
regulation of commercial affairs uniquely affecting Indian
tribes. 14

It should not be surprising, then, that the Indian

Commerce Clause has been used in the past solely to shield the
Tribes from intrusive or abusive activities by nonmembers.
~'

United States v. Antelope, supra, at 552;

Morton v.

Mancari, supra, at 645; Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,
supra, at 201;

United States v. Mazurie, supra, at 554.

See,

The question here is whether the Inoian Commerce Clause of
its own force places limitations on activities by the Tribes
themselves.

A result along those lines; of course, has been

enforced through the "negative implications" of its interstate
counterpart,'under which courts have restricted

States from

unduly burdening or interfering with the free flow of interstate
commerce even in the absence of congressional action.

See,

~'

Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n , 432 U.S. 333
(1977);

u.s.

Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325

761, 769

(1945).

Whatever place this concept of latent Commerce Clause
restraint may have under the Indian Commerce Clause, I conclude
that it is irrelevant here, where Congress has specifically
devised a mechanism by which the Indian tax must secure federal
approval.

The Tribe received £he requisite approval of the tax

from the Secretary of the Interior, as prescribed by the
Reorganization Act of 1934.

This course of events fulfilled the

administrative process established by Congress to monitor such
exercises of Tribal authority.

As a result, this Tribal tax

comes to us in a posture significantly different from a
challenged State tax, which does not need specific federal
approval to take effect, and which may require judicial review to
ensure it imposes no undue burden on interstate commerce.
Judicial review of the Indian tax measure, in contrast, would
duplicate the administrative review it already has received, and
therefore have dubious usefulness.

A judicial excursion into

"negative implications" of the Indian Commerce Clause would be

particularly inapt here, where it is

cle~r

that Congress is well

aware that Indian tribes impose mineral severance taxes such as
the one challenged by petitioners.

See Natural Gas Policy Act of

1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, Section 110 (a),
15

u.s.c.

(Supp. III) § 3320 (a),

(c) (1).

(c) (1), 92 Stat. 3368,
Congress, of course,

retains pl e nary power to limit tribal tax authority or to alter
State power to tax activities affecting interstate commerce, but
I would not read into this latent power a restriction on the tax
already in place.
at

See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, ante,

(White, J., concurring).

This Court, in my view, should

impose no further restriction under the Indian Commerce Clause on
a tax already endorsed by the properly designated agent of the
Congress.l5

B

It is not difficult, however, to demonstrate that the tax
challenged here would survive judicial scrutiny even under the
standards applicable to the Interstate Commerce Clause.
summarized in Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 430

u.s.

As
274, 279

(1977), a state tax on activities connected to interstate
commerce must be "applied to an activity with a substantial nexus
with the taxing State,

[be] fairly apportioned, ... not

discriminate against interstate commerce and (be] fairly related
to the services provided by the State."

The Jicarilla Apache tax

obviously meets the requirement of a substantial nexus with the

reservation, for the mining occurs entirely on reservation land.
In addition, the apportionment requirement is easily met here; it
is undisputed that 100% of the taxed mining activity occurs
within the tribal jurisdiction.l6
Although petitioners make much of the tax's purported
f

qiscriminatory effect, the tax does not in fact treat minerals
transp0rted away from the reservation differently than it treats
minerals remaining on the land.l7

Nor does the Tribe's tax

ordinance exempt minerals obtained by members of the Tribe.l8
The ordinance does exempt minerals received by the Tribe as inkind payments on the leases. 19

This exemption merely avoids the

administrative make-work that would ensue if the

~ribe,

as local

government, had to tax itself, in its role as commercial
recipient of the royalty payments, and therefore it cannot
properly be deemed a discriminatory preference for local
commerce.

Were a different conclusion reached, we would have to

rethink our refusal to impose a Commerce Clause limitation on the
proprietary activities of the States.
Stake, 447 U.S. 429

u.s.

See, e.g., Reeves, Inc. v.

(1980); Hughes v. Alexandria ScraP Corp., 426

794 (1976).

Finally, the tax satisfies the requirement that it bear a fair
relationship to the services supplied to the lessees.
Commonwealth Edison v. Montana, ante, at

In

, we held that this

final requirement of the Complete Auto Transit test is fulfilled
if the measure of the tax is reasonably related to the extent of
the taxpayer's activities within the taxing jurisdiction.

Here,

the severance tax is assessed as a percentage of the value of the

minerals produced, so the measure of the tax is tied to the
earnings made possible under the Tribe's auspices.

See id., at

But for the Tribal government, the lessees would not have
the benefit of law enforcement, public services, and the
attributes of civilization.

Id., at

Thus, even were it

proper to apply the Complete Auto Transit test Clause to the
challenged tax, it would survive scrutiny.

III

In Worcester v. Georgia, Chief Justice Marshall observed
that Indian tribes had "always been considered as distinct,
independent, political communities, retaining their original
natural rights;" although subject to the authority of the Federal
Government, the "weaker power does not surrender its
independ.ence--it right to self-government--by associating with a
stronger, and taking its protection."

6 Pet., at 559-569.

JUSTICE STEVENS endorses this longstanding view, but he
nonetheless finds the particular exercise of sovereign authority
involved here defective for want of notice to non-Indians.

I

fear that the effect of this approach may erode Indian
sovereignty, and produce even more uncertainty than already
exists in Indian commercial affairs.
of the Court of Appeals.

I would affirm the decision

1 The fact that the Jicarilla Apache reservation was
established by Executive Order rather than by treaty or statute
calls for no difference in the analysis, as the Tribe's sovereign
power is not affected by the manner in which the reservation was
created. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978);
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 598 (1963); Spaulding v.
Chandler, 160 u.s. 394, 403 (1895); In re Wilson, 140 u.s. 575,
577 (1891). t
2 "A tax is not an assessment of benefits.
It is, as we have
said, a means of distributing the burden of the cost of
government. The only benefit to which the taypayer is
constitutionally entitled is that derived from his enjoyment of
the privileges of living in an organized society, established and
safeguarded by the devloting of taxes to public purpos~s."
Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 u.s. 495, 522 (1937).
See generally The Federalist No. 30 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed.
1961) 187, 188; M. Jensen, The Making of the American
Constitution 79 (1964).
3 As the concurring opinion in the Court of Appeals observed,
"[i]t simply does not make sense to expect the tribes to carry
out municipal functions approved and mandated by Congress without
being able to exercise at least minimal taxing powers." J.A., at
164 (McKay, J., concurring).
4 Thus, in Maxey v. Wright, 3 Ind. T. 243, 54 S.W. 807, 809 (Ct.
App. Ind. T.), aff'd, 10; F. 1003 (CA 8 1900), the governing
treaty restricted the Tribe's right self-government and
jurisdiction to members of the Tribe and retained only the power
to exclude nonmembers. The court relied on opinions by the
Attorney General that did not begin to address the scope of
Indian sovereignty, but instead identified the Tribe's right, as
a social group, to exclude intruders and place conditions on
their occupancy. For example, one such opinion viewed the power
to place terms on occupancy as "'a question which all private
persons are allowed to decide for themselves; and even wild
animals, not men, have a certain respect paid to the instinct
which in this respect they share with man.'"
3 Ind. T., at
54 S.W., at 809 (citing 18 Op. Att. Gen. 36, 37). The same
opinion proceeded to find such notions as self-government and
jurisdiction irrelevant to "'the right of a hotel keeper to
prescribe rules and charges for persons who become his fellow
occupants,'" and found the Tribe's natural instinct to set terms
on occupancy unaltered by the treaty.
Id. The court's
dependence on this reasoning hardly bears-on the more general
question addressed by JUSTICE STEVENS: what is the source of the
Indian tribes' sovereign power to tax absent a restriction by
Treaty or other federal law?
5 Both the classic treatise on Indian law and its subsequent
revision by the Department of Interior advance the same view.
United States Solicitor of the Deptartment of the Interior,

Federal Indian Law 438 (1958) ("The power to tax does not depend
upon the power to remove and has been upheld where there was no
power in the tribe to remove the taxpayer from the tribal
jurisdiction") (citing Buster v. Wright, supra): F. Cohen,
Handbook of Federal Indian Law 142 (1942) ("One of the powers
essential to the maintenance of any government is the power to
levy taxes. That this power is an inherent attribute of tribal
sovereignty which continues unless withdrawn or limited by treaty
or by act oftCongress is a proposition which has never been
successfully disputed.") (citing Buster v. Wright, supra).
6 JUSTICE STEVENS seeks support for this view in Buster v.
Wright, and quotes a passage discussing the fact that the parties
to a 1901 agreement knew the tax existed.
Memorandum at 32, n.
41 (citing 135 F., at 954). The passage quoted in fact fails to
support JUSTICE STEVENS' view that private parties need notice of
a tax in advance of signing a commercial agreement, for the only
parties to the 1901 agreement were the Creek Nation and the -_
United States. The private traders subject to the tax were not
even considered when the court examined notice of the tax power
and the consent of contracting parties.
7 This rationale in fact conflicts with ' the conclusion in Buster
v . Wr i g h t , 13 5 F • 9 4 7 ( CA 8 19 0 5 ) :
"The ultimate conclusion of the whole matter is that purchasers
of lots in town sites in towns or cities within the original
limits of the Creek Nation, who are in lawful possession of their
lots, are still subject to the laws of that nation prescribing
permit taxes for the exercise by noncitizens of the privilege of
conducting business in those towns." Id., at 958. See Barta v.
Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge Reservation, 259 F.2d 553 (CA 8
1958) (lessees of tribal lands subject to Indian tax on use of
land) •
.a
8 JUSTICE STEVENS asserts that once the tribe permitted
petitioners to enter Indian land pursuant to the mineral leases,
"petitioners are not intruders, and while the leases remain in
effect there is no basis for the claim that the Tribe retains any
power to exclude petitioners from the portions of the reservation
on which they acquired drilling and extraction rights."
Memorandum, at 40.
This conclusion appears to confuse the Tribe's position as
landowner with its position as governing sovereign. Recognizing
and distinguishing the scope of those two roles, the 1958
treatise on Indian law written by the U.S. Solicitor of the U.S.
Department of the Interior embraced as "the present state of the
law" the following summary:
"'Over tribal lands, the tribe has the rights of a landowner as
well as the rights of local government, dominion as well as
sovereignty. But over all the lands of the reservation, whether
owned by the tribe, by members thereof, or by outsiders, the
tribe has the sovereign power to determine the conditions upon
which persons shall be permitted to enter its domain, to reside
therein, and to do business, provided only such determination is

consistent with applicable Federal laws and does not infringe any
vested rights of persons now occupying r ·eservation lands under
lawful authority.'" Federal Indian Law, supra, at 439, quoting
Solicitor's Opinion of October 25, 1934 (emphasis added). See F.
Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law, at 143.
9 Here, the leases extend until the resources are depleted, so
under JUSTICE STEVENS' approach, the Tribes' power to tax
petitioners ~ould be withheld indefinitely.

iO

This conclusion is inevitable once Indian sovereignty is
recognized, for the sovereign powers may be restricted only by
self-limitation or by constraints imposed by superior or co-equal
sovereigns. H. Cohen, Recent Theories of Sovereignty 2-4 (1937):
A. Larson & C. Jenks, Sovereignty Within the Law 11, 26 (1965):
P. Maxfield, et al., Natural Resources Law on American Indian
Lands 4-6 (1977).
11
Furthermore, the police power of a sovereign may not be
contracted away. Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 208 U.S.
583' 596 (1908): New York &. N.E.R. Co. v. Bristol, 151 U.S. 556,
567 (1894).
1 2 The 1927 Act permitted state taxation of mineral lessees on
Executive Order reservations, but it indicated no change in the
taxing power of the affected tribes. Hithout mentioning the
tribal authority to tax, the Act authorized state taxation of
royalties from mineral production on all Indian lands, including
reservations created by Executive Order. Petitioners argue that
the Act thereby transferred the Indian power to tax mineral
production to the States in exchange for the rovalties assured
the tribes. The claim not only lacks any supporting evidence, it
also deviates from settled principles in this area. For, as
different sovereigns enjoy powers to tax the same transations,
e.g., Hayden-Cartwright Act, ch. 582, 49 Stat. 1521, 4 u.s.c. ~
104: Buck Act, ch. 787, 54 Stat. 1059, 4 u.s.c. ~~ 105-110, the
mere fact of state authority to tax does not deprive the Indian
tribe of its power to tax. Fort Mohave Tribe v. County of San
Bernardino, 543 F.2d 1253 (CA 9 1976), cert. denied, 430 u.s. 983
(1977). Cf. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville
Indian Reservation, supra. Moreover, although Congress is
empowered to limit tribal sovereignty, "a proper respect both for
tribal sovereignty itself and for the plenary authority of
Congress in this area cautions that we tread lightly in the
absence of clear indications of legislative intent." Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 u.s. 49, 60 (1978). No such clear
indication is present here.
This principle also defeats petitioners' suggestion that
tribal taxation of oil and gas conflicts with national energv
policies, and therefore the tribal ordinance is be pre-empted by
federal law.
Petitioners fail to cite to any specific federal
statute restricting Indian sovereignty on this basis, nor do they
explain why state taxation of the same energy production escapes

This rule has no bearing here, however, for there can be no
claim that the Tribe seeks to tax any mdre of petitioners' mining
activity than the portion occurring within Tribal jurisdiction.
In such circumstances, the risk of multiple taxation is the
inevitable consequence of the geographid fact that the
reservation falls within New Mexico.
Such geographic
convergence does not work to preclude taxation by both a
municipality and a State, nor by both a State and the federal
government. t For in such instances, the multiple taxation does
not result from efforts by distinct governments to seize more tax
revenues than would fairly be aportioned to the activities
falling within their jurisdictions. Instead, these are the
consequences that inhere in a system of hierarchical
sovereignties, each of which provides services to commercial
activity and may accordingly require financial support from
beneficiaries. Compress & Warehouse Co. v. McLean, 291 U.S. 17
(1934); Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 203-204 (1824); The
Federalist, No. 33 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) 202-203. In
this context, "[t]here is no direct conflict between the state
and tribal schemes, since each government is free to impose its
taxes without ousting the other." Washington v. Confederated
Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, supra, at 158.
17 Similarly, the ordinance does not distinguish between
minerals remaining within New Mexico and those transported beyond
the State boundary.
18 The tax, by its terms, applies when the resources are
"produced on the Jicarilla Apa6he Reservation and sold or
transported off the Reservation." Jicarilla Apache Tribe,
Ordinance of the Tribal Counsel, Oil and Gas Severance Tax, ' '
2,3 reprinted in Appendix N to Petition of Amoco Production
Company, No. 80-15, at 2n. The Tribe explains that this language
was used because no sale occurs prior to the transportation off
the Reservation, just as the State of New Mexico's tax defines
the taxable value of severed resources as the value when
transported from the State. N.M. Stat. Ann., ~~7-25-3 (1980).
The Tribe's tax is due at the time of severance. I believe that
the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the taxable event
defined by the Tribe's ordinance is the severance of the minerals
from the soil. See J.A. 155.
19 Paragraph 4 of the ordinance specifies that "[rloyalty gas,
oil or condensate taken by the Tribe in kind, and used by the
Tribe shall be exempt from taxation." App. 2n.

the asserted conflict with federal policy. Cf. Commonwealth
Edison v. Montana, ante, at
• Indeed, Congress has indicated
1ts awareness of the Indian severance tax here at issue and
declined to disapprove it.
Instead, Congress has included taxes
imposed by an Indian tribe in its provision for costs that may be
recovered through federal energy pricing regulations. Natural
Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, Section llO(a),
(c) (1), 92 Stat. 3368, 15 U.S.C. (1976 ed., Supp. III) § 3320 (a),
(c)(l).

r

1 3 Mor~over, despite petitioners' claims, I discern no implicit
limitation on the tribes' power to tax imposed by the Act of May
11, 1938, ch. 198, 52 Stat. 347, 25 u.s.c. § 396b. That Act
permits tribes organized under the Indian Reorganization Act "to
assume and define for themselves the leasing process," as
governed by constitution or charter adopted under the Indian
Reoganization Act. Joint Appendix (J.A.), at 160 and nn. 6,7.
As the Act fails to include any express restriction on the Indian
tax power, I would find none implied.
14 Thus, pursuant to the Indian Commerce . Clause, Congress has
regulated the sale of liquor in lands allotted to or ceded by
Indians, United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913): Dick v.
United States, 208 u.s. 340 (1908), governed trespass and
settlement of white persons in Indian country, defined crimes,
and fixed boundaries. See F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian
Law, supra, at 92. See also Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona
State Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980): Warren Trading Post v.
Arizona Tax Comm'~380 U.S. 685 (1965).
15
It remains true that "the Tribes themselves could perhaps
pre-empt state taxation through the exercise of properly
delegated federal power to do so." Washington v. Confederated
Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, supra, at 156, but we
are not presented here with a challenge to State taxes imposed on
petitioners' mining activities.
16 Petitioners contend that because New Mexico may tax the same
mining activity at the full value, the Indian tax imposes a
multiple tax burden on interstate commerce in violation of the
Commerce Clause. The multiple taxation issue arises where two or
more taxing jurisdictions point to some contact with an
enterprise to support a tax on the entire value of its multistate
activities, or more than the particular connection would justify.
E.g, Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382, 384-385 (1952). To
guard against this problem, the Court has required an
apportionment of the tax based on the portion of the activity
properly viewed as occuring within each relevant State. See,
e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207,
219 (1980): Washington Revenue Dep't v. Association of Wash.
Stevedoring Cos., 435 u.s. 734, 746 & n.l6 (1978).
See also
Japan Line, Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, .441 u.s. 434 (1979).
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

Re:

80-11; 80-15 - Amoco Production v.
Jicarilla Apache Tribe; Merrion v.
Jicarilla Apache Tribe

Although there is a slight possibility that yo u
may not wish to feast on this fare immediately, you may
want to have the latest version of my memorandum in
your files for future reference . The changes from the
last circulation have been marked .
Respectfully,

Attachment

Question Presented

has~~ ~

Whether the Jicarilla Apache Tribe
power

to

impose

a

severance tax on oi 1 and

this tax violates the Commerce Clause.

I.

~ mil tA& umr' b

~4)~~+·~
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Background

This case has been set for reargument.

Last term the

Court, in a 5-3 vote, tentatively decided to affirm the CAlO's
en bane decision (1) that the Tribe had the sovereign power so
to tax and

(2)

that this tax, which had been approved by the

Commissioner of Indian Affairs on behalf of the Secretary of
the

Interior,

did

not

offend

the

so-called

"Indian Commerce
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Clause." 1
of

the

Justice Stewart did not participate.
Court

divided

as

follows.

Justice

0

The remainder
Stevens

wrote

inti tially and was joined by the Chief and Justice Rehnquist.
Justice Stevens said the Tribe lacked the sovereign power
impose

this tax,

under

to

the novel theory was that the Tribe's

power to tax derives from its power to exclude outsiders; because the Tribe's oil and gas lease granted petrs a right to
enter

the Tribe's property,

quently to impose a
three

Justices

the Tribe was not allowed subse-

tax 1 imi ting

therefore

would

this right of entry.
reverse

the

CAlO's

These

decision

without reaching the Commerce Clause issue.
Justices Marshall and Brennan believed that the Tribe
did possess the sovereign power of taxation and that this tax
did not transgress the Commerce Clause.

(Although he differed

as to theory to some degree, Justice White joined this position

1 The Commerce Clause provides "The Congress shall have the
Power
To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes
"
Art. I, Section 8 (emphasis added). Because this case involves
a tribe rather than a State, the emphasized "Indian Commerce
Clause"--rather than the more typically invoked Interstate Commerce Clause--is at issue. The Court, of course, has long inferred a limitation on state authority from this affirmative
grant of power to Congress. Whether similar restrictions bind
tribes is an issue in this case.
"The fact that the constitutional limitations upon
state interference with interstate commerce are implied rather
than expressed entails one crucial doctrinal corollary. Given
their origin as negative judicial inferences from a constitutional grant of power to Congress, the Supreme Court's doctrinal limitations are always subject to congressional revision."
L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 321 (1978).

TM, W,~ y, JJ~w ~~ C/fJd
3.

to make
CAlO.)

in

favor

of a

simple

affirmanc

of

the

Justice Marshall had three alternative grounds for his

Commerce

~t,

Clause holding.

"the limitations

imposed

by }

~

the interstate Commerce Clause on State regulation have little
relevance to the exercise of Tribal taxation authority."
op.

at 14.

saved

it

Clause.

S~d,

from

approval of

the

tax in question £

any possible violation of

the

Indian Commerce

Third,

even

federal

Draft

absent

federal

approval,

the

LfL,.c_,

5 r-

tax

~

survived

Commerce

Clause

scrutiny

as

formulated

by

the

prong inquiry of Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 430
(1977).

Justice Blackmun--who you joined--agreed with Justice
Marshall that the Tribe had the sovereign power to impose the
tax.

-

Justice Backmun did not agree with Justice Marshall, how-

ever, that the standards of the Interstate Commerce Clause had
"little relevance" to the Indian Commerce Clause.
Justice Marshall's second alternative ground

d..~approv~
--• of

~1

the tax in question.

He did join

r=I:;~~U.

As to Justice Marshall's

third alternative ground, Justice Blackmun referred to his dissenting

opinion

in

Commonwealth

s.ct. 2946, 2964 (7/2/81) •

2

2

Edison

Co.

v.

Montana,

101

Had this case presented the issue,

commonwealth Edison, you will recall, upheld the constitutionality of Montana's coal severance tax.
Justice Marshall,
writing for six Justices, said the severance tax satisfied the
last prong of the four prong test set forth in Complete Auto
Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 u.s. 274, 279 (1977), which asks
whether a state tax is "fairl L related to the services provided
bYt he S tate. " .......Jus't'I ce M ar s hall i nterpreted th 1s inquiry to
Footnote continued on next page.

4.

the

two

whether

of

you would

have

remanded

for

DC consideration

of

the Tribe's tax is fairly related to the services the

Tribe provides--an inquiry presumably to be guided by the test
proposed in the Commonwealth Edison dissent.
To summarize

the voting

in this case,

positions result in a 5-3 to affirm.

these various

(Although the file does

not so disclose, apparently the case was held for reargument in
hopes

of

a

more

substantial

majority.

nounced his resignation on June 18.
was circulated on June 25.

Justice

Stewart

an-

Justice Marshall's draft

Justice Blackmun's draft circulated

June 26.)
The supplemental briefs do not add much substance to

require only "that the measure of the tax . . .
be reasonably
related to the extent of the contact" between the taxed activity and the State.
101 s.ct. at 2958 (emphasis in original).
Montana passed the test, said these Justices, because its severance tax was proportional to the value of the extracted coal.
Three Justices dissented in Montana. Justice Blackmun
(the author of the unanimous Complete Auto Transit decision),
joined by you and Justice Stevens, argued Justice Marshall's
reading "emasculates" the fourth prong of the Complete Auto
Transit test.
!d. at 2968.
The dissent would have remanded
the case for trial according to this test:
If the tax is in fact a legitimate general revenue
measure comparable to taxes imposed on similar industries, a court's inquiry is at an end; on the other
hand, if the tax singles out this particular interstate activity and charges it with a grossly disproportionate share of the general costs of government,
the court must determine whether there is some reasonable basis for the legislative judgment that the
tax is necessary to compensate the State for the particular costs imposed by the activity.
Id. at 2971-72

5.

the thorough consideration this case has received to date.

The

bulk of the SG's brief is devoted to arguing the Tribe has the
power to impose the tax.

In its short Commerce Clause discus-

sion at 18-21, the SG disappointingly fails to make the point
that the tax in question has received federal approval and that
this removes Commerce Clause difficulties.

To

k

~sure

"'

he agrees

with Justice Marshall's position, it might be worth asking the
SG

at

oral

argument

whether,

assuming

some

Indian

Commerce

Clause difficulty, he agrees federal approval would negate the
difficulty.
roughly the same
- - It similarly fails to make the federal approval point.
----The petrs make three points in their recent (10/22/81)
The Tribe's
~

focus.

supplemental

brief.

supplemental brief has
........

First,

...........

the Tribe

-

lacks

the governmental

power of taxation, as is assertedly made clear by the decision
last term in Montana v. United States, 101 S.Ct. 1245

(1981).

Second, a study of the particular historical relationship between a tribe and the United States is necessary to determine
that

tribe's present

rights.

Third,

25

u.s.c.

§398(c)

shows

Congress did not delegate taxation powers to tribes and that
tribes possess no power based on their proprietary interest.

II. Discussion
I agree with Greg's initial bench memo and your tentative position in this case.

Rather than rework this previously

ploughed ground, I will confine my attention to analyzing both

9

6.

the relevance of two new cases and to the new issues raised in
the supplementary briefs.
The first
S. Ct. 1245

/

new case

( 3/24/81) •

is Montana v.

United States, 101

In this case, you joined Justice Stew-

art's majority decision,

holding

--

that

the Crow

Indians

sessed neither the ownership right nor the inherent
~

pos·
sovereignty

to prohibit all fishing and hunting by non-members of the Tribe
on non-Indian property within reservation boundaries.

The in-

herent sovereignty holding of the case is relevant here.

The

Montana Court noted that tribes, in joining the Union, suffered
an

implicit

between
s.ct.

at

an

divestiture
Indian

tribe

of

sovereignty

and

non-members

Since such a

1257.

present

in this case,

shall's

proposed

respecting
of

the

relations

tribe.

relationship with outsiders

101

is

this tends to cut against Justice Mar-

opinion.

relies upon this language.

Petrs'

supplemental

brief

heavily

The Montana opinion continues, how-

ever, in the following manner:
To be sure, Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some form of civil
jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands.
A
tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activ1t1es of nonmembers who enter consensual relations with the
tribe or its members, through commercial dealings, contracts, leases, or other arrangements. [Citing four cases]
101 s.ct. at 1258 (emphasis added).

This

specific

reference

to

taxation

of

leasehold

interests

quiets any concern that Justice Stewart's preceeding and more

7.

general

formulation might have created

for

present purposes.

(Petrs do respond that they have not "consented" to the "unilateral" tax, but Justice Marshall has already rebutted effectively this argument at 9-13 of his draft.)
The second recent case of significance is Commonwealth
Edison,

summarized

in

note

2

supra.

As

Justice

Blackmun • s

opinion has made clear, Commonwealth Edison d9es not apply because the federal government has approved of the tax at issue.
Justice Blackmun also points out that should such approval not
have

been

would
tax

present,

require

does

not

however,

further
burden

his

view

proceedings
commerce

in Commonwealth Edison

to ensure that the Tribe's

unduly.

Both

propositions

are

sound and require no further modification.
Petrs'

remaining arguments point to no weaknesses in

Justice Mar shall's

reasoning.

First,

I

do

agree

with

resps

that specific history of federal/tribe relationships count importantly in any analysis of a particular tribe's current powers.

But

this

should

not

preclude

a

more

general

analysis

when, as here, the power at issue is as fundamental and general
as

the

already

u.s.c.

power

of

taxation.

adequately
§398c.

responds

Second,
to

Justice Marshall's

petrs'

point

draft

respecting

28

Draft op. at 13.

III.

Conclusion

I agree with your tentative decision to vote with Justice Blackmun to affirm.

Neither ~he
-\.

two relevant cases decid-

8.

ed last Term nor
position.

the supplemental briefing should alter your

Hopefully Justice O'Connor will be of a similar per-

suasion and will vote to create a 6-3 decision.
ever,

her

At worst, how-

vote could only produce a four vote dissent from a

majority result in which you concur.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

~-1-~

Nos. 80-11

AND

80-15

J. GREGORY MERRION AND ROBERT L. BAYLESS,
ETC., ET AL., PETITIONERS
80-11
v.
JICARILLA APACHE TRIBE, ET AL.
AMOCO PRODUCTION COMPANY AND MARATHON
OIL COMPANY, PETITIONERS
80-15
v.
JICARILLA APACHE INDIAN TRIBE, ET AL.
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
[November-, 1981]

JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.
Pursuant to long-term leases with the Jicarilla Apache
Tribe, petitioners, 21lessees, extract and produce oil and gas
from the Tribe's reservation lands. In these two consolidated cases, petitioners challenge an ordinance enacted by
the Tribe imposing a severance tax on "any oil and natural
gas severed, saved and removed from Tribal lands." See Oil
and Gas Severance Tax No. 77-0--02, App. 38. We granted
certiorari to determine whether the Tribe has the authority
to impose this tax, and, if so, whether the tax imposed by the
Tribe violates the Commerce Clause.
I
The Jicarilla Apache Tribe resides on a reservation in
northwestern New Mexico.
Established by Executive

~

1-o~
~~--~
~

11-118
~-~
.-

J

;r:;!

~~--~
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Order in 1887,' the reservation contains 742,315 acres, all of
which is held as tribal trust property. The 1887 Executive
Order set aside public lands in the Territory of New Mexico
for the use and occupation of the Jicarilla Apache Indians,
and contained no special restrictions except for a provision
protecting preexisting rights of bona fide settlers. 2 Approximately 2,100 individuals live on the reservation, with
the majority residing in the town of Dulce, New Mexico, near
the Colorado border.
The Tribe is organized under the Indian Reorganization
Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984, 25 U. S. C. §§ 461 et seq.,
which authorizes any tribe residing on a reservation to adopt
a constitution and bylaws, subject to the approval of the
Secretary of the Interior (Secretary). 3 The Tribe's first constitution, approved by the Secretary on August 4, 1937, preserved all powers conferred by § 16 of the Indian Reorganiza'See I C. Kappler, Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties 875 (1904) (order
of President Cleveland). Two earlier orders setting aside land for the
Tribe had been cancelled. See id., at 874-875 (orders of Presidents Hayes
and Grant). The boundaries of the reservation were redefined or clarified
by Executive Orders issued by President Theodore Roosevelt on November 11, 1907 and January 28, 1908, and by President Taft on February 17,
1912. See III C. Kappler, Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties 681, 682,
684, 685 (1913).
The fact that the Jicarilla Apache Reservation was established by Executive Order rather than by treaty or statute does not affect our analysis;
the Tribe's sovereign power is not affected by the manner in which its reservation was created. E . g., Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the
Colville Reservation, 447 U. S. 134 (1980) (Colville)
2
The proviso reads as follows: "this order shall not be so construed as to
deprive any bona fide settler of any valid rights he may have acquired
under the law of the United States providing for the disposition of the public domain." I. C. Kappler, Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties, supra, at
875.
3
The Tribe is also chartered under the Indian Reorganization Act of
1934, 25 U. S. C. § 477, which permits the Secretary to issue to an Indian
tribe a charter of incorporation that may give the tribe the power to purchase, manage, operate, and dispose of its property.
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tion Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 987, 25 U. S. C. § 476. In
1968, the Tribe revised its constitution to specify:
"The inherent powers of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe, including those conferred by Section 16 of the Act of June
18, 1934 (48 Stat. 984), as amended, shall vest in the
tribal council and shall be exercised thereby subject only
to limitations imposed by the Constitution of the United
States, applicable Federal statutes and regulations of
the Department of the Interior, and the restrictions established by this revised constitution." Revised Constitution of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe, Art. XI, § 1.
The Revised Constitution provides that "[t]he tribal council
may enact ordinances to govern the development of tribal
lands and other resources, "Art. XI, § 1 (a) (3). It further
provides that "[t]he tribal council may levy and collect taxes
and fees on tribal members, and may enact ordinances, subject to approval by the Secretary of the Interior, to impose
taxes and fees on non-members of the tribe doing business on
the reservation," Art. XI, § 1 (e). The Revised Constitution
was approved by the Secretary on February 13, 1969.
To develop tribal lands, the Tribe has executed mineral
leases encompassing some 69% of the reservation land. Beginning in 1953, the petitioners entered into leases with the
Tribe. The Commissioner of Indian Affairs, on behalf of the
Secretary, approved these leases, as required by the Act of
May 11, 1938, ch. 198, 52 Stat. 347, 25 U. S. C. §§ 396a-396g
(1938 Act). In exchange for a cash bonus, royalties, and
rents, the typical lease grants the lessee "the exclusive right
and privilege to drill for, mine, extract, remove, and dispose
of all oil and natural gas deposits in and under" the leased
land for as long as the minerals are produced in paying quantities. App. 22. Petitioners may use oil and gas in developing the lease without incurring the royalty. Id., at 24. In
addition, the Tribe reserves the rights to use gas without
charge for any of its buildings on the leased land, and to take
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its royalties in kind. !d., at 27-28. Petitioners' activities on
the leased land have been subject to taxes imposed by the
State of New Mexico on oil and gas severance and on oil and
gas production equipment. !d., at 129. See Act of March 3,
1927, ch. 299, § 3, 44 Stat. 1347, 25 U. S. C. § 398c (permitting state taxation of mineral production on Indian reservations) (1927 Act).
Pursuant to its Revised Constitution, the Tribal Council
adopted an ordinance imposing a severance tax on oil and gas
production on tribal land. See App. 38. The ordinance was
approved by the Secretary, through the Acting Director of
the Bureau of Indian Affairs, on December 23, 1976. The
tax applies to "any oil and natural gas severed, saved and removed from Tribal lands .... " Ibid. The tax is assessed at
the wellhead at $0.05 per million BTU of gas produced and
$0.29 per barrel of crude oil or condensate produced on the
reservation, and it is due at the time of severance. ·I d., at
38-39. Oil and gas consumed by the lessees to develop their
leases or received by the Tribe as in-kind royalty payments
are exempted from the tax. Ibid.; Brief for Respondent
Jicarilla Apache Tribe 59, n. 42.
In two separate actions, petitioners sought to enjoin enforcement of the tax by either ,the tribal authorities or the
Secretary. The United StateS1:>istrict Court for the District
of New Mexico consolidated the cases, granted other lessees
leave to intervene, and permanently enjoined enforcement of
the tax. The District Court ruled that the Tribe lacked the
authority to impose the tax, that only state and local authorities had the power to tax oil and gas production on Indian
reservations, and that the tax violated the Commerce Clause.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit,
sitting en bane, reversed. 617 F. 2d 537 (CAlO 1980). 4 The

--

' Two judges dissented. Both argued that tribal sovereignty does not
encompass the power to tax nonlndian lessees, 617 F. 2d, at 551-556 (Seth,
C. J., dissenting); id., at 551H565 (Barrett, J., dissenting) (also arguing the
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Court of Appeals reasoned that the taxing power is an inherent attribute of tribal sovereignty that has not been divested
by any treaty or Act of Congress, including the 1927 Act, 25
U. S. C. § 398c. The court also found no Commerce Clause
violation. We granted certioriari, - - U. S. - - (1980),
and we now affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
II
Petitioners argue that an Indian tribe's authority to tax
nonindians who do business on the reservation stems exclusively from its power to exclude such persons from tribal
lands. Because the Tribe did not initially condition the
leases upon the payment of a severance tax, petitioners assert that the Tribe is without authority to impose such a tax
at a later time. w__e disagree with the premise that t~e
power to tax de~s only from the power to exclude. Even
if that premise is accepted, however, we disagree with the
conclusion that the Tribe lacks the power to impose the severance tax.
A
In Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U. S. 134 (1980) (Colville), we addressed the Indian tribes' authority to impose taxes on
non Indians doing business on the reservation. We held that
"[t]he power to tax transactions occurring on trust lands and
significantly involving a tribe or its members is a fundamental attribute of sovereignty which the tribes retain unless
divested of it by federal law or necessary implication of their
dependent status." I d., at 152. The power to tax is an essential attribute of Indian sovereignty because it is a necessary instrument of self-government and territorial management. This power enables a tribal government to raise
revenues for its essential services. The power does not detax violates the Commerce Clause).
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MERRION v. JICARILLA APACHE TRIBE

6

rive solely from the Indian tribe's power to exclude non-Indians from tribal lands. Instead, it derives from the tribe's
general authority, as sovereign, t6- control economic activity
Within its JUnsdiction, and to defray the cost of providing
governmental services by requiring contributions from persons or enterprises engaged in economic activities within that
jurisdiction. See, e. g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 199
(1824).
The petitioners avail themselves of the "substantial privilege of carrying on business" on the reservation. Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U. S. 425, 437 (1980);
Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U. S. 435, 444-445
(1940). They benefit from the provision of police protection
and other governmental services, as well as from "'the advantages of a civilized society'" that are assured by the existence of tribal government. Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dept.
of Revenue, 447 U. S. 207, 228 (1980) (quoting Japan Line,
Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U. S. 434, 445 (1979)).
Numerous other governmental entities levy a general revenue tax similar to that imposed by the Jicarilla Tribe when
they provide comparable services. Under these circumstances, there is nothing exceptional in requiring petitioners
to contribute through taxes to the general cost of tribal government.5 Cf. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana,
U. S. - , - (1981) [slip op., at 14-16]; id., a t - ,
- - (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting) (dissent slip op., at 10);
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, supra, at
436-437.
As we observed in Colville, supra, the tribe's interest in
5

Through various Acts governing Indian tribes, Congress has expressed the purpose of "fostering tribal self-government." Callville,
supra, at 155. We agree with Judge McKay's observation that "[i]t simply
does not make sense to expect the tribes to carry out municipal functions
approved and mandated by Congress without being able to exercise at
least minimal taxing powers, whether they take the form of real estate
taxes, leasehold taxes or severance taxes." 617 F. 2d, at 550 (McKay, J.,
concurring).
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levying taxes on nonmembers to raise "revenues for essential
governmental programs ... is strongest when the revenues
are derived from value generated on the reservation by activities involving the Tribes and when the taxpayer is the recipient of tribal services." 447 U. S., at 15~157. This surely
is the case here. The mere fact that the government imposing the tax also enjoys rents and royalties as the lessor of the
mineral lands does not undermine the government's authority to impose the tax. See infra, a t - - - - - . The royalty payments from the mineral leases are paid to the Tribe in
its role as partner in petitioners' commercial venture. The
severance tax, in contrast, is petitioners' contribution "to the
general cost of providing governmental services." Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, supra, at--. State
governments commonly receive both royalty payments and
severance taxes from lessees of mineral lands within their
borders.
Viewing the taxing power of Indian tribes as an essential
instrument of self-government and territorial management
has been a shared assumption of all three branches of the
Federal Government. Cf. Colville, supra, at 153. In Colville, supra, the Court relied in part on a 1934 opinion of the
Solicitor for the Department of the Interior. In this opinion,
the Solicitor recognized that, in the absence of Congressional
action to the contrary, the tribes' sovereign power to tax
"'may be exercised over members of the tribe and over nonmembers, so far as such nonmembers may accept privileges
of trade, residence, etc., to which taxes may be attached as
conditions.'" 447 U. S., at 153 (quoting Powers of Indian
Tribes, 55 I. D. 14, 46 (1934)). Colville further noted that official executive pronouncements have repeatedly recognized
that "Indian tribes possess a broad measure of civil jurisdiction over the activities of non-Indians on Indian reservation
lands in which the tribes have a significant interest ... , including jurisdiction to tax." 447 U. S., at 152-153 (citing 23
Op. Atty. Gen. 214 (1900); 17 Op. Atty. Gen. 134 (1881); 7 Op.
Atty. Gen. 174 (1855)). 6
6

Moreover, in its revision of the classic treatise on Indian Law, the De-
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Similarly, Congress has acknowledged that the tribal
power to tax is one of the tools necessary to self-government
and territorial control. As early as 1879, the Senate Judiciary Committee acknowledged the validity of a tax imposed
by the Chickasaw Nation on nonlndians legitimately within
its territory:
"We have considered [Indian tribes] as invested with the
right of self-government and jurisdiction over the persons and property within the limits of the territory they
occupy, except so far as that jurisdiction has been restrained and abridged by treaty or act of Congress.
Subject to the supervisory control of the Federal Government, they may enact the requisite legislation to
maintain peace and good order, improve their condition,
establish school systems, and aid their people in their efforts to acquire the arts of civilized life; and they undoubtedly possess the inherent right to resort to taxation
to raise the necessary revenue for the accomplishment of
these vitally important objects-a right not in any sense
derived from the Government of the United States."
S. Rep. No. 698, 45th Cong., 3d Sess., pp. 1-2 (1879)
(emphasis added).
Thus, the views of the three federal branches of governpartment of Interior advances the view that the Indian tribes' power to tax
is not limited by the power to exclude. See United States Solicitor for the
Department of the Interior, Federal Indian Law 438 (1958) ("The power to
tax does not depend upon the power to remove and has been upheld where
there was no power in the tribe to remove the taxpayer from the tribal
jurisdiction.") (footnote omitted). See also F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 142 (1942) ("One of the powers essential to the maintenance of any government is the power to levy taxes. That this power is an
inherent attribute of tribal sovereignty which continues unless withdrawn
or limited by treaty or by act of Congress is a proposition which has never
been successfully disputed.") (footnote omitted).
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ment, as well as general principles of taxation, confirm that
Indian tribes enjoy authority to finance their governmental
services through taxation of nonindians who benefit from
those services. Indeed, the conception of Indian sovereignty that this Court has consistently reaffirmed permits no
other conclusion. As we observed in United States v.
Mazurie, 419 U. S. 544, 557 (1975), "Indian tribes within 'Indian country' are a good deal more than 'private, voluntary
organizations.'" Rather, they "are unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members
and their territory." Ibid. See e. g., Worcester v. Georgia,
6 Pet. 515, 557 (1832); Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe of the
Pine Ridge Reservation, 231 F. 2d 89, 92, 99 (CA8 1956);
Crabtree v. Madden, 54 F. 426, 428-429 (CA8 1893); F.
Cohen, "The Spanish Origin of Indian Rights in the Law of
the United States," in The Legal Conscience 230, 234 (L.
Cohen ed. 1960). Adhering to this understanding, we confirm that the Tribe's authority to tax nonindians who conduct
business on the reservation does not simply derive from the
Tribe's power to exclude such persons, but is an inherent
power necessary to tribal self-government and territorial
management.
Of course, the Tribe's authority to tax nonmembers is subject to constraints not imposed on other governmental entities: the federal government can take away this power, and
the Tribe must obtain the approval of the Secretary before
any tax on nonmembers can take effect. These additional
constraints minimize potential concern that Indian tribes will
exercise the power to tax in an unfair or unprincipled manner, and ensure that the tribal power to tax will be consistent
with national policies.
We are not persuaded by petitioners' argument that an Indian tribe's authority to tax nonindians is extremely limited
because its only source is the tribe's power to exclude such
persons from tribal lands. Limiting the tribes' authority to
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tax in this manner contradicts the conception that Indian
tribes are domestic, dependent nations, as well as the common understanding that the sovereign taxing power is a tool
for raising revenue necessary to cover the costs of government.
Furthermo~e, early decisions upholding tribal power to tax
nonmembers do not support this limitation. See, e. g., Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U. S. 384 (1904); Buster v. Wright, 135
F. 947 (CA8 1905), appeal dismissed, 203 U. S. 384 (1905);
Maxey v. Wright, 3 Ind. T. 243, 54 S. W. 807, 809 (Ct. App.
Ind. T.), aff'd, 105 F. 1003 (CA8 1900). It is evident from
these cases that a hallmark of Indian sovereignty is the
power to exclude nonindians from Indian lands, and that this
power provides a basis for tribal authority to tax. None of
these cases, however, establishes that the authority to tax
derives solely from the power to exclude.
Morris v. Hitchcock, for example, suggests that the taxing
power is a legitimate instrument for raising revenue, and
that a tribe may exercise this power over nonindians who receive privileges from the tribe, such as the right to trade on
Indian land. In Morris, the Court approved a tax on cattle
grazing and relied in part on a report to the Senate by the
Committee on the Judiciary, which found no legal defect in
previous tribal tax legislation having "a twofold object-to
prevent the intrusion of unauthorized persons into the territory of the Chickasaw Nation, and to raise revenue." 194
U. S., at 389 (emphasis added). In Maxey v. Wright, the
question of Indian sovereignty was not even raised: the decision turned on the construction of a treaty denying the Tribe
any governing or jurisdictional authority over nonmembers.
3 Ind. T., at 247-248, 54 S. W., at 809. 7
7
The governing treaty in Maxey v. Wright restricted the tribal right to
self-government and jurisdiction to members of the Creek or Seminole
Tribes. The court relied, at least in part, on opinions of the Attorney General interpreting this treaty. For example, one such opinion stated that,
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Finally, the decision in Buster v. Wright actually undermines the theory that the tribes' taxing authority derives
solely from the power to exclude nonindians from tribal
lands. Under this theory, a nonindian who establishes lawful presence in Indian territory could avoid paying a tribal
tax by claiming that no residual portion of the power to exclude supports the tax. This result was explicitly rejected in
Buster v. Wright. In Buster, deeds to individual lots in Indian territory had been granted to nonindian residents, and
cities and towns had been incorporated. As a result, Congress had expressly prohibited the Tribe from removing
these nonindian residents. Even though the ownership of
land and the creation of local governments by non-Indians established their legitimate presence on Indian land, the court
held that the Tribe retained its power to tax. The court concluded that "(n]either the United States, nor a state, nor any
other sovereignty loses the power to govern the people
within its borders by the existence of towns and cities therein
whatever the meaning of the clause limiting to tribal members the Tribe's
unrestricted rights of self-government and jurisdiction, it did
" 'not limit the right of these tribes to pass upon the question, who ...
shall share their occupancy, and upon what terms. That is a question
which all private persons are allowed to decide for themselves; and even
wild animals, not men, have a certain respect paid to the instinct which in
this respect they share with man. The serious words 'jurisdiction' and
'self-government' are scarcely appropriate to the right of a hotel keeper to
prescribe rules and charges for persons who become his fellow occupants.' "
3 Ind. T., at 250, 54 S. W., at 809 (quoting 18 Op. Atty. Gen. 36, 37).
The court, as well as the opinion of the Attorney General, found that the
Tribe's "natural instinct" to set terms on occupancy was unaltered by the
treaty. Neither the court nor the Attorney General adressed the scope of
Indian sovereignty when unlimited by treaty; instead, they identified the
Tribe's right, as a social group, to exclude intruders and place conditions on
their occupancy. The court's dependence on this reasoning hardly bears
on the more general question posed here: what is the source of the Indian
tribes' sovereign power to tax absent a restriction by treaty or other federal law?
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endowed with the usual powers of municipalities, nor by the
ownership nor occupancy of the land within its territorial jurisdictions by citizens or foreigners." 135 F., at 952 (emphasis added). 8 This result confirms that the Tribe's authority
to tax derives not from its power to exclude, but from its
power to govern and to raise revenues to pay for the costs of
government.
We choose not to embrace a new restriction on the extent
of tTie1TI1>al authoritYto tax, By interpreting these early
cases as esta lishing that t IS authority to tax derives solely
from the tribe's authority to exclude nonmembers from tribal
lands. Instead, based on the views of each of the federal
branches, general principles of taxation, and the conception
of Indian tribes as domestic, dependent nations, we conclude
that the Tribe has the authority to impose a severance tax on
the mining activities of petitioners as part of its power to govern and to pay for the costs of self-government.
B

Alternatively, if we accept petitioners' position that the
Tribe's authority to tax derives ~olely from it_~ power o exclude nonlndians from the reservation, we conclude that the
Trlbe has tlie authority to impose the severance tax challenged here. Nonmembers who lawfully enter tribal lands
remain subject to the tribe's power to exclude them. This
power necessarily includes the lesser power to place conditions on entry, such as a tax on business activities conducted
on the reservation. When a tribe grants a nonlndian the
right to be on Indian land, the tribe agrees not to exercise its
ultimate power to oust the nonlndian as long as the nonBoth the classic treatise on Indian law and its subsequent revision by
the Department of Interior, see n. 6, supra, agree with this reading of
Buster v. Wright. United States Solicitor for the Department of the Interior, Federal Indian Law, supra, at 438; F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal
Indian Law, supra, at 142 (both citing Buster v. Wright, supra, for the
proposition that the power to tax is an inherent sovereign power not dependent on the power to exclude).
8
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Indian complies with the initial conditions of entry. However, it does not follow that the lawful property~ _!o b~ on
Indian ~n a so immunizes the non n Ian om the tribe's exercise of its lesser-me u ed power to tax or to place other
conditions on the nonindian's conduct~on the reservation. 9
A nonmember who enters the jurisdiction of the tribe remains subject to the risk that the tribe will later exercise its
sovereign power. The fact that the Tribe chooses not to exercise its power to tax when it initially grants a nonindian entry onto the reservation does not permanently divest the
Tribe of its authority to impose such a tax. 10
Petitioners argue that their leaseholds entitle them to
enter the reservation and exempt them from further exercises of the Tribe's sovereign authority. In other words, petitioners assert that the Tribe has lost the power to tax their
mining activities because it has leased to them the use of the
mineral lands and such rights of access to the reservation as
might be necessary to enjoy the leases. 11 However, this conclusion is not compelled by linking the taxing power to the
pow~r to exclude. Instead, it is based on additional assumptions and confusions about the consequences of the commercial arrangement between petitioners and the Tribe.
Most important, petitioners confuse the Tribe's role as
commercial partner with its role as sovereign. 12 This confu9
See also Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge Reservation, 259
F. 2d 553 (CA8 1958) (lessees of tribal lands subject to Indian tax on use of
land).
10
Here, the leases extend for as long as minerals are produced in paying
quantities, in other words, until the resources are depleted. Thus, under
the petitioners' approach, the Tribe would never have the power to tax
petitioners.
11
But see Buster v. Wright , supra, at 958:
"The ultimate conclusion of the whole matter is that purchasers of lots in
town sites in towns or cities within the original limits of the Creek Nation,
who are in lawful possession of their lots, are still subject to the laws of
that nation prescribing permit taxes for the exercise by noncitizens of the
privilege of conducting business in those towns . . . . "
12
In contrast, the 1958 treatise on Indian law written by the U. S. Solici-

80-11 & 80-1&-0PINION
14

MERRION v. JICARILLA APACHE TRIBE

sion relegates the powers of sovereignty to the bargaining
process undertaken in each of the sovereign's commercial
agreements. It is one thing to find that the Tribe has agreed
to sell the right to use the land and take from it valuable minerals; it is quite another to find that the Tribe has abandoned
its sovereign powers simply because it has not expressly reserved them through a contract.
Confusing these two results denigrates Indian sovereignty. Moreover, it implies that the power to tax depends )
on the consent of the taxed as well as on the Tribe's power to
exclude non-Indians. Whatever place consent may have in
contractual matters and in the creation of democratic governments, it has little if any role in measuring the validity of an
exercise of legitimate sovereign authority. Requiring the
consent of the entrant deposits in the hands of the excludable
nonindian the source of the tribe's power, when the power
instead derives from sovereignty itself. Only the Federal
Government rna limit a tribe's exercise of its sovereign authori~.
. g., United tates v. Wheeler, 5 U. S. 313~322
(1978). 13 Indian sovereignty is not conditioned on the assent

f

tor of the U. S. Department of Interior recognized and distinguished the
scope of these two roles when it embraced as the "present state of the law"
the following summary:
"'Over tribal lands, the tribe has the rights of a landowner as well as the
rights of a local government, dominion as well as sovereignty. But over
all the lands of the reservation, whether owned by the tribe, by members
thereof, or by outsiders, the tribe has the sovereign power of determining
the conditions upon which persons shall be permitted to enter its domain,
to reside therein, and to do business, provided only such determination is
consistent with applicable Federal laws and does not infringe any vested
rights of persons now occupying reservation lands under lawful authority.' " Federal Indian Law, supra, at 439 (quoting Solicitor's Opinion of
October 25, 1934) (emphasis added).
See F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law, supra, at 143.
3
' See alsoP. Maxfield, et al., Natural Resources Law on American Indian Lands 4-6 (1977). Federal limitations on tribal sovereignty can also
occur when the exercise of tribal sovereignty would be inconsistent with
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of a nonmember; to the contrary, the nonmember's presence
and conduct on Indian lands is conditioned by the limitations
the Tribe may choose to impose.
Viewed in this light, the absence of a reference to the tax
in the leases themselves hardly impairs the Tribe's authority
to impose the tax. Contractual arrangements remain subject to subsequent legislation by the presiding sovereign.
See, e. g., Veix v. Sixth Ward Building & Loan Assn of
Newark, 310 U. S. 32 (1940); Home Building & Loan Assn.
v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398 (1934). Even where the contract
at issue requires payment of a royalty for a license or franchise issued by the governmental entity, the government's
power to tax remains unless it "has been specifically surrendered in terms which admit of no other reasonable interpretation." City of St. Louis v. United R. Co., 210 U. S. 266,
280 (1908). To state that Indian sovereignty is "different"
than that of States or local governments because it derives
from the power to exclude does not justify ignoring the principles announced by this Court in cases involving city, state,
and federal taxes imposed under similar circumstances.
Without regard to its source, sovereign power, even when
unexercised, is an enduring presence that governs all contracts subject to the sovereign's jurisdiction. No claim is asserted in this case, nor could one be, that petitioners' leases contain the clear and unmistakable surrender
of taxing power required for its extinction. We could find a
waivey of the Tribe's taxing power only if we fnferred it from
silence in the leases. To presume that a sovereignrorever
waives the right to exercise one of its sovereign powers unless it expressly reserves the right to exercise that power in a
commercial agreement turns the concept of sovereignty on its
head, and we do not adopt this analysis. 14
overriding national interests. See Colville, supra, at 153. This concern
is not presented here. See id.
" Petitioners also argue that we should infer a waiver of the taxing
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The Tribe has the inherent power to impose the severance
tax on petitioners, whether this power derives from the
Tribe's power of self-government or from its power to exclude. Because Congress may limit tribal sovereignty, we
now review petitioners' argument that Congress, when it enacted twOTe"deral acts g~ing Indians and various pieces
of federal energy legislation, de rived the Tribe of its authorityJ o imEose the severan~ tax.
In Colville, supra, we concluded that the "widely held understanding within the Federal Government has always been
that federal law to date has not worked a divestiture of Indian taxing power." 447 U. S., at 152 (emphasis added).
Moreover, we noted that "[n]o federal statute cited to us
shows any congressional departure from this view." ld., at
153. Likewise, getitioners can cite to no statute that specifically divests the Tribe of its power to impose t e severance
tax on their mining act1v1bes. Instead, petitioners argue
tnat Congress implicitly took away this power when it enacted the acts and various pieces of legislation on which petitioners rely. We reiterate here our admonition in Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U. S. 49, 60 (1978): "a proper
power from silence in the Tribe's original constitution. Although it is true
that the constitution in force when petitioners signed their leases did not
include a provision specifically authorizing a severance tax, neither the
Tribe's constitution nor the Federal Constitution is the font of any sovereign power of the Indian tribes. E. g., Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe of
the Pine Ridge Reservation, supra, at 94; Buster v. Wright, supra, at 950.
Because the Tribe retains all inherent attributes of sovereignty that have
not been divested by the Federal Government, the proper inference from
silence on this point is that the sovereign power to tax remains intact.
The Tribe's constitution was amended to authorize the tax before the tax
was imposed, and this is the critical event necessary to effectuate the tax.
See Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe of the Pine Ridge Reservation, supra, at
554, 556; Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe of the Pine Ridge Reservation,
supra, at 99.
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respect both for tribal sovereignty itself and for the plenary
authority of Congress in this area cautions that we tread
lightly in the absence of clear indications of legislative
intent."
Petitioners argue that Congress preempted the Tribe's
power to impose a severance tax when it enacted the 1938
Act, 25 U. S. C. § 396a-396g. In essence, petitioners argue
that the tax constitutes an additional burden on lessees that
is inconsistent with the Act's regulatory scheme for leasing
and developing oil and gas reserves on Indian land. This
Act, and the regulations promulgated by the Department of
Interior for its enforcement, establish the procedures to be
followed for leasing oil and gas interests on tribal lands.
However, the proviso to § 396b of the Act states that "the
foregoing provisions shall in no manner restrict the right of
tribes . . . to lease lands for mining purposes . . . in accordance with the provisions of any constitution and charter
adopted by any Indian tribe pursuant to sections 461, 462,
463, 464-475, 476-478, and 479 of this title." (emphasis
added). 15 Therefore, this Act does not prohibit the Tribe
from imposing a severance tax on petitioners' mining activities pursuant to its Revised Constitution, when both the Revised Constitution and the ordinance authorizing the tax are
approvedy the Secretary. 16
15

17

The Secretary has implemented the substance of this proviso by the
following regulation:
"The regulations in this part may be superseded by the provisions of any
tribal constitution, bylaw or charter issued pursuant to the Indian Reorganization Act of June 18, 1934 (48 Stat. 984; 25 U. S. C. 461-479), .. . or by
ordinance, resolution or other action authorized under such constitution,
bylaw or charter. The regulations in this part, in so far as they are not so
superseded, shall apply to leases made by organized tribes if the validity of
the lease depends upon the approval of the Secretary of the Interior." 25
C. F . R. § 171.29 (1980).
16
In arguing that the 1938 Act was intended to preempt the severance
tax, petitioners attach great significance to the Secretary's approval of the
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Petitioners also assert that the 1927 Act, 25 U. S. C.
We disagree. The 1927 Act permits state taxation of mineral lessees on Executive Order reservations, but it indicates no
change in the taxing power of the affected tribes. See 25
U. S. C. § 398c. Without mentioning the tribal authority to
tax, the Act authorizes state taxation of royalties from mineral production on all Indian lands. Petitioners argue that
the Act transferred the Indian power to tax mineral production to the States in exchange for the royalties assured the
tribes. This claim not only lacks any supporting evidence in
the legislative history, it also deviates from settled principles
of taxation: different sovereigns can enjoy powers to tax the
same transactions. Thus, the mere existence of State authority to tax does not deprive the Indian tribe of its power
to tax. Fort Mojave Tribe v. County of San Bernardino,
543 F. 2d 1253 (CA91976), cert. denied, 430 U. S. 983 (1977).
Cf. Colville, supra, at 158 ("There is no direct conflict between the state and tribal schemes, since each government is
~ose its taxes without ousting the other."). 17
~etitioners contend that tribal taxation of oil and
gas conflicts with national energy policies, and therefore the
§§ 398a-398e, divested the Tribe's taxing power.

leases. Curiously, they attach virtually no significance to the fact that the
Secretary also approved the tax ordinance that they challenge here.
17
The Tribe argues that the 1927 Act granting the States the power to
tax mineral production on Indian land is inapplicable because the leases at
issue here were signed pursuant to the 1938 Act. The 1938 Act, which
makes uniform the laws applicable to leasing mineral rights on tribal lands,
does not contain a grant of power to the States comparable to that found in
the 1927 Act. As a result, the Tribe asserts that the State of New Mexico
has no power to tax the production under petitioners' leases with the Tribe.
Because the State of New Mexico is not a party to this suit, the Court of
Appeals did not reach this issue. See 617 F. 2d, at 547-548, n. 5. For
this reason, and because we conclude that the 1927 Act did not affect the
Tribe's authority to tax, we likewise do not reach this issue.
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tribal tax is preempted by federal law. Again, petitioners
cite no specific federal statute restricting Indian sovereignty.
Nor do they explain why state taxation of the same type of
activity escapes the asserted conflict with Federal policy.
Cf. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana,-- U. S. - (1981). Indeed, rather than forbidding tribal severance
taxes, Congress has included taxes imposed by an Indian
tribe in its definition of costs that may be recovered under
federal energy pricing regulations. Natural Gas Policy Act
of 1978, Pub. L. 95-621, §§ 110 (a), (c) (1), 92 Stat. 3368, 15
U. S.C. §§3320(a), (c) (1) (1976 ed., Supp. III). Although
this inclusion may not reflect Congress' view with respect to
the source of a tribe's power to impose a severance tax, 18 it
surely indicates that imposing such a tax would not contravene federal energy policy and that the tribal authority to do
so is not implicitly divested by that Act.
We find no "clear indications" that Congress has implicitly
deprived the Tribe of its power to impose the severance tax.
In any event, if there were ambiguity on this point, the doubt
would benefit the Tribe, for "[a]mbiguities in federal law
have been construed generously in order to comport with ...
traditional notions of sovereignty and with the federal policy
of encouraging tribal independence." White Mountain
The statute provides that Indian severance taxes may be recovered
through federal energy pricing. However, the legislative history indicates that Congress took no position on the source of the Indian tribes'
power to impose the tax in the first place:
"While severance taxes which may be imposed by an Indian tribe are to be
treated in the same manner as State imposed severance taxes, the conferees do not intend to prejudge the outcome of the cases on appeal before the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals respecting the right of Indian tribes to impose taxes on persons or organizations other than Indians who are engaged
in business activities on Indian reservations. The outcome of the cases on
appeal will determine the legality of imposing such taxes." S. Conf. Rep.
No. 95-1126, p. 91 (1978); H. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1752, p. 91 (1978).
18

I
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Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U. S. 136, 143-144 (1980). Accordingly, we find that the Federal Government has not divested the Tribe of its inherent authority to tax mining activities on its land, whether this authority derives from the
Tribe's power of self-government or from its power to
exclude.
III
Finding no defect in the Tribe's exercise of its taxing
power, we now address petitioners' contention that the sevet,ance tax violates tne ' 'negative implications"o f t~~ com:1;?-erce --C!a~e because It taxes an activity that is an integral
part of the ow of commerce, discriminates against interstate
commerce, and imposes a multiple burden on interstate commerce. At the outset, we note that reviewing tribal action
under the Interstate Commerce Clause is not without conceptual difficulties. E. g., nn. 21 and 24, infra. Apparently
recognizing these difficulties, the Solicitor General, on behalf
of the Secretary, argues that the language/9 the structure,
and the purposes of the Commerce Clause support the conclusion that the Commerce Clause does not, of its own f¢ce,
limit Indian tribes in their dealings with nonindians. vBrief
for the Secretary of the Interior 35--40. The Solicitor General reasons that the Framers did not intend "the courts,
through the Commerce Clause, to impose their own views of
the proper relationship between Indians and nonindians and
to strike down measures adopted by a tribe wit].l which the
political de art~ents of overnment nave not seen- fit to disagree." !d., at 39. Instead, where tn a egislation is inimical to the national welfare, the Solicitor asserts that the
Framers contemplated that the remedies would be the negotiation or renegotiation of treaties, the enactment of legisla-

-

'

9

The Commerce Clause empowers Congress "[t]o regulate Commerce

with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian

Tribes." U. S. Canst., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
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tion governing trade and other relations, or the exertion of
superior force by the United States government. !d., at
38-39. Using similar reasoning, the Solicitor suggests that
if the Commerce Clause does impose restrictions on tribal activity, those restrictions must arise from the Indian Commerce Clause, and not its Interstate counterpart. I d., at
40-43.
[Wh'le the ear ments are n without force"J.his Court to
date has relied on the ndian Commerce ause as a shield to
protect Indian tribes from state and local interference, and
has not relied on the Clause to authorize tribal regulation of
commerce without any constitutional restraints. We see no
need to break new ground in this area today: even if we assume that tribal action is subject to the limitations of the Interstate Commerce Clause, this tax does not violate the "negative implications" of that Clause.
A

A state tax may violate the "negative implications" of the
Interstate Commerce Clause by unduly burdening or
discrimin¥ng against interstate commerce. See, e. g.,
Comm~~~lth Edison Co. v. Montana, - - U. S. - (1981); Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 U. S. 274
(1977). Judicial review of state taxes under the Interstate
Commerce Clause is intended to ensure that States do not
disrupt or burden interstate commerce when Congress'
power remains unexercised: it protects the free flow of commerce, and thereby safeguards Congress' latent power from
encroachment by the several States.
However, we only engage in this review when Congress
has not acted or purported to act. See, e. g., Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408, 421-427 (1946).
Once Congress acts, courts are not free to review state taxes
or other regulations under the dormant Commerce Clause.
When Congress has struck the baTance it deems appropriate,
the courts are no longer needed to prevent States from bur-

7
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dening commerce, and it matters not that the courts would
invalidate the state tax or regulation under the Commerce
Clause in the absence of congressional action. See Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, supra, at 431. 20 Courts are
final arbiters under the Commerce Clause only when Congress has not acted. See Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los
Angeles, 441 U. S. 434, 454 (1979).
In this case, Congress has affirmatively acted ~providing
a series of Federal check~ that must be CTeared before a
tribal tax can take effect. 2 ' Under the Indian Reorganization
Act, 25 U. S. C. §§ 476, 477, a tribe u t o tain a roval
from the Secreta before it adopts or revises its constitution
to announce 1ts mtention to tax nonmem ers.
u er, before the ordmance 1mposmg e severance tax challenged
here could take effect, the Tribe was required again to obtain
approval from the Secretary. See Revised Constitution of
the Jicarilla Tribe, Art. XI, §§ 1 (e), 2. Cf. 25 U. S. C.
20
In Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, supra, this Court refused
to invalidate a South Carolina tax on out-of-state insurance companies despite appellant's contention that the tax impermissibly burdened interstate
commerce. The Court refused to entertain appellant's argument because
Congress, in passing the McCarran Act, had provided that "silence on the
part of Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation of [the business of insurance] by the several States." 59
Stat. 33, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1011.
21
Although Congress has not expressly announced that Indian taxes do
not threaten its latent power to regulate interstate commerce, it is unclear
how Congress could articulate that intention any more convincingly than it
has done here. In contrast to when Congress acts with respect to the
states, when Congress acts with respect to the Indian tribes, it generally
does so pursuant to its authority under the Indian Commerce Clause, or by
virtue of its superior position over the tribes, not pursuant to its authority
under the Interstate Commerce Clause. This is but one of the difficulties
inherent in reviewing under the Interstate Commerce Clause both tribal
action and congressional action regulating the tribes. Therefore, in determining whether Congress has "acted" to preclude judicial review, we do
not find it significant that the congressional action here was not taken pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Clause.
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§§476, 477; 25 C. F. R. § 171.29 (implementing the proviso to
§ 396b of the 1938 Act, quoted supra, n. 15).
As we noted earlier, the severance tax challenged by petitioners was enacted in accordance with this congressional
scheme. Both the Tribe's Revised Constitution and the challenged tax ordinance received the requisite approval from the
Secretary. This course of events fulfilled the administrative
process established by Congress to monitor such exercises of
tribal authority. As a result, this Tribal tax comes to us in a
posture significant! different from a cfiallengeastate tax,
which does no need specific edera approval to take effect,
and which therefore requires, in the absence of congressional
ratification, judicial review to ensure that it does not unduly
burden or discriminate against interstate commerce. Judicial review of the Indian tax measure, in contrast, would duplicate the administrative review called for by the congressional scheme.
Finally, Congress is well aware that Indian tribes impose
mineral severance taxes such as the one challenged by petitioners. See Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 15 U. S. C.
§§ 3320 (a), (c) (1). Congress, of course, retains plenary
power to limit tribal taxing authority or to alter the current
scheme under which the tribes may impose taxes. However, it is not our function nor our prerogative to strike down
a tax that has travelled through the precise channels established by Congress, and has obtained the specific approval of
the Secretary.
B
The tax challenged here would survive judicial scrutiny
under the Interstate Co~erce Clause, even if such scrutiny
were necessary. In VComplete Auto Transit v. Brady,
supra, at 279, we held that a state tax on activities connected
to interstate commerce is sustainable if it "is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly
apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate com-

?
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merce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the
State." Petitioners do not question that the tax on the severance of minerals from the mines 22 meets the first and the
second tests: the mining activities taxed pursuant to the ordinance occur entirely on reservation land. Furthermore, pe- ~
titioners do not challenge the tax on the ground that the
amount of the tax is not fairly related to the services provided by the Tribe. See Supplemental Brief for Petitioners
in No. 80-15, pp. 11, 17-20. 23
Instead, petitioners focus their attack on the third factor,
and argue that the tax discriminates against interstate commerce. In essence, petitioners argue that the language "sold
22

r

Petitioners initially contend that the ordinance taxes the transportation of the minerals from the reservation, not their severance from the
mines. As a result, they argue that the ordinance impermissibly burdens
interstate commerce by taxing the movement in commerce itself, which is
not a local event. The tax, by its terms, applies to resources that are "produced on the Jicarilla Apache Tribe Reservation and sold or transported off
the Reservation." App. 39. The Tribe explains that this language was
used because no sale occurs prior to the transportation off the Reservation.
The Tribe's tax is due at the time of severance. I d., at 38. Therefore, we
agree with the Court of Appeals that the taxable event defined by the ordinance is the removal of minerals from the soil, not their transportat,ion _o
1
from the reservation. See 617 F. 2d, at 546.
-fv ~
23
The Court of Appeals noted that, because the lessees chose not~t a
factual foundation to challenge the tax on this ground, there was ri'o basis
on which to find that the tax was not fairly related to the services provided
by the Tribe. See 617 F. 2d, at 545, n. 4. Indeed, when the Tribe attempted to introduce at trial evidence of the services it had provided to
establish this relationship, the District Court rejected this evidence upon
petitioners' objection that such evidence was irrelevant to their challenge.
Brief for Respondent Jicarilla Apache Tribe 7-8; VI Record 278-290, 294,
300-308. In any event, because the severance tax is assessed as a percentage of the minerals produced, the measure of the tax is tied to the
earnings made possible under the Tribe's auspices, and the tax is reasonably related to the extent of the taxpayer's activities within the taxing jurisdiction. Therefore, after Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana,
supra, a factual inquiry into the value of the services provided by the Tribe
would not be necessary.

80-11 & 80-15-0PINION
MERRION v. JICARILLA APACHE TRIBE

-::z. ?---

25

or transported off the reservation" exempts from taxation
minerals sold on the reservation, kept on the reservation for
use by individual members of the tribe, and minerals taken
by the Tribe on the reservation as in-kind royalty. Although
petitioners admit that no sales have occurred on the reservation to date, they argue that the Tribe might induce private
industry to locate on the reservation to take advantage of this
allegedly discriminatory taxing policy. We do not accept petitioners' arguments; instead, we agree with the Tribe, the
Solicitor General, and the Court of Appeals that the tax is imposed on minerals sold on the reservation or transported off
the reservation before sale. See 617 F. 2d, at 546. Cf.
n. ~' supra. 24 Under this interpretation, the tax does not
treat minerals transported away from the reservation differently than it treats minerals that might be sold on the reservation. Nor does the Tribe's tax ordinance exempt minerals ultimately received by individual members of the Tribe.
The ordinance does exempt minerals received by the Tribe as
in-kind payments on the leases and used for tribal purposes, 25
but this exemption merely avoids the administrative makework that would ensue if the Tribe, as local government,
taxed the amount of minerals that the Tribe, as commercial
partner, receives in royalty payments. Therefore, this exemption cannot be deemed a discriminatory preference for
local commerce.
order to reach a different conclusion, we

fJf

24
The ordinance does not distinguish between minerals remaining within
New Mexico and those transported beyond the State boundary. As aresult, petitioners' argument that the tax discriminates against interstate
commerce by favoring local sales focuses on the boundary between the reservation and the State of New Mexico and not on any interstate boundaries. We will assume for purposes of this argument only that this alleged
reservation-state discrimination could give rise to a Commerce Clause
violation.
25
Paragraph 4 of the ordinance specifies that "[r]oyalty gas, oil or condensate taken by the Tribe in kind, and used by the Tribe shall be exempt
from taxation." App. 39.
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would have to ignore our recent cases refusing to impose a
Commerce Clause limitation on the proprietary activities of
the States. See, e. g., Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U. S. 429
(1980); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U. S. 794
(1976).:__)
IV
In Worcester v. Georgia, supra, Chief Justice Marshall observed that Indian tribes had "always been considered as distinct, independent political communities, retaining their origPetitioners contend that because New Mexico may tax the same mining activity at full value, the Indian tax imposes a 'iliititipie tax burden on
interstate commerce in violation of the CommerceCiause. The multiple
taxation issue arises where two or more taxing jurisdictions point to some
contact with an enterprise to support a tax on the entire value of its multistate activities, which is more than the contact would justify. E. g.,
Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U. S. 382, 384-385 (1952). This Court has
required an apportionment of the tax based on the portion of the activity
properly viewed as occurring within each relevant State. See, e. g.,
Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue, 447 U. S. 207, 219 (1980);
Washington Revenue Dept. v. Association of Washington Stevedoring
Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 746, and n. 16 (1978).
This rule has no bearing here, however, for there can be no claim that
the Tribe seeks to tax an more of petitioners' minin activity than the porng within Tribal jurisdiction. In such circumstances, the risk
tion occ
ofinuffiple""taxab on is the inevitable consequence of the fact that the reservation is located within the boundaries of New Mexico. Such geographic convergence does not preclude taxation b;y both a municipality_y1d
a~ , nor by both a Stru;e and the Federal Government. For in such
instances, the risk of multiple taxation does not result from efforts by distinct governments to seize more tax revenues than would fairly be apportioned to the activities occurring within their jurisdictions. Instead, the
risk is inherent in a system of hierarchical sovereignties, or, in the case of
tribal and State taxes, of sovereignties independent of one another that encompass portions of the same territory, each of which provides services to
commercial activity. Cf. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 203-204 (1824);
The Federalist, No. 32, pp. 202-203 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton). In
this context, "[t]here is no direct conflict between the state and tribal
schemes, since each government is free to impose its taxes without ousting
the other." Colville, supra, at 158.
26
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inal natural rights." 6 Pet., at 559. Although the tribes are
subject to the authority of the Federal Government, the
"weaker power does not surrender its independence-its
right to self government, by associating with a stronger, and
taking its protection." I d., at 561. Adhering to this understanding, we conclude that the Tribe did not surrender its authority to tax the mining activities of petitioners, whether
this authority is deemed to arise from the Tribe's inherent
power of self-government or from its inherent power to exclude nonmembers. Therefore, the Tribe may enforce its
severance tax unless and until Congress divests this power,
an action that Congress has not taken to date. Finally, the
severance tax imposed by the Tribe cannot be invalidated on
the ground that it violates the "negative implications" of the
Commerce Clause.
Affirmed.
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C HAM BERS OF

JUST ICE JO H N PA U L STEVE N S

December 1, 1981

Re:

80-11; 80-15 - Merrion et al. v.
Jicarilla Apache Tribe

Dear Thurgood:
It will come as no great surprise that I intend to
circulate a dissent.
I expect to concentrate on Parts
II-A and II-B (pages 5-15) of your circulation.
It s eems to me that your discussion in Part II-A
does . not adequately confront the critical distinction
between an Indian tribe's power over its own members,
which is a good deal greater than the power possessed
by many sovereigns, and its much more limited power
over nonmembers. And in Part II-B, I do not believe
you adequately e xplain how a tribe can grant a lessee
access to the reservation and the privilege of
extracting minerals and thereafter impose a tax based
on a power to exclude which has been surrendered by the
terms of the lease.
In all events, I shall circulate
my dissent as soon as I can.
Re spe ctfully,

Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

·1

JUSTICE
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December 1 , 1981

J . BRENNAN, JR.

RE:

Nos. 80-11 and 15 Merrion, et al. & Amoco Production
Company and Marathon Oil Co. v. Jicari1la Apache, etc.

Dear Thurgood:
1

J

l

I agree.

1
0

i

Sincerely,

;i

1M

. .i

~·-....-:.·.. ;.

Justice Marshall
cc: The Conference
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Memorandum to Justice Powell
Re:

TM's draft in Nos. 80-11 and -15:

Jicarilla Apache

Justice Marshall's draft closely tracks the memorandum
he circulated last Term.
in

Part

I.

Part

He has added a factual introduction

II generally establishes
power.

~~---=------~~--~--

Indians'

h~ave

that A...eaches

Part IIA argues that this power is

right to self-government.

Part IIB con-

even were this power derived solely from the Indians'

power

to exclude

(as

is Justice Stevens'

position)

1

the

to exclude in this case is sufficient to support
of the tax in question.

These two sections are sub-

identical to Justice Marshall's earlier memo.

Part

~------~~--~---------~~---~---------

the suggestion that subsequent legislation has re-

the

Indians'

strengthened

taxation

considerably

power.

This

section

since Justice Marshall's

has

been

first

ef-

which in turn strengthens his opinion.
You
this much of

joined

Justice

the opinion.

Blackmun
I

last

Term

in

accepting

recommend that you do the same

this Term.
Part

III

of

TM' s

draft

deals

with

the

question of

whether the Apache's tax contravenes the Commerce Clause.
his

i ~o

j

Part III (draft at 20-21)

1

In

Justice Marshall

2.

describes the SG's dual position on the applicability of the
Commerce Clause:
~

dian

inference

first, that it imposes no restrictions on Inwith

interstate

commerce

(SG

brief

at

35-40)

1\

and, second, if the Clause does impose some restrictions, they
are only those from the Indian
Commerce Clause
significant

(as opposed to the Interstate)

(SG brief at 40-43).

because

such

Indian

The SG argued this was

Commerce

Clause

restrctions

should be found to be "far more limited than those placed upon
the

stats

in

their

commercial dealing with one another.

SG

brief at 42.
Greg's

bench

memo

rejected

this

reasoning

on

the

ground that, in commercial matters, tribes more closely resembl~ states

than

foreign

nations.

This reasoning makes sense to me.

See his

bench memo at 12.

I therefore agree with him

that the SG is wrong in contending that the Apaches should not
be subjected

to

the

same test as are states

in the Commerce

Clause area.
Justice Marshall ultimately de 'des not "to break new
ground in this area today,"

avoids a holding

on the issue by assuming the

govern tribes as

states.

Nevertheless,

scribing

the

Ibid.
would

SG' s

he does

this only after

--------------------arguments as "not without

This language is absolutely unnecessary.
be

to

see

it dropped.

But your

favorably de-

force

My preference

judgment may be

these three words are not worth fighting about.

"
that

3.
Part IliA explains that the , Apaches encounter no Commerce Clause problems because their tax has been subjected to
federal

approval.

This

section

is

sound,

in my view,

and I

recommend that you join it.
Part IIIB attempts to dispell the Commerce Clause issue on the alternate ground that, even absent federal approval,
the Apache's
ples.

tax

is acceptable under Commerce Clause pr inci-

This Part, as drafted last Term, applied the interpreta-

tion of Complete Auto Transit v. Brady set forth in the majority opinion in Commonwealth Edison v. Montana--viz., that a tax
"is fairly related to the services provided by the State" so
long as

it meets the minimal requirement that the tax be as-

sessed as a percentage of the minerals produced.

You and Jus-

tice Stevens joined Justice Blackmun's dissent in Montana.

TM has now dropped this Montana argument to the final ~
sentence in footnote

on the logic that "petitioners do not

challenge the tax on the ground that the amount of the tax is
not fairly related to the services provided by the Tribe."

But

TM's footnote 26 goes on to argue that tribes--unlike states-l_

are not restricted by any Commerce Clause proscription on multiple taxation.
relating

to

But Greg's sensible <view was that, for matters

-----------~----~~------------------~

interstate

treated like states.
ed

similarly,

the

commerce

burdens,

tribes

should

be

And if states and tribes are to be treat-

dissenting

position

in Montana

difficulties with TM's cheerful acceptance

would

have

(in footnote 26) of

the possibility of multiple taxation by States and Tribes.

The

4

0

Montana dissenters would have avoided this problem by ensuring
that

the

taxing

jurisdiction's

tax was

apportioned

so as

to

avoid the possibility that the jurisdiction was able to export
the

burden of

the

tax.

See Montana,

-

B

101

s.ct.

at

2971-72.

Consequently, the logic of Part III9 , as particularly expressed
by both footnotes 23 and 26,

is unfortunate.

There is one other potentially objectionable aspect to

~

TM's Part III/ :

its final sentence and citation.

In explain-

ing why the Tribe's decision to exempt from taxation in-kind
mineral payments made to the Tribe does not offend the Commerce
Clause, TM states
this exemption merely avoids the administrative makework that would ensue if the Tribe,
as commercial partner, receives the royalty
payments. ~erefore, this exemption cannot be
deemed a 1d iscr imina tory preference for local
commerce.
In order to reach a different conclusion, we would have to ignore our recent
cases refusing to impose a Commerce Clause
limitation on the proprietary activities of
the States. See, e.g., Reeves, Inc. v. Stake,
. . . Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.
Draft at 25-26.
I

am worried only about TM's characterization of

Reeves and

Hughes as cases that refuse to impose the Commerce Clause "on
the

proprietary

activities

of

the

States."

Your

opinion

in

Hughes was based on the fact, not that the state was engaged in
proprietary activity,

but rather that it had created a market

for hulks by paying a subsidy for their retrieval.
\

clear

You made it

in your Reeves dissent that you did not view Hughes as

standing for a general "Commerce Clause exception for

"propr i-

5.
etary" state acts.

E.g., Reeves, 447

u.s.

at 449-50 ("If .

the State enters the private market and operates a commercial
enterprise for

the advantage of private citizens,

evade

constitutional

the

You

Balkanization.").

were

policy
joined

in

it may not

against
dissent

economic
by

Justices

White, Brennan, and Stevens--and here TM counts on support from
the

first

two

of

these

Justices.

TM's

"administrative

makework" logic can easily stand without its final "proprietary
activities" flourish.
the effort
in Part

t~

III~

~k

My inclination is that it would be worth

TM to strike the

~

sentence and citation

(quoted above).

In sum,

I

recommend that you send Justice Marshall a

note stating that you join his opinion in all respects except

b

for Part III ~

(as well as the introduction to Part II~, if

the bottom of page 2, supra, persuades you).

You might comment

that you will await Justice Blackmun's views, because you have
previously found yourself in substantial agreement with Justice
Blackmun's earlier thoughts on the case.

Finally, I urge you

to think about asking Justice Marshall to consider the dissenting views (particularly respecting Justices Brennan and White!)
in Reeves and
~
III1 ·

thus to delete the final two sentences in Part

jsw
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Memorandum to Justice Powell
Re:

Bad news on Nos. 80-11 and -15:

Jicarilla Apache

I am unhappy to report that I have found a conflict in
this case.

This

is in spite of Greg's checking on this case
I O/t8/QI

last Term,

and my /\checking on the new listing that the liti-

gants filed this Term.
minute doublecheck

It was only when I decided as a last

to compare

the listings that Greg checked

last year against your most recent investment list that I found
the Hubson Bay and Cansulex overlaps.
additions

to

your

list--hence

Apparently these are new

the

miss

between

Greg's

old

checking and my previous new checking.
I am extremely sorry to have wasted your time in this
case by not catching this earlier.
will be no other

repercussions.

I also certainly hope there
I

have alerted my co-clerks

about the possibility, and we are discussing ways to guard more
systematically against such eventualities.
Again, I am very sorry .

.

'

December 3, 1981
80-11 and 80-15 Jicarilla Apache Tribe Cases
Dear Chief:
One of the parties in these cases is Continental
Oil Company (Conoco, Inc.). Among the subsidi.aries of
Conoco listed in the special appendix is Hudson Bay Oil &
Gas Company, Ltd., and also listed is Cansulex, Ltd., a
subsidiary of Hudson Bay.
We own, and trusts from which income is derived
also own, shares of Dome Petroleum, Ltd., another Canadian
company. I was advised during the summer that Dome acquired
a majority interest in Hudson Bay. My understanding is that
this acquisition had not occured when I participated in
these cases last Term.
The present situation, however, presents the
following question: although my family has no interest of
which I am aware in any of the parties to this litigation,
we do have an interest in Dome Petroleum which in turn now
owns a controlling interest in Hudson Bay. Does this
present a situation for disqualification?
Stating the question generally, should one
disqualify where the only interest is in a subsidiary of a
party to litigation where the subsidiary itself is not a
party, and there is no indication that the outcome of the
litigation will affect the subsidiary?
We required the listing of subsidiaries, as I
understand it, for another purpose. If a subsidiary itself
is the party in a case, and a Justice owns an interest in a
parent, there is - or at least may be - a reason to
disqualify. Where, as here, the only party is the parent
and the Justice owns an interest only in a subsidiary, I
would think the outcome of the case rarely would affect the
subsidiary.
The question with respect to subsidiaries in the
context of the present cases has not previously arisen for
me (at least to my knowledge). Yet, we also have two Mobil

2.

Oil Corp. cases on the list for tomorrow; and in checking
again its ~ubsidiaries I find that it lists as a subsidiary
in which it owns "a five percent or greater interest", the
Canadian company mentioned above called Cansulex. Hudson
Bay has some interest (apparently more than five percent) in
Cansulex and - as noted above - the company in which we do
have an interest, Dome Petroleum, now controls Hudson Bay.
What a tangle!
In view of the conjectural and remote
relationship, it would never have occurred to me to
disqualify in these situations were it not for the
continuing efforts of Mr. Cranberg to embarrass the Court
and me . I therefore would appreciate the views of the
Conference . Perhaps we could agree that where the
subsidiary itself is not a party , and the papers do not
indicate that the outcome of the case would affect the
subsidiary in any significant way, that disqualification is
unnecessary.
I

regret having to impose on you for advi@e.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

arltltrlltf tlt~ ~Uh ~taltg
Jragftittghtn. ~. ar.· 2llp~~
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

December 3, 1981

Re:

80-11 and 80-15 - Jicarilla Apache
Tribe Cases

Dear Lewis:
In your letter to the Chief on the subject of
disqualification, you indicated that you would welcome
the views of the Conference. My own view is that the
situation you describe is not disqualifying. When we
discussed the amendment to the rule, I took the
position that we should not even require the listing of
subsidiaries. I believe it was Potter who felt that
subsidiaries should be listed and the rest of us
deferred largely to his judgment in the matter.
In all events, I would think the subsidiary
situation in both this case and in the Mobil cases is
not a sufficient reason for disqualification.
Respectfully,

JL
Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

lfp/ss 12/09/81
MEMO TO FILE

DISQUALIFICATION QUESTION

This refers to my letter of December 3 to the
Conference in which I outlined the remote connection,
through subsidiaries, between the pending Mobil Oil Corp.
petitions for certiorari and also the argued case of 80-11
and 80-15 Jicarilla Apache Tribe cses.
This was discussed at our Conference on December
4, and there was unanimous agreement that there is no
occasion to disqualify in these circumstances.

Several

Justices mentioned that we should not have required, in our
rule change, that subsidiaries be listed unless they are
parties.
In the Mobil Oil Corp. cases, for example, the
subsidiary is Cansulex in which, apparently, Mobil ows some
interest and also - since last summer - Dome (in which we
own shares) owns some interest.

But neither Dome nor

Cansulex is a party in any of these cases.
In sum, I will participate in these cases.

Also,

in light of the views expressed by other Justices - with
which I agree - unless there is some reason to believe that
a subsidiary would be substantially affected by the outcome
of a case involving only the parent, there is no occasion to
disqualify unless the sub itself is a party.

2.
Although John Stevens is the only Justice who
responded in writing to my letter, the sentiment at the
Conference was unanimous.
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Memorandum to Justice Powell

JPS dissent in Nos. 80-11 & 80-15:

Re:

Jicarilla Apache

Despite its length, Justice Stevens' draft contain little

that

is new;

this draft largely reiterates the opinion he

circulated last year.

He does lay more stress on the political

justification for granting Indians a taxation power based solely
on their power

to exclude:

"Tribal powers over nonmembers are

appropriately limited because nonmembers are foreclosed from participation in tribal government."

Dissent at 30.

See also id.

at 32-33.
This rationale has some
troubling on closer examination.

initial appeal,

but I

find

it

Sovereign States have virtually

no power to exclude, under the Commerce and Privileges and Immunities Clauses of the federal Constitution.

They nonetheless are

able to tax all who do business within the State, irrespective of
whether

those

individuals and corporations "are foreclosed from

participation in [state and local] government."
ation power
Clauses.
ever,

This state tax-

is limited by the Equal Protection and the Commerce

As the Commonwealth Edison v. Montana case shows, how-

these

limits are

severance taxes .

quite

loose

in

the context of resource

It would have been sensible to tighten these

F

2.

limits, as suggested by Justice Blackmun•s dissent in that case.

---------------

And in any event,

it is sensible also to subject Tribes to the
~
same Commerce Clause limitations as apply to States--as Justice

-

Marshall does (in the alternative) in his majority opinion in the
~,..----..__,

instant case.

But this consistent treatment of States and Tribes

points out the incongruity of founding tribal taxation power on
logic that has no applicability to the sovereign model of statehood.
Finally,

I do not think Justice Stevens adequately has

replied to Justice Marshall's demonstration that, even assuming a
taxing power based solely on the power to exclude, the Jicarilla
in this case should be found
power

by a

to have contracted away their

lease that is silent on the subject.

Stevens• predictions

tax

Also, Justice

(on the last page of his dissent) of future

unfairness in commercial dealings with Tribes can be avoided if
non-Indian parties are aware that Tribes have sovereign taxation
power

and

make

their

commercial

plans

accordingly.

Moreover,

non-Indians can insist on contractual conditions that explicitly
prohibits additional taxation of the commercial activity in question.

If the problem of tribal breaches of such contractual con-

ditions becomes serious

(as it will not, if Tribes wish to keep

finding people to do business with them), the federal government
(through the Indian Commerce Clause) always has the power to legislate to prevent such abuse.
I recommend you plan generally to join Justice Marshall
(subject to the caveats I mentioned in my memo on his opinion)
but that you await Justice Blackmun•s statement on this case, as
you did last Term.

~

CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

December 8, 1981

Re:

80-11 and 80-15:

Merrion and Bayless v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe
Amoco Prod. Co., etc. v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe

Dear Thurgood,
I am awaiting John's dissent.
Sincerely yours,

Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference
cpm
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CHAMBERS OF"

/

JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

December 21, 1981
Re:

Nos. 80-11 & 80-15

Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe

Dear John:
Please join me in your dissent.
Sincerely,

Justice Stevens
Copies to the Conference
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Justice Stev ns

1st PRINTED DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Nos. 80-11

AND

80-15

J. GREGORY MERRION AND ROBERT L. BAYLESS,
ETC., ET AL., PETITIONERS
80--11
v.
JICARILLA APACHE TRIBE, ET AL.
AMOCO PRODUCTION COMPANY AND MARATHON
OIL COMPANY, PETITIONERS
80--15
v.
JICARILLA APACHE INDIAN TRIBE, ET AL.
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
[December-, 1981]

(

JUSTICE STEVENS,\atssentmg.
The Indian tribes that occupied North America before Europeans settled the continent were unquestionably sovereigns. They ruled themselves and they exercised dominion
over the lands that nourished them. Many of those tribes,
and some attributes of their sovereignty, survive today.
This Court, since its earliest days, has had the task of identifying those inherent sovereign powers that survived the creation of a new Nation and the introduction of an entirely new
system of laws applicable to both Indians and non-Indians.
In performing that task, this Court has guarded carefully
the unique status of Indian tribes within this Nation. Over
its own members, an Indian tribe's sovereign powers are virtually unlimited; the incorporation of the tribe into the
United States has done little to change internal tribal rela-

v:S\ tv ~
~~ ~~-~
\~

(
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tions. In becoming part of the United States, however, the
tribes yielded their status as independent nations; Indians
and non-Indians alike answered to the authority of a new N ation, organized under a new Constitution based on democratic principles of representative government. In that new
system of government, Indian tribes were afforded no general powers over citizens of the United States. Many tribes,
however, were granted a power unknown to any other sovereignty in this Nation: a power to exclude nonmembers entirely from territory reserved for the tribe. Incident to this
basic power to exclude, the tribes exercise limited powers of
governance over nonmembers, though those nonmembers
have no voice in tribal government. Since a tribe may exclude nonmembers entirely from tribal territory, the tribe
necessarily may impose conditions on a right of entry granted
to a nonmember to do business on the reservation.
The question presented in this case is whether, after a
tribe has granted nonmembers access to its reservation on
specified terms and conditions to engage in an economic venture of mutual benefit, the tribe may impose a tax on the nonmembers' share of benefits derived from the venture. The
Court today holds that it may do so. In my opinion this holding distorts the very concept of tribal sovereignty. Because
I am convinced that the Court's treatment of this important
case gives inadequate attention to the critical difference between a tribe's powers over its own members and its powers
over nonmembers, I set forth my views at greater length
than is normally appropriate in a dissenting opinion.
I
The 2,100 members of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe live on a
reservation in northern New Mexico. 1 The area encompassed by the Reservation became a part of the United
States in 1848 when the Mexican War ended in the Treaty of
'See Plaintiff's Exhibit E, p. 14.
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Guadalupe Hidalgo. See 9 Stat. 922. Between 1848 and
1871, the United States did not enter into any treaty with the
Jicarillas or enact any special legislation relating to them; in
1871 Congress outlawed any future treaties with Indian
tribes. 2 In 1887, President Cleveland issued an Executive
Order setting aside a tract of public lands in the Territory of
New Mexico "as a reservation for the use and occupancy of
the Jicarilla Apache Indians." Except for a provision protecting bona fide settlers from deprivation of previously acquired rights, the Executive Order contained no special rules
applicable to the reservation. 3 The mineral leases at issue in
this case were granted by the Jicarilla Apache Tribe on these
reservation lands.
The record does not indicate whether any leasing activity
occurred on the Jicarilla Reservation between 1887 and 1953.
During that period, however, the authority of Indian tribes
to enter into mineral leases was clarified. In 1891 Congress
2
"[H]ereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the
United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract by treaty:
Provided further, That nothing herein contained shall be construed to invalidate or impair the obligation of any treaty heretofore lawfully made and
ratified with any such Indian nation or tribe." 16 Stat. 566, current version at 25 U. S. C. § 71.
3
The entire Executive Order reads as follows:
"EXECUTIVE MANSION, FEBRUARY 11, 1887.
"It is hereby ordered that all that portion of the public domain in the Territory of New Mexico which, when surveyed, will be embraced in the following townships, viz: 27, 28, 29, and 30 north, ranges 1 east and 1, 2, and 3
west; 31 and 32 north, ranges 2 west and 3 west, and the south half of
township 31 north, range 1 west, be, and the same is hereby, set apart as a
reservation for the use and occupation of the Jicarilla Apache Indians: Provided, That this order shall not be so construed as to deprive any bona fide
settler of any valid rights he may have acquired under the law of the
United States providing for the disposition of the public domain."
Grover Cleveland.
I C. Kappler, Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties 875 (1904).
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passed a statute permitting the mineral leasing of Indian
lands. Act of February 28, 1891, 26 Stat. 795, 25 U. S. C.
§ 397. Because the statute applied only to lands "occupied
by Indians who have bought and paid for the same," the statute was interpreted to be inapplicable to reservations created
by Executive Order. See British-American Oil Producing
Co. v. Board of Equalization, 299 U. S. 159, 161-162, 164.
In 1922 the Secretary of the Interior took the position that
Indian reservations created by Executive Order were public
lands and that Indians residing on those reservations had no
right to share in royalties derived from oil and gas leases. 49
I. D. 139. 4
'The Secretary contended that the land on Executive Order reservations was subject to leasing, as "lands of the United States," under the
Mineral Lands Leasing Act of February 25, 1920, 41 Stat. 437, 30 U. S. C.
§ 181 et seq. In 1924, Attorney General Stone rendered an opinion stating
that the Mineral Lands Leasing Act did not apply to Executive Order reservations. 34 Op. Atty. Gen. 181 (1924). In 1925, Stone instituted litigation in the District Court of Utah to cancel certain leases that had been
authorized by the Secretary of the Interior pursuant to the Mineral Lands
Leasing Act. See H. R. Rep. No. 1791, 69th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1927).
The case was dismissed by stipulation after the enactment of the 1927 Act
noted in the text. See United States v. McMahon, 273 U. S. 782.
A later decision by this Court suggests that the Secretary's position was
correct. In Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 316 U. S. 317, the
Court held that an Indian tribe was not entitled to compensation from the
United States when an Executive Order reservation was abolished. The
Court said:
"Perhaps the most striking proof of the belief shared by Congress and
the Executive that the Indians were not entitled to compensation upon the
abolition of an executive order reservation is the very absence of compensatory payments in such situations. It was a common practice, during the
period in which reservations were created by executive order, for the President simply to terminate the existence of a reservation by cancelling or
revoking the order establishing it. That is to say, the procedure followed
in the case before us was typical. No compensation was made, and neither
the Government nor the Indians suggested that it was due.
"We conclude therefore that there was no express constitutional or stat-
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In 1927 Congress enacted a statute expressly providing
that unallotted lands on any Indian reservation created by
Executive Order could be leased for oil and gas mining purposes with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior. 5
The statute directed that all rentals, royalties, or bonuses for
such leases should be paid to the Treasurer of the United
States for the benefit of the tribe for which the reservation
was created. 6 The statute further provided that state taxes
utory authorization for the conveyance of a compensable interest to petitioner by the four executive orders of 1875 and 1876, and that no implied
Congressional delegation of the power to do so can be spelled out from the
evidence of Congressional and executive understanding. The orders were
effective to withdraw from sale the lands affected and to grant the use of
the lands to the petitioner. But the interest which the Indians received
was subject to termination at the will of either the executive or Congress
and without obligation to the United States. The executive orders of 1879
and 1884 were simply an exercise of this power of termination, and the payment of compensation was not required." 316 U. S., at 330-331.
See also Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States , 348 U. S. 272, 279-282.
5
Act of March 3, 1927, 44 Stat. 1347, current version at 25 U. S. C.
§ 398a. Section 1 of the Act provided:
"Unallotted lands within the limits of any reservation or withdrawal created by Executive order for the use or occupancy of any Indians or tribe
may be leased for oil and gas mining purposes in accordance with the provisions contained in the Act of May 29, 1924 [25 U. S. C. § 398]."
See also 25 U. S. C. § 398. Unalloted land is land that had not been allotted in severalty to individual Indians pursuant to the General Allotment
Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 388.
6
Section 2 of the Act provided:
"The proceeds from rentals, royalties, or bonuses of oil and gas leases
upon lands within Executive order Indian reservations or withdrawals
shall be deposited in the Treasury of the United States to the credit of the
tribe of Indians for whose benefit the reservation or withdrawal was created or who are using and occupying the land, and shall draw interest at
the rate of 4 per centum per annum and be available for appropriation by
Congress for expenses in connection with the supervision of the development and operation for the oil and gas industry and for the use and benefit
of such Indians: Provided, That said Indians, or their tribal council, shall be
consulted in regard to the expenditure of such money, but no per capita
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could be levied upon the output of such oil and gas leases, 7
but made no mention of the possibility that the Indian tribes,
in addition to receiving royalties, could impose taxes on the
output. 8
In 1934, Congress enacted the Indian Reorganization Act,
48 Stat. 984, 25 U. S. C. § 461 et seq., which authorized any
Indian tribe residing on a reservation to adopt a constitution
and bylaws, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the
Interior. The Act provided that, "in addition to all other
powers vested in an Indian tribe or tribal council by existing
law," the constitution should vest certain specific powers,
such as the power to employ legal counsel, in the tribe. 9
payment shall be made except by Act of Congress." 44 Stat. 1347, current
version at 25 U. S. C. § 398b.
7
Section 3 of the Act provided:
"Taxes may be levied and collected by the State or local authority upon
improvements, output of mines or oil and gas wells, or other rights, property, or assets of any lessee upon lands within Executive order Indian reservations in the same manner as such taxes are otherwise levied and collected, and such taxes may be levied against the share obtained for the
Indians as bonuses, rentals, and royalties, and the Secretary of the Interior is authorized and directed to cause such taxes to be paid out of the
tribal funds in the Treasury: Provided, That such taxes shall not become a
lien or charge of any kind against the land or other property of such Indians." 44 Stat. 1347, current version at 25 U. S. C. § 398c.
8
In 1938, Congress passed the Act of May 11, 1938, 52 Stat. 347, 25
U. S. C. § 396a-g, which was designed in part to achieve uniformity for all
mineral leases of Indian lands. Like the 1927 Act, the statute provided
that the tribes were entitled to the royalties from such leases. The statute
made no mention of taxes. See n. 45, infra.
9
The statute provided, in part:
"Any Indian tribe, or tribes, residing on the same reservation, shall have
the right to organize for its common welfare, and may adopt an appropriate
constitution and bylaws, which shall become effective when ratified by a
majority vote of the adult members of the tribe, or of the adult Indians
residing on such reservation, as the case may be, at a special election authorized and called by the Secretary of the Interior under such rules and
regulations as he may prescribe.
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The Act also authorized the Secretary of the Interior to issue
a charter of incorporation to an Indian tribe, and provided
that the charter could convey to the tribe the power to purchase, manage and dispose of its property. 10 The 1934 Act
was silent concerning the right of an Indian tribe to levy
taxes. 11 The first Jicarilla Apache Constitution was approved by the Secretary of the Interior in 1937. 12
In 1953, the Tribe executed an oil and gas lease with the
Phillips Petroleum Company. App. 22-30. The lease, prepared on a form provided by the Bureau of Indian Affairs of
"In addition to all powers vested in any Indian tribe or tribal council by
existing law, the constitution adopted by said tribe shall also vest in such
tribe or its tribal council the following rights and powers: To employ legal
counsel, the choice of counsel and fixing of fees to be subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior; to prevent the sale, disposition,
lease, or encumbrance of tribal lands, interests in lands, or other tribal assets without the consent of the tribe; and to negotiate with the Federal,
State, and local Governments." 25 U. S. C. § 476.
10
The statute provided:
"The Secretary of the Interior may, upon petition by at least one-third of
the adult Indians, issue a charter of incorporation to such tribe: Provided,
That such charter shall not become operative until ratified at a special election by a majority vote of the adult Indians living on the reservation.
Such charter may convey to the incorporated tribe the power to purchase,
take by gift, or bequest, or otherwise, own, hold, manage, operate, and
dispose of property of every description, real and personal, including the
power to purchase restricted Indian lands and to issue in exchange therefor
interests in corporate property, and such further powers as may be incidental to the conduct of corporate business, not inconsistent with law; but
no authority shall be granted to sell, mortgage, or lease for a period exceeding ten years any of the land included in the limits of the reservation.
Any charter so issued shall not be revoked or surrendered except by Act of
Congress." 25 U. S. C. § 447.
11
See F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 267 (1942) (hereinafter Cohen).
12
The 1937 Constitution made no reference to any power to assess taxes
against nonmembers. See 1937 Constitution and By-Laws of the Jicarilla
Apache Tribe, Defendants' Exhibit G.
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the Department of the Interior, presumably is typical of later
leases executed between other companies and the Tribe. 13
The lease provides that in return for certain rents, royalties,
and a cash bonus of$71,345.99, all to be paid to the treasurer
of the Tribe, the Tribe as lessor granted to the lessee "the
exclusive right and privilege to drill for, mine, extract, remove, and dispose of all the oil and natural gas deposits in or
under" the described tracts of land, together with the right to
construct and maintain buildings, plants, tanks, and other
necessary structures on the surface. App. 22-23. The
lease is for a term of 10 years following approval by the Secretary of the Interior "and as much longer thereafter as oil
and/or gas is produced in paying quantities from said land."
Ibid. The lessee is obligated to use reasonable diligence in
the development of the property, and to pay an annual rental
of $1.25 per acre and a royalty of 12Y2% "of the volume or
amount" of all oil and gas "produced and saved" from the
leased land. App. 24, 26. Oil and gas used by the lessee for
development and operation of the lease is royalty-free. I d.,
at 24. The Tribe reserved the rights to use free of charge
sufficient gas for any school or other building owned by the
Tribe on the leased premises, and to take its royalty in kind.
I d., at 27-28.
The lease contains no reference to the payment of taxes.
The lessee does, however, agree to comply with all regulations of the Secretary of Interior
". . . now or hereafter in force relative to such leases:
Provided, That no regulation hereafter approved shall
13
This lease is attached to petitioners' complaint in No. 80-11. The
lease attached to the complaint in No. 80-15 was also executed in 1953.
See App. 62. The record does not disclose the date on which most of the
leases with petitioners were executed, but the record does indicate that
leases were executed as late as 1967. See Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1. Leases of
Jicarilla tribal property cover in the aggregate over 500,000 acres of land,
comprising almost 69% of the acreage within the Jicarilla Reservation.
Brief for Respondent, p. 2.
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effect a change in rate or royalty or annual rental herein
specified without the written consent of the parties to
this lease." Id., at 27.
The lease was approved by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs on behalf of the Secretary of the Interior. Id., at 32.
Both of the 1953 leases described in the record are still
producing.
In 1968 the Tribe adopted a revised Constitution giving its
Tribal Council authority, subject to approval by the Secretary of the Interior, "to impose taxes and fees on non-members of the tribe doing business on the reservation." 14 Eight
years later, the Tribal Council enacted an Oil and Gas Severance Tax Ordinance, which was approved by the Secretary of
the Interior. The Tribal Ordinance provides that a severance tax "is imposed on any oil and natural gas severed,
saved and removed from Tribal lands .... " App. 38. The
rate of the tax is $. 05 per million BTU of gas produced on the
reservation and sold or transported off the reservation and
$0.29 per barrel of crude or condensate produced on the reservation and sold or transported off the reservation. App.
39. Royalty gas or oil taken by the Tribe, as well as gas or
oil used by the Tribe, is exempt from the tax. Ibid. Thus
the entire burden of the tax apparently will fall on nonmembers of the Tribe. The tax, if sustained, will produce over $2
million in revenues annually. 15
II

The powers possessed by Indian tribes stem from three
14
App. to Brief for Petitioners in No. 80--15, at 12a-13a. An earlier
Constitution adopted in 1960 contained a similar provision permitting
"taxes and fees on persons doing business on the reservation. " See 1960
Constitution of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe, Art. VI, § 5, Defendant's Exhibit A.
15
See District Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Finding
No. 32, App. 130. The Tribe's answers to interrogatories indicate that in
1976 the royalties on the leases received by the Tribe amounted to
$3,995,469.69. See Plaintiff's Exhibit E, p. 7; Tr. 269.
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sources: federal statutes, treaties, and the tribe's inherent
sovereignty. Neither the Tribe nor the Federal Government seeks to justify the Jicarilla Tribe's severance tax on
the basis of any federal statute, 16 and the Jicarilla Apaches,
who reside on an Executive Order reservation, executed no
treaty with the United States from which they derive sovereign powers. Therefore, if the severance tax is valid, it
must be as an exercise of the Tribe's inherent sovereignty.
Tribal sovereignty is neither derived from nor protected by
the Constitution. 17 Indian tribes have, however, retained
many of the powers of self-government that they possessed
at the time of their incorporation into the United States. As
stated by Justice M'Lean in Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515,
580 (concurring opinion):
"At no time has the sovereignty of the country been recognized as existing in the Indians, but they have been always admitted to possess many of the attributes to sovereignty.
All the rights which belong to self
government have been recognized as vested in them."
Similarly, the Court in United States v. Kagama, 118 U. S.
375, 381-382, stated:
"[The Indians] were, and always have been, regarded as
16
Congress may delegate "sovereign" powers to the tribes. See
Mazurie v. United States, 419 U. S. 544. As indicated, however, neither
the 1927 statute permitting Indians to receive royalties from the lease of
tribal lands nor the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 conveys authority to
the Indian tribes to tax. See pp. 5-7, supra.
" The only reference to Indian tribes in the Constitution is in Art. I,
§ 8(3), which provides that "[t]he Congress shall have the Power to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian tribes." More significant than this reference to Indian
tribes is the absence of any mention of the tribes in the Tenth Amendment,
which provides:
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people. "
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having a semi-independent position when they preserved
their tribal relations; not as States, not as nations, not as
possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty, but as a
separate people, with the power of regulating their internal and social relations, and thus far not brought under the laws of the Union or of the State within whose
limits they resided."
Two distinct principles emerge from these early statements
of tribal sovereignty: that Indian tribes possess broad powers
of self-governance over tribal members, but that tribes do
not possess the same attributes of sovereignty that the Federal Government and the several States enjoy. 18 In determining the extent of the sovereign powers that the tribes retained in submitting to the authority of the United States,
this Court has recognized a fundamental distinction between
the right of the tribes to govern their own internal affairs and
18
The Indian tribes often have been described as "domestic dependent
nations." The term was first used in The Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5
Pet. 1, where Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, explained:
"Though the Indians are acknowledged to have an unquestionable, and,
heretofore, unquestioned right to the lands they occupy, until that right
shall be extinguished by a voluntary cessation to our government; yet, it
may well be doubted whether those tribes which reside within the acknowledged boundaries of the United States can, with strict accuracy, be denominated foreign nations. They may, more correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent nations. They occupy a territory to which we
assert a title independent of their will, which must take effect in point of
possession when their right of possession ceases. Meanwhile they are in a
state of pupilage. Their relation to the United States resembles that of a
ward to his guardian." Id. , at 17.
The United States retains plenary authority to divest the tribes of any
attributes of sovereignty. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U. S. 313,
319; Winton v. Amos, 255 U. S. 373, 391-392; Lone Wolfv. Hitchcock, 187
U. S. 553, 565; 1 American Indian Policy Review Commission, Final Report, 106-107 (1977) (hereinafter AIPRC Final Report). Thus, for example, Congress can waive the tribes' sovereign immunity. See United
States v. Fidelity, 309 U. S. 506, 512.
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the right to exercise powers affecting nonmembers of the
tribe.
The Court has been careful to protect the tribes from interference with tribal control over their own members. The
Court has recognized that tribes have the power to prosecute
members for violations of tribal criminal law, and that this
power is an inherent attribute of tribal sovereignty. United
States v. Wheeler, 435 U. S. 313. The tribes also retain the
power to create substantive law governing internal tribal affairs. Tribes may define rules of membership, and thus determine who is entitled to the benefits of tribal citizenship,
Roffv. Burney, 168 U. S. 218; establish rules of inheritance,
which supercede applicable state law, Jones v. Meehan, 175
U. S. 1, 29; and determine rights to custody of a child of divorced parents of the tribe, and thus pre-empt adoption proceedings brought in state court. Fisher v. District Court,
424 U. S. 382. This substantive tribal law may be enforced
in tribal courts. Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217; Fisher v.
District Court, supra.
In many respects, the Indian tribes' sovereignty over their
own members is significantly greater than the States' powers
over their own citizens. Tribes may enforce discriminatory
rules that would be intolerable in a non-Indian community.
The equal protection components of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, which limit federal or state authority, do not
similarly limit tribal power. See Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56, and n. 7. 19 The criminal jurisdiction of the tribes over their own members is similarly unconstrained by constitutional limitations applicable to the States
'

9

The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 77, 25 U. S. C.

§§ 1301-1303, prohibits Indian tribes from denying "to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of its law." !d., § 1302(8). In Santa

Clara Pueblo, however, the Court held that sovereign immunity protected
a tribe from suit under the Act, that the Act did not create a private cause
of action cognizable in federal court, and that a tribal court was the appropriate forum for vindication of rights created by the Act.
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and the Federal Government. 20 Thus the use of the word
"sovereign" to characterize tribal powers of self-government
is surely appropriate.
In sharp contrast to the tribes' broad powers over their
own members, tribal powers over nonmembers have always
been narrowly confined. 21 The Court has emphasized that
"exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect
tribal self-government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes, and so
cannot survive without express Congressional delegation."
Montana v. United States, - - U. S. - - , - - . In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U. S. 191, the Court
held that tribes have no criminal jurisdiction over crimes
committed by nonmembers within the reservations. 22 In
Montana v. United States, supra, the Court held that the
Crow tribe could not prohibit hunting and fishing by nonmembers on reservation land no longer owned by the Tribe,
and indicated that the principle underlying Oliphant-that
In Talton v. Mayes, 163 U. S. 376, the Court held that the Fifth
Amendment right to indictment by grand jury does not apply to prosecutions in tribal courts. See also United States v. Wheeler, 435 U. S., at
328--329.
21
Certain treaties that specifically granted the right of self government
to the tribes also specifically excluded jurisdiction over nonmembers.
See, e. g., Treaty with the Cherokees, art. 5, 7 Stat. 478 (1835); Treaty
with the Choctaws and Chickasaws, art. 7, 11 Stat. 611 (1855); Treaty with
the Creeks and Seminoles, art. 15, 11 Stat. 699 (1856).
22
In support of that holding, the Court stated:
"Upon incorportion into the territory of the United States, the Indian
tribes thereby come under the territorial sovereignty of the United States
and their exercise of separate power is constrained so as not to conflict
with the interests of this overriding sovereignty. '[T]heir rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, [are] necessarily diminished.'
Johnson v. M'Intosh, 8 Wheat. 543, 574 (1823)."
See also New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U. S. 496, 499 (state court
has jurisdiction to try a non-Indian for a crime committed against a nonIndian on a reservation).
21)
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tribes possess limited power over nonmembers-was applicable in a civil as well as a criminal context. As stated by
the Court, "[t]hough Oliphant only determined inherent
tribal authority in criminal matters, the principles on which it
relied support the general proposition that the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of non-members of the tribe." Montana v. United
States,-- U. 8., at-- (footnote omitted). 23
The tribes' authority to enact legislation affecting nonmembers is therefore of a different character than their broad
power to control internal tribal affairs. This difference is
23
Preceding this statement the Court noted that "the Court [in Oliphant] quoted Justice Johnson's words in his concurrence in Fletcher v.
Peck, 6 Cranch 87-the first Indian case to reach this Court-that the Indian tribes have lost 'any right to governing every person within their limits except themselves.' I d., at 147, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,
supra, 435 U. S., at 209." Montana v. United States,-- U. S., at--.
See also Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (tribes
cannot freely alienate to non-Indians the land they occupy); The Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, supra, 5 Pet., at 17-18 (tribes cannot enter into direct
commercial or foreign relations with other nations).
In Wheeler v. United States, supra, the Court held that the tribes' power
to prosecute its members for tribal offenses was not "implicitly lost by virtue of their dependent status," but stated:
"The areas in which such implicit divestiture of sovereignty has been held
to have occurred are those involving the relations between an Indian tribe
and nonmembers of the tribe.

"These limitations rest on the fact that the dependent status of Indian
tribes within our territorial jurisdiction is necessarily inconsistent with
their freedom independently to determine their external relations. But
the powers of self-government, including the power to prescribe and enforce internal criminal laws, are of a different type. They involve only the
relations among members of a tribe. Thus, they are not such powers as
would necessarily be lost by virtue of a tribe's dependent status. '[T]he
settled doctrine of the law of nations is, that a weaker power does not surrender its independence-its right to self government, by associating with
a stronger, and taking its protection.' Worcester v. Georgia [6 Pet.], at
560-561.'' 435 U. S., at 326.
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consistent with the fundamental principle that "[i]n this N ation each sovereign governs only with the consent of the governed." Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S. 410, 426. Since nonmembers are excluded from participation in tribal
government, the powers that may be exercised over them
are appropriately limited. Certainly, tribal authority over
nonmembers--including the power to tax-is not unprecedented. An examination of cases that have upheld this
power, however, demonstrates that the power to impose
such a tax derives solely from the tribes' power to exclude
nonmembers entirely from territory that has been reserved
for the tribe. This "power to exclude" logically has been
held to include the lesser power to attach conditions on a
right of entry granted by the tribe to a nonmember to engage
in particular activities within the reservation.

III
A study of the source of the tribes' power to tax nonmembers must focus on the extent of the tribal power to tax that
existed in 1934, when the Indian Reorganization Act was enacted to prevent further erosion of Indian sovereign powers. 24
The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 confirmed but did not enlarge
the inherent sovereign powers of the Indian tribes. Congress intended
the Act to "stabilize the tribal organization of Indian tribes by vesting such
tribal organizations with real, though limited, authority.... " S. Rep.
No. 1080, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934). As one commentator interpreted
§ 16 of the Act:
"[l]t would appear that powers originally held by tribes that were recognized and allowed to be retained by treaties or prior statutes, as well as
any additional powers conferred in the same manner, would be retained by
tribes that accepted the terms of the 1934 Act. . . . The provision is consistent with the act's purpose of enhancing tribal government in that it recognized and reconfirmed those powers a tribe may already have had as a
government. " Mettler, A Unified Theory of Indian Tribal Sovereignty, 30
Hastings L. Rev. 89, 97 (1978).
Moreover, although the power given by the Reorganization Act to the Secretary of the Interior to approve or disapprove of the exercise of tribal
24
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Shortly after the Act was passed, the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior issued a formal opinion setting forth his
understanding of the powers that might be secured by an Indian tribe and incorporated in its constitution by virtue of the
reference in the Reorganization Act to powers vested in an
Indian .tribe "by existing law." 25 Solicitor Margold conpowers places a limit on tribal sovereignty, that power does not enable the
Secretary to add to the inherent powers that a tribe possessed before the
Act was passed.
On the other hand, the fact that an Indian tribe may never have had the
occasion to exercise a particular power over nonmembers in its early history is not a sufficient reason to deny the existence of that power. Accordingly, the fact that there is no evidence that the Jicarilla Apache Tribe
ever imposed a tax of any kind on a nonmember does not require the conclusion that it has no such taxing power. To the extent that the power to
tax was an attribute of sovereignty possessed by Indian tribes when the
Reorganization Act was passed, Congress intended the statute to preserve
those powers for all Indian tribes that adopted a formal organization under
the Act.
25
55 I. D. 14. Solicitor Margold described the scope of this opinion as
folows:
"My opinion has been requested on the question of what powers may be
secured to an Indian tribe and incorporated in its constitution and by-laws
by virtue of the following phrase, contained in section 16 of the WheelerHoward Act (48 Stat. 984, 987) [the Reorganization Act of 1934]:
'In addition to all powers vested in any Indian tribe or tribal council by
existing law, the constitution adopted by said tribe shall also vest....
[Italics added.]'
"The question of what powers are vested in an Indian tribe or tribal
council by existing law cannot be answered in detail for each Indian tribe
without reference to hundreds of special treaties and special acts of Congress. It is possible, however, on the basis of the reported cases, the
written opinions of the various executive departments, and those statutes
of Congress which are of general import, to define the powers which have
heretofore been recognized as lawfully within the jurisdiction of an Indian
tribe. My answer to the propounded question, then, will be general, and
subject to correction for particular tribes in the light of the treaties and
statutes affecting such tribe wherever such treaties or statutes contain peculiar provisions restricting or enlarging the general authority of an Indian
tribe." Id. , at 17-18.
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eluded that among those powers was a power of taxation; his
opinion described the permissible exercise of that power:
"Except where Congress has provided otherwise, this
power may be exercised over members of the tribe and
over nonmembers, so far as such nonmembers may accept privileges of trade, residence, etc., to which taxes
may be attached as conditions." 55 I. D. 14, 46.
Solicitor Margold cited three decisions in support of this opinion. These three cases, Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947 (CA8
1905), app. dismissed, 203 U. S. 599; Morris v. Hitchcock ,
194 U. S. 384; and Maxey v. Wright, 3 Ind. T. 243, 54 S. W.
807 (Ct. App. Ind. T.), aff'd, 105 F. 1003 (CAB 1900), were
decided shortly after the turn of the century and are the
three leading cases considering the power of an Indian tribe
to assess taxes against nonmembers. 2li The three cases are
similar in result and in their reasoning. In each the court
upheld the tax; in each the court relied on the Tribe's power
to exclude non-Indians from its reservation and concluded
that the Tribe could condition entry or continued presence
within the reservation on the payment of a license fee or tax;
and in each the court assumed that the ultimate remedy for
nonpayment of the tax would be exclusion from the
reservation.
In the first of these cases, Maxey v. Wright , 54 S. W. 807
(1900), the Court of Appeals of Indian Territory affirmed an
order by a federal territorial court dismissing a complaint
filed by non-Indian lawyers practicing in the Creek Nation.
The complaint sought to enjoin the Indian agent for the Five
Civilized Tribes from collecting an annual occupation tax of
$25 assessed on each non-Indian lawyer residing and practic2<1 Felix Cohen, in his Handbook on Federal Indian Law published in
1942, also relies on these cases in his discussion of tribal taxation of nonmembers. Cohen 266-267. The Court in Washington v. Confederated
Tribes of the Colville R eservation, 447 U. S. 134, cited both Buster v.
Wright and Morris v. Hitchcock in upholding an exercise of the tribal
power to tax. 447 U. S., at 153. Seep. 27, infra.
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ing his profession on the reservation. In rejecting the attorneys' claim, the Court of Appeals first analyzed the relevant
treaties between the United States and the Creeks and noted
that the Indians had "carefully guarded their sovereignty,
and their right to admit, and consequently to exclude, all
white persons, except such as are named in the Treaty."
Id., at 809. The court noted that the United States had
agreed that all persons who were not expressly excepted and
were present in the Creek Nation "without the consent of
that Nation [were] deemed to be intruders," and that the
Government had "pledge[d] itself to remove them." Ibid.
Because attorneys were not within any excepted class, 27 the
court concluded that the Tribe had the authority to require
them either to pay the license fee or to be removed as "intruders." 28 The Court held:
"Attorneys practicing in the United States courts are not persons who
come within the exceptions, for they are not 'in the employment of the government of the United States,' or 'persons peaceably traveling or temporarily sojourning in the country, or trading therein under license from the
proper authority of the United States.'" 54 S. W., at 809.
28
In reaching this conclusion the court relied heavily on two opinions of
the Attorney General of the United States. In the first opinion, issued in
1881, Attorney General McVeagh supported the validity of Indian permit
laws that determined which persons would be permitted to reside on the
Choctaw and Chickasaw reservations. 17 Op. Atty. Gen. 134. In his discussion of the right of non-Indians to enter and remain on tribal lands,
MeV eagh stated:
"Replying to your fourth question: it seems from what has been already
said that, besides those persons or classes mentioned by you, only those
who have been permitted by the Choctaws or Chickasaws to reside within
their limits, or to be employed by their citizens as teachers, mechanics, or
skilled agriculturists, have a right to enter and remain on the lands of these
tribes; and the right to remain is gone when the permit has expired." ld.,
at 136 (emphasis added).
In a second opinion on the same subject, Attorney General Phillips
stated in 1884 that, in the absence of a treaty or statute, the power of an
Indian tribe "to regulate its own rights of occupancy, and to say who shall
participate therein and upon what conditions, can not be doubted." 18 Op.
27
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"[T]he Creek nation had the power to impose this condition or occupation tax, if it may be so called, upon attorneys at law (white men) residing and practicing their
profession in the Indian Territory. And inasmuch as
the government of the United States, in the treaty, had
declared that all persons not authorized by its terms to
reside in the Creek Nation should be deemed to be intruders, and had obligated itself to remove all such persons from the Creek Nation, the remedy to enforce this
provision of the treaty was a removal by the United
States from the Creek Nation of the delinquent as an intruder." Id., at 809-810. 29
Atty. Gen. 34, 36. Although the treaties applicable to the Choctaw and
Chickasaw tribes specifically excepted from the grant of self-government
the power over nonmembers, the Attorney General did not construe this
provision to limit the Tribes' power to exclude:
"I submit that whatever this may mean it does not limit the right of
these tribes to pass upon the question, who (of persons indifferent to the
United States, i. e., neither employees, nor objectionable) shall share their
occupancy and upon what terms. That is a question which all private persons are allowed to decide for themselves; ... " !d., at 37.
29
In other parts of its opinion, the court restated the propositions that
the Tribe was "clothed with the power to admit white men, or not, at its
option, which as we hold, gave it the right to impose conditions," 54 S.W.,
at 811, and that a lawyer who refused to pay for the privilege of remaining
would become an "intruder'':
"On the whole case we therefore hold that a lawyer who is a white man,
and not a citizen of the Creek Nation, is, pursuant to their statute, required to pay for the privilege of remaining and practicing his profession in
that nation the sum of $25; that, if he refuse the payment thereof, he becomes, by virtue of the treaty, an intruder, and that in such a case the government of the United States may remove him from the nation; and that
this duty devolves upon the interior department. Whether the interior
department or its Indian agents can be controlled by the courts by the
writs of mandamus and injunction is not material in this case, because, as
we hold, an attorney who refuses to pay the amount required by the statute by its very terms becomes an intruder, whom the Unites States promises by the terms of the treaty to remove, and therefore in such cases the
officers and agents of the interior department would be acting clearly and
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Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U. S. 384, decided by this Court
in 1904, also arose from a challenge to an enactment of one of
the Five Civilized Tribes that required non-Indians to pay
annual permit fees. The complainants owned cattle and
horses that were grazing on land in the Chickasaw Nation
pursuant to contracts with individual members of the Tribe.
Complainants filed suit in the District of Columbia seeking an
injunction preventing federal officials from removing their
cattle and horses from the Indian Territory for failure to pay
the permit fees assessed by the Tribe. An order dismissing
the complaint was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia and by this Court.
This Court's opinion first noted that treaties between the
United States and the Chickasaw Nation had granted the
Tribe the right "to control the presence within the territory
assigned to it of persons who might otherwise be regarded as
intruders," 30 and that the United States had assumed the obligation of protecting the Indians from aggression by persons
not subject to their jurisdiction. 194 U. S., at 389. The
Court then reviewed similar legislation that had been
adopted by the Chickasaw Nation in 1876, 31 and noted that in
1879 the Senate Committee on the Judiciary had specifically
referred to the 1876 legislation and expressed an opinion that
it was valid. I d., at 38~390.
The Court also reviewed two opinions of the Attorney Genproperly within the scope of their powers." I d., at 812.
30
The Court stated:
"And it is not disputed that, under the authority of these treaties, the
Chickasaw Nation has exercised the power to attach conditions to the presence within its borders of persons who might otherwise not be entitled to
remain within the tribal territory." 194 U. S., at 389.
31
The 1876 legislation required licensed merchants and traders to obtain
a permit and pay a fee of $25.
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eral that had concluded that the power of the Chickasaw to
impose permit fees had not been withdrawn by Congress. 32
Although Congress subsequently had created an express exception in favor of owners of town lots and thus protected
them from eviction as intruders, the Court noted that no
comparable protection had been given to owners of cattle and
horses. 194 U. S., at 392-393. On the basis of these authorities, the Court concluded that the Chickasaw legislation
imposing grazing fees was valid.
In the third case, Buster v. Wright, 135 Fed. 947 (CA8
1905), nonmembers of the Creek Nation brought suit against
federal inspectors to enjoin them from stopping the plaintiffs
from doing business within the reservation; the nonmembers
feared such action because they had refused to pay a permit
32
The Court relied on 23 Op. Atty. Gen. 214 (1900) and 23 Op. Atty.
Gen. 528 (1910). In the first opinion, Attorney General John W. Griggs
stated:
"The treaties and laws of the United States make all persons, with a few
specified exceptions, who are not citizens of an Indian nation or members of
an Indian tribe, and are found within an Indian nation without permission,
intruders there, and require their removal by the United States. This
closes the whole matter, absolutely excludes all but the excepted classes,
and fully authorizes these nations to absolutely exclude outsiders, or to
permit their residence or business upon such terms as they may choose to
impose, and it must be borne in mind that citizens of the United States,
have, as such, no more right or business to be there than they have in any
foreign nation, and can lawfully be there at all only by Indian permission;
and that their right to be or remain or carry on business there depends
solely upon whether they have such permission.
"As to the power or duty of your Department in the premises there can
hardly be a doubt. Under the treaties of the United States with these Indian nations this Government is under the most solemn obligation, and for
which it has received ample consideration, to remove and keep removed
from the territory of these tribes, all this class of intruders who are there
without Indian permission. The performance of this obligation, as in other
matters concerning the Indians and their affairs, has long been devolved
upon the Department of the Interior." 23 Op. Atty. Gen., at 218.
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of the Attorneys General, and the practice of years place
beyond debate the propositions that prior to March 1,
1901, the Creek Nation had lawful authority to require
the payment of this tax as a condition precedent to the
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that agreement as an implied divestiture of a preexisting
power to tax. 33 The court held that even though noncitizens
of the Tribe had acquired lawful ownership of lots pursuant to
the 1901 agreement and could not be evicted from those lots,
they had no right to conduct business within the reservation
without paying the permit taxes. 34
Prior to the enactment of the Indian Reorganization Act in
1934, these three cases were the only judicial decisions con33
After citing the opinion of Attorney General Griggs quoted at length in
Morris v. Hitchcock, Judge Sanborn wrote:
"Pursuant to this decision the civilized tribes were charging, and the Indian agent was collecting, taxes from noncitizens engaged in business in
these nations. It was under this state of facts that the United States and
the Creek Nation made the agreement of 1901. Did they intend by that
agreement that the Creek Nation should thereby renounce its conceded
power to exact these permit taxes? Both parties knew that this power
existed, and the United States, by the act of its President approving the
law of the Creek national council, and the Secretary of the Interior by enforcing it, had approved its exercise. The subject of these taxes was presented to the minds of the contracting parties and was considered during
the negotiation of the agreement, for that contract contains express stipulations that cattle grazed on rented allotments shall not be liable to any
tribal tax (chapter 676, 31 Stat. 871, § 37), and that 'no noncitizen renting
lands from a citizen for agricultural purposes as provided by law, whether
such lands have been selected as an allotment or not, shall be required to
pay any permit tax' (chapter 676, 31 Stat. 871, § 39). But they made no
provision that noncitizens who engaged in the mercantile business in the
Creek Nation should be exempt from these taxes. As the law then in
force required such noncitizens to pay such taxes, as both parties were
then aware of that fact and considered the question, and as they made no
stipulation to abolish these taxes, the conclusive presumption is that they
intended to make no such contract, and that the power of the Creek Nation
to exact these taxes, and the authority of the Secretary of the Interior and
of his subordinates to collect them, were neither renounced, revoked, nor
restricted, but that they remained in full force and effect after as before
the agreement of 1901." 135 F., at 954.
34
135 F., at 954. The court stated:
"The legal effect ... of the law prescribing the permit taxes is to prohibit
noncitizens from conducting business within the Creek Nation without the
payment of these taxes." !d., at 955.
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sidering the power of an Indian tribe to impose a tax on nonmembers. 35 These cases demonstrate that the power of an
Indian tribe to impose a tax solely on nonmembers doing
business on the reservation derives from the tribe's power to
exclude those persons entirely from tribal lands or, in the alternative, to impose lesser restrictions and conditions on a
right of entry granted to conduct business on the reservation. 36 This interpretation is supported by the fact that the
36
Two decades after the Reorganization Act was passed the problem was
revisited by the Eighth Circuit. In Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe of
Pine Ridge Reservation, 231 F. 2d 89 (CA8 1956), the court held that the
tribe had the power to assess a tax on a nonmember lessee of land within
the reservation for the privilege of grazing stock on reservation land. And
in Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge Reservation, 259 F. 2d 553
(CA8 1958), the court held that the United States could bring an action on
behalf of the tribe to collect a license tax of three cents per acre per annum
for grazing land and fifteen cents per acre per annum for farm land levied
on nonmember lessess. The court in Barta held that" the tax did not violate the constitutional rights of the nonmember lessees, stating in part:
"The tribe by provisions of its treaty with the United States has power to
provide for the admission of nonmembers of the tribe onto the reservation.
Having such power, it has the authority to impose restrictions on the presence of nonmembers within the reservation." 259 F. 2d, at 556.
Language in both Iron Crow and Barta suggests that the Court of Appeals,
unlike the earlier courts, may not have rested the taxing power solely on
the power to exclude. The Court of Appeals of course did not have the
benefit of our decisions in Oliphant, Wheeler, and Montana v. United
States.
36
In the chapter of his treatise entitled "Taxation," Felix Cohen states:
"Though the scope of the power [to tax] as applied to nonmembers is not
clear, it extends at least to property of nonmembers used in connection
with Indian property as well as to privileges enjoyed by nonmembers in
trading with the Indians. The power to tax nonmembers is derived in the
cases from the authority, founded on original sovereignty and guaranteed
in some instances by treaties, to remove property of nonmembers from the
territorial limits of the tribe. Since the tribal government has the power
to exclude, it can extract a fee from nonmembers as a condition precedent
to granting permission to remain or to operate within the tribal domain."
Cohen 26&-267 (footnotes omitted).
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remedy for the non-payment of the tax in all three cases was
exclusion from the reservation. 37
As I have noted, a limitation on the power of Indian tribes
to tax nonmembers is not simply an archaic concept derived
from three old cases that has no basis in logic or equity.
Tribal powers over nonmembers are appropriately limited
because nonmembers are foreclosed from participation in
tribal government. If the power to tax is limited to situations in which the tribe has the power to exclude, then the
nonmember is subjected to the tribe's jurisdiction only if he
knowingly accepts the conditions of entry imposed by the
tribe. 38 The limited source of the power to tax nonmemIn another chapter, entitled "The Scope of Tribal Self-Government,"
cited by the Secretary of the Interior and the Tribe here, Cohen describes
the power of taxation as "an inherent attribute of tribal sovereignty which
con tines unless withdrawn or limited by treaty or by act of Congress .... "
!d. , at 142. After d1scussing Buster v. Wright , Cohen cites that case for
the proposition that "[t]he power to tax does not depend upon the power to
remove and has been upheld where there was no power in the tribe to remove the taxpayer from the tribal jurisdiction." !d., at 143. As demonstrated above, however, the license tax in Buster was predicated on the
tribe's right to attach conditions on the right of nonmembers to conduct
business on the reservation; the tribe could prevent such nonmembers
from doing business regardless of whether it could physically remove them
from the reservation. Moreover, in that same chapter on tribal self-government, Cohen recognizes that tribal taxes have been upheld on the basis
of the tribe's power to remove nonmembers from the reservation, and that
"[i]t is therefore pertinent, in analyzing the scope of tribal taxing powers,
to inquire how far an Indian tribe is empowered to remove nonmembers
from its reservation." Ibid.
The American Indian Policy Review Commission recognized that the
court decisions upholding the tribes' taxing powers "rely largely upon the
power of tribes to remove persons from the reservation, and consequently,
to prescribe the conditions upon which they shall enter," but argued for a
broader source of the right to tax. AIPRC Final Report 178-179.
37
In Buster v. Wright, the penalty for nonpayment of the tax was the
closing of the nonmember's business, enforced by the Secretary of the Interior. 135 F., at 954. In Morris v. Hitchcock, the remedy was the removal of the nonmember's cattle from the reservation, again enforced by
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hers-the power to exclude intruders-is thus consistent
with this Court's recognition of the limited character of the
power of Indian tribes over nonmembers in general. 39 The
proper source of the taxing authority asserted by the Jicarilla
Apache Tribe in this case, therefore, is not the Tribe's inherent power of self-government, but rather its power over the
territory that has been set apart for its use and occupation. 40
the United States. 194 U. S., at 392. In Maxey v. Wright, an attorney
refusing to pay the license fee to the Interior Department was subject to
removal from the reservation. 54 S. W., at 810.
38
"No noncitizen is required to exercise a privilege or to pay the tax.
He may refrain from the one and he remains free from liability for the
other." Buster v. Wright, 135 F., at 949.
39
See pp. 13-14, supra. As I have indicated, seen. 21, supra, treaties
recognizing the inherent power of tribal self-government have also deprived the tribes of jurisdiction over nonmembers. Nevertheless, those
same treaties often specifically recognized the right of the tribe to exclude
nonmembers from the reservation or to attach conditions on their entry.
See e. g., Treaty with the Choctaw and Chickasaw, art. 7, 11 Stat. 611
(1855); Treaty with the Creeks, art. 15, 11 Stat. 699 (1855). See II C.
Kappler, Indian Affairs Laws and Treaties 7, 9, 12, 15, 17, 20, 21, 27, 30,
42, 75, 418, 682, 699, 703, 719, 761, 774, 779, 790, 794, 800, 866, 886, 888,
929, 985, 990, 998, 1008, 1016, 1021 (1904) .
.w The various tribes may have taken a similar view of their power to tax
at the time of the Indian Reorganization Act. Cohen's treatise notes:
"The power of an Indian tribe to levy taxes upon its own members and
upon nonmembers doing business within the reservations has been affirmed in many tribal constitutions approved under the Wheeler-Howard
Act [Indian Reorganiztion Act], as has the power to remove nonmembers
from land over which the tribe exercises jurisdiction." Cohen 143.
The following clause from the 1935 Constitution of the Rosebud Sioux
Tribe, which Cohen cites as a "typical" statement of such "tribal powers,"
indicates that the tribe perceived the scope of its taxation powers over nonmembers to be narrower than the scope of that power over members. The
Constitution conveys tribal power"(h) To levy taxes upon members of the tribe and to require the performance of reservation labor in lieu thereof, and to levy taxes or license fees,
subject to review by the Secretary of the Interior, upon nonmembers doing
business within the reservation.
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This conclusion is consistent with our recent decision in
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 44 7 U. S. 134. In that case we held that a tribal tax on
cigarettes sold on the reservations of the Colville, Makah and
Lummi tribes to nonmembers of the tribes was a permissible
exercise of the tribes' retained sovereign power to tax. 41 We
recognized that the power to tax non-Indians entering the
reservation had not been divested by virtue of the tribes' dependent status and that no overriding federal interest would
be frustrated by the tribal taxation. The Court quoted with
approval, as an indication of the Executive Branch's understanding of the taxing power, Solicitor Margold's 1934 opinion. The Court noted further that "[fJederal courts also have
acknowledged tribal power to tax non-Indians entering the
reservation to engage in economic activity" and cited Buster
v. Wright and Morris v. Hitchcock. 447 U. S., at 153. 42
The tax in Colville, which was applied to nonmembers who
entered the reservation and sought to purchase cigarettes, is
clearly valid under the rationale that the tribes' power to tax
derives from the right to exclude nonmembers from the reservation and the lesser right to attach conditions on the entry
of such nonmembers seeking to do business there. 43 Colville
thus supports the principles set forth above. The power of
"(i) To exclude from the restricted lands on the reservation persons not
legally entitled to reside therein, under ordinances which shall be subject
to review by the Secretary of the Interior." Ibid.
" The Court stated:
"The power to tax transactions occurring on trust lands and significantly
involving a tribe or its members is a fundamental attribute of sovereignty
which the tribes retain unless divested of it by federal law or necessary
implication of their dependent status." 447 U. S., at 152.
42
The Court also cited, without discussion, the Eighth Circuit's decision
in Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, supra, n. 35.
43
A nonmember can avoid the tax by declining to do business on the reservation; the "sanction" imposed for refusal to pay the tax is denial of permission to buy cigarettes.
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Indian tribes to tax nonmembers stems from the tribes'
power to exclude those nonmembers; any exercise of this
power must be consistent with its source.
In some respects the tribal power to tax nonmembers is
greater than the taxing power of other sovereigns. States
do not have any power to exclude nonresidents from their
borders. Moreover, their taxing statutes, like their other
laws, must comply with the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. They may not, therefore, impose
discriminatory taxes as a condition attached to entry into the
jurisdiction in order to engage in economic activity. But
since an Indian tribe has exclusive control over the "use and
occupancy'' of land within its reservation, it may attach special discriminatory conditions to any license to a nonmember
to use or occupy a portion of that land. Specifically, a power
to tax that is derived from the power to exclude necessarily
encompasses a power to impose discriminatory taxes as conditions attached to entry or· attached to the exercise of privileges within the Reservation.
IV
The power to exclude petitioners would have supported the
imposition of a discriminatory tribal tax on petitioners when
they sought to enter the Jicarilla Apache Reservation to explore for minerals. Moreover, even if no tax had been imposed at the time of initial entry, a discriminatory severance
tax could have been imposed as a condition attached to the
grant of the privilege of extracting minerals from the earth. 44
But the Tribe did not impose any tax prior to petitioners' entry or as a condition attached to the privileges granted by the
leases in 1953. As a result, the tax imposed in 1976 is not
valid unless the Tribe retained in the leases the power either
to exclude petitioners from the reservation or to prohibit
"" "[A]s the payment of a tax or license fee may be made a condition of
entry upon tribal land, it may also be made a condition to the grant of other
privileges, such as the acquisition of a tribal lease." Cohen 143.
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them from continuing to extract oil and gas from reservation
lands.
The leases executed by the Tribe and petitioners are
clearly valid and binding on both parties. The Tribe does
not contend that the leases were not the product of arms
length bargaining. Moreover, the leases were executed on a
form prepared by the Department of the Interior, the Department gave specific approval to the terms of the leases,
and they were executed pursuant to explicit congressional
authority. 45 Under the leases petitioners clearly have the
Congress intended the Act of March 3, 1927 to make applicable to Executive Order reservations the leasing provisions already applicable to
treaty reservations pursuant to the Act of May 29, 1924, 43 Stat. 244. S.
Rep. No. 1240, 69th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1927). The Act of 1927 thus permitted the leasing of unallotted Indian land for terms not to exceed 10
years and as much longer as oil and gas in paying quantities were found on
~he land. 44 Stat. 1347. Among the purposes of the 1927 statute were to
"[p]ermit the exploration for oil and gas on Executive-order Indian Reservations," to "[g]ive the Indian tribes all the oil and gas royalties ," and to
"[p]lace with Congress the future determination of any changes of boundaries of Executive-order reservations or withdrawals." Ibid. In light of
these purposes, it is clear that Congress intended leases executed pursuant
to the 1927 Act to be binding.
The Tribe contends that the leases in this case were executed pursuant
to the Act of May 11, 1938, 52 Stat. 347, and not the 1927 Act. The Tribe
notes that the lease in No. 80-15 states that it was executed pursuant to
the 1938 Act. See App. 64. In response , petitioners note that, although
the Tribe argues that the 1938 Act-unlike the 1927 Act-does not require
that royalties be paid to the Secretary of the Interior for the benefit of the
Tribe, petitioners make their royalty payments to the United States Geological Survey for the benefit of the Jicarilla Apache. See Tr. 79-80.
There is no need to resolve this question, because for our purposes the provisions of the 1938 Act do not vary significantly from the provisions of the
1927 Act. The 1938 Act, like the 1927 Act, permits the leasing of Indian
lands for a period "not to exceed 10 years and as long thereafter as minerals are produced in paying quantities. " 25 U. S. C. § 396c. One of the
purposes of the 1938 Act was to establish uniformity in the leasing of tribal
lands by applying the law governing oil and gas leasing to all other mineral
leasing as well. S. Rep. No. 985, 75th Cong. , 1st Sess. 1-2 (1937). Other
purposes were to "bring all leasing matters in harmony with the Indian Re46
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right to remain on the reservation to do business for the duration of the contracts. 46
There is no basis for a claim that exercise of the mining
rights granted by the leases was subject to an additional, unstated condition concerning the payment of severance taxes. 47
At the time the leases contained in the record were executed,
the Jicarilla Apache Constitution contained no taxing authorization whatever; the severance tax ordinance was not enacted until many years after all lessees had been granted an
unlimited right to extract oil and gas from the reservation.
In addition, the written leases unambiguously stated:
"[N]o regulation hereafter approved shall effect a change
in rate or royalty or annual rental herein specified withorganization Act," id., at 3, and to enact changes designed "to give the Indians the greatest return from their property." ld., at 2. There is no
indication in the legislative history that the purposes of the 1938 Act are in
any way inconsistent with the purposes of the 1927 Act and prior legislation. Presumably the purposes of the earlier legislation were incorporated
into the uniform scheme intended by the 1938 Act.
,..; As Attorney General McVeagh stated in 1881, only those permitted by
the tribe to remain on the reservation may do so, "and the right to remain
is gone when the permit has expired." 17 Op. Atty. Gen., at 136.
47
In Colville, the nonmember desiring to purchase cigarettes on the reservation knew that his right to do so was conditioned on his consent to pay
the tax. Attorney General Griggs, in his 1900 opinion on "Tresspassers on
Indian Land," discussed in similar terms the effect on tribal laws of a federal statute providing for the sale of reservation lots to non-Indians:
"[T]he legal right to purchase land within an Indian nation gives to the purchaser no right of exemption from the laws of such nation, nor does it authorize him to do any act in violation of the treaties with such nation.
These laws requiring a permit to reside or carry on business in the Indian
country existed long before and at the time this act was passed. And if
any outsider saw proper to purchase a town lot under this act of Congress,
he did so with full knowledge that he could occupy it for residence or business only by permission from the Indians." 23 Op. Atty. Gen., at 217.
In 1977, the American Indian Policy Review Commission noted that Indian tribes "do not both tax and receive royalties. Usually they just receive royalties." AIPRC Final Report 344.
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out the written consent of the parties to this lease."
App. 27.
Nor can it be said that notice of an inherent right to tax
could have been gleaned from relevant statutory enactments.
When Congress enacted legislation in 1927 granting the Indians the royalty income from oil and gas leases on reservations
created by Executive Order, it neither authorized nor prohibited the imposition of any taxes by the tribes. Although the
absence of such reference does not indicate that Congress
pre-empted the right of the tribes to impose such a tax, 48 the
lack of any mention of tribal severance taxes defeats the argument that all parties were aware as a matter of law that a
severance tax could be imposed at any time as a condition to
the continued performance of a mineral lease.
Thus, nothing in the leases themselves or in any Act of
Congress conveyed an indication that petitioners could accept
the rights conferred by the leases only by accepting a condition that they pay any subsequently enacted severance tax.
Nor could such a condition be presumed from prior taxing activity of the Tribe. In my opinion it is clear that the parties
negotiated the leases in question with absolutely no expectation that a severance tax could later be imposed; in the
contemplation of the parties, the conditions governing petitioners' right to extract oil and gas were not subject to
change during the terms of the agreements. There simply is
no support for the proposition that the Tribe retained the
power in the leases to impose an additional condition on petitioners' right to enter the reservation and extract oil and gas
from reservation lands. Since that authority was not reThe statute did authorize the collection of severance taxes by the
States. Petitioners have argued that this authorization pre-empted any
tribal power to impose a comparable tax. As recognized by the Court of
Appeals, however, the legislative history indicates that Congress simply
did not consider the question of tribal taxes on mineral output from reservation lands. 617 F. 2d, at 547.
48
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tained, the Tribe does not now have the power to alter unilaterally the terms of the agreement and impose an additional
burden on petitioners' right to do business on the
reservation. 49
In this case, the Tribe seeks to impose a tax on the very
activity that the leases granted petitioners the right to undertake. As Solicitor Margold wrote long ago:
"Over tribal lands, the tribe has the rights of a landowner as well as the rights of a local government, dominion as well as sovereignty. But on all the lands of the
reservation, whether owned by the tribe, by members
thereof, or by outsiders, the tribe has the sovereign
power of determining the conditions upon which persons
shall be permitted to enter its domain, to reside therein,
and to do business, provided only such determination is
consistent with applicable Federal laws and does not infringe any vested rights of persons now occupying reservation land under lawful authority." 55 I. D., at 50
(emphasis added).
Petitioners were granted authority by the Tribe to extract oil
49
The Secretary of the Interior argues that a license or franchise issued
by a governmental body does not prevent the later imposition of a tax unless the right to tax "has been specifically surrendered in terms which admit of no other reasonable interpretation." Brief for United States 13, n.
7 (quoting St. Louis v. United Rys, 210 U. S. 266, 280). See also New
Orleans City & LakeR. R. v. City of New Orleans, 143 U. S. 192, 195;
New York Transit Corp. v. City of New York, 303 U. S. 573, 590-593.
The principal issue in these cases cited by the Secretary was whether the
retroactive imposition of a franchise tax violated the Contract Clause of the
Constitution or was so fundamentally unfair as to constitute a denial of due
process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although this argument was by no means frivolous, cf. Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 315
U. S. 610, no such issue is raised here. These cases are distinguishable
from the instant cases because Indian tribes do not have the same
attributes of sovereignty as do States and their subdivisions. See pp.
!}-.15, supra.

J

80-11 & 80-15-DISSENT
MERRION v. JICARILLA APACHE TRIBE

33

and gas from reservation lands. The Tribe now seeks to
change retroactively the conditions of that authority. These
petitioners happen to be prosperous oil companies. Moreover, it may be sound policy to find additional sources of revenue to better the economic conditions of many Indian tribes.
If this retroactive imposition of a tax on oil companies is permissible, however, an Indian tribe may with equal legitimacy
contract with outsiders for the construction of a school or a
hospital, or for the rendition of medical or technical services,
and then-after the contract is partially performed-change
the terms of the bargain by imposing a gross receipts tax on
the outsider. If the Court is willing to ignore the risk of
such unfair treatment of a local contractor or a local doctor
because the Secretary of the Interior has the power to veto a
tribal tax, it must equate the unbridled discretion of a political appointee with the protection afforded by rules of law.
That equation is unacceptable to me. Neither wealth, political opportunity, nor past transgressions can justify denying
any person the protection of the law.
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R . W HI TE

January 5, 1982

Re:

80-11 - Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe

80-15 - Amoco Production Co. v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe

Dear Thurgood,
Although I
reconsid e red

was with you only in part last term, I

and

now

join

your

proposed

Court.
Sincerely,

Justice Marshall
Copies to the Confere nce
b kh

opinion

for

have
the
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MARSH SALLY-POW

80-11 and 80-15 Jicarilla Apache Cases

Dear Thurgood:
After reviewing your opinion again over the
holidays, I would be happy to join all of it if you could

j 1.

In

U-L-

~r

introduction to Part III, you state

the position of the SG with respect to the Commerce
Clause.

On page 21, you ; : refrain from adopting the SG's

views, but you commence the first full paragraph by
stati ~

0 •while these arguments are not without force • •

"

In my view, the SG's position is highly
doubtful.

In commercial matters, tribes resemble states

2.

more closely than they do foreign nations.

It is

~

unnecessary to imply any approval of the SG's position.
Could you not make it clear that we find it unnecessary to
consider in this case the merits of the SG's arguments?

~ 2.

footnote~23

I have a somewhat similar problem with
(p. 24)

ana

2z:

(~ ,

26).

In the text on p. 24

you state that "petitioners do not challenge the tax on
the ground that the amount of the tax is not fairly
related to the services provided by the tribe".

The first

sentence of n. 23 adds that the Court of Appeals, for this
reason, found no basis in the record to find that "the tax
was not fairly related to the services provided by the
tribe."

If n. 23 were concluded with this sentence, I

would have no difficulty with it.

The remainder of n. 23,

however, is in effect a finding that "the tax is

3.

reasonably related to the extent of the taxpayer's
activities within the taxing jurisdiction".

As it is

unnecessary to make such a holding in view of the record,

--~,d~···
could you

&v~ follow
the

3.

example of the Court of Appeals?

The second paragraph of footnote 26 (p. 26)

says in effect that the multiple tax burden doctrine of

\sWesJ
the Commerce Clause does not apply to taxation

Indian

trib~

Again, it is unnecessary

by~an ~

t~ ~i~ ~ . , -

- So
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~t,l() tb~· ~
!'fcA
Aparagraph e£ "j2:" ~ in its present form. I know of no
decision of this Court that has expressly gone so far as

-

to say that there are no limitations to multiple taxation
by a tribe, a state in which the tribe is located, and the
federal government •
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/ 4.
cited (last

at the bottom of p. 25)

for the view that this Court

1

limitations on the proprietary

t:A-ere eou3:d be- -v i-ewed

a~

of the states".

Justices B
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White and Stevens joined me in dissent in

Reeves~

~~~~
A opinion in Alexandria Scrap was based on the fact that
Maryland had created a market for hulks by paying a
subsidy for their retrieval in furtherance of the state's
special interest.

~

I made clear

i ~J

RoovQs dissent, I

do not view Hughes as supporting a general rule that the
Commerce Clause is inapplicable whenever the state is
acting in a proprietary capacity
t..

.....c.A'l
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5.

Although it has taken me some time to state my
concerns, I think you

~
~

meet all of them without

altering the analysis or force of your generally fine
opinion.

If you prefer not to make changes along the

following lines, I will join your judgment and Parts
vvt

I

I~ ~

~

1

II,Aof the opinion.
!,,,
Sincerely,

jsw

~rut-- /)A) ~JUt.

01/04/82

~

Mem~dum to Justice Powell
to TM on Jicarilla Apache

I

agree with your proposed letter.

suggestions to make.
have pencilled
for

Justice

They also

have only two

The first is the minor additions that I

in on pages 4-5.

Marshall

I

the

suggest your

nature

These changes might clarify
of

willingness

the
to

action

you

join Part

request.

IliA of the

opinion--which seems to me well reasoned and necessary to the
judgmen t(!)
My

second

proposed

concerns

26, which you discuss on page 3.

Justice Marshall 1 s

note

In addition to the pencilled

editing suggestions, I recommend that you add the following to
the end of that page:

This rule can have no bearing here,
however,
Tribe

for

seeks

there can be no claim that the
to

tax any more of petitioners 1

.
I

'
2.

mining

activity

than

the

within Tribal jurisdiction.
an

assertion

that

the

portion

occurring

In the absence of

amount

of

the

Tribal

taxation is not fairly related to the services
provided by the Tribe, see note 23 and accompanying text supra, the risk of excessive mul~~

tiple

taxation

attempted
tax

on

to

the

could ~ ariset if a State

levy a

disproportionately large

activity

in

question.

This

law

suit, of course, does not involve a challenge
to excessive State taxation, and we of
intimate

no opinion regarding

that might be acctt5ed-e.f
tiple
could

burden.
~

We

State taxation
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creat"'\~

do note
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a mul-

that a State tax

offend the Commerce Clause's multi-

~
ple

interstate

taxation

proscription A in

the

absence of congressional authorization to impose such a tax,
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Prudential Ins. Co. v.
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Benjamin,

u.S.

328

408,

421-427

f
that petitioner contends

th~

It

(1946),

and

State of New

Mexico has taxed the production of oil and gas
from

the

Tribe's

Reservation

authority granted in 1927
II

at

(25

11

[p] ursuant

u.s.c.

§

to

398c))
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These changes would effectuate your intentions, as I understand
them,

and

are

likely,

I

think,

to

be

acceptable

to Justice

Marshall.
I will be happy to discuss further any of these proposals if this would be helpful.
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80-11 and 80-15 Jicarilla Apache Cases
Dear Thurgood:
After reviewing your opinion again; o~
~
~ ' I~ wetlle be happy to join all of it if you could

accept changes along the lines indicated below.
1.

In the introduction to Part III, you state

the position of the SG with respect to the Commerce
Clause.

On page 21, you refrain from adopting the SG's

views, but you commence the first full paragraph by
stating that "While these arguments are not without
force .

.

"
In my view, the SG's position is highly

doubtful.

In commercial matters, tribes resemble states

more closely than they do foreign nations.

It is

2.

unnecessary to imply any approval of the SG's position.
Could you not make it clear that we find it unnecessary to
consider in this case the merits of the SG's arguments?
2.

I have a somewhat similar problem with

footnote 23 (p. 24).

In the text on p. 24 you state that

"petitioners do not challenge the tax on the ground that
the amount of the tax is not fairly related to the
services provided by the tribe".

The first sentence of n.

23 adds that the Court of Appeals, for this reason, found
no basis in the record to find that "the tax was not
fairly related to the services provided by the tribe."

If

n. 23 were concluded with this sentence, I would have no
difficulty with it.

The remainder of n. 23, however, is

in effect a finding that "the tax is reasonably related to
the extent of the taxpayer's activities within the taxing

3.

jurisdiction".

As it is unnecessary to make such a

holding in view of the record, could you not follow the
example of the court of Appeals?
3.

The second paragraph of footnote 26

Sv..j1~f5

« ~in

ef"tect that the multiple tax

ca r1

the Commerce

Clause ~dae~

and Indian tribes.

nevtv
not apply

burd~n

(p. 26)

doctrine of

tv!tdltpll J

to~taxation

by states

Again, it is unnecessary to say this.

know of no decision of this Court that has expressly gone
so far as to say that there are no limitations to multiple
taxation by a tribe, a state in which the tribe is
located, and the federal government.
of this second

4.

4.

Finally, I note that Reeves and Hughes v.

Alexandria Scrap arrCited (last sentence commencing at the
bottom of p. 25) for the view that this Court imposes no
"Commerce Clause limitations on the proprietary activities
of the states".

Justices Brennan, White and Stevens

joined me in dissent in Reeves, and I think the Court's
decision there properly could be limited to~ facts.
any event

m~inion

In

in Alexandria Scrap was based on the

fact that Maryland had created a market for hulks by
paying a subsidy for their retrieval in furtherance of the
state's special interest.

I do not view Hughes as

supporting a general rule that the Commerce Clause is
inapplicable whenever the state is acting in a proprietary
capacity.

.>-----.
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I would be content, however, if you

5.

simply omitted the two final sentences in Part III-B,
beginning with the words "In order to reach ••

"

* * *
9~~d-~~

Although Ai~ haQ tak&n m~ some time to state my

concerns, I think you could meet all of them without

~

altering the analysis or force of your generally fine
I\

opinion.

prefer not to make changes along the
lines, I will join your judgment and Parts I

II, and III-A

of th :
e~
o~p~i~n~i~o~n:·~----------------------~
Sincerely,

Justice Marshall
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Suggested revision of the second paragraph of
note 26:

This rule can have no bearing here, however, for
there can be no claim that the Tribe seeks to tax any more
of petitioners' mining activity than the portion occurring
within Tribal jurisdiction.

In the absence of an

assertion that the amount of the Tribal taxation is not
fairly related to the services provided by the Tribe, see
note 23 and accompanying text supra, the risk of excessive
multiple taxation could arise only if a State attempted to
levy a disproportionately large tax on the activity in
question.

This law suit, of course, does not involve a

-2.

challenge to excessive State taxation, and we intimate no
opinion regarding State taxation that might create a

i'f\
multiple burde •

..f~J5 C~$1:!

We do note that a State tax could

offend the Commerce Clause's multiple interstate taxation
proscription only in the absence of congressional

0
authorization

~kkf0

t~ impose such a ~tax, e.g., Prudential Ins.

Co. v. Benjamin, 328
petitioners

u.s.

contend~that

408, 421-427 (1946), and that
here the State of New Mexico has

taxed the production of oil and gas from the Tribe's
Reservation "[p]ursuant to authority granted in 1927 (25

u.s.c.

§

398c))

80-15, at 3.
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THE CHIEF JUSTICE

January 7, 1982
Re:

No. 80-11 - Merrion V. Jicari11a Apache Tribe
80-15 - Amoco Production Co. v. Jicari11a
Apache Tribe

Dear John:
I join.

Regards~

Justice Stevens
Copies to the Conference
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Jicarilla Apache Cases

Suggested revision of the second paragraph of
note 26:

This rule can have no bearing here, however, for
there can be no claim that the Tribe seeks to tax any more
of petitioners• mining activity than the portion occurring
within Tribal jurisdiction.

In the absence of an

assertion that the amount of the Tribal taxation is not
fairly related to the services provided by the Tribe, see
note 23 and accompanying text supra, the risk of excessive
multiple taxation could arise only if a State attempted to
levy a disproportionately large tax on the activity in
question.

This law suit, of course, does not involve a

2.

challenge to excessive State taxation, and we intimate no
opinion regarding State taxation that might create a
multiple burden in this case.

We do note that a State

tax could offend the Commerce Clause's multiple interstate
taxation proscription only in the absence of congressional
authorization of such a state tax, e.g., Prudential Ins.
Co. v. Benjamin, 328

u.s.

408, 421-427 (1946), and that

petitioners contend that here the State of New Mexico has
taxed the production of oil and gas from the Tribe's
Reservation "[p]ursuant to authority granted in 1927 (25

u.s.c.

§

398c)) • • •

80-15, at 3.

II

Brief for Petitioners in No.

,January 11, 1982
80-11 and 80-15 Jicarilla Apache Cases

Dear Thurgood:
After reviewing your op1n1on again, I will be
happy to join all of it if you could accept changes along
the lines indicated below.
1. In the introduction to Part III, you state the
position of the SG with respect to the Commerce Clause. On
page 21, you refrain from adopting the SG's views, but you
commence the first full paragraph by stating that "While
these arguments are not without force • • • "

In my view, the SG's position is highly doubtful.
In commercial matters, tribes resemble states more closely
than they do foreign nations. It is unnecessary to imply
any approval of the SG's position. Could you not make it
clear that we find it unnecessary to consider in this case
the merits of the SG's arguments?
2. I have a somewhat similar problem with
footnote 23 (p. 24) • In the text on p. 24 you state that
"petitioners do not challenge the tax on the ground that the
amount of the tax is not fairly related to the services
provided by the tribe". The first sentence of n. 23 adds
that the Court of Appeals, for this reason, found no basis
in the record to find that "the tax was not fairly related
to the services provided by the tribe." If n. 23 were
concluded with this sentence, I would have no difficulty
with it. The remainder of n. 23, however, is in effect a
finding that "the tax is reasonably related to the extent of
the taxpayer's activit1es within the taxing jurisdiction".
As it is unnecessary to make such a holding in view of the
record, could you not follow the example of the Court of
Appeals?
3. The second paragraph of footnote 26 (p. 26)
suggests in effect that the multiple tax burden doctrine of
the Commerce Clause can never apply to multiple taxation by
states and Indian tribes. Again, it is unnecessary to say

,,'•

2.

this. I know of no decision of this Court that has
expressly gone so far as to say that there are no
limitations to multiple taxation by a tribe, a state in
which the tribe is located, and the federal government.
I enclose a suggested revision of this second
paragraph for your consideration.
4. Finally, I note that Reeves and Hughes v.
Alexandria Scrap are cited (last sentence commenc1ng at the
bottom of p. 25) for the view that this Court imposes no
"Commerce Clause limitations on the proprietary activities
of the states".
Justices Brennan, White and Stevens joined
me in dissent in Reeves, and I think the Court's decision
there properly could be limited to its facts. In any event
my opinion in Alexandria Scrap was based on the fact that
Maryland had created a market for hulks by paying a subsidy
for their retr1eval in furtherance of the state's special
interest. I do not view Hughes as supporting a general rule
that the Commerce Clause 1s 1napplicable whenever the state
is acting in a proprietary capacity. I would be content,
however, if you simply omitted the two final sentences in
Part III-B, beginning with the words "In order to
reach •
"

* * *
Although I have written at some length to state my
concerns, I think you could meet all of them without
altering the basic analysis or force of your generally fine
opinion.
Sincerely,

Justice Marshall
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

·.

lfp/ss 01/11/82

Jicarilla Apache Cases

Suggested revision of the second paragraph of note
26:
·l

I :
I

This rule can have no bearing here, however, for
there can be no claim that the Tribe seeks to tax any more
of petitioners' mining activity than the portion occurring
within Tribal jurisdiction. In the absence of an assertion
that the amount of the Tribal taxation is not fairly related
to the services provided by the Tribe, see note 23 and
accompanying text supra, the risk of excessive multiple
taxation could arise only if a State attempted to levy a
disproportionately large tax on the activity in question.
This law suit, of course, does not involve a challenge to
excessive State taxation, and we intimate no opinion
regarding State taxation that might create a multiple burden
in this case.
We do note that a State tax could offend the
Commerce Clause's multiple interstate taxation proscription
only in the absence of congressional authorization of such a
state tax, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 u.s.
408, 421-427 (1946), and that petitioners contend that here
the State of New Mexico has taxed the production of oil and
gas from the Tribe's Reservation "[p]ursuant to authority
granted in 1927 (25 U.S.C. § 398c)) . • • . "
Brief for
Petitioners in No. 80-15, at 3.

January 11, 1982
80-11 and 80-15 Jicarilla Apache Cases
Dear Thurgood:
After reviewing your opinlon aqain, I will be
happy to join all of it if you could accept changes along
the lines indicated below.
1. In the introduction to Part III, you state the
position of the SG with respect to the Commerce Clause. On
page 21, you refrain from adopting the SG's views, but you
commence the first full paragraph by stating that "While
these arguments are not without force • • • "
In my view, the SG's position is hi.ghly doubtful.
In commercial matters, tribes resemble states more closely
than they do foreign nations. It is unnecessary to imply
any approval of the SG's position. Could you not make it
clear that we find it unnecessary to consider in this case
the merits of the SG's arguments?
2. I have a somewhat similar problem wi.th
footnote 23 (p. 24). In the text on p. 24 you state that
"petitioners do not challenge the tax on the ground that the
amount of the tax is not fairly related to the services
provided by the tribe". The first sentence of n. 23 adds
that the Court of Appeals, for this reason, found no basis
in the record to find that "the tax was not fairly related
to the services provided by the tribe." If n. 23 were
concluded with this sentence, I would have no difficulty
with it. The remainder of n. 23, however, is in effect a
finding that "the tax is reasonably related to the extent of
the taxpayer's activit1es wi.thin the taxing jurisdiction".
As it is unnecessary to make such a holding in view of the
record, could you not follow the example of the Court of
Appeals?
3. The second paragraph of footnote 26 (p. 26)
suggests in effect that the multiple tax burden doctrine of
the Commerce Clause can never apply to multiple taxation by
states and Indian tribes. Again, it is unnecessary to say

2.

this. I know of no dec1.sion of this Court that has
expressly gone so far as to say that there are no
limitations to multiple taxation by a tribe, a state in
which the tribe is located, and the federal government.
I enclose a suqgested revision of this second
paragraph for your consideration.
4. Finally, I note that Reeves and Hughes v.
Alexandria Scrap are cited (last sentence commencing at the
bottom of p. 25) for the view that this Court imposes no
"Commerce Clause limitations on the proprietary activiti.es
of the states".
Justices Brennan, White and Stevens joined
me in dissent in Reeves, and I think the Court's decision
there properly could be limited to its facts. In any event
my opinion in Alexandria Scrap was based on the fact that
Maryland had created a market for hulks by paying a subsidy
for their retrieval in furtherance of the state's special
interest. I do not view Hughes as supporting a general rule
that the Commerce Clause i.s inapplicable whenever the state
is acting in a proprietary capacity. I would be content,
however, if you simply omitted the two fi.naJ sentences in
Part III-B, beginning with the words "In order to
reach • • • "

* * •
~lthough I have written at some length to state my
concerns, I think you could meet all of them without
altering the basic analysis or force of your generally fine
opinion.

Sincerely,

Justice Marshall
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

lfp/ss 01/11/82

,JtcRrilla Apache Cases

Suggested revision of the second paragraph of note
26:
This rule can have no bearing here, however, for
there can be no claim that the Tribe seeks to tax any more
of petitioners' mining activity than the portion occurring
within Tribal jurisdiction. In the absence of an assertion
that the amount of the Tribal taxation is not fairly related
to the services provided by the Tribe, see note 23 and
accompanying text supra, the risk of excessive multiple
taxation could arise only if a State attempted to levy a
disproportionately large tax on the activity in question.
This law suit, of course, does not involve a challenge to
excessive State taxation, and we intimate no opinion
regarding State taxation that might create a multiple burden
in this case.
We do note that a State tax could offend the
Commerce Clause's multiole interstate taxation proscription
only in the absence of congressional authorization of such a
state tax, e.q., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 u.s.
408, 421-427 (1946), and that petitioners contend that here
the State of New Mexico has taxed the production of oil and
gas from the Tribe's Reservation "[p]ursuant to authority
granted in 1927 (25 u.s.c. § 398c)) • • • • "
'Brief for
Petitioners in No. 80-15, at 3.
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CHAMBE:RS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

January 11, 1982

Re: No. 80-11 - Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe
No. 80-15 - Amoco Production Co. v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe
Dear Thurgood:
Lewis joined me last Term in a proposed short "dissent"
concerning (1) the Indian Commerce Clause/Interstate Cammer ce
Clause relationship and (2) the satisfaction of the fourth prong
of Complete Auto Transit.
In your presently circulating majority opinion , you have
accommodated the first of these two points, and I am content as to
that feature.
Because of the second point , however, I am
concerned with the last two sentences of your footnote 23 and
would prefer to have at least those two sentences eliminated .
Lewis Powell is writing separately with four suggestions .
If you see your wa y
One Qf these has to do with footnote 2 3.
clear to adopt his first two suggestions , you have my vote . You
also may wish to go along with his last two suggestions .
I have
no objections to them, but you have my vote whether or not you
adopt them.

Justice Marshall
cc: The Conference

. '

(proposed letter)
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

January 11, 1982

Re: No. 80-11 - Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe
No. 80-15 - Amoco Production Co. v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe
Dear Thurgood:

-

Lewis joined me last Term in a proposed short "dissent"
concerning (1) the Indian Commerce Clause/Interstate Commerce
Clause relationship and (2) the satisfaction of the fourth prong
of Complete Auto Transit.
In your presently circulating majority opinion, you have
accommodated the first of these two points, and I am content as to
that feature.
Because of the second point , however, I am
concerned with the last two sentences of your footnote 23 and
would prefer to have at least those two sentences eliminated .
Lewis Powell is writing separately with four suggestions .
If you see your way
One of these has to do with footnote 23.
clear to adopt his first two suggestions , you have my vote. You
also may wish to go along with his last two suggestions .
I have
no objections to them, but you have my vote whether or not you
adopt them .
Sincerely,

Justice Marshall
cc: The Conference
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C HAMBERS O F

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

January 11, 1982

Re: No . 80 - 11 - Merrion v . Jicarilla Apache Tribe
No . 80-15 - Amoco Production Co . v . Jicarilla Apache Tribe
Dear Lewis :
I appreciate your letting me see your proposed letter to
Thurgood . I enclose a copy of what I propose to write him . I
shall not release it until I have your approval . Would you let me
know?

Sincerely ,

Justice Powell

.1anuar.y t5, 1982

80-11 ~errion v. Jicarilla ~pache TribP
80-15 Amoco v. ,Jicadlla Apache Tribe

Dear Thurgood:

Please join me.
C:::incere1y,

Just.ice Marshall
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

<!Jtnni a-f tift 2!tttitl'lt ~ffi:±tg
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.§u:p-umt

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

Re:

January 15, 1982

No. 80-11) Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe
No. 80-15) - Amoco Production Co. v. Jicarilla
Apache Tribe

Dear Thurgood:
Please join me .

Justice Marshall
cc: The Conference

<!Ion.rt o-f tlyt 'J!ittitdt ~hUts
'J,'ila.slfhtg-tntt, ~· <!f. 2llc?Jl.$

.§tttnrm.t

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

Re:

January 15, 1982

No. 80-11) Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe
No. 80-15) - Amoco Production Co. v. Jicarilla
Apache Tribe

Dear Thurgood:
Please join me .

Justice Marshal l
cc: The Conference
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